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Robert Paul

FOREIGN SECRETARIES
OF
THE XIX. CENTURY.

LONDON:
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Robert Paul

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FOREIGN SECRETARIES
OF
THE XIX. CENTURY.

BY
PERCY M. THORNTON.

VOL. III.


SECOND EDITION.

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LONDON:
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THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED

TO

Richard Oherard Webster, D.C.,

IN AFFECTIONATE REMEMBRANCE OF

OUR CAMBRIDGE LIFE.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

IN thanking my readers for their favour given to the last volume of this work, I contemplate their appreciation of my efforts with all the greater satisfaction that, on the whole, their judgment is upheld by the various critics who have deigned to employ their pens upon *Foreign Secretaries of the Nineteenth Century*, Volume III. Some, it is true, have noticed the book as a whole, gracefully acknowledging that former silence was not due to intentional neglect, but to ignorance of an unknown writer's desire to collect facts faithfully and tell the truth without prejudice.

If in some few instances this characteristic is questioned, the honest doubts of such writers are more than balanced by criticism of a favourable type, which, when proceeding from journals holding such different political opinions as the *Daily News* and *Morning Post*, I can scarcely fail to prize.

Matter of opinion must, as a rule, remain matter of opinion still, and in the few remarks I feel called upon

to make I shall therefore adhere as much as possible to statements of fact, provoking no needless controversy, and letting my readers draw their own conclusion.

Before proceeding to consideration of matters connected with later history, I wish to recur to a review of the first volumes of this work in the *Academy*, where it is contended that Lord Castlereagh, had he survived, would never have sanctioned—as did his brilliant successor, Mr. Canning—the independence of the revolted Spanish American colonies. So far from that being the case, Lord Castlereagh, with his accustomed statesman-like foresight, had divined the impossibility of the *status quo* concerning them being maintained.

In the last State paper Lord Castlereagh ever wrote, which he delivered to the Duke of Wellington as part of his instructions when leaving for the Congress of Verona, held in 1823, the following paragraph is found :—

“As to the form of government (absolute) which she has of late established for herself in Europe, that is a matter with which, in the opinion of the English Cabinet, no Foreign Power has the smallest right to interfere. But the case of the revolted colonies is different. It is evident from the course which events have taken that their recognition as independent states has become merely a question of time.” *

* *Life of Lord Castlereagh*, by Sir Archibald Alison, vol. iii. p. 177.

Lord Castlereagh lacked, then, but the facile power of public expression which his great rival, Mr. Canning, possessed to such a fascinating extent, and in this case, at least, was prepared to deal with the situation as it stood, without reference to the surging revolutionary spirit which in some degree threatened the established European Governments at that period. On the contrary he accepted the inevitable with no bad grace, and thus can be shown to have differed very little from his brilliant successor in regard to the Spanish American colonies, as, indeed, to foreign policy generally.

One or two mistakes have crept into the remarks of my critics. For instance, the *Daily News* of December 12th, 1882, in an otherwise impartial notice, has attributed to the author an opinion that "later changes in the army have ruined our military strength once and for all." Whereas it was averred in *Foreign Secretaries*, vol. iii. p. 348, that the drift of opinion held by the Conservatives generally tended towards this view; a notable exception being made, however, in the case of Lord Cranbrook, who both endorsed and gave fair play to the principle of Mr. Cardwell's measure, and this notwithstanding the prevalent dissatisfaction of military men.

Not only were the words just quoted qualified by the clause *if the bulk of the Conservatives are to be believed*, but it was argued that the necessity of some reserve

such as Mr. Cardwell created, when Minister of War in Mr. Gladstone's first Cabinet, must be apparent to all who look into the question and discover that the number of recruits was totally inadequate under the old system. The writer was, in fact, employed in stating well-known truths, not in expressing his private views. Taken, however, out of their context, the words quoted by the *Daily News* seem to charge him with an expression of opinion which, from the nature of the case, would have had no peculiar worth.

But, in justice to the aforesaid bulk of military and Conservative opinion, it is, nevertheless, right to state that Mr. Cardwell's short service system was modified by the authorities considerably before the late success was gained so worthily by Lord Wolseley in Egypt; and further, in justice to an individual, it is necessary to point out that the same all-important compromise between long and short service was arranged mainly at the instance of that remarkable soldier, Sir Frederick Roberts.

Again, several other critics misjudge the writer, in perfect good faith and in a most kindly spirit, but still misjudge him, when inferring that he, writing in the interest of one great political party—and that the Tory—believed that its rival would fail to protect the honour of the country.

On the contrary, these memoirs show that one party

has been as patriotically inclined as the other when wielding power ; and had not something akin to a cry of No Foreign Politics been raised—aye, and gained many votes—at the General Election of 1880, no such question ever would have come on to the tapis. But this is true only of provincial platforms. By the *leaders* of the Liberal party the peace-at-any-price party has never been directly encouraged.

It is the misfortune of the present volume to trench so nearly on our own times that, unwittingly, more than one memory may have been awakened which can claim importance only because a controversy once raged around the question with which it is connected. Silence on such matters can alone avail to gain a hearing for matters of deeper import, and therefore the wisdom of having abandoned biography after 1865 and thenceforth adopted historical narration is manifest, seeing that during a period when party spirit ran high personal references have for the most part been eschewed. One matter, however, of contemporary moment can scarcely escape attention.

A paragraph of the notice in *Vanity Fair* of December 30th, 1882, deplores an absence in *Foreign Secretaries* of the anxiety which Russia and the proceedings of her Chancellerie should produce on the mind of every Englishman who reads modern history carefully. Now the reason why such apprehensions, though deeply felt,

were partially suppressed, is because the writer has striven faithfully to uphold facts without exciting passions so lately allayed. For amongst many men even of culture, learning—aye, and of political experience—comment on the fact that Russia is pressing upon India for the purpose of engaging British resources in Afghanistan whenever it may suit the Muscovite to thunder at the gates of Constantinople, only tends to a stirring-up of polemics which can have no good result. Nevertheless there is a time to speak and a time to be silent, and we now quite agree with the able and perspicuous reviewer who writes on foreign policy for *Vanity Fair* that the hour for utterance on this point has arrived.

Not only Russian agents swarm in Armenia, where the Turks have unfortunately disregarded their treaty obligations, due observation of which alone can justify European, and specially British, intervention on their behalf; but a railway from the Caspian Sea to Askabad is actually in progress, and also, as Lord Palmerston feared would be the case, that place has been occupied by Russia, Persia being but her advanced post. We know likewise, through the report of the Russian engineer, Gospodin Lessar, that it is not by any means an arduous undertaking to connect Askabad with Herat, inasmuch as not only is the way smooth until, near Herat, a sloping piece of ground rises to a height of 900 feet, but the country is well watered. Merv also has

been visited by the Russian officer Alikinoff, who established at the same time commercial relations with the natives. The Russian Foreign Office is engaged in carrying out a deliberate policy, from whatever cause it may be chosen, and nothing we can effect will hinder her progress towards the British frontier. When Kandahar was abandoned, the game was practically given up by England.*

Lord Palmerston, as these volumes show, foretold the present crisis exactly, and any Englishman with half an opportunity to make the facts better known should for his country's sake risk being branded as a partisan when, by placing another straw on the camel's back, he may hasten the day when England and her rulers shall be awakened to see the truth. If action be speedy, scientific and ready precaution may yet render a struggle in front of our frontier perilous to the advancing foe.

* Herat is already within the grasp of Russia, and beyond the reach of British power. The Russian position at Askabad places them, in regard to time, a fortnight nearer to that town than the English. Again, the whole intervening country between Askabad and Herat is more or less under Russian influence, so that advance on our part would be deemed a menace, and invite the Muscovite to the immediate seizure of the key to Afghanistan. Rudely awakened from the hustings hysterics which gained them so many followers, the Government has silently allowed their Indian prototypes to follow Mr. Griffin Vyse's suggestion, and establish a British post at Tal Chotiali, which, although further from Kandahar than Quetta, yet covers about seventy passes; a course, we

There remains, as regards criticism to which this volume has been subjected, only the questions connected with the secret treaty which was signed in 1844 by Nicholas, Emperor of Russia, the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen. This point has been discussed so fully by various critics in the Press, that the reference to it here will be made as succinct as possible.

Several eminent critics, amongst whom is a practised writer on foreign politics in the *Saturday Review*, ask us to believe that the document to which we have called such marked attention was in sober truth that returned to Parliament in 1854, purporting to be Count Nesselrode's account of certain conversations which took place between the Russian Emperor and the British Ministers in 1844, and founded, as we are told, on communications received from the Czar himself.*

Now that communication is simply an assumption of Russo-British complicity in measures concerning the future of a disintegrated Turkey. It is avowedly from a

may add, which in the fine frenzy of electioneering they declined to adopt. To an extent, moreover, the gravity of the situation has been recognised by the granting of an annual subsidy to the Ameer Abdul Rahman.

* See *Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey*, Part VI., presented to Parliament in 1854.

Russian source, is anonymous, and yet twice distinctly alludes to the existence of another agreement. *

Deep students of foreign politics having ventured to deny the truth of the revelation made in *Foreign Secretaries of the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. III., because Nesselrode's anonymous circular was returned to Parliament during actual war in 1854, and made no stir in the political world, it surely behoves us now to ask, what was the *eventual engagement* therein mentioned as having been agreed on during the Czar's visit to London in 1844?

What, again, may we inquire, would have been the effect on the public mind if a paper signed by the four great men, viz. Nicholas of Russia, the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen, had been returned to Parliament, bearing special reference to the Holy Places question as well as to the general future of Turkey? Would not such a disclosure have created a storm of opinion before which diplomatic concealment must have become impossible, and this although Count Nesselrode's published communication, colourless as at first sight it seems to be, really deals with matters of enormous import, when admitting that members of a British Ministry did consort with the natural and, indeed, proclaimed enemy of Turkey, whose underhand

* The whole paper, translated from the French, will be found at the end of this Preface.

dealings towards her had met with exposure after exposure since the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. We are apt, moreover, to forget that in 1844 anxiety was still felt in British ministerial circles concerning a spirit of Chauvinism on the part of France, which was believed to be but partially allayed. The resignation of Thiers in 1840, had staved off a crisis which might have involved war with Great Britain, but which by no means prevented the traditional influence of France in Syria and Palestine from being duly asserted. Moreover, M. Guizot, the new French Minister who guided Foreign affairs, was by no means the man to give way on such a question.

It is notorious to any reader of history that at Bethlehem and Jerusalem French and Russian traditions clash; and if those of the grand nation be declared merely sentimental, they at least claim antiquity, dating as they do from the thirteenth century, and consecrated by memories of St. Louis and the Crusades.

On the other hand, if the Czar of Russia is anything, he is the Pope of the Eastern Church, who, appealing with even greater force to tradition and sentiment, yearns for supremacy as regards custody of the Holy Places. So strong is this feeling reported to be amongst the Russian peasantry that a recent traveller described to the writer how thousands of pilgrims may be seen at

Moscow kneeling in humble adoration before certain small models of the sacred shrines; so that if the Romanoff family disregarded this sentiment they would decisively discard an invaluable element of personal devotion amongst the people, in the absence of which secret societies of a revolutionary type would have the field to themselves.

It is, then, we contend, impossible to maintain the assumption which has been advanced by the *Saturday Review* in their second article on this volume, that in 1844, when Louis Philippe was on the French throne, there was no prospect of a dispute between Russia and France as to the custody of the Holy Places. Louis Philippe, as we have shown,* was served for the most part by men steeped in Imperialistic traditions, to whom the Chauvinistic utterances of Thiers in 1840 were more welcome than the enforced change of policy adopted by Guizot, when, as his correspondence has since proved, he by no means gave up the national resolve to thwart British policy both in Europe and the East.

How far the Great Duke, Peel, and Lord Aberdeen came to fear an extension of French influence in Syria at the special period of 1844 will probably become apparent when the history of that period is written with the archives of the two Foreign Offices at hand for reference. But that they dreaded France, and that

* *Foreign Secretaries of the Nineteenth Century*, vol. iii. pp. 29 and 80.

based on the highest authority, while the *Academy* declared the author's conclusions to be *corroborated*, issuing a special paragraph for the occasion.

The writer's informant, although unwilling to come immediately to the front in this matter, is not dealing with a question new to the light of public discussion. Both Lord John Russell and Lord Aberdeen were questioned in their respective Houses, during March 1854, as to the conversations with Nicholas in 1844, and never even gave official denial to the question whether the aforesaid communications were in writing, or whether they had reference to the Holy Places. Lord Aberdeen took refuge as regards the latter matter in the difficulty of remembering what had happened ten years before. The questions, we must remember, were asked by those who, by virtue of official position, knew what was in the sacred box, and who failed to elicit a promise of the mysterious papers' production. Surely, if untrue, the Ministerial reply would have been couched in no uncertain terms.

Later in the year 1854, Ministers produced Nesselrode's Memorandum, founded on communications with the three British statesmen in 1844; but of an actual agreement signed by Nicholas, Wellington, Peel, and Aberdeen, nothing was printed. But we know now that, whether Lord Aberdeen remembered it or not, Nicholas had reason to consider him bound to give Russia support

upon the very portion of the Eastern Question which came upon the tapis in 1852-3-4.

Technically speaking, as the *Saturday Review* urges, the Holy Places question was settled in April 1853, and, allowing that to be true, notwithstanding its constant reappearance in official letters and despatches, it is notorious that out of its bud, so to speak, blossomed forth the Protectorate over the Christian inhabitants of the Porte which Prince Menchikoff sought to enforce.

Lord Palmerston was shrewd enough to see the connection between these two questions. But even if he was wrong, there remains the fact that around that question concerning which Nicholas felt strongest, and on which he believed England to have pledged herself to support his cause, ranged the dispute out of which sprang the Crimean war.

It is difficult for a private person to establish as history a diplomatic incident which has appeared in public merely as his own *ipse dixit*, and until the mystery is disclosed by those who themselves have been engaged in affairs, the author must, it seems, be content to remain, so to speak, at the parting of the ways.

But, on the other hand, there is such a thing as silence giving consent, and inasmuch as the third volume of *Foreign Secretaries* has been in the hands of living statesmen who must have had charge of the sacred box, while nobody scatters the story to the

winds, as by one single word anyone cognisant of the facts might have done had it been untrue, we shall continue to hold the opinion that nothing has to be retracted from what is told in *Foreign Secretaries* concerning the secret treaty signed in 1844 by Nicholas, Wellington, Peel, and Aberdeen.

But the author desires most heartily to protest against the assumption that he has in any way desired to attack the public career of Lord Aberdeen. An estimate has been arrived at regarding this part of the subject, which results on a searching examination of the two Foreign Secretaryships of a statesman who has received nought but honour from the pen of one who deeply esteems rectitude and high purpose.

And yet it may be possible, as a compiler of historic fact, to question the efficacy—aye, and the wisdom—of a particular act, even if the step taken was prompted by adhesion of those best able to judge of public need.

Lord Aberdeen's connection with the Crimean war has, rightly or wrongly, been so decidedly adverse to his official reputation, that we have done him justice in demonstrating the fact that his untoward hesitation was caused by a sense of honour, and that the feeling took its birth from converse and counsel held with such men as Peel and Wellington. And, indeed, a more severe judgment than that of the *Saturday Reviewer* concerning

Lord Aberdeen, when commenting on the first volumes of this work, and when the secret agreement was not in question, can scarcely be conceived. The Reviewer held that he most of all men was responsible for the Crimean war, that sudden bursting forth of pent-up waters which followed so closely on the Great Exhibition of 1851. Something beyond the action of one man, however elevated his position, must have made possible the situation which rendered the deluge a reality. A crisis, it is true, may have been created by individual action, and according to our judgment the newly-elected Government, that of all the talents in 1854, were weighted by a stress of circumstances which is only shadowed forth in these pages, but will nevertheless be soon patent to all. But this is only an opinion. To the matter of fact stated in our pages we stoutly adhere.

In conclusion, it is impossible for one who has profited so largely, both in gaining knowledge and in correcting errors, not to acknowledge with gratitude the very instructive comments of the critics in whose articles the information appeared.

Battersea Rise, S.W.,

February 1883.

MEMORANDUM by Count Nesselrode, delivered to her Majesty's Government, and founded on Communications received from the Emperor of Russia subsequently to His Imperial Majesty's visit to England in June 1844.

(Translation.)

RUSSIA and **England** are mutually penetrated with the conviction that it is for their common interest that the Ottoman Porte should maintain itself in the state of independence and of territorial possession which at present constitutes that Empire, as that political combination is the one which is most compatible with the general interest of the maintenance of peace.

Being agreed on this principle, **Russia** and **England** have an equal interest in uniting their efforts in order to keep up the existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to avert all the dangers which can place in jeopardy its safety.

With this object the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering without absolute necessity in its internal affairs.

In order to carry out skilfully this system of forbearance, with a view to the well-understood interest of the Porte, two things must not be lost sight of. They are these :—

In the first place, the Porte has a constant tendency to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon it by the Treaties which it has concluded with other Powers. It hopes to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousy of the Cabinets. It thinks that if it fails in its engagements towards one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility.

It is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails in its obligations towards one of the Great Powers, it is the interest of all the rest to make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly towards the Cabinet which demands just reparation.

As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other Cabinets, it will give way, and the differences which have arisen will be arranged in a conciliatory manner, without any conflict resulting from them.

There is a second cause of complication which is inherent in the situation of the Porte ; it is the difficulty which exists in reconciling the respect due to the sovereign authority of the Sultan, founded on the Mussulman law, with the forbearance required by the interests of the Christian population of that Empire.

This difficulty is real. In the present state of feeling in Europe the Cabinets cannot see with indifference the Christian populations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of oppression and religious intolerance.

It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman Ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them that they can only reckon on the friendship and on the support of the Great Powers on the condition that they treat the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness.

While insisting on this truth it will be the duty of the foreign Representatives, on the other hand, to exert all their influence to maintain the Christian subjects of the Porte in submission to the sovereign authority.

It will be the duty of the foreign Representatives, guided by these principles, to act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address remonstrances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation.

By persevering in this system with calmness and moderation, the Representatives of the great Cabinets of Europe will have the best chance of succeeding in the steps which they may take, without giving occasion for complications which might affect the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire. If all the Great Powers frankly adopt this line of conduct, they will have a well-founded expectation of preserving the existence of Turkey.

However, they must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolution that Empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the friendly Cabinets to prevent it.

As it is not given to human foresight to settle beforehand a plan of action for such an unlooked-for case, it would be premature to discuss eventualities which may never be realised.

In the uncertainty which hovers over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application; it is that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished, if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common.

That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, in a common interest of conservatism and of peace.

In order to render their union more efficacious, there would

remain nothing to be desired but that England should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view.

The reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is very simple.

On land Russia exercises in regard to Turkey a preponderant action.

On sea England occupies the same position.

Isolated, the action of these two Powers might do much mischief. United, it can produce a real benefit: thence, the advantage of coming to a previous understanding before having recourse to action.

This notion was in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London. The result was the eventual engagement, that if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common.

The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner:—

1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present state, so long as that political combination shall be possible.

2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists, and in conjunction with each other to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that Empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own States and the rights which the Treaties assure to them respectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

For the purpose thus stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal Maritime Power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg, London, and Vienna.

Conflict between the Great Powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious circumstances. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the Emperor agreed with Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers during his residence in England, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed.

INTRODUCTION.

THE author desires to acknowledge the advantage which he has hitherto derived from the suggestions of his various critics in the Press, more especially being indebted to the *Athenæum* for an article which has supplied information which the earlier volumes of this work failed to afford. But the avowal is made, nevertheless, in the belief that the writer in the premier literary journal is unduly prejudiced towards Mr. Canning's memory, condemning that bright light of statesman-like and oratorical genius for having entered into a coalition of the very mildest description with the then Duke of Devonshire and other Whigs, when not only was he the successor of Lord Liverpool (whose Government was practically a coalition, in which the Catholic question was left open), but a predecessor of Lord Aberdeen, under whose auspices was first initiated the modern system of administration by clever men having little in common but the adopted name, Liberal.

Neither can we endorse the assertion that Lord Liverpool's influence was impotent with George IV. to induce that monarch to accept Mr. Canning as Foreign Secretary in 1822. It would be more correct to acknowledge the *assistance* which the Premier received at the hands of the great Duke of Wellington. For confirmation of this opinion we refer our readers to pages 195 to 202 of the third volume of Mr. C. D. Yonge's *Life of Lord Liverpool*. They will there see that the Premier selected Mr. Canning for the post, and adhered stoutly to his opinion in the face of Lord Eldon's opposition. That the King yielded to the Duke of Wellington's arguments does not detract from the steady and proved persistence of the British Prime Minister.

As regards Lord Castlereagh, several critics seem to share the fast-exploding prejudice which for a time passed current as truth. They look upon him as one who, ignoring public opinion, suffered the unpopularity which the supporter of aristocratic exclusiveness deserved.

But public opinion was not unanimous on this point, inasmuch as again and again did the British statesman revel in the sunshine of his countrymen's approval. An instance is recorded in the second volume of this work, while the then Foreign Secretary accompanied George IV. to Ireland in 1821, and when he seemed to observers to have reached the summit of his power; while we cull the following from the Late Dean Stanley's *Memoirs of Edward and Catherine Stanley*, page 156. The date is Monday, June 13th, 1814, and the account tells of the reception

accorded to the allied monarchs who, after the conclusion of the great war, visited England. After describing the Royal party and their demeanour, the narrator adds :—

“ We saw Lord Castlereagh almost pulled off his horse by congratulations and huzzahs as *loud as those given to the Emperors.*”

The minds of the generous British people had not then been prejudiced against the great diplomatist, so aware of England's external needs that Lord Russell, when in 1860 pressed to justify his conviction of the necessity for retaining pre-eminence at sea, adduced Lord Castlereagh's evidence given before a Committee of the House of Commons in 1817 as conclusive on the point in question. It was to the effect that Great Britain should, for purposes of safety, be enabled to assemble a fleet equal in power to at least two of the other European Powers. (See Lord Russell's *Recollections.*) Still, we are fully cognizant of the fact that as to Lord Castlereagh's conduct of Home affairs there will continue to be much divergence of opinion, albeit a statesman who ruled in the pre-Reform period should be judged from a different point of view than those entrusted with the fulfilment of a popular mandate, such as in our own times awaits each successive minister.

We have of necessity been brought face to face with the pungent criticisms of those holding views akin to, if not identical with, those of the peace-at-any-price party. No sane man acquainted with the position of affairs can desire for England that she should make extravagant

displays of physical force, or do more than prepare to defend herself when her interests, treaties, or rights are assailed ; but, nevertheless, it is open to throw the weight of an enormous influence into the scale where it is most likely to preserve the healthy balance of power in a Europe which refuses to disarm, and whose leading nations have constituted their territories into opposing fortresses.

But not only should we now stand in danger of forfeiting our present position, but most assuredly the liberation of Europe never could have received accomplishment early in the century, had such theories been carried out in practice to a logical conclusion.

That any Englishman acquainted with the facts should desire to read in history his country's ignoble surrender to the murderers of Louis XVI., and to the subsequent oppressors of Germany and Spain, passes our comprehension, and it is easy to understand how people so thinking might welcome national inaction or even condone national disgrace.

They are not, we believe, a majority amongst us in 1882. We take this opportunity to express a hope that when Mr. Courtney, the fair-minded, if hostile, critic of the *Academy*, has heard the writer to the end, that he will modify his opinion that an attempt is being made in *Foreign Secretaries of the XIX. Century* to perform the impossible, and make head against public opinion.

To oppose the ruling factor which is forming the present, and determining the social future of mankind, is

indeed a vain design for mortal to conceive. The prize of power more and more surely drifts into the hands of the many, whose leaders we only ask to consult history for guidance. So far as the writer is concerned, he is well aware that the exaltation of a past that has served its time, at the expense of a present which has work ready to be done, and men ready to accomplish it, will never captivate the practical minds of Englishmen.

I heed not those who pine for force,
A ghost of time to raise ;
As if they thus could check the course
Of these appointed days.

(*Lord Houghton.*)

After considering the matter in all its bearings, a conclusion has been arrived at that there does not exist adequate material for a public life of Lord Bexley at the hands of the author, as suggested by Mr. Courtney in the *Academy*. The matter of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer's papers has been thoroughly sifted, and their contents been partially transferred to these pages, and there remains but to acknowledge the kindly feeling which endeavoured to select a literary field for one akin in literary sympathy, if not in opinion.

Part of the matter contained in the following pages has already received attention in the sketches of Lord Aberdeen's and Palmerston's careers, which closed the second volume of *Foreign Secretaries of the XIX. Century to 1834*. The author has been led to amplify and extend these details, not only for the sake of completeness, but

for the purpose of introducing facts bearing on matters connected with vital questions of policy which can scarcely escape mention when a complete chronological arrangement forms part of the task on hand.

We have taken up the record of British foreign affairs at a moment when a pause befel the revolutionary or democratic spirit of progress, which, call it by which name we may—dread, or welcome, its advance—has been the most potent element in modern politics since the time when the American Colonies asserted their independence. Stained with the crimes of the French Revolution, it has nevertheless succeeded in maintaining its hold on human sympathies, and at the moment of which we write had but lately achieved its greatest triumph in England, which, in the shape of the first Reform Bill of 1832, has spread comparative contentment over the great towns, and made good citizens of the manufacturers and rising capitalists who, previously oppressed with a belief in their political nullity, were by no means ready to take their share of any national sacrifice demanded of them, or persuade the masses under their influence to approach politics from a patriotic rather than a cosmopolitan point of view.

But the great national enfranchisement of 1832 had not brought plenty and contentment into the dwellings of the poorer classes. Want, and the twin-brothers misery and crime, if minimised, still stalked over the land in an ill-starred union, rendering the task of Government the more difficult to men in office con-

strained to reconcile the claims of a reformed Parliament with those of a proud aristocracy. The reason of all this dissatisfaction and unsettlement was discovered by means of a previous dissemination of the writings of Adam Smith and Ricardo, the well-known political economists, whose teachings were shortly to bear fruit, as our narrative will show, in the destruction of the Corn Laws. There is no dispute that these constituted a grievance to those inhabitants of large towns whose prolonged hours of labour brought but the means of obtaining a scanty pittance, and who suffered sorely under the infliction of dear bread. The course of home reform has always been slow in the United Kingdom, and the Reform Government of 1832 found themselves in a few years' time oppressed with home troubles in Ireland and England alike, and, therefore, unable to take up the ground abroad which their influential and statesman-like supporters desired. In fact the refusal to save the Sultan from falling under Russian dominion in 1833, was by no means a voluntary attitude on the part of England, who, likewise, had to concur in the course of events in Poland, where the national if (as Mr. Cobden avows) aristocratic aspirations had received a *coup de grace* at the very moment that those of the poorer classes in England were dawning, and this in defiance of treaty-law as deliberately formulated in 1814. Disposed as the writer of these pages is to follow faithfully the line of conduct prescribed for Englishmen by the patriotic students of

her constitution from John Hampden to the two Pitts and Charles Fox, it is impossible to deny that, so far as the extension of liberty had progressed in 1834, it was an undoubted relief to the overcharged political atmosphere, and has, on the whole, probably rendered mankind both better, wiser, and happier.

But the continued development of the same principles of constitutional rule which have guided Great Britain into the enjoyment of moderate freedom, should lead her statesmen to look with anxious eye on the yearnings of a democracy of the future, such as a powerful party in the State would fain force upon us. For it is the union of popular eloquence, combining with a section of those owning wealth and influence who profess to welcome vital changes, social and political, that occasionally refuses to inculcate the first duties of patriotism, and would lead men to concur in an ignoble retirement from the politics of the world. The manufacturers and capitalists in 1832 gained political rights which they have since been called on to share with others lower in the present social scale, while latterly and more especially in towns the latter class threatens to gain absolute predominance, many of them lacking the average comforts of life, possession of which would most certainly ensure the highest qualities of citizenship; while others, happily fast decreasing in number, are practically without education.

Nobody who has studied the characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon race will deny the virtues of a well-fed

well-clothed, and well-taught Briton ; but during the interim, special opportunities present themselves to popular leaders clever enough to discover the present plastic nature of the masses who have it in their power to rule.

Despite the restraining influences of natural Conservatism, and of a still powerful moneyed class, we may any moment find ourselves threatened with an organisation of numbers banded together for the purpose of taking away, by Act of Parliament, the property of the few, and, in defiance of political economy, distributing the spoil amongst the many.

During this process we may rest assured that agitators will not inculcate sacrifice on behalf of the nation as a virtue, inasmuch as the two currents of opinion are too violently antagonistic one to the other.

We are now about to take up the thread of our narrative but a few years before William IV. died ; and it is impossible to peruse that Monarch's correspondence with Earl Grey, through Sir Herbert Taylor, his eminent Secretary, and not see that the rock ahead, which we have striven to indicate, was perceived by those bearing rule at the period of the first Reform Bill. It is specially worthy of comment, moreover, that the King's frequently expressed fears were formally endorsed as containing solid foundation at a Cabinet Meeting of January 7th, 1832, of which a special minute will be found in vol. ii. p. 80.

Amongst those consenting were Lord Brougham, the Duke of Richmond, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Grey,

Lord Althorpe, Lord Melbourne, Lord Goderich, Lord Palmerston, Lord Stanley (better known to us as the Fourteenth Earl Derby, and Mr. Grant (Lord Glenelg). These ministers saw the necessity—to use their own words—“ of resisting any proceedings which may tend to the establishment of a dangerous and unconstitutional control over the Government, which would be equally fatal to the efficiency of the executive power and to the independence of the Legislature.”

But these illustrious and experienced individuals failed to stem the democracy which the circumstances of their time had forced them to propitiate, and not the least famous of their number, the Fourteenth Earl of Derby, when once again endeavouring to stand in the breach, was first constrained to make way for those who bore to the front the Reform flag of 1832, emblazoned with the logical demands which that great enfranchisement was declared to have engendered, and ultimately, in 1868, with his own hand, conferred the measure of liberty which he—in common with Wellington, Canning, Palmerston, and Peel—had previously deprecated.

We have seen how the spirit of the times proved too strong for the doubters even of 1832, and henceforth the party of privilege, having on its side for the most part the ancient and still powerful influences connected with Church and aristocracy, was destined to wage a struggle wherein its forces were more often than not to be marshalled on the weaker side. And it is impossible to scan the biographies of the period without observing that the

names of new men—since familiar as household words amongst us — were superseding those of the former political dispensation, unable to adapt their ideas to the great revolution which, put it how you will, was decisively, if peacefully, accomplished by the first Reform Bill.

Perhaps the change was in some sort not inaptly exemplified by the destruction, on October 31st, 1834, of the Parliament Houses of Westminster, and of the time-honoured chambers where so much wisdom and eloquence had reigned.

The era of merchant princes and manufacturers most of us are best acquainted with is represented more fitly, and in accordance with the spirit of the hour, by the magnificence of Sir Charles Barry's rich adornments, than, notwithstanding its noble associations, fine carving, and ancient tapestry, by the somewhat sombre erection which, in a ruined condition, is depicted in the prints of the time.

As has already been stated, an epoch is about to be traversed the outlines of which appear in the second volume of this work ; but, owing to the assistance given from various private sources, we are enabled to lighten the narrative by the recital of more than one fact hitherto unknown to the public.

Amongst these we may name the *presumable cause which led the Emperor Nicholas of Russia to encounter the Anglo-French alliance in arms during the years 1854–56*. Special attention has been, moreover, drawn to the

foreign policy of the late Sir Robert Peel, a factor in modern history hitherto somewhat ignored.

It has been thought desirable to abandon biography after 1865, and analyse the foreign policy of the Russell, Derby, Gladstone, and Beaconsfield ministries rather from the purely narrative point of view, this mode of description being best adapted for contemporary history.

The writer is fully aware that the latter portion of his subject, being more concerned with matters with which his readers will be familiar than were the former volumes, is proportionately valuable rather for the sake of the continuity which completeness demands than for any special interest likely at present to attach to many of the subjects themselves. But the element which more than one facile pen avoids has been adjudged its fair place in the narrative, and the glories of England by land and sea have not been spoken of with bated breath, or left unnoticed in contemptuous silence.

The author desires to offer grateful thanks, for their very kind assistance in supplying valuable materials for the third volume of this work, to His Grace the Duke of Wellington, Earl Malmesbury, Earl Clarendon, Lord Charles Russell, The Venerable Archdeacon Harrison, The Rev. H. M. Butler, D.D., Head Master of Harrow, Mr. J. Wilson Holme, Mr. Markham Spofforth, Mr. J. E. Mayal, F.C.S., Mr. Blanchard Jerrold, M. Auguste Filon (tutor to the late Prince Imperial), Mr. William Dealtry, C.M.G., to whom he owes the election letter of Mr. Pitt, together with several other friends and

acquaintances. The author is, of course, indebted to many published works and journals, and owes a special debt to Irving's *Annals of our Time* (Macmillan), which volume has assisted him in chronological arrangement both of facts and details.

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He Mytun

FOREIGN SECRETARIES
OF
THE XIX. CENTURY.

DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

"Sleep, Brothers, sleep! brave spirits of my making,
Pride of my heart in Europe's troubled day!
Sweet be your rest, and blissful your awaking,
When the Day dawns and shadows flee away."

Eton on Wellington and Wellesley.

REV. H. M. BUTLER, D.D.

DECEMBER 1834 TO APRIL 1835.

Two members of the Tory party, among the two most distinguished statesmen in the realm, were bold enough to abet King William IV. suddenly, without apparent rhyme or reason, save in his personal predilections, he dismissed his Whig Ministry, upon the members of which he may be said to have fairly sprung a mine with almost dramatic effect.

We can picture the pleasure with which the light-hearted Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, might welcome the prospect of a drive to Brighton in the pleasant autumn season, when the varying beauties of the scenes

surveyed successively from Banstead Downs, Reigate Hill, and in the woodland vale of Sussex, are, if not indeed then at their best, at least exquisitely delightful.

It was on a November day, 1834, that the Premier made a journey, destined to become historical, along this charming route ; his enjoyment thereof somewhat damped, no doubt, by the melancholy occasion of his visit to the King, but not, it is well known, by the slightest inkling of what was in store for him. Relays of horses brought Lord Melbourne in his own carriage to the Pavilion, by the afternoon, when he was straightway closeted with his royal master, and proceeded to propose certain ministerial re-arrangements necessitated by the death of Lord Spencer, whose son, Lord Althorpe, was consequently elevated to the Upper House, to the confusion of his colleagues, relying as they did on his excellent leadership of the House of Commons.

A few hours afterwards and the Ministry had received a summary dismissal, intelligence of which Lord Melbourne himself carried to London.

England straightway witnessed the spectacle of the great Duke of Wellington's instalment in the several high offices of State, all the seals having been temporarily entrusted to him pending the return of Sir Robert Peel from Rome. This unlimited trust extended to his subject by the King was silently endorsed by the people. By so crucial an experiment was the loyal servant of a limited monarchy shown to have received no mere spasmodic gratitude for unrivalled military service, inasmuch as, unlike Miltiades and Aristides, who served the Athenian Republic so well, he was not overwhelmed

by popular jealousy, and doomed to suffer for his very pre-eminence.

In short, the immediate consequences of the King's rash venture may well have seemed to himself and his allies to be justifying their schemes, as proving neither unpopular nor inexpedient.

Nevertheless, the wisdom of their conduct was at once disputed by the fiery Lord Stanley, whose brilliant powers of sarcasm were devoted to exposing the anomalous position of affairs which the King's conduct had brought about. Indeed, so telling were the arguments of this potent advocate that his earlier sallies were held to have deterred many from rendering a support to Sir Robert Peel ; and yet, when the struggle came, Stanley's attacks were aimed rather against the Whigs, from whom he had so lately separated, than directed towards penetrating the weak points in Sir Robert's political armour.

For weak points there certainly were ; nor can any thoughtful lover of liberty, on due reflection, fail to rejoice that the *coup d'état* of 1834-35 resulted but in a partial victory for the Conservative forces. True, it might well seem to the King and the two doughty leaders of the Conservative party necessary that it should have an opportunity of recovering from its disorganisation, by which, in their view at any rate, the balance of political power in the country was disturbed to an inconvenient or even dangerous degree.

It must not be forgotten, by those who contemplate the state of public affairs in 1835, that the counties had gone over to the Whigs after the Reform Bill, and that the House of Lords had not even the weight of

property to back it whenever it might endeavour to place a curb on designs inimical to the Constitution. In fact, the Peers were unable to secure breathing space in times of excitement during which hasty legislation might be brought before them. Exceptional as were the measures dictated to Sir Robert Peel by the peculiar condition of things which he had to meet, his after career proved that the policy he pursued was designed for the advancement of what he judged to be the general good, and not primarily for the benefit of his political party.

But he saw at once the advantage of promoting some approach to harmony of opinion between Lords and Commons, and deemed that such a result would be best attained by attracting to his cause the Conservative sympathies of all classes, thus welding a moiety of the nation together in one solid phalanx, under a leadership which none should dispute.

The proposed task was beset with extreme difficulties. Among Sir Robert's own followers there were very general complaints in regard to his haughty, unbending demeanour towards those with whom he came in contact, even towards those whose political position gave them the right to associate on terms of intimacy with this autocrat of the House of Commons, whom young Disraeli alone bearded with any show of success. They did not sufficiently realise that their chief's outward stateliness veiled a tenderness of heart almost womanly in its sympathy.*

* When the Queen, for a third time within a few days in 1843, was assaulted in public and escaped injury, the Prime Minister,

The influence of the leaders on the more popular side few would deny. Lord John Russell not only represented the Whig sentiment of his time, as it moulded itself in a refined and highly-educated mind, but spoke with all the *prestige* which family connection with the house of Russell could afford. Though they were inheritors of Church property allotted to them at the Reformation, the Russells had one and all thrown themselves into the people's cause whenever popular interests came into antagonism with more aristocratic claims.

In Lord Melbourne all sections of the party recognised a chief worthy of their allegiance and affection. Deeply read as he was in theology, science, history, and philosophy, Lord Melbourne will be long and well remembered as the friend and political guide of the young Queen Victoria.

As Prime Minister, his name will perhaps descend to posterity as that of the most agile of all Liberal leaders in performing the difficult task of riding two horses, *Whig* and *Radical*, at one and the same time. His secret appears to have lain in conciliatory language and conduct; whilst at the same time he ever leant towards moderation. Stockmar, nevertheless, discerned in him the party spirit which more or less animates every Englishman who has taken part in affairs of State;

summoned to the royal circle, shed tears. Mr. Theodore Martin, in his *Life of the Prince Consort*, has graphically conveyed to our minds the scene when the Queen and her husband, after the first nervous reaction of passing through such a trial, welcomed the friend and adviser with whom rested the supreme responsibility for the public safety.

a condition of things which has sometimes led men to charge their leading politicians with inconsistency, because under divergent circumstances, and according to varying expediency, a change of front has been forced upon them.

Lord Melbourne, however, so thoroughly succeeded in keeping his natural feelings under control, that, but for the public conviction that necessity would force him to take O'Connell as leader to the aforesaid horses, he might not have finally lost his power in 1841.

But the Whig Premier's tact, and the devotion of his followers, were certain sooner or later to be rendered ineffectual against the genius of their persevering opponent, Sir Robert Peel, who, though comparatively deficient in the art of achieving personal popularity, had reduced the practice of politics to an absolute science.

Sir Robert Peel, on receiving intelligence of the political crisis, travelled by forced stages from Rome. A sojourn in the land of bright sunshine and song was not, at the period of which we write, likely to be lost on a statesman who was no less Conservative in his views on foreign affairs than he was jealously attached to the Constitutional forms and traditions of his country. The theories and designs of Mazzini, although in 1834 they were in their infancy, yet exercised an influence over Italians of the poorer class, which an observant traveller like Sir Robert could not pass by without notice. No one statesman can be cited who more uniformly evinced respect for the Treaties of 1814, or bore readier witness to the merits of the great English negotiator (Lord

Castlereagh) whose tact and influence had contributed towards making thirty-nine years' peace possible. But we know that Sir Robert Peel was not blind to the blots unfortunately left on that settlement, chief amongst which was the arbitrary alienation of the Italian peoples one from another.

Mr. G. Barnett Smith, in his *Life of Peel*,* tells us that when the question of the Holy Alliance was raised in Parliament during 1823, Sir Robert Peel's reply to Lord Brougham was regarded as too moderate and not sufficiently emphatic; but we should, one would think, at the same time have been informed that when Sir Robert spoke with such respect of our allies, he was replying to an extravagant sally of his great lawyer assailant, who had averred as a fact that Napoleon I. was never accused by his bitterest slanderers of actions so atrocious as the spoliation of Norway, the partition of Saxony, the transfer of Genoa, and the cession of Ragusa. Such exaggeration speaks for itself, and is clearly but the empty froth of party contention, only designed for momentary effect. We mention this here for the purpose of showing how evenly balanced was Sir Robert's judgment on a question whereon cheap popularity might have been had for the asking, had the speaker stooped to pander to the prevalent error which assumed a change of policy on the part of Lord Liverpool's Cabinet in 1823, because the eloquence of the new Foreign Secretary, Mr. Canning, had popularised his predecessor's well-known maxims.

* *Life of Sir Robert Peel*, p. 46. Isbister.

As, then, in December 1834, the coming Prime Minister of England passed by Turin and Geneva over the execrable roads he was called on to traverse, visions of a future wherein the uprising of the Italians against their Austrian masters, and of consequent European disorder, played no unimportant part, must have afflicted one so mindful of the signs around him. On December the 3rd he reached Lyons, and, by way of Paris, arrived in London early on December 9th, when the eyes of all were straightway fixed on his movements.

Thus, after Sir Robert's interview with the Sovereign, it came to pass that the Iron Duke was definitively invested with the Foreign Office seals, which would have been offered for his acceptance thirteen years before, after Lord Londonderry's death, had not the public choice fixed on Mr. Canning as the more fitting recipient.

In 1822, Arthur Duke of Wellington was presented to men's minds rather as the general who had wielded England's sword than as the statesman called to her councils in times of domestic doubt and Constitutional disturbance.

In December 1834 it was so far otherwise, that notwithstanding Lord Stanley's onslaughts upon the retrograde movement which the King had chosen to make, public opinion was not the least outraged at beholding their greatest soldier called up to usurp all the offices of government, and vested with powers which nothing but his own disinterested honesty prevented from becoming those of a dictator. Under such exceptional circumstances did the nation trust its foremost warrior,

having not inaccurately gauged the truth and nobility of his character. Indeed, we may say that the conqueror of the Peninsula was too sagacious a statesman to be even tempted by a soldier's leaning towards autocracy to figure before his countrymen otherwise than as one who could be fully depended upon to conserve public order, and surrender intact national privilege. Whether in office at home or on service abroad, the Duke of Wellington was deservedly relied on by a prescient and liberty-loving community.

Having thus far traced at some length how the anomalous conjuncture arose which placed a soldier at the Foreign Office, we proceed to recount what was there effected during that short tenure, details connected with which have been almost lost amid the questions of Constitutional interest which were in the minds of most thinking men.

We have previously alluded to the appointment of Lord Londonderry (better known as Sir Charles Stewart) as Ambassador to Russia. The selection seems to have been wise, and in every way acceptable to the nation whose province it was to receive the envoy. Lord Londonderry would have gone to his post with full knowledge of his duties, and, what is of most importance, with the fullest determination to guard the English interests which existing territorial arrangements fully secured.

But the Whigs, still half dominant, could not brook the elevation of an undisguised partisan, while Sir Robert Peel's new Government was too weak to withstand the agitation which ensued. In justification

of the unpopular appointment, we have on record the thoughtful after-testimony of Mr. Disraeli when he visited Seaham, in 1855, to inaugurate Lord Londonderry's statue, and did due honour to the great merits of that soldier-diplomatist's character. The stability of a Government which had thus to disavow the man of its special choice, could scarcely have been credited by the most enthusiastic admirer of William IV.'s *coup de état*, or of Conservative government as consolidated by the system of Sir Robert Peel.

As a set-off against this confession of weakness, a lasting result was obtained when the great Duke essayed to put at end to the savagery with which the civil war in Spain had been conducted since its commencement in 1833. There, amidst the mountains of the Basque provinces, and, indeed, far into the regions of northern Spain, a compact military faction held its own against all the troops which Queen Christina, acting for her infant daughter, could bring into the field ; and this, too, although the soldiers of the young Queen Isabella were supported by a dominant fleet in complete possession of the sea-board, and all the advantages which unrestricted naval transit could afford.

It becomes necessary, at this point, to digress for a space to recount how it came to be possible that a nation, which had spent so much blood and treasure to save itself from foreign domination, came in turn to be the victim of what is even worse, namely, internal discord and civil war, on Ferdinand's death, Sept. 1833.

Don Carlos, the pretender to the ancient Spanish throne, was a younger brother of Ferdinand VII., and

when that monarch was immured in France by Napoleon, shared his fate, and passed his youth under circumstances where acquisition of healthy knowledge became impossible. He, therefore, appears in history as a selfish and unscrupulous bigot, without the redeeming virtues either of chivalry or devotion to his country, which should serve to relieve the otherwise dark picture which the truthful historian must draw. But his cause, nevertheless, was one which a British House of Lords might have argued for days without a certainty of convincing either a Brougham or a St. Leonards of its untenability.

The reigning Bourbon family had, in the year 1700, introduced into Spain the Salic law which obtained in France and had there the sanction of high antiquity (Pharamond having instituted it in 424, and Clovis I. ratified its provisions in 511). By this statute females were excluded from inheriting the crown. But on March 29th, 1800, Ferdinand induced the Cortes, or Spanish Parliament, to abrogate by decree the aforesaid restriction on female succession. In June 1833, Isabella, his infant daughter by Maria Christina, a Neapolitan princess, was accepted as his successor.

As the King had been married three times previously, and had no issue, the rage of Don Carlos' partisans may be conceived when the Cortes, exercising a doubtful right, declared female rule to be henceforth legal, and Isabella the future sovereign of Spain. Hence arose a disputed succession, with all the disadvantages clinging thereto, in a country the Constitution of which had been sorely strained by Napoleon's usurpations, and its lands

ravaged by the war which a patriot people waged against their oppressors.

Unfortunately for Don Carlos, his cause was bound up in men's minds with that of autocracy in its ruder and baser form ; so that during the influx of Liberal opinion which had of late pervaded England, it had been resolved to foster the Constitutional yearnings of the Spanish people, and to do so by supporting Isabella as Queen, provided that her counsellors determined to preserve the Constitution hitherto connected with her cause.

Hence Lord Palmerston's quadruple treaty of April 22nd, 1834, by which Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal guaranteed the throne to the young Queen.

The cause of Don Carlos might then appear to be desperate. But it received adventitious aid from various causes inherent in the circumstances existing in Northern Spain. The Basque provinces were inhabited (as, indeed, they still are) by a population, if not absolutely indigenous to the soil, still claiming descent from those ancient tribes of non-Aryan origin whose language they have retained, all trace of whose advent into Europe has elsewhere absolutely disappeared.

They stand, then, as Mr. Freeman tells us in his lately published book on European Geography,* a strange survival of the distant past, equally conservative of their religion, prejudices, customs, and mother tongue.

Among their cherished customs were maintained

* Vol. i. p. 55.

certain *fueros* or local privileges of self-government, highly prized by the mountaineers of the Pyrenees, but misunderstood, if not disregarded, by the Cortes and Government at Madrid—a circumstance which, conspiring with others, led to the Carlist revolt of 1833.

It is true that when once, April 29th, 1833, Don Carlos had declared himself legitimate successor to King Ferdinand VII. civil war was, sooner or later, certain to ensue, inasmuch as a compact minority of the military in Valencia and the north was ready to join the Basque malcontents. The revolt was raised to the dignity of a serious struggle for the Spanish throne by the earlier successes of a remarkable leader whom fortune granted to the Carlist cause.

No sooner had the Navarese risen and joined the Carlist standard, than Zumalacarregui was elected general of the somewhat heterogeneous forces who were henceforth for some years to be looked upon by the Legitimists of Europe as fighting their battle. General Zumalacarregui possessed some attributes necessary alike to the statesman and soldier. The historians of Spain tell us that he was wise and skilful, while the course of our own narrative will show him to have been by no means deaf to the promptings of humanity. So furious had the contest quickly become, that, as soon as the Spanish Government found how sturdy a foe was before them, quarter was neither given nor asked for. This inhuman method of warfare was deliberately adopted by the chiefs of Queen Isabella's party, in the belief that by entering on a course of decimation the more numerous would in the end suffer least.

The Carlists were certainly not slow to retaliate, and when the Duke of Wellington became Foreign Secretary he found a ruthless contest being carried on in the unhappy country for which he had formerly done so much. Every day there came accounts of massacres in cold blood, the victims being prisoners of war, whose lives are held sacred amongst all civilised nations.

The Duke of Wellington, therefore, resolved to send Lord Eliot on a mission to Spain, for the purpose of inducing the leaders on both sides to adopt the rules of ordinary warfare and to spare their prisoners' lives. This humane intervention was straightway accepted by the Government leaders in Spain, who, as they were enjoying the *prestige* of British support, could scarcely refuse to perform their part towards mitigating the horrid savagery for which they were primarily responsible. The proposals were likewise, to his infinite credit, accepted by the Carlist leader, Zumalacarregui, without standing upon ceremony, such as the successes of his troops might fairly have led him to insist on ; that is to say, he consented to treat simply as head of an army in the field, without requiring a previous acknowledgment of the Carlists as belligerents. In the interests of humanity he waived more than a point of mere ceremony, for his concession was capable of being turned against him whenever it might suit his opponents to urge their own superior status according to the then accepted code of international law.

The Eliot Convention was received in the Spanish Cortes with much dissatisfaction. It had involved, it was declared, a treating with rebels on terms of equality

which should not be conceded to those in arms against the Government chosen by the Spanish people.

That the Government troops, however, were benefited rather than their opponents, can easily be discerned on consulting the Annual Register for 1835. It is recorded that "within a month of the Eliot Mission completing its task, no less than 600 lives of the Queen's soldiers were saved," whence it appears that the Carlists then took by far the majority of prisoners. Well might Lord Eliot and Colonel Gurwood, when they returned to England, look upon the expulsion of the Pretender from Spain as doubtful of accomplishment.

But though the war went on raging fiercely, the Duke of Wellington's desire to mitigate suffering received ample and speedy fulfilment. The result of his efforts, however, was not known in Great Britain until Sir Robert Peel's Government had ceased to exist, and Lord Palmerston had succeeded the Duke of Wellington as head of the Foreign Office. So brief was the Duke's tenure, that few are aware that he succeeded in contributing so signally to the general interests of mankind. Yet, in the opinion of Mr. A. E. Ewald,* the Duke of Wellington is, from the statesman's point of view, seen at his best when we regard him as Foreign Minister: according to this distinguished biographer, he was too exclusive and unsympathetic when he had to deal with the welfare of the people at home, but on all continental topics he was essentially in

* *Representative Statesmen*, vol. ii. p. 207.

his element. He knew, from his personal acquaintance with the leaders of European diplomacy, what were the wishes and ambitions of every State in the family of nations. Though a thorough Englishman in his tastes and sentiments, he averred that the reason Russian spies working their intrigues in the drawing-rooms of London society disliked him, was because, although he was at the head of an English Administration, he was yet a noble of almost every country in Europe. He was Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo in Spain, Duke of Brunoy in France, Duke of Vittoria in Portugal, Prince of Waterloo in the Netherlands; he held the batons of eight Marshalates, whilst on his breast hung the noblest orders by which monarchs can confer distinction. Thus, as Mr. Ewald urges, from the peculiarity of his position, he was more familiar with the practical part of a Foreign Secretary's duties than others could well be. He not only held titular dignities in many countries of Europe, but was personally well-acquainted with the courts, governments, and peoples of almost every quarter of the continent. The Duke then did, undoubtedly, administer the office with a knowledge of his subject not possessed in the first instance by any other Foreign Minister of the century. It may, nevertheless, be open to doubt whether a soldier is, under ordinary circumstances, suited to perform such official duties in an English Cabinet. The Duke of Wellington proved himself to possess the unerring judgment and lofty sense of responsibility, which enabled him to carry his tasks through satisfactorily; whilst his political sagacity will be appreciated by those who know how England has profited by

European tranquillity and an undisturbed balance of power secured so long by the Treaty of Vienna. It has become especially worthy of remark that, in 1830, when Prime Minister, he predicted that trouble would ensue from the French occupation of Algeria, a forecast fully justified by more recent events in Tunis.

Wellington's services as a man of peace were not limited to the mitigation of the horrors of the Carlist War. His zealous efforts also contributed much towards preventing a rupture, which seemed imminent, between France and the United States. Few amongst us who remember the dispute over the Alabama claims, which was closed in 1871, are cognisant of the fact that thirty-six years before the crisis in question a precisely similar difficulty disturbed the good feeling between America and the French Monarchy under Louis Philippe. It is a curious coincidence that the parallel is made still more complete by the French having then paid down a lump sum for the sake of ensuring peace and good-will. The claims arose out of injuries suffered by American commerce during the prevalence of Napoleon 1.'s Continental System in 1807-8. They were from time to time asserted with more or less persistency; but from the year 1830, General Jackson being President, they were pressed in such a form as to make European statesmen fearful lest war should ensue. President Jackson evinced scant respect for the tender susceptibilities of Louis Philippe's subjects, and it became doubtful whether, with the most peaceable intentions, any French Minister could be found to satisfy the American demands.

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Here, then, there was clearly a case for friendly mediation. It had, to be sure, been commenced in an informal way by Lord Palmerston (Foreign Secretary from Nov. 2, 1830, to Dec. 9, 1834); but took a more pronounced and official form under the Duke's administration. In this case, again, Peel and Wellington left office before they saw the fruits of their diplomacy, but they are entitled to full credit for their important share in bringing about the amicable settlement which was effected in 1835. Against the inestimable advantages of peace we have to set off nothing worse than a French Ministerial crisis, and a loss to the exchequer of that prosperous country amounting to £1,041,666 13s. 4d. English money, or twenty-five millions of francs in French coin.*

Though little was attempted or achieved, during the Duke of Wellington's Foreign Secretaryship, which directly affected the honour or well-being of this country, yet our readers must acknowledge that the opportunities then presented for advancing the cause of humanity and peace, together with the alacrity displayed in seizing them—not to mention the peculiar circumstances which led to his appointment—give to his brief tenure of that office an importance and interest out of all proportion to its duration; though it forms, after all, but a slight

* The British in 1871 had to pay £3,229,166 18s. 4d., while indirect claims to the amount of £9,476,166 18s. 4d. were rejected. If we consider the vast increase of commerce and national revenues, we shall see that our payment was comparatively less burdensome than that made by the French.

episode in the life of one of the foremost figures of modern history.

On New Year's Day, 1835, the great fight began, and Parliament was dissolved. Each combination of parties was confident of success, the Conservative particularly so; whilst the divers independent and not naturally congenial sections of the popular coalition hugged one another effusively, forgetful of the fact that but for the presence of Sir Robert Peel and his compact phalanx they would themselves have been separated into two, if not three, hostile camps, each with the regular paraphernalia of party leader, tellers, and political wire-pullers. The Nonconformists of Welsh and English boroughs could have had little in common with the aristocratic nonchalance of Melbourne or the Catholic enthusiasm which fired O'Connell's Irish repealers.

Even at this distance of time it is difficult to believe that such a union would have been serviceable for hustings' purposes, but for the very general conviction that a great principle was at stake—one that is closely bound up with the foundation of National Liberty. The battle was not waged for Constitution against real or pretended Reform, but was the last formal struggle between King and Constitution. If the project which William IV. formed, and in which Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington, as we have said, aided and abetted him, had been successfully carried out, the work of the Reform Bill of 1832 would have practically been undone, and the sovereigns would have continued to claim at least an occasional independent power inconsistent with the theory of triple government indicated by the requisite

union for legislative purposes of Sovereign, Lords, and Commons.*

At the outset fate seemed adverse to the Conservatives. The earlier contests of importance were decided against them, and all the prestige which accrues to a victory in the City of London was fairly claimed by the Opposition forces. But it soon became apparent that, responsive to the changed attitude of the gifted Stanley, English counties were going back to the Tory party, which they deserted after the Reform Bill of 1832. From that moment Conservatives had the satisfaction of feeling that, were power to rest in the balance or even be entrusted to the Whigs, the House of Lords would

* Constitutional lawyers may be found to dispute the questionable nature of the King's conduct on this occasion, on the ground that the right to dissolve Parliament and to select his own ministers is nominally part of the British Sovereign's prerogative. But custom, as ruled by the results of the first Reform Bill, had given such preponderance of real power to the popular branch of our Legislature, that unwritten law branded the King's conduct as being altogether out of sympathy with the spirit of the Constitution.

We subjoin Sir Robert Peel's statement of his case, culled from the electioneering address to the electors of Tamworth:—"On the 26th of November last, being then at Rome, I received from His Majesty a summons, wholly unforeseen and unexpected by me, to return to England without delay, for the purpose of assisting His Majesty in the formation of a new Government. . . . The King, in a crisis of great difficulty, required my services, . . . Was it fit that I should assume that either the object or the effect of the Reform Bill has been to preclude all hope of a successful appeal to the good sense and calm judgment of the people?"

It will be seen that Sir Robert assumed that it was for the King and not the nation to make this appeal, or make and unmake ministries.

find a strong body of allies to give expression and effect to aristocratic views in the Lower House.

But it was manifest that the conflict which had been waged was by no means settled decisively, and that although Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington were leaders of a reinforced and compact host, they could not command a majority of the whole House, and would therefore be unable to retain power whenever the conflicting views of their opponents might admit of a temporary combination.

Nevertheless, even in 1835, men saw the future English minister in the person of Sir Robert Peel, even though that statesman's first premiership and the Duke of Wellington's Foreign Secretaryship were brought to a close by the resignation of the Ministry.

The heterogeneous elements of the Opposition had found a subject on which they could agree in Lord John Russell's proposals to appropriate certain surplus revenues of the Irish Established Church to secular purposes. A succession of divisions decided by small majorities against the inviolability of ecclesiastical property, on which the Government took their stand; so Peel, weary of struggling against what was, after all, always potentially and at this juncture actually an adverse majority, resigned in April 1835, after having been in office barely five months. On this side issue was decided the fate of the last attempt of the British Sovereign to control the Legislature. The personal popularity of Peel and the Great Duke only served to accentuate the significance of its failure.

The Duke of Wellington's foreign policy, generally

speaking, was characterised by a constant watchfulness against France; for he never ceased to fear lest the spirit of unrest created by the Revolution, and utilised by the Great Napoleon, should once more reappear in some new form, and threaten to submerge the world. Hence, resting on a personal knowledge of the reigning family in Russia, which (as he in effect assured Mr. Thomas Raikes) would never make an alliance with modern and revolutionised France, so long as the Romanoffs staved off a like spirit at home;* and relying, above all, on an alliance, constant because based on mutual interest, between Great Britain and the German Powers (inasmuch as from geographical reasons those interests were unlikely to clash), the great Duke of Wellington does not figure in history as having entertained apprehensions of Russian intrigue and ambition to such an extent as later students of foreign politics, and it may be shown that he shared this opinion of the Northern Power's comparative inability to wound England with Castlereagh, Peel, and Aberdeen, whose views have been adopted in later times, and under different circumstances, by men of Mr. Gladstone's and the Duke of Argyll's experience. But it should not be forgotten, in justice to those who do not take the Duke of Wellington's view, that he pre-supposed a Europe guided by the treaty-law promulgated in Council after 1814, and against which (broadly speaking) no Power had lifted a finger, either when the Duke was Prime Minister in 1828, or during his Foreign Secretaryship in 1835; otherwise, in the confusion

* *Private Correspondence of Th. Raikes with the Duke of Wellington.*

of later years, he could scarcely have failed to remember that the staunch fidelity of 1812 and 1813, obscured rather than obliterated the deceit of Tilsit (1808).

Our narrative must of necessity be for some pages to come interspersed with the views of the Duke of Wellington on matters of State, so that it would be equally out of place to prolong this chapter unduly, either as regards the subject directly under consideration, or in reference to the Duke's career generally.

Nothing that can be written or spoken will now affect one way or the other the public estimation of the most prominent subject of George IV., William IV., and Queen Victoria. The name of Arthur Wellesley goes down to posterity as that of a statesman animated by an honest desire to do his duty without reference to partisan preference. It is not necessary to speak here of an unsurpassed military reputation, save to observe that we are proud to think of our greatest soldier as the warmest friend to peace. Mr. Morley, in his life of Cobden, tells us how, when the Duke and the Free Trade leader met and shook hands cordially under the glass dome of the 1851 exhibition, the assembled multitude greeted them both with enthusiasm, caused, as Mr. Cobden afterwards somewhat regretfully stated, by the love of militarism which remained, as he feared, very close to the English heart. Not so, however, say nine out of ten men who know Great Britain well (and that without having joined in the belief that such good-fellowship between peace personified and war triumphant signified the speedy advent of that day when there shall be no more conflict), but rather that Englishmen of every

station saw in the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Cobden two apt representatives of their own race.

We might linger long over the many memories preserved in the various biographies, which we might even now reproduce to advantage.* We might pause to analyse that voluminous but admirable literary production, the complete edition of the *Wellington Despatches*, and see there the great soldier as the good friend.†

* The Duke of Wellington was the third son of Garrett, first Earl of Mornington, and born at Mornington House, 24, Upper Merrion Street, Dublin, on April 29th, 1769. He married, April 10th, 1806, the Hon. Catherine Pakenham, third daughter of the second Lord Longford, and by her had issue two sons.

(1.) Arthur Richard, present duke; and (2) Charles, major-general in the army, who died in 1858, and whose son, Arthur, born in 1845, is heir presumptive to the family honours (*Burke's Peerage*).

The great Duke of Wellington's appearance must be familiar to many of our readers, as his homely habits when in London rendered his name a household word. A constant rider, he was famed for long-suffering affection towards his horses, and bore their faults with a tender forgetfulness which owners of those beautiful animals will sometimes do well to copy.

During the Duke's tenure of official posts, whether connected with Government or as Commander-in-Chief, he was accustomed to perform his duties with unfailing regularity, and never deferred for an hour that which by instant application could be effected. "No time like the present," was his reply to Mr. R. P. Ward, Lord Mulgrave's brother-in-law, when, in 1824, the Duke first succeeded that nobleman at the Ordnance, and plunged straight-off into business with the practised Under Secretary. The Duke was in the habit of walking away from the House of Lords and getting on to his horse when warmed by the exercise, and his general appearance was familiar to Londoners of all conditions.

† "Lord Hill, his old comrade-in-arms, was supposed to require a sum of money for purposes connected with his Shropshire pro-

We might dwell long on the manifold interest of a visit to Strathfieldsaye, with its avenue of oaks and pellucid river, where the great trout bask lazily, while the house itself is so redolent of its late master's memory.*

But, content with passing comment on these incidental facts, we must, without further delay, resume the thread of that story wherein the Duke of Wellington continues to play a prominent part, until the moment when, in 1852, we take final leave of him under the glamour of the fourteenth Lord Derby's congenial eloquence.†

perty, and the Duke voluntarily and speedily offered his purse."—*Wellington Despatches*.

* A bust of Massena, who, next to Napoleon, has been adjudged the greatest of all the French leaders who were opposed to the Duke, and a sketch of the entry into Madrid after Salamanca, are specially worthy of note, and are to be seen, at Strathfieldsaye. Canova's colossal statue of the First Napoleon stands in Apsley House.

† "The Duke's orthodoxy in religious matters is well known, and is exemplified by the remark he made to a young officer, when, as Colonel Arthur Wellesley, he was in command under the first Lord Harris. Over-hearing speculation of a thoughtless character upon theology, he remarked, 'Do not talk about what you do not understand. Read Paley.' The officer (afterwards Colonel Sandys, never forgot this."—(*Personal Recollections of Rev. C. B. Tayler*, pp. 17, 18.)

APPENDIX.

The subjoined epitaph, &c. should, properly, form an appendix to our notice of the elder of the *par nobile fratrum*, Lord Wellesley. As, however, much of the sentiment applies equally to the Duke of Wellington, we feel that these interesting memorials may without impropriety find a place after our account of the younger brother's brief term of service at the head of the Foreign Office.

An Epitaph in the Chapel of Eton College.

HAEC . IN . IPSIVS . MONVMENTO
RELIQVIT . INSCRIBENDA
RICARDVS . COLLEY . MARCHIO . WELLESLEY.

Fortunæ rerumque vagis exercitus undis
In gremium redeo serus, Etona, tuum.
Magna sequi, et summæ mirari culmina famæ,
Et purum antiquæ lucis adire iubar,
Auspice te, didici puer, atque in limine vitæ
Ingenuas veræ laudis amare vias.
Si qua meum vitæ decursu gloria nomen
Auxerit, aut si quis nobilitarit honos,
Muneris, alma, tui est: altrix, da, terra, sepulchrum,
Supremam lacrimam da, memoremque mei.

VIXIT. ANNOS . LXXXII . MENSES . III . DIES . VI
DECESSIT . VI . KAL . SEPT . A.S . CIO . D.CCC . XL . II
HOC . MARMOR . IN . EGREGII . VIRI . MEMORIAM . POSVIT
ARTHVRVS . DVX . DE . WELLINGTON
FRATER . SVPERSTES.

A PARAPHRASE.

Long driv'n by changeful gusts of Time and Fate,
 An old man broken with the storms of state,
 To thy calm haven, all my wanderings past,
 Eron, dear Mother, I return at last.
 Yet yearns my spirit, ere its journey close,
 To tell some part of what to Thee it owes.

To follow greatness with supreme desire ;
 The beckoning peaks of glory to admire ;
 In youth's clear dawn to gaze with sober eye
 On the chaste splendours of the classic sky ;
 True praise to love, false vulgar praise to flee ;—
 Such were the lessons that I learned from Thee.

If laurelled rank, or tributary fame,
 In life's long lists have graced thy nurseling's name ;
 If any tongues in any lands there be
 To vouch my acts not all unworthy Thee ;
 Thine, Mother, be the praise : 'twas thine to tend
 The venturesous start, be thine to soothe the end.
 Grant, kindly earth—the latest boon I crave—
 Here, on thy fostering breast, a hallowed grave ;
 Nor grudge thy Son, if still thy Son be dear,
 A Mother's lingering thought, a Mother's parting tear.

HARROVIENSIS.

December 1875.

NOTE.—This rendering of the epitaph given above is inserted, together with the accompanying remarks and quotations, by the kind permission of the author, the present Head Master of Harrow School, who dedicated it to the Dean of Windsor, nephew to the Duke of Wellington and Lord Wellesley. We believe that Dr. Butler never saw the rival translation by the fourteenth Earl of Derby, which adorns our memoir of Lord Wellesley, until he met with it in our pages (vol. ii. p. 50).

The admirers of the Latin Epitaph may, perhaps, not all be aware that the second and third couplets appear also, with a slight difference, in Lord Wellesley's poem, "Salix Babylonica," which bears date "Fern Hill, Windsor, August 22, 1839," and was printed in the "Primitiæ et Reliquiæ, MDCCLX." The lines are there thus introduced :

Sit mihi primitiasque meas, tenerosque triumphos,
 Sit revocare tuos, dulcis Etona, dies.
 Auspice Te, summæ mirari culmina famæ,
 Et purum antiquæ lucis adire iubar,
 Edidici Puer, et iam primo in limine vitæ
 Ingenuas veræ laudis amare vias.

Here the sequence of thought and expression is perfect, whereas in the Epitaph it may perhaps be felt that the connection between the first and second couplets is hardly close enough. Lord Wellesley's English paraphrase, not known to "Harroviensis" till his own version was completed, runs as follows (see page 16 of "Reliquiæ") :—

Come, parent Eton ! turn the stream of time
 Back to thy sacred fountain crowned with bays !
 Recall my brightest, sweetest days of Prime,
 When all was hope, and triumph, joy, and praise.
*Guided by Thee I raised my youthful sight
 To the steep solid heights of lasting fame,
 And hailed the beams of clear ethereal light
 That brighten round the Greek and Roman name.*

It ought to be added that there is the best authority for stating that the Epitaph, with the exception of the last line, was composed as far back at least as 1827.

PALMERSTON. (II.)

APRIL 1835 TO SEPTEMBER 1841.



It is scarcely possible to realise what Lord Palmerston's second Foreign Secretaryship did for England without first contemplating the state of Europe when he took office.

In France there was at the head of affairs a body of statesmen unsurpassed in the annals of any nation, at any given period, for talent, eloquence, courage, and resource.

The Cabinet of the Duc de Broglie contained within its confines both Thiers and Guizot, while Molè was the Minister for Foreign Affairs ; and this combination of genius governed at a moment when the love of conquest and military display was re-asserting its natural sway in every Frenchman's heart.*

* *French Administrations between 1834 and 1836.* — In February, 1835, the Duc de Broglie (father of the French statesman of to-day) took office, Thiers and Guizot, who had served

It was on the 24th of May 1834 that it was determined to occupy Algeria permanently, and so to plant

from November 1834, under Marshal Mortier, being again in the Cabinet, while the Foreign Office seals were committed to M. de Rigny. After a year's co-operation M. Thiers separated himself from the De Broglie Government; and from that moment began the long struggle for office between himself and Guizot. Thiers became Prime Minister on February 16th, 1836; but a little more than six months' power sufficed to break up the Government, as they disagreed upon the Spanish question.

The crisis terminated in the formation of the Molè Ministry, which survived more than two years, and then died through internal dissensions which led to the retirement of M. Guizot, the right arm of the Premier, M. Molè being himself a man of talent, culture, and experience.

M. Molè having dissolved Parliament, retired at the desire of a new Chamber, which entrusted Marshal Soult with the reins of power on May 12th, 1839; but this arrangement only lasting until the 1st of March 1840, the great moving power in the French State at that time, namely M. Thiers, became Prime Minister of a Cabinet which, as we shall see, at one time threatened to convulse Europe with war, but which collapsed when Lord Palmerston gained his diplomatic triumph in Syria. M. Guizot thereupon stepped into the place of his great rival.

Of the above-mentioned statesmen the names of Mortier and Gerard will be remembered as soldiers of the First Empire rather than for powers of statesmanship. The Count De Rigny's career, however, is certainly unique in the nineteenth century, and we must go back to the times of our own Prince Rupert to discover a counterpart, even to a portion of his history. Originally a sailor, De Rigny joined the Imperial Marine Contingent of the Grande Armée, and was present both at Jena and Wagram, living to command the French fleet at Navarino in 1827, and be chosen Foreign Minister in 1835.

Of M. Molè, whose talents and fidelity were acknowledged by the First Napoleon, when, after abdicating in 1814, he left the Empress Marie Louise to his care at Blois, it may be said that he

the French standard on the African coast of the Mediterranean. A training-ground where the military spirit of the nation could find scope was adjudged a national necessity; and therefore close observers concluded that the spirit of the great Napoleon still lingered in the French army, and that one and all, gifted statesmen, eager soldiery, and fiery people, desired but an opportunity to avenge Leipsic and Waterloo.

But in Germany there were not wanting signs that a too demonstrative military policy on behalf of France might renovate the Holy Alliance, so far as Austria, Russia, and Prussia were concerned. Metternich still ruled the Austrian councils, notwithstanding that on March 2nd, 1835, the Emperor Francis had left the world wherein he had witnessed such manifold and strange vicissitudes. Accounted by his famous Minister as a man thoroughly suited to the position he was called on to fill, Francis of Austria will be remembered as by no means the least notable of the Hapsburgh line. Ferdinand, his successor, immediately accepted Metternich's services, amid dangers from without which were undoubtedly such as to make those from within the more insidious. In Russia the Emperor Nicholas had paid a visit

was the trusted subject of each successive sovereign during a long life, while Louis Philippe selected him as his first Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Employing his leisure in attaining proficiency in the classics, M. Molé was, nevertheless, no mere scholar, as is proved by the tact with which he kept his Government together in 1836.

Such were the men, nearly all of them drawing their inspiration more or less from the Napoleonic era, with whom Lord Palmerston had to cope when head of the British Foreign Office.

to Warsaw during 1835, and sternly announced his resolve to rule with an iron hand, punishing harshly the instigators of any fresh agitation. Frederick William III. of Prussia was the sole survivor of the allied sovereigns who had dictated peace to the world after Waterloo, and in his capacity as a royal Cincinnatus (for he almost gave himself up to agricultural pursuits) by no means relaxed the constitutional disabilities which pressed upon northern Germany. Thus the general condition of Europe did not tend towards an increase of freedom.

* The internal affairs of Prussia and Austria ran with apparent smoothness between 1835 and 1841, and, indeed, until a year or two before the first mutterings of the storm which temporarily submerged the Governments in 1848. King Frederick William III. was desirous of cementing the liberties granted by Stein and Hardenburg, and the people, weary of the impotence of the provincial assemblies, expected that its sacrifices in 1813 and 1814 would be duly rewarded by the concession of a National Parliament. But the Sovereign hesitated, and more than once, when on the point of granting a constitution, drew back when the question seemed about to be settled. It has since transpired that he was much under Metternich's influence, who, whatever his personal desires for the happiness of mankind might be (and in theory, at least, he was not illiberal), held down the various nationalities which made up Austria with an unrelaxed vigilance.

For information concerning German politics between 1815 and 1848, see Prof. Seeley's *Life of Stein*; also two remarkable articles on Prussia, one in the last *Edinburgh Review* for 1846, and another in the same publication, which, written in 1848, contains comments on the memoirs of Count Usedom, a Prussian nobleman of great experience. The articles in the *Edinburgh Review* are said to be from the pen of Mr. Monckton Milnes, now Lord Houghton, and in the case of the article of 1846 displayed a knowledge of German and European politics almost prophetic, as the revolutionary disturbances of 1848 were distinctly foretold.

No one, it is true, could look upon Prussia as dangerous to European peace ; but it was known that, as the ally of Nicholas of Russia and Ferdinand of Austria, the Prussian king might join a renewed alliance against schemes of French aggression.

For a time, however, the chance of war breaking out between France and the United States fully occupied even the active and restless minds of Thiers and Guizot.

In Turkey, the Sultan had constituted himself the vassal of the Russian Czar, inasmuch as the treaty of Unkiar Skalessi—1833—hung like a mill-stone around his neck. Moreover, the power of Mehemet Ali, which had only been scotched, not killed, was growing day by day ; so that the resolute Sultan Mahmoud could not help feeling that there were dangers around, under which he might finally succumb. But even in this inflammable quarter there seemed to be no immediate danger of a conflagration.

Thus it came about that Lord Palmerston found the peace of Great Britain, and of Europe generally, in a state of comparative security, and was therefore free to concentrate his best energies on the defence of Belgian independence, and on the protection of other British interests sanctioned by treaty.

Belgium had, since the Brussels riots in April 1834,*

* Holland and Belgium never ceased to spar between the signature of the Treaty of 15th November 1831 and the 19th April 1839, when the five Great Powers re-affirmed the independence of Belgium.

In 1834, riots occurred in Brussels, caused by the Dutch party having bought some horses for the Prince of Orange, which, being left in Brussels when the Dutch retired, had been considered the

remained comparatively quiet, but the symptoms of unrest were palliated rather than removed, and it was made no secret amongst the militant party in France that sooner or later the Low Countries would, as they hoped, fall back into an allegiance, which Flanders, at least, formerly held, to the House of Bourbon. Spain continued faction-torn, and cursed by a civil war, to which, to increase Palmerston's difficulties, France and England were by treaty bound to put an end.

Louis Philippe had, however, during conversation at Paris, evinced a disinclination to perform the part allotted to him in the Quadruple Treaty,* and assist in securing Queen Isabella's throne. When, then, on the return of Lord Eliot and Captain Gurwood from Spain, it became known that the Carlist strength was

property of the Belgian nation. The merchants who were supposed to have made the payment in question, had to submit to their houses being sacked, and suffered loss of property in the very presence of a soldiery, who alone protected them from personal violence. These internal dissensions were the more dangerous, insomuch as they gave plausible excuse for benevolent (?) French intervention; while it was, and is, the object of England to keep France, and, indeed, any other Power, out of the Low Countries. M. Thiers' constant proposals for a Franco-Belgian *Zollverein* (Customs-Union), on the German plan, were equally dangerous and even more insidious.

* The Quadruple Treaty, concluded in London, April 22nd, 1834, by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal, guaranteed the possession of her throne to the young Queen Isabella II. of Spain, giving international countenance to the abolition of the Salique law, which, until Ferdinand VII. finally abrogated it on March 29th, 1830, precluded any female from inheriting the Crown. A full account of the controversy thereby aroused will be found further on.

rather on the increase than otherwise, the conviction was there and then forced upon the English Ministry that failure awaited their policy unless steps of an extraordinary description were taken. Accordingly the Foreign Enlistment Act was temporarily suspended, and British subjects were tacitly encouraged to enrol themselves under the Spanish flag. That they might do so with effect, Sir De Lacy Evans, a commander of skill and experience, was allowed to lead them, and a novel expedient resorted to which, judged by its immediate results, certainly failed to gain the justification it became necessary to show. The Whig Government, in brief, resorted to the questionable policy of grasping at the advantages likely to be gained by armed interference, without accepting the responsibilities thereof.

If the plan was not exactly unpopular, there were certainly not wanting indications of serious opposition at home, which gained strength when the military operations languished and fell short of what was on all hands expected. Before long, General Evans's expeditionary force became the subject of bitter party contention at home.

General Alava, the distinguished Spaniard, who is said to have been both at Trafalgar and Waterloo, as well as with the Duke through a large part of the Peninsula War, entered warmly into the scheme. He was an ardent supporter of the young Isabella's throne, and is said to have proudly exclaimed, "Don Carlos may be King of Spain, but never of General Alava." *

* *Greville Memoirs*, vol. iii., p. 275.

The arrangements for pay and commissariat were negotiated in Madrid by Colonel Wylde, and nobody doubted but that in the background, and encouraging the movement, stood the British Government.

The first military movements were attended with tolerable success, for after a smart engagement outside the lines of Sebastian, the Carlists were forced to retire so as to afford increased breathing-space to the inhabitants; or, as the Duke of Wellington phrased it, General Evans gained just enough ground to allow the Sebastian ladies room to take their daily walks.

But the subsequent action at Hernani, after the troops of General Evans had advanced into the Carlist territory, was by no means successful, and although the English soldier displayed all his natural qualities, lack of timely cohesion with their Spanish allies, want of food, sickness, and the consequent relaxation of discipline, conspired to destroy the hopes of those 10,000 volunteers who had but a short time before enrolled themselves with such enthusiasm.

Moreover, resentment at an interference in Spanish affairs which the Carlists took to be untimely, led them to question the right of General Evans' contingent to the advantages of the Eliot Convention, signed and sealed but a few days before. In fact, Great Britain was waging against the Carlists the same kind of unofficial contest as Spain had essayed to carry on with our Government in 1805, when Pitt and Lord Harrowby intercepted the treasure-ships.

But if the matter had rested there, and the British troops had been fairly treated, there would not have

arisen the tempest of discontent which seriously injured Lord Melbourne's Government. Unfortunately, however, it was far otherwise.

Pay was not forthcoming. Bodies of men suffered death and imprisonment as the result of not being included amongst those competent to receive the benefits of the Eliot Convention. Parliament was scandalised by hearing the petitions of destitute and half-clothed men, victims of Spanish ill-faith, who could nevertheless lay no legal claim to redress from the Government, who took refuge in thin official disguise, and replied with sophistical platitudes, pleading ignorance concerning this enormous deception and unworthy betrayal.*

As the year 1836 advanced, it became more and more apparent that Louis Philippe would risk neither French blood nor French reputation across the Pyrenees. In fact at this juncture we first descry the revival of a jealousy between Great Britain and her traditional foe, which, fortunately, passed by without an outbreak. This happy escape was due to a variety of circumstances, of which the respective influence is not to be easily estimated, but chief amongst which it is clearly right to reckon Lord Palmerston's resolute and faithful determination.

Undaunted he stood his ground—one man against many. Only half supported by his colleagues, mistrusted by the mass of his political opponents, albeit—and this was of the greatest importance—allowed fair play by Sir Robert Peel, Palmerston met in fair diplomatic fight all

* Speech of Marquess of Londonderry, *Hansard*, June 19th 1838.

the mind of France, with the issue that Louis Philippe himself, Thiers, Guizot, Molè, one by one succumbed before his concentrated weight of will. The genius of the French diplomatists was backed up by vast resources and the sympathies of a mighty people. Had the discussions terminated in the *ultima ratio* of the sword, we should have found ourselves engaged in a very arduous struggle.

There is no more remarkable instance in history of recovery from national disaster than that furnished by France between 1815 and 1837, unless it be the prodigious amount of latent resources revealed by the same nation between 1870 and 1881.

Those were halcyon days when the Orleans monarchy was established amongst a prosperous, powerful, and apparently contented people. The Fieschi conspiracy to assassinate the statesman King had culminated in a failure, while the attempt evoked the sympathy and secured the allegiance of all classes. So, indeed, it appeared even to the acutest political observer.

Moreover, the dynasty was happy in the heir to the throne, who, young, popular, and an enthusiastic soldier, was well adapted to satisfy the national craving for a prince who should also be a military leader.

Scarcely a cloud was seen in the horizon. The affairs of Belgium had been settled without French susceptibilities suffering injury ; profound peace reigned, while King, merchant, manufacturer, and peasant alike grew rich, and looked to a future of unbounded prosperity.

Nor had men forgotten that on the 30th of October 1836, the heir to the Napoleonic fortunes had appealed to a French soldiery at Strasbourg, but had utterly

and, what matters more in France, ridiculously failed to rekindle the fervour which had carried the founder of their house in triumph from St. Juan and Cannes to Paris in 1815. The spell had, it was urged, been broken, and but a name remained. But what a name! And given the wizard who could conjure therewith, in the absence of the Duke of Orleans, events were yet to prove its power.

The weak point of Orleanism from first to last was that the *juste milieu* of Casimer Periet, and Louis Philippe had to satisfy the most universal, most blatant Chauvinism that the world has ever witnessed. Love of military display, love of glory, aye, and love of country too, were all contained in that spirit, which it is ever so hard to control, so impossible to suppress. And we now can see that from the moment when in 1831 the bronze statue of Napoleon the Great was replaced on the Vendome column, to the moment when in 1840 his coffin rested under the dome of the Invalides, there was an official acknowledgment that a popular sentiment existed which was the very reverse of that which Louis Philippe originally essayed to guide.

Though the statesman's skill yet held the nation together in tranquil allegiance, the Napoleonic idea lay in its heart, slumbering only, not dead. With such a community—its strength and spirit, at the command of the singularly able leaders we have mentioned—had Lord Palmerston to reckon when he too came to the front and said in effect, "England will abate no claims

allowed her by treaty, forego no just interests, neglect no occasion for defending the oppressed all over the world."

The somewhat broken thread of our narrative now brings us to the beginning of a new reign, when, in 1837, Queen Victoria acceded to the throne as her sailor uncle's successor; which event, of course, entailed a fresh appeal to the constituencies.

Although it was well known how entirely the inexperienced Queen trusted to Lord Melbourne's guiding hand for direction, the country gave but a faint and uncertain reply when appealed to by the Whig Government, only returning a nominal majority in its favour; so that Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons, and the Duke with Lord Lyndhurst in the House of Lords, wielded between them Parliamentary strength little inferior to that of the Premier and his distinguished followers Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell.

But it was not only the increased and dangerous strength of their opponents which embarrassed the Whig Government. As was its elevation to power in 1835, so the retention of power by Lord Melbourne's Administration in 1837, with their nominal majority diminished, was, as everyone knew, the result of a coalition between Whigs, Radicals, and Irish Repealers. By this time the Opposition presented the serried ranks of a compact, united, and reorganised party. Amidst the uncertainties of such a position, the Prime Minister found a serious outbreak of rebellion in Canada added to the other difficulties of his enfeebled Ministry. But the courage

and resource of Sir Francis Head nipped in the bud a movement which might otherwise have cost England much blood and treasure. Papineau, the insurgent leader, was speedily defeated and his troops dispersed at Toronto, January 5th, 1838.

Under these by no means favourable conditions Lord Palmerston achieved the extraordinary successes which the next few pages must be employed in recounting. It should, moreover, be remembered that the conditions of public life, as, indeed, of every-day existence in England, were, before and during 1837-38, slowly changing. Steam and the concomitant phenomena of railways were working their sure results. With increased employment had come first a gathering together of people, and thence an increase of population. The great towns were overcharged with inhabitants. Bread was dear as a necessary result of protective duties, and trade struggled to be free. The Government, stricken with the fatal paralysis attending Parliamentary weakness, felt compelled to propitiate those who cared less for prestige abroad than about their own vital necessities at home; so that, had not the spirit of Canning lived again in the heart of his pupil and follower, the Foreign Secretary, Government might have been induced to make some disastrous surrender of our Continental interests, and Liberty would have had to mourn over a consequent curtailment of Britain's beneficent influence, if not of her dominion.

The first aim of Lord Palmerston continued to be the fulfilment of the Quadruple Treaty guaranteeing

to Isabella the Spanish and to Donna Maria the Portuguese throne.

Neither the expulsion of Don Miguel from Portugal nor the death of the great Carlist, General Zumalacarrégui in 1835 had served to advance the interests of England's allies so much as might have been expected.

A sanguinary and protracted conflict raged on with varying issue in the north of Spain, whilst throughout the Peninsula intrigue succeeded intrigue, hatred of the British being the only point of agreement between the various parties.*

It may be conceived, then, with what satisfaction Lord Palmerston heard, towards the close of 1838, that signs of internal disagreement were to be discerned in the camp of the Ultramontane Pretender.

Despite the practical neutrality of Louis Philippe, who refused to carry out his treaty engagements, that formidable rebellion, the suppression of which had

* The following citation will show what effect General Evans' expedition had in destroying the beneficial results of the Eliot Convention. Lord Rokeby, writing to Mr. T. Raikes from Spain in June 1840, confessed himself less Carlist in sentiment since he learnt Don Carlos' character aright, thus confirming rather the estimate thereof taken by the Whig Government than that put forward by Lord Londonderry and others of the Tory Opposition. Lord Rokeby goes on to relate that Balmaceda (a Carlist leader) shod the alcalde of a village the other day with red-hot horse-shoes, feet and hands. "You may conjecture," he adds, "what fate is reserved for Sir de Lacy Evans if he falls into Carlist hands."

seemed so hopeless to the English envoy, Lord Eliot, in 1835, was at last crumbling to pieces, and the Basque peasantry gave ominous signs of drawing back from the cause they alone endowed with vitality.

Eye-witnesses declare the scene to have been picturesque and even pathetic, when Maroto, the Carlist general, came down to the plain of Bergara, in August 1839, and resigned his trust, followed, it is true, when so doing, but by a portion of his troops (the inhabitants of the Basque provinces holding back until their traditional privileges should be secured to them).

The locality had already become historic as the spot where the Eliot Convention received signature; the place then hallowed by promulgation of mercy to the captive, was now to become eternally famous as the rallying ground of those who desired peace for Spain. Maroto stood there as the representative of no routed army. Despite the successes of Espartero, Carlist forces had found their way to the very gates of Madrid, and when driven off, they retreated to mountain fastnesses, where, safe in the sympathy of the inhabitants, and secured from attack by nature of the country, they planned fresh invasions into the territory owing allegiance to Queen Isabella.

To allay miseries thus forced upon Spain was, indeed, one cause alleged by Maroto for his change of conduct; whilst the lack of resources in the Carlist camp was itself adding to the horrors of the conflict by placing difficulties in the way of enforcing the rules of civilised warfare. "Men are not," said the Carlist leader,

“made of bronze, nor can they, like chameleons, exist on air.”*

The failure of Don Carlos to win for himself a crown was, according to the information supplied to Lord Palmerston, and recorded in the *State Papers*, attributable principally to the character of that prince. Foreign intervention might sap the sources of possible success for the Carlists, by ensuring to their opponents a command of the sea, but no such advantage could seem to blight the high spirits of those who believed they were fighting for their lawful king. No legal intricacies could convey to these illogical peasants due reason for the supersession of custom such as their fathers had taught them to respect, and which, moreover, had been inculcated in each Biscayan family by a priesthood charged with the entire management of education in that quarter of Spain. It was, however, owing to the fact that Don Carlos was unworthy of the efforts made on his behalf, that the determining, if not final, event of the civil war came about. Led by the advice of intriguing friars,† the so-called Legitimate Monarch rewarded with imprisonment and banishment the services of his most faithful followers. He suspected that the provinces were fighting, not for him, but entirely for their *fueros*. Moreover he did not undergo the hardships or brave the inclement weather to which his troops were exposed, thus neglecting the most obvious duties of a commander. Indeed, whenever he stopped in a

* *State Papers*, 1840, p. 105, now in British Museum.

† *Ibid*, 1840, pp. 105–59.

town, his earliest step taken was that of enjoining a levy of two or three thousand *reals* on the inhabitants, in order that means might be forthcoming for the supplies of his own table.* Thus it came to pass, in August 1839, that but a day or two before the defection of Maroto, Don Carlos essayed to review his troops at Elgueta, and was saluted at first in solemn silence, and then with ominous cries of "Vivâ Maroto!" "When the King is present," cried the Pretender, in high displeasure, "no other cry should be raised. I am your General!" This is the last public appearance recorded of this man, who represented a cause which might, one would think, have been successful in the hands of a hero, though including elements which made ultimate disintegration inevitable so soon as the leadership fell into ordinary hands. If Zumalacarregui had lived, so much devotion might not have been sacrificed for nought; but, as we all are aware, the Convention of Bergara, signed on September 30th, 1839, followed Maroto's surrender, and from that moment Carlism languished in Spain.

The embers of conflict, it is true, smouldered for a while; but Lord Palmerston must have seen with joy that the objects of British intervention were secured, and the Quadruple Treaty rendered a reality. Occurring as these events had done, when the tangled skein of Portuguese politics had been partially unravelled, and the more Constitutional party had returned to power under Don Pedro's daughter, Maria de la Gloria, the supremacy of British counsels in the Peninsula had

* *State Papers*, 1840, pp. 105-59.

become assured, this country having been made sole mistress of the situation by the refusal of France to fulfil her obligations under the said treaty.

Notwithstanding the ignominious issue of the Evans expedition, the favourable turn of affairs was largely due to English interference. It was England who had retained the seaboard for the Spanish Government, and made the raising of the siege of Bilbao a necessity. It had been England, represented by the gallant Sir Charles Napier, who led the weaker Portuguese fleet to destroy that of Don Miguel, and chase that inhuman tyrant from the country he had cursed with his presence. The fact of English supremacy in the Peninsula was then patent before Europe, even if, as ever has been the case, neither in Spain nor Portugal were the people prepared to welcome foreigners as their deliverers.

But such ill-will was at least impotent; not so the silent resentment of Louis Philippe and his ministers.

It was in the East where a spark was first ignited which threatened to envelop not only Turkey, but the two great Western Powers, in a general conflagration. Mehemet Ali, the Egyptian Pasha, determined, in 1839, to strike once more for Syria, meeting with the silent approbation of Russia * when he thus essayed to take their best recruiting ground from the Turks. Had his scheme succeeded, Sultan Mahmoud's Asiatic power would have been stricken at the root, and his empire

* In October 1838 presumed Russian intrigues in Persia and Afghanistan led to the war with Dost Mahomed on behalf of Shah Soujah, whom the British straightway desired to place on the throne.

confined to the Balkan Peninsula, where at the best it could exist but as an exotic. But the French King, prompted by his minister Thiers, showed himself blind to these consequences, and avowedly encouraged Mehemet Ali in his course, hoping to reap for France the position in Egypt which Napoleon the First had sought to gain. Still that Quixotic and romantic Eastern adventure, the inception being, as it was, the result of information culled from books in the Louvre, had shaped the course of French policy in the East and given the nation a permanent mission to establish herself as a rival to England in Egypt, and, if possible, to exercise supreme influence over the Holy Places, to which, as a child of the Latin Church, France might, not unnaturally, look with an interested eye.

That the French were earnest in this matter the world soon perceived, and it became at once apparent that a duel *à l'outrance* was to be fought between Lord Palmerston and Thiers. The English minister had shown himself strong enough, or lucky enough, to reconstitute Belgium and secure its territories from foreign invasion, and to carry out the Quadruple Treaty faithfully.

Would he be able to check Thiers once more in his course, and save the Turkish Empire from the most insidious design ever levelled against its integrity?

If Syria had been taken by Mehemet Ali as the result of a Franco-Egyptian alliance, subsequent partition of Turkey between Russia and France could only have been arrested by a vast war, in which England's necessities would have forced her to be a principal actor.

On such an occasion the action of the German powers

must, under the most favourable circumstances, have remained limited and uncertain.

That escape from such a difficulty was found, is due mainly to diplomacy, although the efforts of the English fleet, under Stopford and Napier, should not be forgotten. On July the 14th, 1839, the Turkish fleet deserted to Alexandria, and left the dying Sultan, Mahmoud, as helpless in naval power as, from physical causes, he had become weak in body. The year, moreover, had not closed before he was buried with his fathers, and Abdul Medjid, his son, entered on a career equal in interest to that of his remarkable predecessor.

The spring and summer of 1840 were passed in anxious deliberation. Guizot, the eminent statesman, came to London and endeavoured in vain to reconcile French claims to supreme influence in Egypt and Syria with the views of Lord Palmerston and the English nation. Supported abroad by a staff of zealous subordinates, the Foreign Minister was kept so well informed of the situation, naval, military, and diplomatic, that he was enabled to calculate accurately the risk he ran when he induced Europe, as represented by England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, to interfere in concert with the view of rescuing Turkey from Mehemet Ali.

France, to the amazement of her king and statesmen, found herself left out in the cold and confronted with such an alliance as forbade the realisation of her Eastern schemes unless she would commit herself to a war against frightful odds.*

* The Thiers Ministry, committed to extremities on the Syrian question, resigned October 20th, 1840. "We have talked together

But Lord Palmerston resolved on possessing a material guarantee, in the shape of such places of arms on the Syrian sea-board as were in temporary possession of Mehemet Ali. In accordance with his orders, the gallant Sir Charles Napier captured Sidon and Beyrout, the first-named place falling on September 27th, and the latter on October 10th, 1840.

There remained only St. Jean d'Acre, and that a stronghold which was deemed impregnable. Day by day the French fleet lay watching Admiral Stopford's squadron, while he prepared for a task it was believed impossible to accomplish, inasmuch as experts maintained that no men-of-war could remain under fire of the Egyptian forts and escape destruction.

But a ruse succeeded where other tactics might have

of making war," said the retiring Minister to his astute master. "Yes ; but that is entirely a different affair to making it," replied the Citizen King, in an interview which has become historic.

In the Chamber, M. Thiers spoke to the following effect, November 27th, 1840 :—

"I wished to arm in order to obtain a modification of the treaty. I resolved on obtaining it, and I should have obtained it ; and if I had not I would have gone to war, for the honour and interest of my country demanded it. . . . I would have cried, War ! war ! and I should have found an echo in France. Let me be kept from power, let me be banished for ever, but let it not be said that as a French Minister I would ever have permitted language insulting to the honour of France."

Such, then, was the labyrinth through which Lord Palmerston had to steer during M. Thiers' *régime*, while even M. Guizot, in the King's Speech for November 1840, spoke of extraordinary credits which maintenance of the national position demanded.—Irving's *Annals of our Times*, p. 77.

failed. Anchoring just within fire, the British fleet waited long enough for their enemies to get the range, and then floated down to close quarters under the batteries. Thus the Egyptians, taken by surprise, were unable to give an immediate or well-regulated reply, and after a furious cannonade the coveted citadel surrendered, and the British flag floated over St. Jean d'Acre on November 3rd, 1840.

This triumph, won under the eyes of the French, accentuated the feeling of jealousy already rife between the two nations; but the position, both diplomatic and strategic, having been entirely reversed, and England claiming the nine-tenths of the law which possession is said to give, was, thanks to Lord Palmerston, in a position such as she had not occupied since 1815.

In fact, as has been said by another great statesman (Earl Beaconsfield in *Endymion*) commenting on the situation, England was victorious by land and sea. Lord Palmerston's policy was entirely successful, and the schemes of Thiers were scattered to the winds of heaven.*

No thinking man can look otherwise than with regret upon the savage feeling of jealousy and recrimination which at this moment undoubtedly animated two great nations.

The cause was not absolutely owing to the conduct of

* Lord Palmerston owed much to his agents in Syria, chief amongst whom was Mr. Thompson, whose command over foreign languages rendered his information far superior to that supplied to the French by dragomans and interpreters.

any one individual, but lay deeply seated in national character. If the success of Lord Palmerston in promoting free institutions both in Spain and Portugal was the immediate cause which moved the French ministers to attempt the establishment of supreme influence in the East, yet Europe had received a previous warning of their aspirations in that direction. In August 1830, when the same French Government was permitted to exercise a protectorate over an outlying province of the Ottoman Empire, Algiers had been practically annexed to France without Nicholas of Russia, Metternich, or Lord Aberdeen speaking decidedly against such infringement of treaty law.* The reign of might had then begun to eclipse that of national engagements, and Europe has ever since rendered itself liable to a like surprise—such as has unfortunately been sprung upon the Powers in 1881, under the sanction of Lord Beaconsfield's administration, when an extension of the policy of 1830 led the French arms to Tunis, with the prospect, as we are openly told, of probably soon including Tripoli in its scope.

What, then, would have been the fate of England in 1840 if she had not owned a Palmerston, and if her foreign policy had been entrusted to those who did not

* On the other hand, readers of Guizot's *Memoirs of a Minister*, and, indeed, of all official documents bearing on the questions of this time, will be struck by the firm attitude of Prince Metternich when bent on protecting the Christian populations of Syria, as, indeed, when joining Lord Palmerston in endeavouring to preserve the Ottoman Empire, and ample evidence thereof may be found amongst Lord Palmerston's own letters.

sufficiently appreciate her imperial mission ? The Ottoman power would have been sapped at the root. For had Syria been severed from Turkey in Asia, all life must have forsaken the Sultan's European provinces, since the main source whence the Porte was wont to draw troops in time of need would have been no more available. With France established in Egypt as an ally of its Viceroy, the Indian mails could have been stopped at the will of a future Thiers, and the position of Turkey have remained dependent on the agreement of Russia with whatever French Government might find it convenient to enter on such course and revive the Napoleonic traditions.

There are those amongst us who lightly and contemptuously deride the policy of Pitt as being in any degree a guide for later generations, because, they tell us, a fresh Napoleon can never arise ; and even some enthusiasts exist who, in spite of the sad lessons taught by contemporary history, positively believe or hope that Liberal doctrines have placed a veto on European slaughter and disturbance. They surely go too far. Who is to guarantee us against the appearance of another Thiers, whose gifts—brilliant to a degree, as all must admit—might yet be reproduced under the ægis of any possible political system ?

Surely the recital of the Syrian difficulties in 1840 should serve as a warning against the careless confidence in the superior present which is preached to us in high quarters, and as a strong plea for the "obsolete" theories of a mistrusted past.

Europe may well have wondered in 1840 at the

spectacle of our British Government discredited in the Commons, without a friend to speak for it in the Peers, yet wielding such authority abroad, and manifestly destined to descend to posterity as having placed its country in a position second to none; thanks to the intrepid Foreign Minister who seemed to have failed in nothing he undertook on her behalf. But trade was bad in England, nor had success in the East been attained without some drain on our resources, whilst a Chinese war and impending disaster in Afghanistan cast unwelcome shadows over an otherwise satisfactory outlook.

China, at that time, desired to be isolated and trade with no man. The people were contented, and their rulers confident in their general and assured superiority to the rest of mankind. But one branch of commerce the Chinese Government specially and more resolutely refused to make official terms with, inasmuch as it was declared to encourage a deterioration of the empire. When, then, the British Government was found forcing the opium trade upon an unwilling nation, our claim to be the pioneers of civilisation and morality received a rude shock, which, in the opinion of some people, might prove fatal to any such belief at all.* However, after the conflict began,

* The Chinese war of 1839-40 was caused by the desire of the Chinese Government to abolish the East India Company's monopoly in the opium trade, which the Chinese never looked on as otherwise than contraband of war. Suddenly, in 1839, the Chinese

a qualified support was granted to ministers by Sir Robert Peel and his party, the Opposition leader distinguishing between loyal conduct to the ministry when committed irrevocably to a certain course, and any approval of the policy which had created the situation. In fact, upon this head Lord Melbourne's Government received an amnesty of contempt.

Ever since the moment in 1839 when stringent measures were deemed necessary in Jamaica,* to effect which the Constitution must have been suspended, but the requisite confidence in their judgment was refused by the House of Commons, the Government had, so to speak,

Commissioner, Lin, determined on its forcible suppression, seized the British merchants at Canton, and took Captain Eliot, the English Superintendent, prisoner, forcing him to sign an order for the surrender of all the opium then shipped at Canton, and to pledge the faith of his Government to return to the merchants the *two millions* thereby lost.

For this the British Government demanded satisfaction, but in vain; whereupon we proceeded to take, by force of arms, the security we were unable by peaceful measures to retain for our traders.

On August 29th, 1842, the Chinese Emperor agreed to pay twenty-one million dollars, and to open five of his principal ports to British commerce, also to surrender the island of Hong Kong to England.

* The emancipation of the slaves in 1834 was followed by their political enfranchisement, but they proved themselves so little fitted to participate in representative government, that the Jamaica Suspension Bill was brought in in 1839. In committee on this Bill the Government were practically defeated, only getting a majority of six, and thereupon resigned, but did not actually retire from office on this occasion.

lived but on royal favour. By a manifest misunderstanding between Sir Robert Peel and the heads of the Queen's Household, it had been assumed that social difficulties lay in the way of Conservative government, which led the astute leader to bide his time.

The time had come, in 1841, when general approval greeted the utter defeat of Lord Melbourne at the polls, and with it the apparent ignoring of all that Lord Palmerston had done for England.*

* "The Convention of July 13th, 1841, was not absolutely signed until the general election was over, and the Whig Government doomed. Such was the French dread of Lord Palmerston's prowess that every endeavour was made to procrastinate, and give prestige to his successors, rather than to the minister who had foiled them. Lord Palmerston's letters show that he felt this bitterly for his party, rather than on his own account, and those who take the modern view of Lord Palmerston having been a Conservative will misread history altogether. An Englishman first, Lord Palmerston ever remained a Whig, but allowed no bitterness to mingle with outspoken expressions of opinion. His view was expressed in a famous speech at Tiverton, where he remarked, "Our political differences should be transient, but our friendships eternal." The tone of his political comments were, generally speaking, in accordance with this idea.

Not alone in Syria and Spain did English and French interests threaten to come into collision between 1835 and 1841, but in all quarters of the globe.

To use Guizot's own words: "I was fully determined in all places and at all times, whenever the serious interests of the country required, never to elude the diplomatic embarrassment to which they might give rise. By land and sea, in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, in the Mediterranean, and in the Ocean, frequent occasions occurred which excited such difficulties, for at all these points the two nations found themselves incessantly in contact." These are the words of the minister of peace specially chosen to succeed the baffled Thiers.

But in politics there is no such thing as gratitude, and we have yet to learn that great services will reap contemporary justice, even under a scheme of Constitutional rule nearly perfect so far as liberty is concerned.

The acknowledgment of such benefits must be left to history; and when the early Victorian period finds a complete chronicler, he will perforce speak to us of the grand and substantial results gained by Lord Palmerston during his second occupation of the Foreign Office.*

A series of pamphlets made their appearance during Lord Palmerston's second Foreign Secretaryship, a notice of which is necessary in any account of or dissertation on the recent course of England's foreign policy. Mr. Urquhart, formerly Secretary of the English Embassy at Constantinople, gave to the world in 1839 a *brochure*, entitled *England, France, Russia, and Turkey*. In it he foreshadowed the present situation in Central Asia—prophesied that Persia would yield to Russian influence and intrigue, and, in fine, spoke as became a seer of old, his fears having in the issue proved to have

“Imperfectly informed as to facts, we had engaged ourselves much further than comported with the strength of the Pasha and the interest of France.”

Such was Guizot's explanation of the situation, so far as regarded Syria and Palestine.—Guizot's *Memoirs of a Minister*, p. 127.

* On June 4th, 1841, the Government was defeated by one vote (811–812), on a vote of want of confidence moved by Sir Robert Peel, Repealers and Radicals reinforcing the Tories. A dissolution was the consequence. The main question at the ensuing general election was Protection v. Free Trade. The Protectionists were victorious. After the elections a vote of want of confidence was carried by 860–269; so ministers resigned, August 30th.

been well founded. But owing to his being violent in his manner of expressing opinion, and otherwise eccentric, not to say combative, his doctrines and speculations had not the influence to which their soundness entitled them. Mr. Cobden's more famous reply was in three parts, *England, Ireland, and America*. The writer demonstrated the value of Free Trade as a principle, and exhibited in a systematic and concrete form the views which Molesworth and Grote had long held in the abstract.

But Cobden went farther, and, like the followers who perpetuate his worthy name by means of the Cobden Club, proclaimed his profound disbelief in the efficacy of diplomacy, placing all the wars of the eighteenth century to the credit of a baneful attempt to keep up balance of power in Europe. He concluded by expressing a hope that the popular party cry at the British elections would one day be, "No foreign politics." It is not easy to see the connection between Free Trade, which has been proved by experience to enrich nations, and the policy of complete isolation, which no British statesman has yet been bold enough to put to a practical test. It is fair to say that if Mr. Cobden's optimistic conditions had been fulfilled, his proposals would be practicable. But their fulfilment seems almost as far off as ever.

Mr. Cobden's attack on the old diplomatic methods has led to a thorough ventilation of the subject, and so far the inquiry which thoughtful men made, after reading Mr. Cobden's closely reasoned periods, could scarcely have passed without effecting good. But the almost universal response has been that the

disposition to strike a balance of power by uniting against aggression by the strong, has ever been a need connected with improving civilisation. In the days of the ancient monarchies, when distance was not bridged by the appliances of modern invention, the ruder form of alliance—for purposes of attack, not of defence—prevailed, that is, the strong almost universally attacked the weak, and did so with the greater delight when they could bring to the conflict two nations, and therefore two hosts, marshalled for the purpose of destruction and pillage. We have but to turn to sacred writ and read the books of Kings and Chronicles—with which Mr. Cobden was doubtless familiar—to discover how constantly were armies, aye, and kingdoms also, destroyed when they essayed to neglect even the simple form of alliance which came within their reach ; while, if we contemplate the history of the Jews, and learn how their very being as a nation was perpetuated by the judicious alliance with Rome which the Maccabees negotiated, it will not be difficult to perceive how true is the axiom which supposes safety in numbers, and this is of importance even if there were not in the Eastern world the special conditions which render attention to the balance of power essential to the preservation of European peace. If the nature of man were really changed, or the geographical conditions of Europe altered since the days of Rome, then would it be possible to relax certain rules which, whether we like them or not, must be observed if peace is to reign triumphant.

“ The balance of power is such a disposition of things as that no one potentate or state shall be able abso-

lutely to predominate and prescribe laws to the others." So says Vattel.

Now the writer, be he doctrinaire or practical man, who with the course of European events since 1784 before his eyes, will contravene this, must be suffering from a blindness almost hopeless of recovery, because, dreaming that he sees, he will seek no cure. But the modifications of the old system which Lord Palmerston introduced were in the direction of assisting nationalities, and therefore more than ever out of harmony with Mr. Cobden's cry, which he did actually adopt in course of his pamphleteering, of "No foreign politics."

We are by no means strongly prejudiced in favour of those selfish rules of public conduct, which are to some extent prescribed by the natural law of self-protection, but which, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we hold to have been abused by Louis XIV., Frederick the Great, and the Empress Catherine, all of whom used the law of public safety as an excuse to take from weaker powers that which they were unable to protect.

If the statesmen of Europe cease to aim at securing judicious alliances for their several communities, the world will stand appalled and helpless whenever the next warrior dictator, be he child of the people or autocrat run riot, shall arise. Mr. Kinglake's great Usage, or understood public law of nations, will then too late be invoked, but will be conspicuous by its absence, as also under such conditions would be the healthy opinion which, based on mutual agreement and mutual interests, should render the ascendancy of such a tyrant impossible.

We gladly close a notice of Lord Palmerston's most successful tenure of the Foreign Office with these reflections, because the more men ponder over his career, read his written opinions, and know the popular sympathy which urged him on, they will less incline towards other opinions held, as Lord Salisbury once said, by masses of people, but which have, fortunately, led captive only a small section of those who, under any present political combination, must guide the external policy of England.

Lord Palmerston and Mr. Cobden, judging from their written opinions between 1835 and 1841, each grasped two cardinal facts, one being that war is the greatest human evil that can afflict a state not subjected to absolute disintegration; but they likewise discerned, that if an Englishman will do anything at all for certain he will most surely fight when the occasion demands.

We have dwelt specially upon the great success gained in 1840 and 1841, because then the results were altogether out of proportion to the sacrifices undergone by our gallant sailors at St. Jean d'Acre and on the coasts of Palestine and Syria.* Lord Palmerston's victory was

* The subjoined will show that Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador at Constantinople, had a potent share in the determination of events; also, how Asia was affected by the earlier successes in Afghanistan. The extracts from Lord Dalling's *Life of Palmerston* speak for themselves.

"Ponsonby is heart and hand in favour of the Turks, and although he allows himself to express almost a personal dislike of Mehemet Ali, which, as an ambassador, he ought certainly to avoid doing, yet I believe his views are correct, and that if we do not speedily take some decisive steps, it will be too late for us

indeed a moral one, and the power which Thiers and Guizot knew he commanded never had to be put to the test, because these statesmen, furnished with all available knowledge as to the past and information concerning the present, knew that they were confronted by a man of determination who was, no less than Cobden, aware of the evils attendant on war, yet saw a greater peril in the uncompensated paralysis which the separation of Turkey and Syria would inflict on the Sultan's Government. This, accompanied—as, by the nature of the case, it must have been—by the practical consolidation of French influence in Syria, hitherto but traditional and sentimental, would have placed France in supremacy in Egypt, and threatened something more than a de-

to check Russia. This is our time, for the successes in India have had a great effect upon the whole of Asia, the people there considering it to be virtually a defeat of the plans of the Czar.”—Lord Avonley to Mr. T. Raikes, Dec. 9th 1839. Written from a raft on the Nile.

“Lord Palmerston was right in considering the defeat of the Egyptian forces in Syria, the taking of Chusan (in China), the overthrow of Dost Mahomed, the happy combination of a series of triumphs which it only wanted the formal submission of Mehemet Ali (dated 14th January 1841) to complete.”—Sir Henry Bulwer (Lord Dalling), *Life of Lord Palmerston*, vol. ii., p. 278.

Lord Palmerston, very fairly, desired to add to the above successes a treaty negotiated mainly by himself with the French Government, relating to the suppression of slavery, but which was to bear signatures of the five great Powers—an instrument, however, which failed to take effect until the Whigs had resigned.

Sir Henry Bulwer appropriately speaks of the success attained in 1841 as the pedestal of Lord Palmerston's after-fortunes at home.

Prince Metternich, to use Lord Palmerston's words, stood *stout* and *firm* throughout the Syrian crisis.—Bulwer, vol. ii., p. 881.

struction of the balance of power in Eastern Europe. Is it rash to suggest that, under such conditions, we might have had to fight to prevent the construction of the Suez Canal, which is now of more use to us than to any other country?

Lord Palmerston was, then, a Peace Minister, in the truest sense of the word, in 1840 and 1841, even as he had proved himself in 1830-33, when his warlike attitude secured Belgian independence under his candidate for the throne, King Leopold.*

* Vol. II., p. 818.

Abundant

LORD ABERDEEN. (II.)

"I am not surprised at this Empire of tradition in the policy of a well-governed State. Memory is the mother of foresight, and the past always occupies a leading place in the present."—Guizot, on the "Foreign Policy of Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen."

SEPTEMBER 1841 TO JUNE 1846.



RETROSPECTIVE summary of Lord Aberdeen's second Foreign Secretaryship brings forcibly before our minds the views held by Sir Robert Peel, the all-powerful Premier of that period. Was *he* the colleague of Wellington, likewise the supporter of that most specious of all the fallacies of modern politics known to its opponents as *peace without honour*? or did he desire the total change of diplomatic method for which it has become popular, in certain quarters, to agitate?

This question will have to be answered by anyone who attempts to grapple with the problems of foreign policy which again and again, under varying aspects and clothed in different forms, appear and reappear, calling for the judgment of those in power and authority.

The facts are, however, plain to those who pursue the subject without entangling it with matters of domestic finance and political economy, upon which it is notorious Sir Robert not only formed, on the whole, correct views, but gave legislative effect thereto during the famous administration which Lord Houghton (speaking to the Merchant Taylors' Company in June 1881) declared to have conferred great benefits on all sections of the community.*

On the other hand, we have been asked by men in high places to believe that Sir Robert Peel would have been found leagued with those who desired to promote principles such as his whole official existence was a long struggle against—to see society, that is, trampled under the hoof of a ruthless democracy, of which, in 1834, he expressed abhorrence—and that he had become without scruple a disciple of Mr. Cobden in foreign politics.†

* The police force of London owes, as is well known, its existence to Sir Robert Peel.

† The power of Mr. Cobden, which enabled him to impress his opinions upon the generation in which he lived, was undoubtedly enhanced by his conspicuous attainments, as it also was rendered palatable by reason of his amiable and attractive character. Thoroughly travelled, well read, blessed with an acute understanding and a scientific mind, he made men feel that they were not listening to the mere dogmatic theories of a *doctrinaire* when brought to think by hearing one of his powerful and logical speeches, or attracted by the simple, and therefore excellent, periods which flowed from a facile pen. As one of Mr. Cobden's most intimate friends informed the author, he was a constant writer, and by means of private correspondence in the habit of committing his ideas to paper, thus implanting them fixedly in a memory famed alike for clearness of arrangement and most uncommon power of retention.

During the session of 1830 Sir Robert Peel enunciated the following sentiments concerning the foreign policy of Lord Grey's Government:—

“With respect to the maintenance of peace, although it is a popular topic, I am sorry to hear the present

Such was the man who, clearly discerning the great truths of Free Trade, sought to ally the results thereby gained with a system of foreign policy involving the destruction of ancient diplomatic usage, such a change being calculated, as he thought and believed, to hasten the day when wars shall cease.

But the point to which we desire to call attention here is that the intellectual conversion which Sir Robert Peel underwent did not in his case extend to the aforesaid idea, or sanction Mr. Cobden's dream of secret diplomacy, or still less endorse the Peace-at-any-price doctrine which, despite later wavering connected with the necessity of England remaining strong at sea, Cobden certainly seemed to favour. It was in the year 1849 that a gathering of Free Traders elected to preside over them at the London Tavern the ex-Prime Minister, the man whom, next to the Duke of Wellington, a foreigner would have named as best representing England. But when called on to speak to the assembled merchants and scientific thinkers who formed the staple of the once all-conquering, but then defunct, Corn League, the oracle began, from their point of view, to revile where he was expected to bless.

“The Leopard” (Napoleon I.'s name for England), said Sir Robert Peel, “never paused in his course of victory, from the mountains of the Pyrenees to Paris, and the flag of England was triumphantly borne to the fore.” “Desperate and horrible heresy,” cried the philosophical Liberals. “Questionable utterances as regards our ally,” said (with some truth) the responsible statesmen who, with Lord Palmerston as a mouthpiece, uttered a protest.—Lord Dalling's letters connected with 1849. (*Life of Lord Palmerston*).

But the incident should nevertheless tend to show the school of foreign politics in which Peel was trained, and, as far as we can discover, both lived and died. It was clearly not that of Bright and Cobden.

Ministers state it as a distinguishing mark of policy that they are determined at all hazards to maintain peace. Of course, every Government must wish to preserve peace. The Government of the Duke of Wellington always stated that to be its wish, and there is no Government but does so. It stated that it would leave no effort untried, consistent with the honour of the country, to preserve peace."

"No man feels more than I do the immorality of war and the necessity of avoiding the rekindling of its flames, but peace is not always to be preserved at the wish of the Government, and I doubt the policy of too strong and determined a declaration that at any hazard the Ministers of the country will preserve peace."*

In these few sentences lie the refutation of all the erroneous views on British foreign policy which have since crept in, simultaneously with a promulgation of better social laws, such as in the halo of increased comfort and happiness men have been taught to believe that they inherit as a natural birthright, and which, therefore, they need not exert themselves to defend. Sir Robert Peel's distinct statement to the effect that peace inconsistent with honour is unworthy the consideration of a great country, should be echoed and re-echoed all over England. It should go forth from the benches of that House of Commons where the sway of the Speaker was once so complete. It should be posted in the workshop, and proclaimed from the platform, until the apostles of a degraded and spiritless line

* *Hansard* for 1830.

of action know that they can no longer claim this honoured name to abet theories unanimously rejected by all practical statesmen since the world began. Save to a small, though noisy, party, the condemnation of peace without honour is a palpable truism ; even if, as we must admit, it sometimes remains a moot point what is or is not "honour."

We have, moreover, to tell (and this, too, in despite of a secret agreement to support Russia as regards the Holy Places which, as the course of our story will show, Peel, Wellington, and Aberdeen all signed) how, in plain and unyielding language, the Emperor Nicholas, during his visit to England, was informed by the British Prime Minister that no foreign influence in Egypt would be allowed by the British Government, who desired to keep the way open to India. Moreover, that when the Emperor's schemes for a proposed partition of Turkey were unveiled during the same conversation, they were received by the British Minister with solemn and silent disfavour.*

It is true that Mr. Disraeli descried in Sir Robert's conduct as to the appointment of a Sovereign for Servia, in 1842, an undue trust in Russian pretensions, and that it is quite possible, during the many intricate discussions which have taken place in England during the last thirty years, that Peel might not always have embraced the views of the more "Imperially-minded" amongst us, but he would certainly have approached each subject as a matter of public policy, and have given no counten-

* *Life of Prince Consort.*

ance to the advocates of peace at any price, or listened to ecstatic and stagey humanitarians, whose supremacy would threaten the very existence of the State they sought to guide.

When Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel first came into office, in 1841, a debate took place in Parliament upon the subject of foreign policy, and what had been its character since the great war closed. On that occasion Sir Robert made the memorable declaration to the effect that the tenour of our foreign policy had been practically unchanged between 1815 and 1841. He could not, that is, find ground for complaint at any of the strong measures—savouring, as some even did, of interference in other nations' internal affairs—which had characterised Lord Palmerston's rule. The influence of England had, on the whole, been on the side of right and liberty. This is of the more importance as marking the point where, in Sir Robert's view, his great opponent, Lord Palmerston, overstepped the mark of necessary activity in foreign affairs. Such an opinion, we know, was held by Sir Robert in 1850, when a few days before his own untimely death he modified the assertion "We are all proud of him," by a qualification to the effect that he could not approve the policy then under discussion.

But there were words in the speech on foreign politics in 1841 which bring home to our minds forcibly the identity of the school in which he had learnt his maxims of policy.

It was that, we can scarcely doubt, of Pitt, Castlereagh, and Canning, the identity of whose views facts

have allowed us previously to establish beyond all cavil or dispute.

What, said Sir Robert, were the results—what the influence of that twenty-five years' peace?

“If France were in any danger of an unjust aggression, the security of France would not be found in the number of her regiments, but in the mind and public spirit with which she would rise as one man to dispel the danger. It is the same with that magnificent country which has abolished the name and distinctions of separate states. Germany at this moment, from Hamburgh to the Tyrol, from Berlin to the southern confines, burns with a spirit which would intimidate and overbear any invader. These are the securities against aggression and the securities for peace.

Not high-raised towers, nor moated gates,
Not cities proud with spires
And turrets crowned. Nor bays, nor broad-armed ports
Where, laughing at the storm,
Rich navies ride. Nor gay and spangled courts,
Where low-bowed baseness
Wafts perfume to pride. No ; but man,
High-minded man, with powers
As far above dull brutes endued,
In forest, brake, or dell,
As those excel cold rocks or bramble rude.

The theory here set forward, that the bravery and devotion of a nation will, of necessity, suffice for its safety, has been found lacking on more than one later occasion ; but only owing to modern discoveries, which have revolutionised warfare altogether. Yet the spirit of Sir Robert's utterance remains as true as when first

spoken in 1841 ; while it has more than ever become a statesman's duty to avoid isolation for his country.

Surely, then, we have entered on a time when patriotism allied with diplomacy should have the fullest scope, and when the rational balance of power in Europe should be carefully watched over by those who rule over us.

We have before alluded to Sir Robert Peel's speech on the Scinde war, when in 1844 he defended the Indian policy of his Government, and Sir Charles Napier's conduct of the campaign. Part of it ran as follows :—

“ There is an uncontrollable principle at work where civilisation and refinement come into contact with savagery and barbarism, especially in the East, which prevents the application of rules of conduct laid down in this country. Suppose, for argument's sake, that Russia or Persia were intriguing in Afghanistan, and that Scinde refused a passage to our troops, it would be clearly impossible for a Governor-General to say, ‘ Let me look at my Vattel or Puffendorf.’ ”

It is impossible to read this and not feel how thoroughly Sir Robert Peel gauged the grave issues at stake in Central Asia, and that he would have been urged into no unreasoning course of agitation against any Government, whatever their mistakes might be, who acted boldly in defence of British interests in Afghanistan when assailed by foreign intrigue.*

* We must not be understood to commit ourselves to the view that moral principles are invariably to give way to considerations of immediate expediency, or to any disparagement of the rights

But the story of Lord Aberdeen's second Foreign Secretaryship will of itself dash to pieces the theories of those who believe Peel to have been a cosmopolitan, not a patriotic, Minister.

Domestic politics do not, as a rule, fall within our scope, even had they not been narrated, for the most part to perfection, by other compilers. When the historian of these events does arise, he must be armed with exceptional and recondite information before works such as those of Mr. Justin McCarthy can be superseded in any way. Even special attention directed to foreign affairs leaves us with meagre matter, rich neither in European incident nor in novelty. Nevertheless, to ensure completeness, the tale must be told once more. Sir Robert Peel's Government found two wars left to them as a legacy, viz., the contest in China and the struggle, for so it was shortly to become, in Afghanistan.

The Chinese succumbed speedily before the prowess of Sir Hope Grant, and the war is memorable rather on account of the cause that brought it about, than for the incidents which ended the conflict and gave Great Britain trading rights at Canton, Hong Kong, and Fouchou, together with the desired privilege to trade in opium, whereby was secured a source of revenue the existence of which many thoughtful men feel, and even doubt the desirability of its continuance.

But the troubles in Afghanistan were of a totally different type. They originated in perplexing questions

of inferior races, when we insist upon the paramount sanctity of the law of self-preservation.

of policy whereon the skilled Central Asian politician, Sir A. Burnes, had in November 1840 written to a friend in Bombay, alluding to the advances of Russia :—
 “ Further submission to what is going on, and our days of supremacy in the East are numbered.” And yet the writer proceeds to condemn a policy which should bring England and Russia face to face near the frontiers of Hindostan. “ The attack of Russia on Khiva,” he continues, “ is justified by the law of nations, and in a country like England, where slavery is so odiously detested, ought to find favour in men’s eyes rather than blame.”

Thus did British statesmen find themselves face to face with a problem not unlike that of the Græco-Slavonic movement which in Europe has since been made an excuse for Russian aggression beyond the Pruth and Danube.

Sir Alexander Burnes knew this, and yet he believed that our advance on Cabul in 1838 was ill-timed and founded on a misconception of the situation.

The Governor-General of India, who, under Lord Palmerston’s special guidance, had moved the troops up to the wild and stony mountain-country of Afghanistan, was the peaceable and hard-working Lord Auckland, who, acting on orders from home, and on a conviction that Dost Mahomed was intriguing with Persia, had issued a proclamation of war in October 1838. That is, he declared Dost Mahomed’s reign to be ended, and Shah Soojah’s about to begin ; the latter sovereign to be escorted to his capital by British bayonets, where Sir William Macnaughten was to act as envoy, and so check

further progress of the Russian influence which had hitherto been disseminated so insidiously, through Persian encroachments on Herat, then, as now, considered a strategic point of paramount importance.

We all know full well what was the tragical issue of these endeavours to cope with a somewhat distant danger. Deceptive success at first, then the rise of Cabul against the British; Burnes and Macnaughten murdered, and the army of General Elphinstone cajoled and done to death by treachery. The failure, if not complete, was only saved from so becoming by the endurance, courage, and resource of Sir Robert Sale at Jellalabad, and by the subsequent achievements of General Pollock, who with his avenging army forced the passes of Khyber and Jugdulluk, in the latter of which he overthrew our bitterest foe, Akbar Khan.

These transactions were not completed until September 1842, so that Sir Robert Peel's Government had to take into consideration the measures needful for the occasion, and to do so during the time of Lord Aberdeen's Foreign Secretaryship.

Without disputing the general accuracy of the judgment produced against Lord Auckland's Afghan policy, it is to be noted that its condemnation can only stand on the ground of the British Foreign Secretary (Lord Palmerston) having combined with the Governor-General to recommend ill-timed measures, devised, nevertheless, to guard against an undoubted danger, the propinquity of which was matter upon which it had become the statesman's peculiar province to decide. That their decision was arrived at without due reference to the

condition of the border territories through which military communication must have perforce been kept up during a British occupation of Afghanistan, is therefore more appropriate food for reflection than any under-rating the difficulties connected with an invasion of Hindostan. The arduous nature of the country had not prevented Alexander the Great, 327 years B.C., from penetrating to the Indus. It is no answer to aver that his conquest only embraced the north-west corner of India, and that it was not permanent; for seeing that the primary difficulties have been frequently overcome, there remains no antecedent improbability why, with the aid of Persia, a modern Alexander, hailing from the North, should not sow terror and dissension among England's oriental subjects.

It is worthy of remark that on the part of the British Government there was never any doubt as to the necessity of re-establishing English credit in Afghanistan, and that the assembling of the avenging army under Pollock, and other subsequent measures taken, were at the instigation and with the consent of Sir Robert Peel's Administration. Lord Auckland had been unable to devise a policy to counteract that which had failed, and returned to England, palpably asking for guidance from those Imperial superiors, whose predecessors had guided the Governor-General to his original decision.

Never has been known a more consentient condemnation of a policy than that which posterity has pronounced on that of Lords Palmerston and Auckland in Central Asia. The campaign was believed by many at the time to have been undertaken unnecessarily, and by later

generations is known to have been premature and ill-timed.

As the danger was not immediate, the nation expected that her rulers should correctly gauge its proximity, and save India from unnecessary exhaustion and loss of life. This we can now, judging by the light of later events, see not to have been effected.

The warnings of Burnes were laid aside by the Whig Government, because the fact of the Russian advance blinded them to all other considerations. Moreover, they did not see the necessity for publishing minutes and despatches warning the Queen's advisers against a venture upon the carrying out of which both Lord Auckland and Lord Palmerston had resolved. This latter omission told sadly against the Government case when in later years it came up for public judgment, and, notwithstanding Lord Palmerston's spirited justification, the first invasion of Afghanistan is to be remembered for hasty adoption and faulty execution.

But in the wake of these two wars bequeathed to Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel by their predecessors, followed two others of great if not equally serious import. As the Duke of Wellington had pointed out, failure had been registered in Afghanistan when waging war with imperfect communications—imperfect, that is, from the nature of the peculiar circumstances then existing, as well as of the rocky and desolate tracts of country which it was necessary to traverse. The Ameers of Scinde had only assented to our passage through their territory because they believed us to be strong, and when it was demonstrated before the world that we were

unable to remain in Afghanistan, they rallied their forces and prepared to attack the British force under Sir Charles James Napier, which was posted in their midst for the purpose of keeping open communications, whilst Generals Nott, English, and Pollock were, during 1842, struggling to avenge the disasters of the previous year.

The result of Napier's watchful precaution and ready courage was soon apparent at Meeanee, on February 17th, 1843, when with only 2,600 men he overthrew the Beloochee force of 35,000, following up his advantage by others of minor import, but crowning all shortly after at Hyderabad, when the power of the Ameers was finally crushed and their sovereignty merged in that of England (June 1843).

A Gwalior war likewise temporarily engaged the attention of Sir Hugh Gough, who, however, found no difficulty in disposing of his opponents.

But it was towards the Punjaub that the attention of British statesmen and soldiers was anxiously directed. There Runjeet Singh, dying in 1838, had left behind him disquiet and unsettlement. The Old Lion of the Punjaub had bequeathed his kingdom, but not his genius for government, to successors who, soon being removed by violent death, gave way to a Regency acting for the young Dhuleep Singh.

Lall Singh, who was the nominal chief, acting for the Maha Ranee, the young Prince's mother, never had a firm hand on the soldiery, and on the 14th of December 1845, was induced to cross the Sutlej river and attack the British at Ferozepore. Here, on a plain outside the city, had been assembled the force destined to suffer

disaster and disintegration in Afghanistan. Here had the succouring armies of Pollock set out on their task, and after the resolve to withdraw from Cabul a concentration of troops had been effected amidst considerable pomp and display. Possibly the Sikhs were not entirely unmindful of the drama enacted before the very threshold of their homes. They had seen the destruction of a British army but partially avenged, and heard one Governor-General of the East India Company reverse the proclaimed policy of his predecessor. Lord Ellenborough, when in 1844 he left India, could claim for the Government he served that national prestige had to some degree been asserted, but the throne of the wretched puppet sovereign, Shah Soojah, was seen to have had no foundation, whilst the united endeavours of Lord Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary and the Indian Government, had failed to induce the Khan of Bokhara to surrender his two captives, Colonel Stoddart and Captain Arthur Conolly, who were brutally murdered whilst on a mission sent for the purpose of counteracting Persian intrigues and of lessening the evils of the slave trade then prevalent in Bokhara. These declensions of British authority were not entirely lost on the Sikh soldiery, who, unrestrained by the master hand, and deceived by their own leaders, resolved to measure strength with an adversary they alike loathed and dreaded.

The struggle which ensued on the sandy levels that skirt the Sutlej has not a parallel in Indian history. Again and again did victory hang in the balance. Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, with praiseworthy abnegation, served as second in command under

Sir Robert Peel and his Foreign Secretary evinced a statesmanlike disposition to accept accomplished facts, and not shrink from measures that did at first sight appear contrary to the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. But, as we have already pointed out, Peel distinctly held that there is an uncontrollable principle at work when civilisation and refinement come into contact with savagery and barbarism, which prevents the unfailing application of rules of conduct laid down in England.

Probably a more unjust war than that against the Ameers of Scinde was never waged, provided those Princes were considered to have possessed equal rights with the East India Company, and to be lords of their own domains. What ruler who could avoid it would allow columns of foreign troops to be quartered on his territory for the purpose of securing passage for an army bent on attacking a neighbour? The Ameers themselves were friendly with our foes, whose interests undoubtedly had much in common with their own, provided independence were in reality the supreme desideratum.

But, as Mr. Gladstone told us during his Midlothian campaign in 1880, the Government of Sir Robert Peel, even whilst disliking the policy thrust upon them by the remorseless current of events, did not hesitate to accept the situation, both in Scinde and on the Sutlej—adopting, that is, measures of Imperial consolidation, which, in common with those of Clive, Warren Hastings, and the Marquess Wellesley, it might be found difficult, if not impossible, to defend in the abstract. The truth of this contention can be shown without for one moment

endorsing the subsequent policy of annexation entered on by Lord Dalhousie, and marked as dangerous by that lucid writer and thinker on Indian politics, Colonel G. B. Malleson, who, in his grand history of the Mutiny, has clearly marked where the duties of England towards the natives of India both begin and end.

Whilst these momentous events threatened to loosen England's hold on India, Sir Robert Peel was doing all that statesmanship could effect towards increasing the prosperity of the various classes at home. During 1842 the finances of the country were boldly re-arranged and property called on to display its loyal acquiescence in a tax not exceeding 7*d.* in the pound, on incomes above £150 per annum. It is worthy of observation that the lieutenant who assisted the Premier to master the financial details on this occasion was no less a personage than William Ewart Gladstone, whose name from that moment has been bound up with his country's history. In 1844 an extension of the Factory Act was ensured, bringing a message of comparative hope and contentment to many a poverty-stricken home, where the young of either sex had previously been doomed to a short and miserable existence, during which necessity compelled them to defy the laws of nature. If the amelioration of their condition can be traced directly to no exclusive political section of society, yet the ready acquiescence of such men as the Premier and his Foreign Secretary made Lord Ashley's task possible.

To return to our theme.

Lord Ashburton was sent to Canada in 1842 for the purpose of settling the North-West frontier with the

Americans. This boundary line had been left undefined at the Peace of Ghent, when the desire for an amicable settlement was on either side so overpowering as to lead both British and American negotiators to slur over questions of difficulty. The result was that differences more than once occurred, and in reference to the limits of Oregon, war became possible between the two countries. The British Government then deserved well of its country when in the summer of 1846 these differences were finally arranged. Lord Ashburton's share in the settlement should not be forgotten, inasmuch as his conduct in Maine during 1842 and 1843 led men to look upon the questions at issue as capable of friendly arrangement, to be arrived at by mutual concession for the mutual advantage. And, indeed, it is pleasant to reflect that, despite prejudices which have been proved to be capable of dispersion, no question, however threatening, has embroiled us with America since the Peace of Ghent in 1814.

It should surely be one of the first duties of each British Minister thoroughly to understand the Constitution and study the needs of that vast kindred society which was severed from England because her rulers had neglected such lessons when Lord North and his Royal Master remained deaf to the warnings of Burke and Fox. Therefore it is that, in our opinion, the final settlement of the North-West Frontier was not the least of the benefits which accrued to England during the Premiership of Sir Robert Peel and the second Foreign Secretaryship of Lord Aberdeen.

In France the change of Ministry from Thiers to

Guizot had by no means allayed the jealousy which the maintenance of the Quadruple Treaty in Spain and Portugal had aroused. A symptom of such irritation made itself felt during 1844, when the violent measures taken by France in Tahiti nearly led to an explosion between the two nations.* Such, indeed, was the Eng-

* Sir Robert Peel was likewise called on by Lord John Russell to give assurances to the effect that the French raid on Tangiers, provoked by tribal incursions into Algeria, during 1844, did not prelude permanent occupation, and that Prince de Joinville's bombardment of Fort Mogador and the overthrow of the Arab army, under Abd-el-Kader at Isly, August 14th, 1844, would only lead to a peaceful settlement, to be followed by the absolute withdrawal of the force. Lord Aberdeen openly expressed to M. Guizot the views which Lord John Russell desired to elicit, and Sir Robert Peel was soon enabled to give the required assurances to the House of Commons. In Peel's mind there was no doubt about the necessity of promptly taking up a bold attitude when Imperial interests were at stake. How comes it, then, our readers will possibly ask, that, with this weight of evidence to the contrary, men of Mr. Cobden's probity and Mr. Morley's fairness in argument still claim Peel as a non-Imperial statesman. In Morley's *Life of Cobden*, vol. i., p. 71, will be found the basis of this contention. Peel, it is urged, desired to warn his countrymen against making too large an insurance when seeking to guard against external dangers—a doctrine which it seems to ourselves may be subscribed to by any follower of Palmerston himself. The point we desire to press is that Peel, in and out of office, uniformly advocated the maintenance of the maximum strength adjudged necessary by experts who had studied the special needs of England. The fact that he had been Chancellor of the Exchequer would of itself lead him to guard against an unnecessary and ceaseless encroachment on the public purse, such as no one in their senses commends.

To one quotation from Peel's speeches and writings which might lead men to suppose he was of Mr. Cobden's way of thinking in

lish feeling upon what to ourselves would seem a trivial matter, that the arbitrary hoisting of a French flag on an island in the Pacific Ocean caused Sir Robert Peel to speak out in terms of indignation such as, had he lived in 1879, would have led to his being in some quarters dubbed a Jingo.

But the French king avoided carrying matters to an extreme, and following the advice previously given him by Talleyrand, proceeded to avail himself of any crisis for the purpose of modifying the treaties of 1815.

Indications of this line of policy soon appeared when the Spanish marriage question occupied general

matters of national defence, we can straightway adduce—as, indeed, we have done—half a dozen to prove that not one jot or tittle of England's rights, moral or territorial, were ever surrendered by Sir Robert as a Minister, and that his moral support was never given to such a policy when in Opposition.

His last public utterance, on the occasion of the great debate on foreign affairs in 1850 (*Don Pacifico*), concluded with an expressed distrust of the then recent Liberal doctrine of gratuitously interfering to implant constitutional liberties in foreign countries.

“It is my firm belief (said Sir Robert Peel) that you will not advance the cause of constitutional government by attempting to dictate to other nations. If you do, your intentions will be mistaken, you will rouse feelings upon which you do not calculate, you will invite opposition to Government; and beware that the time does not arrive when, frightened by your own interference, you will withdraw your countenance from those whom you have excited, and leave upon their minds the bitter recollection that you have betrayed them.”

Had this advice been followed, the Poles in 1863 would not have been excited with false hopes, nor would the Danes have rued the day when they listened to British counsels; neither would Greece have been called on to pay such an exorbitant price for Thessaly in 1881.

attention. The French king had resolved on maintaining peace, notwithstanding his check in the East, after which, as we have above stated, M. Thiers had resigned, giving up his position as Minister to Guizot. The latter, a thoughtful, high-minded Protestant, was destined to become the close friend of Lord Aberdeen, and to retain that nobleman's confidence even after the Spanish marriages had been carried out contrary to the implied promise given to England. We have reached the latter conclusion after a careful consideration of the case from a French, and even from an Orleanist point of view. It was urged that during the two visits of Queen Victoria and her husband to Eu, Louis Philippe and Guizot undertook on the one hand not to marry the Infanta of Spain to the French king's son, Duke of Montpensier, until Queen Isabella of Spain herself was married and had issue; whereas, on the other hand, England promised not to recognise or support the candidature of anyone but a Bourbon Prince for the hand of the Queen of Spain.

This latter engagement the French attempted to stretch into a promise to *take active measures to promote* the choice of a Bourbon and to *oppose* the choice of any other Prince.* Had this expressed correctly the letter, or even the spirit, of the English agreement, an historian might feel bound to point out that an important section of English diplomatists, at the head of whom was Sir Henry Bulwer, were in favour of

* Stockmar's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 141.

Prince Leopold of Coburg, as a relation of the British Queen's. It is likewise no secret that such a solution of the difficulty would have been that most welcome to the English nation. But it is nevertheless true that the Queen, Prince Albert, and the English Ministry faithfully performed their portion of the Eu understanding. Not so the French Government, who utilised this assumed resolve of the British Court and people to promote a marriage between Queen Isabella and Prince Leopold, and argued therefrom that a conspiracy was on foot to break the agreement entered into at Eu in 1845. We are here concerned with the discussion so far as Lord Aberdeen's conduct of the matter is in question, and we find the Minister prudent and careful in his diplomacy to a degree.

After Guizot had, in February 1846, despatched a memorandum to London giving England's inclination towards Leopold as a reason for France not keeping her engagements, Lord Aberdeen, according to Stockmar, played the part of the ostrich. That is, he did little except declare that nothing had happened, or ever would happen, that could justify the French suspicions.*

But on this occasion the statesman had buried his head in the sand to some purpose, for three pages later Baron Stockmar is found to admit, in the notes left by him and published in his memoir, that the honourable and open proceedings of Lord Aberdeen made it impossible for the French, even if they wished it, to take advantage of their craftily-laid plan.

* Stockmar's *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 158.

So far, then, as Lord Aberdeen's share in the transaction is concerned, honesty was proved to be, as it often has been before, by far the best policy. But if the moral influence of Louis Philippe's Government was as yet powerful, the material prospects of the dynasty had been darkened by the sad tragedy which closed the Duke of Orleans' life in 1842. Young, handsome, and an ardent soldier, the heir to Louis Philippe's fortunes was, as we have said, well adapted to satisfy the French love of military display, and in some degree to supply an antidote to the Napoleonic feeling which surely, if slowly, had been arising ever since October 1840, when the *Belle Poule* brought the late Emperor's ashes to France, where, after being carried to Paris, they were deposited in the Invalides, the ceremony being witnessed by Louis Philippe and his family.

It was a sad message that flashed over the boulevards of Paris on July 13th, 1842, telling a great people that their immediate destinies were uncertain, and a royal father that his old age would be passed in grief, and that insecurity had come over, if, indeed, absolute effacement did not await the dynasty which Louis Philippe I. was held to represent.

In a small *auberge* near the Porte Maillot, and just beyond Vauban's old fortifications which encircle Paris, lay the heir of so many hopes, stricken, as from the very first became apparent to the medical men, beyond the reach of human aid. He who in his youthful and soldierly impulsiveness had panted for the hour of battle, preferring, as we read in Guizot's *Memoirs of a Minister*, to fall on the Rhine, rather than as a victim of revolu-

tionary violence in the boulevards of Paris, after all met his death by a pure accident but a stone's throw from the city. A pair of high-couraged runaway horses, the leap of an athletic youth from the swaying vehicle, but, alas, with his sword entangled with his limbs, —and the heir to Louis Philippe's fortunes was dashed to the ground to rise no more. This is all posterity will learn of a disaster which changed, as we believe, the fortunes of a nation. The sad event is commemorated by the Chapelle St. Ferdinand, near Paris, still the property of the much-honoured Orleans family. There we may still be enabled to realise something of the sad reality, for close to a fine recumbent statue of the dead Prince, and in the chapel vestry, hangs a painting which delineates the closing scene. The King and Queen Amelie—the Duchess of Orleans—the Counts D'Aumale, De Nemours, and Montpensier, the youthful Count de Paris, Marshals Gerard and Soult, and last, but not least, M. Guizot himself, are all depicted, their forms recalling a page of French, and, indeed, of European history which awaits the cool exploration of the philosophical thinker and writer.

Was it possible to construct a purely constitutional monarchy in France, which should alike prove durable and contain the constitutional elements which were wanting in the old States-General, thus allying freedom with tradition in the manner which has gained liberty for Englishmen for at least two centuries? This question is of such paramount importance that, at the risk of making what hasty readers may deem a flagrant digression, we have to consider the situation in Paris

after the Duke of Orleans' death. Such reflection lies by no means far from the thread of our story, inasmuch as for some reason Peel, Aberdeen, Wellington, and conspicuously Palmerston, do not seem to have looked with confidence on Louis Philippe, while it is notorious that he was dubbed a *parvenu* by the haughty Legitimist party in Europe.

It is indeed hard to feel any sentiment but contempt for the counsellors who desired to refuse the society of their sovereign's children to the accomplished young Duke of Orleans, because, forsooth, his race was not distinguished enough to consort with such puffed-up princelings, the ladies of the family being forced to restrain their natural inclination towards one who combined a fine presence with the chivalry of a race boasting descent from St. Louis.

Again, we cannot but look with astonishment at the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas of Russia, when he recalled Count Pahlen from Paris in 1844, lest, as senior Ambassador, he should be called on to congratulate Louis Philippe on his birthday.*

Such narrow-minded discontent with things as they are savours rather of the beggar on horseback, than the deliberate action of mighty potentates, and finds a counterpart only in the miserable suggestion made in the lately-published Russian diplomatic papers, whereby Napoleon III. is represented as having thrown a great

* Count Pahlen, at the age of ninety-five, is possibly the oldest diplomatist now living. He expressed his satisfaction after reading the second volume of this work, the characters in which he knew and recognised.

chance away when he elected to marry the woman he loved and admired, in preference to a marriage *de convenance* with a Swedish Princess.

But something beyond mere prejudice worked persistently against the Orleans monarchy, and, as a most important step was taken by Lord Aberdeen during the Foreign Secretaryship which we are considering, while the after action both of Lords Palmerston and Malmesbury became identical in sentiment, an attempt will be here briefly made to determine whence sprang the causes of such manifest distrust.

Louis Philippe had in 1830 been raised to the French throne through the influence of General Lafayette and the eminent banker Lafitte. He gladly adopted the neglected *Charte* of Louis XVIII., the gradual and contemptuous abnegation of which cost Charles X. his throne. But the newly-elected King of the French was at the outset more inclined towards Liberalism than any of his family, and, fraternising to a great degree with the people, he posed as a Citizen King, thus concentrating on his head the general wrath of Continental Sovereigns.

Long had rumour credited the liberal-minded Prince, when Duke of Orleans, with covert designs on his obstinate cousin's throne, and it is even rumoured that when, at Charles X.'s last assembly, in 1830, previous to the promulgation of the fatal Ordinances, Louis Philippe picked up the king's hat, which had fallen, this slight incident was by many regarded as a sinister omen. Hence there existed the elements of virulent family differences, which made the new Government as unwelcome to the Faubourg St. Germain as we have

previously shown it to have been despised by the blue-blood Legitimists of Europe. Moreover, we have found the genuine Constitutional instincts of Louis Philippe impugned in more than one volume where the writers had exceptional means of informing themselves, but we must unhesitatingly refuse to believe this view to be correct, either as to Louis Philippe himself, or the two great geniuses, Thiers and Guizot, whose talents adapted them so thoroughly for the Parliamentary arena, and whose whole careers are one long protest in favour of popular rule concentrated in a Constitutional form.

The cause of England's mistrust is most certainly to be explained by the circumstance that, as we have previously stated, the Orleanist system did not hesitate to seek popularity by inflaming the old sentiment which Waterloo and the treaties of 1815 had left in many French minds. Whether in Belgium, Syria, or Spain, the attempt to overshadow and, what is worse, sometimes deceive England, made her Ministers distrustful and a real alliance impossible, while it ultimately left the Orleanist *régime* without the aid, moral, if not material, which England was ready to grant to un-aggressive foreign Liberalism of a non-socialistic type.

There remains but the failure to hold their ground at home in France to account for ; and here we believe the hindrance was, if we may so use the word, Radical, and for the reason that the vague strivings after freedom, and therefore, after Parliamentary Government, which, at the close of the eighteenth century, took the rude form of savage revolution, had no known representative model to copy, no national habit to indulge. Even the States-

General had not been assembled since 1618. In Germany, where the revolution, *per se*, never took root, it was otherwise, inasmuch as despite the total absence of a National Assembly, there still existed certain local liberties in the municipal form, which readers of Seeley's *Life of Stein* will know it was the object of more Liberal German statesmen to nurture and enlarge.

The French yearnings were for something beyond the phantom States-General, for something undefined, and yet held to include absolute liberty, if not licence, in thought and deed, such as genuine Constitutional rule must surely check and was known so to do by all who had ever been called to exercise any deliberative duties.

Hence the difficulty before which Louis XVIII. faltered, against which Charles X. struggled vainly and illegally, and with which Louis Philippe likewise failed to cope. But in the heir to his throne, the Duke of Orleans, he had at least a temporary stay on which to look for support to a somewhat declining cause.

No matter, then, that the heir to Napoleon's glories was in prison for his raid on Boulogne, August 6th, 1840,*

* In Count Orsi's *Recollections of the Last Century* (Longmans), pp. 129-162, will be found an authentic account of Prince Louis Napoleon's Boulogne expedition. It differs little from the generally received story, which tells how the garrison, apprised previously of his advent, first hesitated, and then left the adventurous heir to Napoleonic fortunes to his fate, the military changing an attitude of doubtful neutrality for one of active hostility, both firing on the fugitives and appearing on the heights with the National Guard, when the First Napoleon's nephew had to swim for his life.

But the oft-told story of the eagle is explained in a commonplace manner, namely, that during what proved to be fatal delay

it is nevertheless true that when the Duke of Orleans fell from his carriage whilst driving beyond the Arc de

one Colonel Parquin bought the bird at Gravesend from a mere freak of his own, asking the vendor in broken English, "*How mooch?*" and straightway, having completed the purchase, tethered the noble bird to the mainmast. When the steamer *Edinburgh Castle* fell into the hands of the French authorities, the eagle was taken to the Boulogne Museum, whence it escaped. The story of its presence amidst the conspirators as a dynastic emblem was, of course, speedily circulated.

The attempt on Boulogne was foiled, and failed to achieve even partial success, by reason of a delay which befel the Prince in London. In our opinion, it never deserved the contemptuous ridicule which enemies were eager to cast on it.

The precedent of the Great Emperor in 1814 was, doubtless, before Louis Napoleon when he, so to speak, threw the dice for a throne. When Napoleon I. left the Bay of St. Juan and Cannes for Paris, after his escape from Elba in 1814, he marched with a small band of followers to Grasse, where the Royalist commandant refused him admittance to the town, so necessitating a detour amongst the mountains of many miles. And yet his progress to Paris was one long triumph!

There is one other feature in Count Orsi's narrative which is of interest, and it is the appearance of General Montholon, the First Napoleon's friend and fellow-captive in St. Helena, in Prince Louis Napoleon's train. Well might the assembled Buonapartists cheer lustily the man whose devotion had been so paramount, destined as he was to share the falling fortunes of a third Napoleon in the prison at Ham.

The course of our story will tell how the present Lord Malmesbury, after visiting his friend at Ham, returned to England for the purpose of soliciting Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen to intercede with Louis Philippe and Guizot for the young Buonaparte's release from prison, on the condition that he should covenant to retire to Ecuador, and never return to Europe.

Count Orsi, on the other hand, narrates how money was borrowed from the millionaire Duke of Brunswick, which might be paid to the narrator himself, when the Prince was meditating an escape

Triomphe, the main obstacle to a Buonapartist restoration was there and then removed.

But the course of the British Government continued to be successful in Foreign affairs, while at home prosperity made great strides between 1841 and 1846, and railways were promoted by Sir Robert Peel to a measure believed at the time to be in advance of the demand made for such locomotion, while finally, as we all know, it fell to this historic Administration to free and cheapen the food of the poor, and, stripped of much verbiage, such will even be their title to supreme honour. They threw open the ports to save Ireland from a famine, and declared Free Trade established to satisfy an agitation the leaders of which had convinced Sir Robert Peel that an economic truth was at stake. In 1846 he would be a bold man who averred that no grievance existed when high protective duties sustained the agricultural interest in contentment whilst their commercial brethren were in want.

Wrong in principle we all allow Protection to be, said Sir Robert, except on the special ground of national interest, when he opened his great speech which established Free Trade. On that very ground of national interest, or on the plea that such a crisis has arisen, a cry came in 1881 from the large towns of Yorkshire and Lancashire asking for Protection against foreigners, whom

from his place of confinement. The interview between Count Orsi and the eccentric Duke is well told, and is most amusing. The whole volume is full of the interest naturally surrounding the recollections of one who knew Louis Napoleon so well. The Boulogne expedition Count Orsi actually devised.

careful readers of Peel's great speech will see were believed by that statesman to be about to follow England's example of selling in the dearest and buying in the cheapest market.

They have not done so, and ruin at Bradford, distress at Coventry, attests to the existence of a weak side, if not in the idea itself, at least in the original argument for one of the best of human ideas. But these toilers of the great cities, who for the moment desire change from a system which, on the whole, has enriched the community, should remember that hand in hand with their own special desire for Protection, will proceed a demand for concomitant agricultural relief such as, in a nation committed to popular courses, never can be seriously entertained. While the ship of State sailed through smooth waters all might be well, even whilst the revenue reaped benefit from a small duty on foreign corn, and colonial produce came into England free.

But it would be open to any eloquent agitator to raise the cry of cheap bread at the slightest inclination to hard times ; and what man is there amongst us, who has observed the later course of events, who believes that with such a watchword arguments for Free Trade would not prove irresistible.

Therefore it is that we believe Sir Robert Peel's long-considered line of action will leave permanent mark on the direction of English policy ; which, whatever special commercial treaty the nation may temporarily accede to, will still, on the whole, remain loyal to Free Trade.

As we know, Sir Robert Peel's conduct cost him the Premiership, and subjected him to the indignant con-

demnation even of those who knew the value of a great united Conservative party. And yet the Premier himself, as the late Lord Derby said of him after his death, sacrificed personally, for what he believed to be right, more than could be expected of any ordinary man in a like position.*

* "Why did Disraeli attack Peel so bitterly?" is by no means an uncommon question to be asked by those but partially acquainted with the great controversy which raged over England in 1846.

The answer we believe to consist simply in the fact that, after giving due credit to Sir Robert for his intellectual conversion and subsequent honesty, yet human nature, in the shape of a dissipated Parliamentary majority, required a spokesman who might speak as they thought and translate the indignation which animated their spirits. (See *Lord Beaconsfield's Speeches*, as collected by Mr. Kebbel (Longman's), vol. i. pp. 58-257.)

We see no reason for doubting that Mr. Disraeli felt this indignation on his own account; that, as his ability fitted him, so his natural feelings prompted him, to lead the attack upon his quondam chief. The Conservative majority was laboriously welded together to support the very system to destroy which their chosen chief triumphantly led a recalcitrant section of a once more disorganised party, and this we state full of previously-expressed admiration for Peel, and appreciation of what he did for England.

Lord Lytton, in the *New Timon*, holds the following language upon Peel's rupture with his party:—

"He had not party, he had England's trust;
When firm, she called him cautious, yielding, just. . . .
Pitt in his prime was not a party man,
And Peel seem'd born to end as Pitt began.
But were the followers wrong, if their belief
Clung to the cause deserted by its chief?
If loud their wrath, can honesty condemn?
Candour, absolving him, excuses them."

This is of a different character, indeed, to the pungent criticism of the Whig Chancellor, Lord Cottenham. "Either," said he,

Such was the view held of the personal conduct of the chief whose administration followed a truly Conservative

“ Sir Robert Peel foresaw the necessity of giving up his opposition to the repeal of the Corn Laws, or he did not. If he foresaw it, he was wanting in honesty when he persevered in his opposition. If he did not foresee it, he was wanting in wisdom, and is not fit to be entrusted with the supreme direction of this great Empire.”

It is very difficult to dispute the logic of this ruling, we must admit ; but it precludes the possibility of the intellectual conversion which we believe took place in Peel's mind. So it was that a sensitive conscience helped him to brave

“ The taunt which stings the honour to the core,
The look which says, ‘ False friend, we trust no more.’ ”

But it is vain to deny that in 1846 the self-sacrificing Prime Minister suffered in men's estimation in consequence of faults of manner to which numerous witnesses testify. It was hard enough to be thrown into a minority, but worse to be cavalierly treated by a chief who had so changed his mind that he did not even fear fighting hostile tariffs with free imports, while with a superior air he seemed to assume the crass stupidity of those who lingered wistfully around his own forsaken creed. But this we believe was exclusively the fault of manner, fully justifying the Iron Duke's famous aphorism in 1829, “ How shall we get on with the king ? I have no small talk, Peel no manner.”

Of the *conscientious* spirit in which Sir Robert Peel regarded the Premiership clear evidence was found at Drayton Manor after he died, where, in a private chamber, was discovered a self-composed prayer to the Almighty for strength to enable him to perform his duties. Peel's self-sacrifice received final and complete demonstration when, as Mr. Morley, in his *Life of Cobden*, shows, he refused to entertain the idea of returning to power after the repeal of the Corn Laws as head of a great middle-class party.

Mr. Theodore Martin, in his *Life of the Prince Consort*, has furnished evidence, as we have already observed, of the warm heart that lay concealed under a formal exterior ; telling us how the Minister shed tears after a second dastard attempt to injure Queen Victoria had been made during his second Premiership in 1842,

line in foreign policy, namely, one of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations—the policy adopted by Castlereagh at the close of the great French War, and more or less endorsed by all his successors.

Probably, in history, the names of Wellington, Peel, and Aberdeen, will descend together to posterity marked as resolute upholders of treaty law, who, whilst refusing to interfere unnecessarily with other nations,

miscreants, by name Francis and Bean, having successively assailed Her Majesty.

Finally, we append the following letter for the purpose of throwing one more weight into the balance of our contention to the effect that Peel was no cosmopolitan Minister, comparatively careless of British honour abroad.

“What must be my feelings when I retire from the House of Commons after eight or nine hours’ attendance on frequently superfluous debates, and feel conscious that all that time should have been devoted to such matters as our relations with the United States, the adjustment of the Oregon dispute, our Indian policy, our political or commercial relations with the great members of the community of powerful nations.”—Sir Robert Peel to Cobden, June 1846.—Morley’s *Life of Cobden*, vol. i. p. 899.

Sir Robert Peel clearly declined to allow domestic to supersede foreign politics in the manner some of his friends and biographers seem to assume. And, indeed, the great merit of Peel’s second administration consists in the fact that no branch of the community was forgotten. Economical and commercial matters shared attention with foreign and colonial affairs, while the Premier, in private and public capacity, freely encouraged the Arts. Nor were literature and the interests of authors neglected. Lord Aberdeen tried to unravel the tangled skein of international copyright, sending to Paris a fit, if informal, British representative, no other than Mr. Gladstone, whose short stay in the French capital was not totally unproductive of result, a convention for securing copyright under certain circumstances having been shortly afterwards made between England and France.

were yet influenced by none of the *doctrinaire* theories the very advocates of which find them incapable of application to practical politics.

We have traced with some detail the course of Sir Robert Peel's foreign policy, because an impression has been lately allowed to go abroad, based partly on careless reading of Mr. Gladstone's statements before the General Election of 1880, and partly on absence of all reference to European or Colonial matters in the recent biographies, that Peel was not a Minister who studied foreign affairs. Or, as Mr. G. Barnett Smith, in his otherwise appreciative life of Sir Robert Peel (page 199), has phrased it, when comparing the subject of his biography with Canning :—
“ Each left a school. In the one we may learn how to sustain our renown and our power abroad ; in the other, how to advance our prosperity at home.” The truth being that Peel regarded his country's interests as a whole, and so earned the high and lasting renown which clings around his name. We have written, therefore, here, so as to supply facts for the benefit of future inquiry. As regards Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen, however, one leading incident in their Political career—so far as foreign politics are concerned—has hitherto remained without record, destined as it was to influence the future of the world, and to which we invite special attention. When the Czar Nicholas was in England in 1844, so vivid were the fears of British statesmen as to the ambition of France, that, notwithstanding the Emperor Nicholas' unconcealed desire to partition Turkey, the three representatives of the then Conservative party, namely, *the Duke of Wellington, Sir*

*Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen, met the Russian Czar, and signed a secret memorandum promising to exert their personal influence on behalf of the Greek as opposed to the Latin Church at Jerusalem, and so practically to forward Russian claims to the guardianship of the Holy Places, as opposed to those of France, who was to be ignored in the matter. This memorandum, to a certain extent favouring Russia's claim to a protectorate of the Greek Church, was never placed in the Foreign Office archives, but was forwarded in succession from one English Foreign Secretary to another, until, as we shall show, poor Lord Aberdeen (Wellington and Peel being dead) was called on for his pound of flesh in 1853. In Sir Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort* (vol. i. pp. 214–225), will be found a full description of the Czar Nicholas' visit to England in 1844. It is there clearly told, first, that he never mentioned State affairs at court, and we learn, on page 223, that “*He (Nicholas) asked for nothing whatever, has merely expressed his great anxiety to be on the best terms with us, but not to the exclusion of others.*” Now as the gist of the secret agreement was the exclusion of France, it is clear that at this moment the contents and nature of that document were unknown at head-quarters in London. The signatories doubtless contemplating that they had given an earnest of their individual bias, and not subscribed to a pact binding upon others. Unfortunately this view seems to have been adopted, in 1853 by the chosen statesmen of Great Britain, when the Czar was misinformed as to the drift of public feeling in England.*

It is, moreover, worthy of note that Sir Theodore

Martin, writing in 1875, expressed conviction that Nicholas, when in London, had failed in his object—failed, that is, specially with Sir Robert Peel the Prime Minister, one of the three statesmen who promised to support Russia in the matter of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, so that it is reasonable to suppose that those best able to judge either remained ignorant of the secret agreement or failed to gauge its import.

Sir Theodore Martin, after showing that Sir Robert Peel's desire was to see the Orleans dynasty peacefully secure in France, and noting Nicholas's diplomatic checks, first, on his attempting to detach England from France, and, secondly, to secure British co-operation in partitioning the Turkish Empire, adds the following significant sentence :—

“ It is not improbable, however, that he deceived himself upon this subject, and was led by this self-deception into adopting the policy which some years after brought him into disastrous collision with the Western Powers.”

After a brilliant military review, pleasant intercourse with our own Royal family, the charms of Ascot races, a fête at Chiswick, visits to the Opera, and all the varying delights of London life, Nicholas left Great Britain popular amongst the masses, and respected by those best able to judge of character. A section of political opinion, however, in France, exercising, we must allow, some perspicuity, believed the Czar's visit to be *connected with some secret arrangements to the prejudice of French interests.*

Lord Aberdeen, as Foreign Secretary, has to share with M. Guizot the credit of allaying the quarrels between the Maronites and Druses in the Lebanon, so as to prevent

such massacres as in 1860 followed the crisis which had been so long postponed by diplomatic action.*

For the personal part of Lord Aberdeen's closing years, men will in future turn to the records of Guizot's career, and to the *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, where are constant references to the charming personal character of the man whom Mr. Gladstone, and the gifted Peelites generally, never ceased to speak of with affection, not to say enthusiasm, and who carried self-abnegation to the extent of never allowing a single member of his family to profit, even indirectly, by his possession of power and

* An important event, not under the cognizance of our Government, deserves a passing notice. A month before Peel and Aberdeen left office, unable to carry their Coercion Bill for Ireland, when the abandonment of Protection had disintegrated their party, Prince Louis Napoleon escaped from Ham, and did so on being refused permission to visit his father, lying sick at Florence.

Passing through Belgium he reached England on the Derby day, May 27th, and dined with Lady Blessington at Kensington, being entertained by the same hostess and in the same house where he spent his last evening in England before he set out for Boulogne in 1840.

Henceforward Louis Philippe's Government had to reckon with a peril of the greater magnitude. (For Orsi's full and interesting account of the Prince's escape, preparations connected with which he himself supervised, see Count Orsi's *Recollections*, pp. 197-217.)

It is scarcely to be wondered at that confusion should arise in men's minds between the Count Orsi who wrote the *Recollections* and designed the Boulogne expedition, and Count d'Orsay, the *bon ami* of Lady Blessington, and also of the Prince President and future Emperor, Napoleon III., who extended the hand of friendship to the man of art and fashion.

Hence a natural confusion between the two individuals, who probably knew the French Emperor equally well. Count Orsi is, it is said, now living near Monaco (May 1882).

control of preferment. As late as March 1881, Mr. Gladstone spoke in the House of Commons of the great influence possessed by Lord Aberdeen over Continental Governments, and of his being a friend united in the ties of friendship and affection.* Although Lord Aberdeen's thoughtful reticence is proverbial, it must by no means be inferred that he was unable to defend himself in debate at a crisis, or, indeed, to carry war into the enemy's country. The records of Lord Palmerston's Foreign Office experiences bear testimony to the sometimes

* One public matter of great importance occurred during Lord Aberdeen's Foreign Secretaryship, to the close of which we have now carried our story. Disturbances on the frontier led the United States, at the instance of the more southern part of her dominions, to annex Texas, which caused a war with Mexico. Even though the scene of action lay on the other side of the vast Atlantic, it nevertheless seems strange that so portentous an event as the conquest of Mexico, and the taking of its capital by General Scott in September 1847, has made so little impression upon the minds of Englishmen of this generation. We are to some degree anticipating events; but we may observe that when the United States troops defiled into the beautiful valley of the Cordillera mountains, and thence beheld the steeples and domes of Mexico, the prospect amply repaid the soldiers for their toil and for the sharp struggle which ensued. The subsequent annexation and admission of Texas into the Union has an interest as containing the earliest cause of quarrel between the North and South, which, culminating in 1860, was destined to plunge a continent into civil war. Moreover, as Mr. Jefferson Davis tells us in his lately-published *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, it was owing to the Mexican war that the South had any arms at all in store in 1861. We are anxious to see knowledge of American traditions disseminated in England, and so gladly draw attention to this interesting episode of nineteenth-century history, which, if we mistake not, has escaped even the searching glance of Mr. Justin McCarthy, whose appreciation of

inconvenient interpellations which the ex-Foreign Secretary, so versed, as Mr. Gladstone tells us he was, in the secrets of foreign Courts, would make in Parliament. Guizot, again, tells us that Lord Aberdeen had a habit of adopting silence deliberately when he believed time and experience would do more to convince his opponents than the talk which both Napoleon I. and Carlyle associated with British institutions. Indeed, there are some cases in which Lord Aberdeen avowedly deprecated popular support, declaring with Alcibiades that if applauded he was led to ask which of his sayings had been foolish. Such was Lord Aberdeen's antipathy to the Whig foreign policy in 1849, that during a debate in the House of Peers he said Lord Minto could only have been received by the King of Naples, on his notorious mission for the scarcely-concealed purpose of promoting Italian unity (of which we shall shortly speak further), had not the same reason stood good which induced the old woman of Syracuse to acquiesce in the tyranny of Dionysius, viz. *lest the devil should come next*, a cutting parallel scarcely in character with Lord Aberdeen's accustomed charity, instances of which have been frequent in these pages.

Farther encomiums it will be purposeless to give here, but we will conclude by advising our readers to study the pathetic account of Lord Aberdeen's funeral,

our brethren across the Atlantic is not the least pleasant feature of his enticing pages, after reading which Englishmen do not, at least, rise with the mistaken impression that the American continent lacks a history.

in the beautiful old church at Stanmore, to be found in the second volume of the *Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, with extracts from whose diary we conclude this chapter.

“And he is at rest, that just, upright, chastened, courteous spirit ; that clear perception and firm hold of truth ; that comprehensive, calm retrospect, ennobling all his conversation. . . . The last link of such a chain holding us to Pitt and the old giants, and such an example of unselfish greatness of character. The greatness of power mingled with simplicity—the elements of all greatness. . . . Off at 8.15 in order to attend Lord Aberdeen’s funeral. Very cold. A wonderfully striking sight. England’s Premier—vanity of vanities ! Graham’s tall kingly figure and bald head in the falling snow. Gladstone with his face speaking. Newcastle. The light within the vault. A most impressive sight, engraven in my memory for ever.”—*Life of Bishop Wilberforce*, vol. ii. p. 464.

PALMERSTON. (III.)

JUNE 1846 TO DECEMBER 1851.

LORD PALMERSTON had never concealed his objections to the foreign policy pursued during Sir Robert Peel's Administration by Lord Aberdeen. He dissented from the details of the Ashburton Treaty because, although it had determined the frontier question at issue on the north-west of Canada, it contained a proviso which practically gave up the right of search, and made it almost impossible to retain our old supremacy on the high seas. Moreover, as has been stated in this work (vol. ii. p. 276), he conscientiously believed that the Conservative Government had endeavoured to sustain the despotic system of government in Europe. This we now see to have been an erroneous view, inasmuch as it received a decided contradiction through the inexorable logic of facts, and in truth Lord Palmerston was sorely disturbed

as to the future of his own long-cherished schemes in 1846, before he had been many hours in the Foreign Office so indelibly connected with his name. The Quadruple Treaty guaranteeing Constitutional government in Spain and Portugal, had but nominally succeeded in effecting the purposes for which it was promulgated. The Carlists, as we have seen, were expelled from Spain, where the young Queen Isabella's throne was directly threatened by no dynastic enemies ; and yet this quiet and repose came to Spain through the resolve of her rulers to embrace the very autocratic rule which, combining elements both priestly and inquisitorial, had led the British Government to throw their weight into the scale against Don Carlos.

Thus it came to pass that as early as July 24th, 1846, Lord Palmerston not only spoke of Prince Leopold as a possible candidate for the Spanish Queen's hand, but proceeded to lecture the supporters of absolutism in a manner which, if deserved, was not likely to be tamely submitted to by the proud descendants of the immortal Cid. Here, in the humble judgment of the writer, it was that this great minister erred. Not even with the enormous force of his influence and the weight of his opinion could Lord Palmerston instil English ideas into his continental *protégés*. The Constitutions proclaimed at his instigation remained to the end, if indeed they lasted, more or less hot-house plants, save and except in the case of that promulgated in Belgium during 1833, where good and sound principles of government were from the first put in practice. It was an indiscretion to have allowed the possibility of Prince Leopold's candi-

dature for the Spanish Queen's hand, inasmuch as Guizot and Louis Philippe rested their case on an assumed intention of England to avoid the fulfilment of her part of the compact arrived at by the sovereigns at Eu. It was a mistake, as giving power and cohesion to the gathering mass of opinion at home, which, if not actively hostile to Lord Palmerston's foreign policy, only retained an attitude of acquiescence because the traditions of British Parliamentary life were opposed to party warfare over such matters; while—and this is by no means least in importance—it was the means of giving cohesion to the autocratic section of European opinion, who looked to Russia as a leader. As for the forbearance of the scattered Conservatives, the conduct of the Whig Lords Grey and Grenville, when opposing the Spanish war between 1809 and 1813, was felt to have intrinsically weakened their party, whilst even the great services and transcendent abilities of Fox had previously failed to clear his memory from the stain of opposition scarcely patriotic. Thus it came to pass that at home Lord Palmerston's irregular and over-strained interference with other countries was tolerated, if not applauded, by a nation who nevertheless knew that they possessed a great minister, representative alike of the national determination and love of freedom.*

* Louis Philippe carried his point about the Spanish marriages, but the political intention thereby given temporary effect to was never destined to bear fruit. We have expressed our belief that Lord Palmerston made a mistake when he publicly alluded to the possibility of Prince Leopold's candidature, and justice now bids the historian to declare the French schemes to have been not only

We have above expressed the general view, taken from a moderately Constitutional and Conservative standpoint, of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy ; that it was justified, by extraordinary circumstances, and was calculated in the main to attain the ends desired by those responsible for the Treaties of 1814-15.

Lord Palmerston knew, better than most men, that, being avowedly a compromise, arrived at in the face of a threatening conflict, the treaty of Vienna left much to be desired in the direction of granting the desires of nationalities and the dictates of Liberty, which yearnings, under the threatening clouds of possible revolution, he endeavoured to satisfy, and yet preserve peace as secured by the much-abused Treaty of 1814.

The time has arrived when a broader and more general view can be taken of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy than could possibly be indulged in by contemporaries. We have been constantly told that the continental nations, having little in common with England, were in 1847-48 totally unprepared for the reception of constitutional doctrines, and that the attempt to engraft them abroad resulted in the fiasco which might therefore be expected. But truth bids us add that, writing in the year 1882, and after various and prolonged vicissitudes, we see various shades of Parliamentary government subsisting in Belgium, Germany, Austria, Italy, and France, while we see it under trial in a rude form in Spain. Lord

disingenuous, as many diplomatic measures unfortunately are, but distinctly and undoubtedly dishonest. How the high private character of Guizot could allow him to become party to such conduct still remains unexplained.

Palmerston's efforts have not, then, been without fruit, seeing that a change in the direction of free institutions has passed over the whole face of Europe, and this we state without for one instant desiring to bind ourselves to the support of the dangerous principle of Nationalities, towards which Lord Palmerston inclined. We admit that adherence to that principle, under Stein and Hardenbergh, in 1813, made the rising of Germany possible, and has since contributed to her national unity, as well as to that of Italy; yet we consider that it contains the elements of perpetual unrest, inasmuch as it involves phenomena of disturbance which are, from the very nature of the case, periodically reproducible, time and place alone being changed.

But credit is none the less due to those who prevented such efforts from exceeding their natural scope, and who, above all, took a firm stand on treaty law, making Lord John Russell's boast (when he first took office in 1846, and saw the free Republic of Cracow overrun by Austria and Russia) possible. "Our protests," said the Prime Minister, "have been disregarded, but our moral force has been increased and fortified, inasmuch as there is no treaty, either ancient or modern, which we have violated or set at nought."

This illegal proceeding at Cracow proved but the prelude to a tempestuous time of European affairs, such as mankind has not since seen, and scarcely finds a counterpart even at the period of the first French Revolution. The reign of Law was temporarily changed for one of Might when the Imperial bandits annexed Cracow to Austria, contrary to the treaty engagements

of Europe. Prince Metternich may be said to have thus forsworn himself before the world, and to have assisted at the undoing of his own handiwork.

But, as is usually the case on such occasions, the statesmen of Europe had their hands too full to do more than protest against such irregularity, so that even the stout-hearted Palmerston had to accept the inevitable.

The year 1847 saw preliminary and threatening movements, which gave an ominous forecast of what was soon to follow.

Civil war began in Switzerland, where the Sonderbund, or union of Roman Catholic States, strove to uphold Jesuit teaching against contrary doctrines maintained by other cantons, of which Geneva was the centre. As the little Swiss Federation was completely surrounded by Roman Catholic, and, for the most part, absolute Governments, there was, for a time, danger lest the neutrality guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna should be infringed. Here, indeed, we find Palmerston standing stoutly by treaty law, and striving to show that the immunity from foreign interference extended to times of internal commotion and disturbance ; so that the Roman Catholic cantons had to yield to the will of a majority who were permitted to exert their legal rights as such.

Italy was at the same moment honeycombed with conspiracy. The Austrians were hateful alike to the populations and the sovereigns of the country. They had, from time to time, held the land by right of conquest, their tenure dating back to the sixteenth century, when Charles V. was at the summit of his power. But their domination was looked on in 1847 with a loathing such

as continued to be felt until the final liberation of the country.

Lord Palmerston knew all this, and in his plain way declared that the Austrians had no business there at all, and sent Lord Minto to Italy, in 1847, for the purpose, as Baron Stockmar tells us in his *Memoirs* (vol. ii. p. 364), of obtaining timely and moderate concessions on the part of the Governments, and thankful and moderate acceptance of what was offered them on part of the people. This desired result was not at the moment obtained, and, as the enemies to Lord Palmerston's foreign policy declared, his action led to wars and revolutions throughout Italy, whilst the British Minister came to be looked on as the enemy to all things Austrian.*

* Count Orsi, in his *Recollections of the Last Century*, gives an original account of the schemes afoot to effect political changes in Italy, which, taking their inception in 1831 and 1832, culminated in action before 1848 passed away. We are taken behind the scenes and shown the two sons of the ex-king of Holland opening negotiations with no less a personage than the Duke of Modena, who professed himself anxious for the liberation of Italy. Risings were to have taken place simultaneously in Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and the Romagna, at a moment when Louis Philippe was believed to be determined to observe a strict non-intervention so far as France was concerned. When, however, the Austrians marched into the Romagna, the Duke of Modena played traitor, and, looking only to his own safety, calmly executed the insurgents as if he had never himself heard of the conspiracy. Count Orsi introduces us to the captivating young Prince Napoleon Louis, elder brother of Napoleon III., whose brilliant future was cut off by death but a few months before the Great Napoleon's son, the Duke de Reichstadt (according to Buonapartist traditions Napoleon II.), passed away from the world where his boyhood had

The year 1848 opened in England amidst peace and plenty, after a general election, whereat no great question had stirred the people's feelings, and at a time when the Conservative party was powerless for purposes of government, being deserted by all the enlightened spirits, who owed their position in public life to Peel. But on the continent thunder-clouds, long lowering around, burst almost universally, and threatened destruction to principalities and powers. It was also a peculiar feature of this convulsion that the sovereigns themselves were, as a general rule, unequal to the occasion.

The King of Prussia trembled before the Frankenstein he had by his own factious policy aroused. In Vienna the Austrian Emperor quailed before a mob, and sacrificed his famous Chancellor, Prince Metternich, to their demands. In France Louis Philippe refused to strike a blow for order, and came ignominiously to England disguised as Mr. Smith, whilst the only spark of spirit shown on behalf of the dynasty was evinced by the Duchess of Orleans, who brought her son, the Comte de Paris before the Legislative Assembly, in order that he might profit by his grandfather's abdication, which, made in the child's favour, was nevertheless rendered

created so unique an interest. French to the backbone himself, we know how an hour's conversation with Marmont, his father's old comrade-in-arms, delighted him at Vienna, and from Count Orsi we learn with what magic the King of Rome's very name acted on the French people. But this child of the highest destiny passed his closing days a martyr to Austrian policy.

void by the violence of a mob, who broke their way into the Chamber and made deliberation impossible. But for Lamartine's efforts on behalf of reasonable freedom, blood might have flowed as it did during the Directory, and the guilt thereof have remained on the head of a monarch who failed to keep the compact entered into with his people, and to do his best to preserve for them the social order upon which all government rests. We write this not without much hesitation, inasmuch as had not the historical truth been undoubted, Louis Philippe's high and admirable character, strong understanding, and remarkable talents would have led us to extenuate somewhat in expressing censure. But there is no doubt about the vacillation which allowed the troops to be defeated in the Paris streets by a mob. Marshal Bugeaud plainly stated his ability to keep order if allowed to act, but was left in deadly uncertainty until the revolutionary spirit had spread through the city.

Those who desire to form an adequate idea of Louis Philippe as a man, should turn to the closing pages of Lord Brougham's *Autobiography*, where, amidst other biographical sketches, one of the Citizen King is not the least remarkable. Simple in his tastes, thoroughly companionable in society, and happy in his home, Louis Philippe had observed carefully when travelling and in European exile. He, moreover, possessed an unusual power of mimicry, and surprised Lord Brougham by so faithfully imitating his former fellow-traveller in America, Mr. Alexander Baring, the famous financier, that the British Peer thought himself in Lombard Street rather than at Paris. Moreover, Louis Philippe could give an

adequate idea of what Robespierre and Danton's manners were, and reproduced his idea of these monsters nearly half a century after French Society was first shaken to its depths by the great Revolution.

But we must return to consideration of the European situation.

Had Prince Napoleon Louis been alive his chance of one day gaining the hearts of the French people must indeed have been considerable ; for if any individual could be found to compete with the captivating young Duke of Orleans in public favour, it was the handsome, clever, instructed, and athletic son of Louis, once King of Holland, the latter being, at the time we mention, better known as the Comte St. Leu. Both Prince Napoleon Louis and Louis Napoleon (afterwards Napoleon III.) were members of the Italian *Carbonari*, or Secret Society, and as such had sworn to do what in them lay to assist Italy in gaining her independence. It is, moreover, worthy of note that the younger brother was distinguished in Council by his silence, such conduct fully tallying with his after demeanour when as French Emperor he became arbiter of Europe. The two brothers fought bravely in the ranks of the insurgents in the Romagna during 1832, efforts which, taken in unison with Magenta and Solferino, were scarcely repaid in 1870 when Prince Jerome Napoleon besought Victor Emanuel's Minister, the excellent Lanza, to stand shoulder to shoulder with Italy's former benefactor, and one of her oldest friends, viz. Napoleon III. But we anticipate, the more because Count Orsi's narrative does not carry us down to Lord Minto's mission in 1847, the events

of 1848, or to the abdication of the chivalrous Charles Albert after Novara.*

Russia alone, by means of her iron system of despotic rule, succeeded in keeping the peace sorely threatened by agitation and revolution amongst the Czech and Magyar nationalities who belonged to the neighbouring Austrian Empire. As for the Austrian Empire itself, disintegration appeared to be imminent, as not only towards the Russian and Turkish frontiers were the component parts threatening to dissolve, but Charles Albert of Sardinia headed a national movement which was formed for the purpose of expelling the German element out of Lombardy and Venetia alike.

To complicate matters further, Rome rose against the Papal Government, the populace murdering Count Rossi, Pio Nino's Minister of Justice; and thus did disorder pave the way for the French occupation of April 1849.

The Spanish Government again adopted a tyrannical line at home, and an independent mode of diplomacy abroad, which caused Lord Palmerston to challenge Narvaaz† to a combat which colleagues at home in the

* For more detailed information see Count Orsi's *Recollections*, pp. 57—86. No one reading the above pages can fail to perceive the benefits which the literary advocacy of the Count Lennox did for the Buonapartists. After the Duke de Reichstadt's death he distributed 600,000 pictures in Paris, representing the future Napoleon III. Count Lennox was finally prosecuted by the Government, and suffered imprisonment.

† After varying fortune and constant strife for supremacy with Espartero, Narvaaz died in 1866. Originally a member of the

Cabinet would not allow the British Minister to engage in ; the recall of Sir Henry Bulwer, and bad blood between the two nations, alone resulting during a season of suspended diplomatic relations.

In Italy the struggle seemed likely to result adversely to Austria during 1848, and it was not until March 1849 that the hopes of Sardinia were temporarily destroyed on the plain of Novara, after sustaining which disaster the unfortunate Charles Albert abdicated.

In Hungary, Russia, coming to the rescue, saved the right arm of their empire for the Hapsburgs, while the hunted fugitives received a sanctuary in the Turkish dominions, whence the Sultan boldly declared they should not be given up. The Emperor Nicholas, however, was at this moment the arbiter of Europe, and not in a mood to brook opposition from any quarter. Nevertheless, Lord Palmerston saw his opportunity, and calmly prepared to protect the Turks, answering Russia's suspension of intercourse with the Porte by the despatch of Sir William Parker with the British fleet to Besica Bay. On this occasion all parties in England warmly supported the Foreign Secretary and Lord John Russell's Government in their conduct, which allowed them to act as the friends of Liberty, and yet protect the interests of England.

Nicholas sullenly withdrew, reserving his hostile

Liberal party, no Constitutional scruples stood in his way when in office. When he died, in 1866, it was said of him that he told the priest who came to shrive him that he had no enemies, having killed them all.

action for a more favourable season, when his army might cross the Pruth duly organised and prepared. Thus did the good fortune of Palmerston allow him to atone for much that Conservative statesmen, such as Peel, disapproved, by enlisting their sympathies on behalf of the right of political asylum, and the just influence of England.

Notwithstanding this shining diplomatic success, the disapproval of much that Lord Palmerston had done was so general that the well-known case of Don Pacifico was seized on during June 1850 by the Opposition in England to crush the Foreign Secretary, and, if possible, drive him from office. The debate proved one of the finest in our modern history, Mr. Disraeli, Mr. Gladstone, Sir Robert Peel, and Mr. Cockburn, the future Lord Chief Justice, specially distinguishing themselves.

The fact seems to have been that it was not so much the individual case of Don Pacifico, who, after all, was an English subject, and, as such, had a right to seek redress for the smallest wrong, that had stirred men's combative natures to the uttermost, but a very prevalent notion, culled from a letter written by the Duke of Wellington in 1848 to General Burgoyne, expressing an opinion that we might be found without allies when, as he believed, a descent on our coast was strategically possible. Was it, then, true that by studying to engraft British institutions abroad, Lord Palmerston was sowing broadcast the seeds of hatred against England? Mr. Cockburn affirmed what no one present was found to deny, when he declared that the protection of its citizens

all over the world was a principle acted on by Rome from the earliest ages, not a mere accessory right claimed whilst exercising almost universal dominion.

Lord Palmerston claimed a similar privilege for every Briton, and did so in a speech of five hours' duration, the effect of which was decisive.*

The mild and uncertain criticism of Sir Robert Peel, deprecating the meddlesome character of the Whig foreign policy, and concluding with the phrase "we are all proud of him," possesses a mournful interest as being the last words uttered by that beautiful and resonant voice in the chamber formerly guided by its owner's genius.

On Friday, June 29th, 1850, Sir Robert Peel was returning on horseback from Buckingham Palace, where he had inscribed his name. Whilst riding up Constitution Hill, by the side of the Royal Garden, he met Miss

* "With all thy faults I love thee still," is the burden of each erudite Englishman's opinion, when imagination has led him first to travel in Greece, and then to condone something akin to anarchy in her provinces, not to mention a commercial morality scarcely consistent with descent from the high-minded people of Athens and Sparta.

Such, anyhow, have been the sentiments of Lord Byron, Lord Broughton, George Canning, Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. A. W. Kinglake, who (*Eothen*, p. 74) declares :—"For myself I love the race ; in spite of all their vices, and even in spite of all their meannesses, I remember the blood that is in them, and still love the Greeks."

Therefore it was that in 1850 the minatory measures with which Sir W. Parker, the British admiral, in time of peace and at the instance of Lord Palmerston, had terrorised King Otho's Government, helped to consolidate the Parliamentary Opposition at home

Ellis, one of Lady Dover's daughters, riding with her groom. His horse, as every rider will know to be a natural occurrence, swerved towards the railings of the Green Park as they passed by, and in so doing threw Sir Robert, whilst in falling the statesman was crushed under the full weight of the animal. One, Dr. Foucart, witnessed the mishap at the distance of about 150 yards, and came to render the best assistance within his power. On asking Sir Robert Peel whether he was badly hurt, he received an affirmative reply, and obtained a cab, which drew the suffering statesman to his home in Whitehall Gardens. It was found impossible to carry Sir Robert beyond the dining-room, where he suffered terribly, a nervous restlessness impelling him to attempt movements which his painful injuries would not allow. Once in the next two days, and that on the Monday night, he showed signs of apparent improvement and freedom from pain, but on Tuesday morning the, so to speak, comatose condition which had set in was declared by Sir Benjamin Brodie, Mr. Cæsar Hawkins, Dr. Seymour, and Mr. Hodgson, the family physician, to betoken the approach of death, to avert which was beyond human skill. Lady Peel and the family were then admitted into the apartment, together with the Bishop of Gibraltar, Sir James Graham and Sir H. Hardinge, for whom, in his delirium, the patient had frequently asked.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

Not the least distressing part of the catastrophe consisted in a settled public conviction that, owing to the peculiarly sensitive nature of the patient, surgical skill had

not been fully exercised. The parts most acutely affected were untouched by the physicians, inasmuch as the pain suffered by Sir Robert was so acute that medical efforts made for the purpose of reducing his anguish had to be confined to such injuries as were visible. What it might have been possible to effect had the discovery of chloroform been previously made it is useless to discuss. Lady Peel was offered the honour of being created a Viscountess in her own right, which same honour had been bestowed on Canning's widow.

In accordance with Sir Robert Peel's expressed desire, this family honour was refused.

Sir Robert Peel was buried at Drayton Bassett, near Tamworth, in private solemnity, having by will desired that no honours should be accepted for services of his own by members of the Peel family.

Sir Robert Peel shared with Walpole, the younger Pitt, and lately with Mr. Gladstone, the title of Great Parliamentary Minister. Chatham, Canning, Palmerston, and Beaconsfield it may be allowable to place in another category, and yet not detract from their equally famous careers.

The public grief was universal and overwhelming, so that its intensity can scarcely be realised by those who only remember Peel's name as that of a great statesman, but do not stop to consider the remarkable nature of his career and its influence on civilisation and humanity. Parliament acted as a faithful mouthpiece of national feeling when it gave expression to sentiments shared also by business men, who knew how near akin Peel's capacity for performing hard work was to genius, even

if, as Carlyle believed, it did not represent the gift itself. It likewise correctly set forth the feeling of poorer people, who had in several ways profited by the exercise of much toil and perpetual self-denial.

As leader of the Opposition in the Lords, Lord Stanley (afterwards the fourteenth Earl of Derby, and Prime Minister of England) told how thoroughly any opposition he had from conviction found it necessary to set up against Sir Robert Peel's public policy was devoid of personal feeling of any kind, and expressed his conviction that the departed statesman had sacrificed for what he thought right more than in reason could be expected of any man so circumstanced; whilst the great Duke of Wellington's few appropriate words of lament for the loss of his colleague were accompanied by tears freely shed.

In the House of Commons Mr. Gladstone, the great statesman's pupil and warm admirer, after a pathetic allusion to a career characterised by the splendour of his talents, and the purity of his virtues, concluded thus:—

Now is the stately column broke,
The beacon's light is quenched in smoke,
The trumpet's silvery sound is still,
The warder silent on the hill.

We have entered into the above digression with the full conviction that no historical narrative bearing on foreign or domestic policy can be nearly complete, that does not bear a record of Sir Robert Peel's deeds in life and of the honours showered on his memory in death.

But to return to our more immediate subject. The foreign policy of Lord Palmerston between 1846 and

1852 will, perhaps, be best remembered as having conducted England unscathed through the complications of 1848, and this in spite of Chartism threatening violence at home, and the notorious liberality of the Minister's sympathy abroad. To steer safely through the shoals of a revolutionary epoch, and yet surrender no principle or forego no aspiration expressed on behalf of freedom, will stand as by no means the least noteworthy amongst Palmerston's achievements. But that public opinion at home sustained the Foreign Secretary in such a course is due in a great degree to the moderate expression of traditional respect for treaty law in Europe which the unofficial statesmen of Great Britain never ceased to manifest. In no factious spirit was such preference displayed, but in certain and confident belief that no sympathies, however noble, no patriotism, however fervent, can hope to take permanent effect on the politics of the world unless based on adherence to public law, and therefore founded on justice and morality.

The epoch during which Lord Palmerston was Foreign Secretary, and Lord John Russell Prime Minister, carries us up to times which many of us remember, and the historian thereof must perforce show us the England of developed science profiting by the electric telegraph, and glorying in an extending network of railways. He must show us an agricultural population still faithful to the lords of the soil, even if worship of the capitalist had even then, in some degree, been substituted for the traditional reverence towards landlord or squire. He must tell us of increased comfort in poorer homes, caused by cheaper food, which was due to a combination of causes, chief amongst

which was the removal of Protective duties, together with the increased, cheapened, and quickened means of transit.

In foreign and colonial affairs we shall be told how after a second campaign the north-west frontier of India was rendered secure by the annexation of the Punjaub and the deposition of the Sikh dynasty from a kingdom which had proved uncontrollable by existent native powers. We shall learn in detail, hitherto not familiar to all, how, after an undecided and sanguinary combat at Chilianwallah, the Sikhs were finally overthrown at Goojerat by Lord Gough, where, on the 21st of February 1849, 1,500 Afghan horsemen, under Akram Khan, son of Akbar Khan, helped to swell the ranks of our enemies, and learn how justice was designedly tempered by mercy when the young dispossessed Prince Dhuleep Singh found a home in England, with an income nominally of £40,000 a year, but which we fear, on various pretexts involving confiscation of his private property, has been reduced to £25,000.

Turning to matters less directly affecting this country, we have to relate that the year 1850 saw North-Eastern Europe disturbed by the now familiar Schleswig-Holstein question, even then dangerous to public peace.

It is sufficient to state* that Christian I. in 1448 was elected Duke of Schleswig and Count of Holstein, notwithstanding that one principality belonged to the Danish Crown and the other to that somewhat shadowy power the Holy German Empire, and that the duchies were not to be separated. Here, then, it became necessary

* Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, vol. i. p. 490.

to point out the fruitful cause of difference, which became no less manifest when, after protracted fighting, Europe sanctioned an arrangement by which the duchies were surrendered to Denmark, whose kingdom was guaranteed to her on the 4th of July 1850.

This settlement, hateful to every Prussian, was, however, as Baron Stockmar tells us, forced on unwilling Germans by Nicholas, the Czar of Russia, who, as the diplomacy of the time showed, was supreme in European Council.

Finally, we are called to reflect on how many names connected with the older world passed away between 1846 and 1852. Louis Philippe, King of the French, surviving but eight years his son the Duke of Orleans—that child of brilliant destiny and noblest attainments, during whose lifetime no Napoleon could have, in France, hoped to tempt fortune with success; Marie Louise, the widow of Napoleon I. following her great husband behind the veil; the Archduke Charles, once the most promising and successful of Austrian commanders; Peel, the British Parliament man: all these had passed away, and left behind them memories destined to awaken alike the curiosity and contemplation of mankind.

But Lord Palmerston's career, as representative of the British Foreign Office, was likewise drawing to a close. It is matter of common notoriety that in the opinion of the highest authorities in the land Lord Palmerston's independence at the Foreign Office was carried too far. And yet, to a great degree, such a result seems but to have been the logical sequence of many months and

years spent solely in studying the continent, its dangers, and requirements.

Lord Russell, with characteristic self-abnegation, has left on record* his opinion that he, as Prime Minister, ought to have seen Lord Palmerston and induced him (as he believed, not a difficult matter) to make a proper submission to Constitutional custom. With a weakened Government, conscious of the blow they had received, did Lord John Russell and his colleagues proceed to carry on the affairs of the nation after Lord Palmerston's resignation, while the most superficial observer could not but see that, as Lord Palmerston's error was made in advancing what he believed to be the welfare of England, it would soon receive condonation at the hands of the people.

As we know, he lived to be the trusted minister of the Sovereign, who asked for him a public funeral in Westminster Abbey, as a meet reward for services akin to those of Pitt and Canning. We have but to reflect what a state of warfare with France would mean in our own times, and understand how the early, if informal, acknowledgment of Louis Napoleon's power which Lord Palmerston made, rendered such conflict improbable.

Moreover, despite all the hard words expended on the conduct of Napoleon III., it is as certain that he won his position in France by sheer undaunted courage as it is, on the other hand, true that from various reasons the French Republic had not fair play in

* Lord Russell's *Recollections*, chap. iv. p. 258.

1851-52. It is impossible to read the several biographies which have since been published, without imbibing a conviction that if Louis Napoleon's party had not made their *coup d'état*, a like stroke of policy would have emanated from the Orleanist camp, while a third alternative, that of trusting to the Assembly for guidance, threatened anarchy.*

But there remains one matter to which it is necessary now to allude in any biography of Lord Palmerston, inasmuch as at the date of the publication of Mr. Evelyn Ashley's life of his distinguished relative the circumstances we are about to describe were non-existent. The Russian Government have lately seen fit to publish an official record† of their success in shaking off restrictions imposed by the Treaty of 1856, and in the course of this narrative to make public the monstrous assertion that the Crimean war was planned in London between Prince Louis Napoleon, when in exile, and Lord Palmerston. Now, we have received the permission of several individuals acquainted with the French Prince, and intimate with the British statesman, to aver their total disbelief of anything of the kind ever having been discussed at all; while one, whose position and acquaintance with affairs was at the time unapproached, supplements the private opinion which a close friendship with Louis Napoleon and Lord Palmerston specially fit him to

* Evelyn Ashley's *Life of Lord Palmerston*; Blanchard Jerrold's *Life of Napoleon III.*

† *Étude Diplomatique sur la Guerre de la Crimée*, 2 vols. St. Petersburg. Also rendered into English by Sutherland Edwards. W. H. Allen & Co.

express, by an avowal that exceptional knowledge allows the authorization of an unqualified contradiction to such a statement, stigmatising it as altogether absurd, and, during Louis Napoleon's exile, impossible. The Russian officials have, therefore, been themselves deceived, and should hasten to expunge from their official chronicle of events an unworthy aspersion upon the character of two public men, who, being dead, are unable to defend themselves ; one, moreover, which can never in the most infinitesimal way serve their cause.

It has fallen to the lot of the present narrator to record in an earlier page of this volume, and in chronological order to recur to, the cause which absolutely did lead Nicholas to make his great mistake and involve Russia in war with the Western Powers, and we shall then learn how this great master of banter, as Mr. Disraeli called him, proved himself by far the strongest man in Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet.

A bird's-eye view of Europe as it appeared in 1848-49 will best serve to show the conditions with which collective statesmanship was called to strive. We have been led to glance into a translation of the suppressed diaries of Varnhagen von Ense, and thence glean somewhat of the Prussian politics when Frederick William IV. was, politically speaking, labouring in the trough of a tempestuous sea. Anxious for German unity rather than Prussian interests, this Prince was in reality the very embodiment of the ideas which have since made Germany great and powerful. Esteemed to be a visionary, rather than a man of action, Frederick William nevertheless placed his confidence in that remarkable statesman, Joseph von Radowitz,

who, notwithstanding his romantic love of Mother Church, justly understood Germany's needs, if anyone ever did understand them between the Stein Hardenburgh period and that of Bismarck ; and we state this without attempting to condone the vacillations of a monarch and the instability of a State which, so long as Metternich was at Vienna, never dared to have a mind of its own.

Turning the focus of our glass towards the Austrian capital, we do not discover a peaceful prospect, when choice between moral subservience to Russia or revolution at home resulted in the expulsion of him who, with all his faults, was a great statesman, who had served his country well. Metternich's system died the natural death which spared its creator for some years after his nominal supremacy was a thing of the past. Russia desired to stand aloof, dreading domestic disturbance, but proved herself capable when called on to act against Hungary in 1849 ; France was convulsed ; Italy torn with civil war, the Pope trembling on his throne ; Spain had gravely compromised herself with the Liberal England that had asserted her independence ; Denmark was preparing for war on behalf of Schleswig-Holstein. Only Sweden and Norway, Belgium, and Holland remained unmoved, while Switzerland had but a year previously been brought into peaceful federal unity through a judicious arbitration of the European Powers, which prevented Papal influence from allowing the weaker party, led by the Jesuits, to modify the Federal Diet and the Constitution by which the Roman Catholic states had originally agreed to abide. Appeal had been made to force, by which, as carrying out the will of the

majority, Europe allowed the matters at issue to be decided, so creating a diminutive precedent for the guidance of the United States when engaged in a struggle of wider scope in 1862. And through this period of convulsion England passed with nothing but a threat of Chartism to disturb her internal tranquillity; and the presence of Lord Palmerston at the helm of her foreign affairs had, we believe, much to do with this.

As for the American continent not even the discovery of gold in California, and the consequent rush to gain riches, could hide the breach between rival interests, which were nearly coming to a crisis when Southern statesmen brought Texas into the Union. Thinkers of the type of Mr. Calhoun even then feared the future as containing elements of strife it were vain to ignore.

We have been led, at the risk of seeming to repeat, to lay stress on the unique happiness of England in passing peacefully through the ordeal of revolutionary excitement. Nor was this exemption obtained without constant attention and hard work. Lord Palmerston, as Mr. Disraeli said of him, was a master of banter, and used the talent to shield himself from engaging in conversations where grave affairs of estate could not be profitably discussed; so that superficial observers might even vote him trivial. Indeed, he would go so far as to affect indifference to matters very near his heart when fearful of unmasking his reserve. For instance, when Professor Vambéry, the well-known Hungarian traveller, called to warn him of the inevitable Russian advance in Central Asia, Palmerston's manner was that of one almost unconcerned, asking whether his visitor really

believed that armies could traverse the vast wastes known to exist between the Caspian and Herat; albeit the well-instructed foreigner knew well how deeply his words had sunk into the statesman's heart, the strength of the impression being proved beyond cavil by the Cassandra-like warning which closes the present chapter.

Not a bad instance of banter pure and simple occurred on the formation of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet in 1853, when, at a City dinner given by the Fishmongers' Company, he labelled the ejected Tories as destructives, on the ground that by compact organisation they had destroyed party spirit in their opponents' camp, split up as it originally was into several parties.

The strength of Lord Palmerston's character is well known by every reader of his letters, where confidence in the truth of his own opinions added force to each line of his writings; but his determination in matters of ready action is well illustrated through an incident recorded by Baron Bunsen.* Bunsen and Palmerston had elected to be rowed over to Portsmouth from Osborne, when guests of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and, the weather being rough, the Foreign Minister took the helm, demonstrating the connection between steering the vessel of State, as Bunsen phrased it, and steering a boat at sea. "Oh, one learns boating at Cambridge, even though one may have learnt nothing better," remarked Lord Palmerston; and guide the craft safely to shore he certainly did. But when they landed—alas! the train was gone.

* *Memoirs*, vol. ii., pp. 151, 152.

Lord Palmerston immediately declared that he *must* return to London on pressing business, and that, moreover, by special train. The railway officials protested that the risk of collision was too great. "On my responsibility, then," said the statesman, and thus enforced compliance, although Bunsen tells us all trembled but the master-mind whom it was vain to oppose. The special train shot through station after station, and landed them safe in London, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs reaching his office in time to transact the public business.

Not the least remarkable feature of Lord Palmerston's individuality consists in the practical teaching to be derived from his ever-amusing speeches, in which, as in nearly all the actions of his life, public and private, he showed himself an observant, practical man of the world.

As an instance of what we mean : when exhorting the people of Tiverton to adopt a high aim in any department of life where it was their duty to labour, he drew an illustration from the turf, one, doubtless, which came home to many of his hearers, whom he reminded that as careful preparation is not thrown away upon the score or so of unsuccessful horses who compete at Epsom for the blue ribbon of the turf, known to the world as the Derby, because such training led to the securing of other prizes, so in life no patient toil will, in the long run, go unrewarded ; and the Foreign Secretary carried this theory into practice so thoroughly that neither Lord Eldon nor the great Napoleon did harder work at the desk than the apparently gay voluptuary, at home alike in the drawing-room, the hunting-field, or the racecourse.

Never abashed or unequal to the situation in which he found himself, Palmerston's readiness and nerve were never more manifest than when in 1862 Mr. Walpole's honest distrust of the Liberal finance was about to be made the stalking-horse of the Conservatives, who desired to injure a Liberal Government. Lord Palmerston promptly made the question one of confidence, involving the future of the Government; which bold expedient promptly drove Mr. Walpole from the field, and (it was the eve of Epsom Summer Meeting) caused Mr. Disraeli to say that the Derby (*sic*) favourite had bolted—a *double entendre* with a vengeance, considering that Mr. Walpole must of necessity have become member of any Cabinet formed by the then Conservative leader.

Occasionally, however, Lord Palmerston paid Mr. Disraeli out in his own coin, as was the case in May 1862, when the Inland Revenue Bill came before the House of Commons. Mr. Disraeli, on that occasion, launched into an interesting dissertation on Italian affairs, and held the House entranced by some of his pungent criticisms on foreign affairs. In reply, Lord Palmerston reminded the Tory leader that when the subject itself had but a few days previously been under discussion, he was, for some unexplained reason, absent, and that his gratuitous speech therefore reminded the Premier of certain Volunteers, who, unable to discharge their rifles during a review, had reserved the firing until they reached a thoroughfare where the noise might terrify the old women of the neighbourhood.

Better still was his reply to critics who in the same year, 1862, assailed the Government for allowing dis-

turbances to occur at the Longford election. Irish elections were, to his knowledge, said Lord Palmerston, a fruitful source of riot and disturbance. He might even say that the electoral result did not so much exemplify the survival of the fittest, but, rather, the return of a survivor. The remedy he would prescribe on such occasions was withdrawal of the local militia and police, who, for the time being, should give way to regular soldiers, under whose protection voters might exercise the franchise in safety.

A practical suggestion this, one might imagine, for times of more permanent danger, and, indeed, we might go on almost *ad infinitum* quoting passages replete with sagacity, and yet never wearisome, because lightened by the natural vivacity and wit which the speaker probably owed to his Irish blood. Possibly the period (1862-3), from which we have drawn several anecdotes, yields more frequent instances of the nature to which we allude, but they are by no means confined to any one epoch, more than to a single class of subject.

Ludicrous in the extreme, and yet thoroughly descriptive of the situation, was Lord Palmerston's remark to Baron Brunnow in 1849, when that worthy man was bent on forcing the Sultan to surrender Andrassy, Kossuth, and Bem into the clutches of Russia and Austria. Baron Brunnow instanced his master the Czar's known desire to preserve the Sultan's Government, of which we have heard so much, and ignored the threats of violence in which the official spokesmen of Vienna and St. Petersburg were dealing so freely. "You are holding," retorted the British Minister, "a smelling-

bottle to the nose of a fainting lady whom you have driven into a swoon."

The hustings fun which periodically passed between Lord Palmerston at Tiverton and the famous local butcher who was wont to wax censorious, is remembered by the inhabitants of a borough that transferred to England's representative man the fidelity which before the Reform Bill they yielded to the Ryder family, one, as we have elsewhere shown, based upon no mean motive, no hopes of material gain.*

But we would not conclude a final chapter on Lord Palmerston with the recital of any mere jest, however suggestive of graver truths such sparkling wit may be. The statesman's highest merit is, after all, that of *forethought*, such knowledge being utilised on behalf of present needs, the indulgence of which shall not blight the future, or discount its legitimate hopes.

It is easy to say that Lord Palmerston was wrong in deprecating the design of a Suez canal, when, as we have already shown, but for his own prescient determination we might have been called on now to carve a right of way through the desert, and through an Egypt under foreign domination, or even to have fought to prevent the canal being made at all.†

That Syria is not French, and Constantinople Russian,

* See Lord Harrowby's speech on Reform Bill of 1882, vol. i. p. 99.

† The famous saying of Montesquieu should be borne in mind—"It is not always the country declaring war that is responsible for its horrors."

we owe to Lord Palmerston, and therefore may set against his mistaken judgment as to the possibility of constructing the canal grateful thanks to the man without whose wisdom England's plight in Egypt would be worse than the most alarmist writer can represent it to be in 1882.

But what think our readers of the subjoined dive into the future with which we conclude, and which was indited in 1849? Lord Palmerston wrote as follows:—

“Persia must, I fear, now be looked on as an advanced post for Russia whenever she chooses to make use of it. She will command it either by overpowering force or by bribing the State by prospects of acquisitions in Afghanistan. There would be no insurmountable difficulty to *prevent Russia from assembling a considerable force at Astrabad.*”*

The situation in Central Asia as it is in 1882 is there accurately described, thirty-three years before its development.

* *The Life of Palmerston*, by Evelyn Ashley, vol. i. p. 24.

LORD GRANVILLE.

DECEMBER 1851 to FEBRUARY 1852.

THE month of December 1851, saw Lord Granville seated in the saddle vacated by Lord Palmerston. . Thirty years afterwards, and at the time these lines are penned, England owns the same Foreign Minister, who, therefore, adds to his other gifts the advantage of long experience and observation of State affairs. Lord Granville, being the son of a diplomatist who won his fame as Ambassador in Paris, early in life acquired a knowledge of the French language, customs, and localities, which have stood him in good stead ever since. Add to the latter advantage that of a community of tastes with his own countrymen, and the secret of his success and popularity is solved, inasmuch as that urbanity and readiness of speech for which Lord Granville is so notorious could not of themselves prove qualities enabling a man to hold his own in the forefront of the diplomatic world. Lord Granville is now, and ever has been, a Whig, and, like the more famous of his predecessors and contemporaries, has

understood this to mean a mild but consistent partisanship on behalf of the more popular side in English politics. Not that his lordship would ever from choice subscribe to extreme doctrines or opinions at home or abroad, but at a certain distance behind the Liberal tail he conceives himself bound to follow. Not, that is, the father of their theories, and seldom an eulogiser of their policy, but still a faithful supporter and steadfast party official, confident that the supremacy of his own political side is best on the whole for England.*

In 1851 Lord Granville succeeded the greatest Foreign Minister of that day. Lord Palmerston had differed frequently with colleagues on matters connected with his office, and such divergence of opinion culminated when an informal approbation of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* was conveyed to the French Ambassador by Lord Palmerston himself. The evidence upon which he founded the opinion in question is now before the world in Mr. Evelyn Ashley's life of his great uncle. It is there shown that without doubt the Orleanist party were making attempts to incite the French to rise in their favour. This, having been passed over by Mr. Kinglake as a mere unconfirmed rumour, must now take its part in helping to break down that laboriously-erected theory of Louis Napoleon's wickedness, cruelty, and perfidy which the brilliant penmanship of Mr. Kinglake brought

* The pedigree of the Granville family is that of their Sutherland relations until Granville Gower, born 1778, who gained the peerage which has descended to the present possessor. Co-heir's of the Earls of Bath, they claim descent from the heroic Sir Richard Grenville of Tennysonian fame.

prominently before the world, but which, written in indignation, overleaped the bounds of sober fact.

It is, unfortunately, true that France in 1850–51 was in a deplorable state of party division—threatened, that is, by civil war or socialistic anarchy. The difficulty was bridged over by means every lover of Constitutional rule must of necessity reprobate, but at a cost of human life far less than had been the case either in 1830, 1848, or during the Commune in 1871, when the slain were numbered by thousands. During the *coup d'état* and the insurrectionary movements which accompanied it, 381 individuals are shown to have fallen. Moreover, the story told by Mr. Kinglake, that prisoners were assassinated by order of the authorities during the *coup d'état*, has never received authoritative confirmation. It is true that the French Imperialists have been unable to do more than meet the asseveration with a decided denial, but the burden of proof in such a matter lies surely with the literary assailant. Mr. Blanchard Jerrold has shown beyond doubt that France was of her own free will inclined to accept Louis Napoleon as ruler, but that this national desire was to have been frustrated by a conspiracy of Orleanist and Legitimist generals, whose parties agreed on nothing but a resolve to baulk the will of France.

In fact, if Louis Napoleon had not placed these very men in durance, he himself would have once more tasted the solitude of Ham, or suffered imprisonment in the Castle of Vincennes. A denial of these facts can never be sustained, any more than can the vague accusations of cowardice made against the remarkable man whose

seventeen years' rule marks such an important era in French history.

But the system which family traditions led Prince Louis Napoleon to adopt was one calculated to alienate the sympathies of all who valued Constitutional liberty. It might, or might not, serve the purposes of France to be placed in Imperial leading-strings, but all parties in England revolted from the spectacle, and it needed the blandishments of her most famous and experienced statesmen to reconcile the British Sovereign and her people. If the story as told in perfect good faith, and in accordance with the best information he could then gather, by Mr. Kinglake, were worthy of acceptance as genuine history, then of a surety would there have been no French alliance with England in 1853. Prince Albert, for one, would most certainly never have advised its consummation. Hesitation there then certainly was in presence of the wild and exaggerated stories which reached this country, where it was generally believed that the infuriated soldiery of France had, on December 2nd, 1851, been hounded on to attack the bystanders, instead of, as all recent narrators, public and private, agree, being themselves the victims of a panic, under which they believed themselves attacked from the houses, and in danger of annihilation.

Louis Napoleon was, at least, guiltless of direct responsibility for this unfortunate bloodshed, which took place, let it be remembered, during an insurrection the success of which might have installed a Commune such as in later days we have seen to the fore in times of foreign conquest and general confusion.

But, as we have said, men believed much that they were told ; and whereas the truth could but at the best reveal a doubtful and, to English minds, disreputable transaction, the negative action of Lord Granville during his first short tenure of Foreign Office responsibility will not seem surprising. The conviction that France had, in 1851, determined to revert towards the Napoleons, will gather strength from study of the subject. In our own opinion, no circumstance favours such a view more decidedly than the conduct of Count Morny. That clever and brilliant man had in his composition nothing unpractical, and his adherence to Louis Napoleon was not given to an idea or to family sentiment. He deliberately judged that the pendulum of political feeling had swung round towards the Empire.

On the other hand, it is sad to contemplate how France, with all the best elements of freedom, yet could not in 1852 turn them to account without incurring civil war, or, as most thinking men believed, being hurled into anarchy, through the vagaries of an extreme Republic. Under different conditions, it is true that other results have, between 1873 and 1881, followed on eight years' Parliamentary rule.

Well might Sir Robert Peel tell the Emperor Nicholas in 1844 that he desired to see the French crown descend peaceably to the Duke of Orleans, whose own personal capabilities were such that no Napoleon could have competed with success against them.

With his death, however, all reasonable hope of sustaining pure Constitutional government passed away, and from Reform banquets, where contemptuous silence

was adopted in lieu of the King's health, it was but a step to the anarchy which Louis Napoleon was called in to forestal. And without justifying the personal system of government adopted by the Third Empire, one must fain render admiration to the courage evinced by the President, who, as an eye-witness has related to the writer, rode coolly into the haunts of those known to be enemies of public order, and, despite their threatening gestures and abuse, cowed them with the magic of a bold man's determination.

When Lord Granville took the Foreign Office Seals for the first time, he found the Continent bowed down by the iron despotism of the sovereigns who lived in dread of the Red Republicanism and Communism which received a check in 1848, but were neither destroyed nor disheartened. These autocratic rulers were mercilessly inclined towards the refugees, who, for the most part, had made England the place of their asylum. Austrian Czechs, Hungarians, Italians connected with secret societies, Prussian Socialists, whose short day of triumph in Berlin had come to an end, Polish refugees, who had conspired against the Czar—one and all were to be found around the familiar haunts of Leicester Square.

In the face of Continental irritation against England, which Lord Palmerston's political opponents declared that his foreign policy had fanned into a flame, it became necessary to define where this right of asylum commenced and ended, and this without for a moment abrogating the proud right of Britain to shelter fugitives purely political.

As Lord Granville reminded the House of Lords in

1851, when questioned on the case of Herr Most, his duty led him to issue a circular on the subject soon after taking office in 1851. In that circular the principles on which the British Government acted were laid down. The first of those principles was that all foreigners had a right to be admitted to and reside in this country; secondly, that being here they had a right to our protection, but at the same time they were amenable to our laws; and thirdly, that there was no power in Her Majesty's Government to send them away from the country, except under the conditions of an extradition treaty. The circular went on, on the other hand, to denounce in very strong terms the flagrant abuse of the hospitality thus given to foreigners, if any of them attempted to incite others to insurrection against the countries to which they belonged, and it was also stated that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government at that time to exercise all their legal power to foil any such attempt. Notwithstanding that the despatch received a considerable amount of criticism, it was on the whole considered to be a fair statement of the English law and custom concerning this most important subject.

Not so, however, deemed Count Schwarzenbergh, the Austrian Prime Minister, who, stung to the quick by the consistently bold attitude of the British Foreign Office, had issued a despatch, through Count Buol, demanding the instant extradition of certain refugees, aggressive conduct to which Lord Granville promptly replied with a decided refusal, and strained relations upon this subject were transmitted to the Liberal Government's successors.

Lord John Russell's Ministry was in a weakened condition when Lord Granville took the seals on December 17th, 1851, inasmuch as a difference of opinion between the Whigs and Peelites had ensued over the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which forbade Roman Catholic dignitaries appointed by the Pope to assume their titles in England.

As Lord John Russell himself phrased it* : " I wished to assert the Queen's title to appoint Bishops, and place it on the Statute Book." But there existed a large party in Great Britain who looked on the measure as an infringement of religious liberty. When Lord John Russell had gained his point, and made a statutory protest, he willingly agreed to the repeal of this same Act, thus to a great degree justifying the opposition which his Government experienced.

But Lord Palmerston's resignation following this difference with the Peelite section outside the Cabinet, made a prolonged tenure of office improbable, seeing that the compact party led by Mr. Disraeli was sooner or later sure to draw sufficient malcontents into the Opposition camp, and place the Ministry in a minority.

This occurred when the Militia Bill came on for discussion. There was a general desire to adopt measures of home defence, inasmuch as it seemed uncertain what line of policy Louis Napoleon might be forced to adopt. Those who knew him best were aware that it would not from choice be inimical to England, but new combinations and alliances were discussed and considered possible from day to day, so that it became clear that

* Lord Russell's *Recollections*, chap. iv. p. 257.

Englishmen might have arisen any day from their slumbers and found a Napoleon in arms and not master of himself. A reconstitution of the Militia was then universally resolved on ; but the Government wished to raise it locally, and as a force not movable except in case of invasion.

This, Lord Palmerston, who entered the lists against his former colleagues, pointed out might lead to delay such as would render the troops unavailable until the crisis had passed, and not ready to stand shoulder to shoulder whenever the possible invader should make his spring.

The view of the late Foreign Secretary was adopted by the Protectionist Opposition ; and Lord John Russell's Administration, being in a minority, resigned (February 23rd, 1852).

The task of government taken up from the hands of Peel had proceeded during a time of European peace of such a remarkable character, that, after the temporary settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1850, no dark cloud appeared on the horizon. In London the great Exhibition of 1851 gathered together men from all climes and dominions. Peace existed, and its continuance was hoped for, even after the return of a Buonaparte to power in France had dashed the hopes of the more sanguine.

The defunct Whig Government had struggled hard to rule according to its principles, and consolidated the measures of Peel while it promulgated others of value. Light was at length untaxed. It seems strange that eight-and-thirty years should have been allowed to elapse

after the close of the great war in 1815, and a tax upon windows yet remain unrepealed. Wanderers through the suburbs of London, and, indeed, into the country districts, may have observed dead windows on many of the old-fashioned dwellings, such make-believe accessories to health and enjoyment having originally been rendered necessary when light and air were luxuries only within reach of our more fortunate and richer countrymen.

Great changes were, moreover, seen in the composition of parties between 1846 and 1852. Peel was gone. Lord George Bentinck had died suddenly, and left the leadership of his host to Mr. Disraeli, who, in combination with his aristocratic chief, latterly become fourteenth Earl of Derby, was destined to recuperate the fortunes of a party, consolidation of which, on statesman-like grounds, should be welcome to one and all amongst us, whatsoever our politics or opinions may be.

On the other hand, a great Liberal phalanx was in process of formation, destined to render the Government possible when men differed sorely, being welded together by the magic of an apt political name. The Prince Consort foresaw that a coalition might become a temporary necessity, and had mapped out the main lines of Lord Aberdeen's Government before the last Whig Administration proper expired in 1852.

But, as Lord Derby wittily observed when dining with the Goldsmiths' Company in April 1852: "It was supposed that the crop of statesmen was one of very limited amount, for which if you desired to search you must dig in certain favoured localities and confine yourself thereto.

A fortunate adventurer, gentlemen, I have boldly opened a new mine."

The opening of that mine, and what was found therein, must be reserved for the next chapter.

Lord Granville's first occupancy of the Foreign Office occurred at a moment when the soothing acts of diplomacy were sorely needed to assuage Continental jealousies and appease misunderstandings.

It was not the strongest point in Lord Palmerston's conduct of British relations abroad that it left the sensibilities of our old Austrian ally apparently disregarded. In an attempt to loosen what he conceived to be the unnecessary trammels of autocracy, the English Foreign Minister had been unfortunate enough to gain the distrust and hatred alike of those whose tyrannical principles he desired to repudiate, and of men whose wish to preserve their old institutions intact was yet in unison with the longings of loyal and order-loving men all over the world.

As a liberal-minded Minister, yet fired to the full with sympathy for civilisation, and possessing a knowledge of the Continent, Lord Granville was the very man to exercise his peculiar graces of toleration towards opponents, even in quarters where it was impossible to extend approval, while, as we have seen, he did not hesitate to present a bold front when the occasion required.

Whether the Austrian General Haynau ever did flog a woman at the close of the Hungarian rising in 1849, is involved in historical obscurity, but we unfortunately know that by proclamation he threatened so to do ;

and the rough usage he received at the hands of the London draymen represented a phase of British feeling which, without favouring lynch law amongst us, none would desire to eradicate. But it was desirable, nevertheless, that it should be generally recognised that Austrian gentlemen, as a rule, had the same feelings as Englishmen on this subject, and that political rancour stirred up against a chivalrous nation was little calculated to forward the interests of peace in times of unsettlement. To demonstrate this fact, and yet not withdraw English sympathy from Constitutional nations loth to discourage tyranny, was a task that Lord Granville appeared perfectly fitted to perform, and his first appearance on the European field of politics as Foreign Minister will be connected in history with such accomplishment.

As those familiar with the Liberal Foreign Minister of later times well know, he possesses the same power of interpreting the feelings and joining in the pursuits of his own countrymen which gives him the personal popularity at home, such as he likewise enjoys on the Continent. An excellent judge of horse-flesh, he is never mounted but on a well-bred animal, and his days with the harriers on the breezy downs around Walmer are enjoyed by no means in selfish isolation; as, in addition to the faces of well-known English politicians, those of foreign diplomatists are often to be seen revelling in the fine air and glorious glimpses of the sea with which men riding over those Kentish uplands are familiar. It is even rumoured that Lord Granville has mounted several Chancellors of the Exchequer, and that it is a subject of

private meditation as to which of the financiers in question he can conscientiously render the palm in a competition where the standard probably does not come quite up to that which his lordship's own proficiency would lead him to adopt. Both Lord Sherbrooke (late Hon. R. Lowe) and the Right. Hon. W. E. Gladstone have, we believe, enjoyed the breezes around Walmer Castle on horseback.

Lord Granville may be considered as a worthy successor of Pitt, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Dalhousie, and Lord Palmerston, in the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports, to which he was appointed in December 1865, inasmuch as he is representative of a type essentially English in his sympathies, which are, nevertheless, broad enough to embrace other nations of the earth in their scope.

At the special moment of which we write, Lord Granville had not attained to the Liberal leadership in the Peers, which he has rendered specially famous since 1855, as, finding himself in the presence of two Parliamentary gladiators, unsurpassed for the depth of their knowledge and the scope of their ability, he has held his own, and given clear and simple utterance to Liberal opinions.

Few who have attended the debates in the House of Lords can fail to have observed how, after some great speech by the late Earl of Derby, Lord Granville would be called on to reply in presence of an audience charmed alike with the brilliancy of metaphor and power of illustration which characterised the utterances of that remarkable man. They will remember, likewise, how by a few

well-chosen sentences, enlivened, maybe, by a timely joke, Lord Granville picked the elaborate structure to pieces, and recalled noble lords down to the region of every day matter-of-fact, out of which the Conservative leader's eloquence had temporally lifted them.

But Lord Granville has done more than this, inasmuch as, despite the strongest party passion which from time to time has been unfortunately, if inevitably, stirred up, he has succeeded in retaining the respect of all, and by his very presence in the strife has calmed its passion, and assisted in recovering a dignified composure for the Chamber of which he is so prominent a member.

These more personal details have been added somewhat out of the chronological period to which they belong, because when Lord Granville's name again occurs as Foreign Minister in these volumes it will be after biographical description has given way to narrative, as being the more convenient form in which to convey impressions almost exclusively connected with those amongst us still.

Probably no memory is imprinted on this practised statesman's mind with more striking remembrance than that of the visit to Moscow which he was chosen to make as representative of England at the late Emperor Alexander's coronation in June 1856. The Crimean War had but lately closed, and all Lord Granville's tact could scarcely shield him from the shrinking which a great people naturally feels for the country that blocks the way to a traditionally, not to say nationally, longed-for goal. Whether Lord Granville experienced any such half-suppressed murmurings, we know not; but

the high sense of hospitality which obtains at Moscow did most certainly lead to the British representative receiving the welcome which his high position warranted.

The ceremony itself seems to have eclipsed all that the fancy of fiction could invent.

Worthy of the Cæsars or the great Oriental conquerors, the coronation ceremonies cost a million sterling. Amidst the strange eccentricities of Byzantine architecture which characterised the Moscow that arose from the ashes of 1812, wended a long and at times almost weird procession, embracing not only deputies from the various Asiatic races which have submitted to Russia, but huntsmen in full livery, with gorgeous accessories of gold and white facings. Two and two they passed on, while to the strains of festal music the grave faces of men, members of the Imperial Council, astute in diplomacy, skilled in logic, and in some sort the pillars of the State, were seen amidst a pageant the import of which they, with their knowledge of the Russian nature, would be the last to deny.

And then those Guards of the Preobraginski regiment, picked men out of sixty millions of the Russian subjects ! They marched before the White Czar himself, who, amidst a salvo of seventy-one guns, mingled with the unanimously expressed acclaim of the people, and surrounded by Luders, Osten, Sacken, Mentschikoff, and Gortschakoff—names redolent of the late war with the Western Powers, entered his beloved city of Moscow.

We do not hesitate to state our decided opinion that Lord Granville was in every way the best possible British

official witness of this grand sight, constantly accustomed as he was to assuage the acerbity of party passion at home. We can but regretfully remember that it became his duty to announce, in 1881, to the Upper House of our Parliament, that this same adored ruler of Russia had suffered cruel death as the result of a social conspiracy men could neither fathom nor suppress.

Truly a strange doubtful destiny this to which some are born ! The sceptre which sways over eighty millions is powerless before the machinations of a few miscreants.

Half a million people viewed this spectacle, which can never have been effaced from the British representative's mind.

Lord Granville could scarcely have held his prominent position as a leading Liberal statesman without being, as he most surely is, one of the cleverest men in Her Majesty Queen Victoria's realms. But we fail to recognise, amidst his ready wit and unfailing facility of expression, the type of statesmanship which made Lord Granville's master, the late Lord Palmerston, so pre-eminent amongst his compeers. By this we mean that men do not know what the innermost likes and dislikes of Lord Granville may be on political matters. He has uniformly shrouded them in the silence which has also hidden from us his opinion on more recondite questions of statesmanship which, if his talents allow Lord Granville to approach officially, have never received elucidation from the Foreign Secretary's written or spoken opinions.

We have chronicled the remarkable success of Lords Palmerston and Granville in steering Great Britain

through Continental dangers; but when Lord John Russell's Government resigned and the good and wise Lord Clarendon gave up the Viceroyalty, no lover of the Union could contemplate without something akin to hopelessness the condition of that distracted land of Erin. Steady upholding of the public peace alone saved the Emerald Isle from reverting to the miseries of 1814 and 1815, when nothing but the successful conclusion of the French war precluded a recurrence of the terrors attendant upon the Irish Rebellion of May 1798, when, as few people now realise, no less than 150,000 Irish lives are believed to have been sacrificed, together with those of 20,000 English. Well, indeed, may those responsible for order make a stand on the threshold, and, acting in the spirit of Lord Clarendon when Viceroy, temper justice with a guarded moderation, none the less merciful because stern reprisals await the ill-doer.

The later portion of Lord Granville's career is indissolubly bound up with the domestic as well as the external history of England, and will be well known to most of our readers. The Liberal leader in the House of Peers has not only consistently performed his technical duties with grace and natural good feeling, but has proved himself a Parliamentary soldier of supreme ability. Of the former gifts abundant illustration is afforded by the numerous complimentary speeches, abounding in the speaker's own amiable sentiments towards men generally, which stand recorded in *Hansard*. If asked to instance the best thereof, we should be inclined to place in the first rank the speeches on the death of the Princess Alice, the murder of the Emperor

of Russia, Lord Granville's two eulogies on his two doughty Conservative opponents, Lords Derby and Beaconsfield, and last, but not least, the few tender sentences that won all hearts to sympathy when England stood appalled at the assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke in May 1882.

Of the livelier type of address, we might add many specimens did our space admit, and it would be difficult to find a speech more replete with humour than that made by Lord Granville in explanation of the Liberal fall in March 1874, when he boldly declared that he believed his colleagues had received many adverse votes because the British athletic world adjudged them to be a lot of muffs. "But," added the speaker, "I am prepared to challenge the present Ministry to pick their best men and pit them against a like number of the defunct Liberal Government for a ride across country"—it being well known that not only were Lord Hartington and Lord Spencer prominent in their respective hunts, but that Lord Granville knew well what he was talking about when he challenged his opponents to such a competition.

If asked to describe Lord Granville's attitude during the several years of his party's discomfiture, we should characterise it as consistently courageous, and it is impossible not to admire his steady persistency when pleading the then unpopular cause of the backward school when Indian frontier questions were raised in the House of Lords in connection with Afghanistan; nor is it possible to forget the adroitness of the Earl's conduct when entrusted with the now celebrated Liberal

change of front concerning Turkey, made moreover, during 1876, in presence of the enemy in shape of a skilful, not to say eloquent, ministerial bench—a change of direction which Lord Salisbury called a curve, and which, whatever its political outcome, has led to an unfortunate degree of acerbity in the utterances of public men.

But now again, since, in 1880, he declined the Premiership and was installed triumphantly in his old office, Lord Granville has once more by his conciliatory demeanour proved himself equal to any fortune.

La Rochefoucauld has said that it requires greater powers of mind to support good fortune than bad, and Lord Granville has not only undergone this test but proved well the courage

Which, in the very depths of ill
And discontent, is faithful still.

The Liberal Foreign Secretary has been married twice : first, in 1840, to a daughter of the Duke d'Albergh, who died in 1860, and through whom he is connected with the present Lord Acton, one of the best-read men in Europe ; and secondly to a Miss Campbell, of Islay, by whom he has a young family. It is notorious that Lord Granville thus shares the social advantages which, on the whole, are still to be found in the Whig ranks rather than amongst those of their political opponents.

LORD MALMESBURY.

FEBRUARY 27TH, 1852, TO DECEMBER 17TH, 1852.

JAMES HOWARD HARRIS, third Earl of Malmesbury, was born in March 1807, and won his political spurs in the regions of diplomacy rather than of Parliamentary conflict.

His career may, therefore, be regarded as, to a certain degree, in unison with that of his distinguished grandfather, the first earl, whose short connection with the House of Commons was broken for the fulfilment of duties which both Fox and Pitt desecrated his ability to perform. This first earl, the eminent diplomatist, sprang from an old Wiltshire family, and, after receiving all the honours which George III. could bestow upon an ambassador of the first rank, died in 1820. He was succeeded by James Edward, second earl, whose life was mostly passed in his Hampshire home at Christ Church, although appointed to the Governorship

Malmesbury

of the Isle of Wight—an office, one would suppose, of honour rather than of responsibility.

In 1841 the subject of our present memoir came into enjoyment of the peerage which his predecessors had filled so worthily. We have endeavoured to delineate his career as a statesman in the next few pages, while in literary circles his name will ever be remembered as editor of the matchless diplomatic journals which have preserved his grandfather's reputation, and which have already been made use of for reference by historians of the type and standing of the late Lord Stanhope.

We desire to take this opportunity frankly to acknowledge the use made of Lord Malmesbury's diaries when compiling the earlier chapters of these volumes, as we are conscious that much of their interest has been due to the constant reference made to that mine of diplomatic treasures which the world owes to the present Lord Malmesbury's genius and industry. Marrying, in 1830, the only daughter of the fifth Earl of Tankerville, Lord Derby's Foreign Secretary succeeded to the family peerage in September 1841. Well known in official circles abroad, Lord Malmesbury made the acquaintance of Louis Napoleon at Florence in the year of his own marriage, and in 1845 visited the then imprisoned Prince at Ham, returning to England for the purpose of inducing the Government to solicit Louis Philippe and Guizot to grant their dynastic foe liberty, on the condition that he should go to Ecuador and bind himself never to return to Europe. Sir Robert Peel, although favourable to the plan, felt himself bound to consult his Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen, who refused, from

what he deemed to be State reasons, thus altering, maybe, the whole future of Europe.

But, as we shall show, the incident was the means of enabling Lord Malmesbury to serve his country to good purpose when a supreme occasion arrived; for the Third Napoleon, whatever his shortcomings, was not the man to forget a benefit, and so it came to pass that confidence, that plant of tender growth, was early established between the two men, a circumstance destined to contribute to public advantage.

So far as his office was concerned, Lord Malmesbury probably exercised independence of action in 1852 such as few Foreign Ministers had before enjoyed. The noble chieftain, Lord Derby, was of very necessity immersed in the gigantic task of reconstituting an official party, and all his colleagues—Mr. Disraeli included—were, we are told, on authority not to be doubted or indeed questioned, almost fully engrossed in learning the routine of their several offices, and a perusal of the Budget speech will of itself show the depth of the research which absorbed the Chancellor of the Exchequer's attention. Almost the whole Cabinet was totally inexperienced as to ministerial duties, as was, in the nature of the case, inevitable, when a reconstituted Conservative party first took office after years of distraction and difference.

But as regards Lord Malmesbury the case was different, and a notable exception has to be recorded, inasmuch as the permanent Foreign Office officials all expressed surprise at the new Foreign Secretary apparently knowing by *intuition* the *routine* and *sentiment* of

his duties ; the fact being that he had' previously read, arranged, collated, and copied no less than *two thousand* original letters and despatches of his grandfather, this correspondence embracing communications with all the Sovereigns, Ministers, and Diplomats of Europe between 1768 and 1809, so that he might be said to possess the information requisite for an Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, and to be familiar with each particular period of his grandfather's career.

There are in all ages and amongst all nations men destined to perform solid services unrecognised by the general run of mankind, their sterling but unobtrusive merits being hidden behind the distracting, ever-shifting scenes of tempestuous politics.

Such was the third Lord Malmesbury. Such his official fate before the testimony of two leading colleagues ruled otherwise—not only the Prime Minister, but Mr. Disraeli, attesting to his special merit as Foreign Secretary.* Lord Derby's encomium on his colleague concludes this chapter. Contenting ourselves, for the present, with a passing allusion to statements such as these, to which the reading public will look when seeking to form a judgment on modern history, we proceed to record events as they occurred between February and December 1852.

Special opportunities have enabled us to perform this

* Mr. Disraeli said in the House of Commons, on February 8th, 1853, that Lord Malmesbury had received scanty justice, but that to his indefatigable application and determined energy the country was much indebted.

duty with respect to Lord Malmesbury's first administration of the Foreign Office, and we diffidently approach the task in full consciousness of its importance, and well aware of the peculiar historic interest clinging to a period which included almost the closing hours of the Great Peace which dated from the Settlement of 1815, a period which has somewhat fallen into oblivion in the renewed clang of European arms. And yet the first administration of Lord Derby, apparently uneventful as it was, held, as we shall show, the keys of the Temple of Janus, and might have kept the dread portals closed still longer had not the British community—to use the words of a French contemporary observer-- yearned for the immediate formation of a *brilliant* Cabinet.

The general condition of affairs in Europe will be familiar to those who have traced our story to the close of Lord Granville's first Foreign Secretaryship, and they will know that in 1852 marks of the great democratic upheavals which occurred in 1848 still remained, inasmuch as repression, not eradication, of the evil had commended itself to the Continental Sovereigns as a passing expedient suitable to their methods of domestic administration. In fact, the spirit of Metternich still lingered on the scene, where the advantage of his prescience as to external politics was no longer enjoyed. When, however, we come to consider the mutual relations between the several States, we find that nothing was certain except that Russian influence reigned supreme over Germany, and that Austria stood estranged, if not absolutely hostile to England.

Now these undesirable conditions were attributable

to causes over which, for the most part, there was no possible external control; but they led men to doubt the immediate and assured efficacy of a diplomatic interference such as had been more or less in vogue under Lord Palmerston.

Moreover, it was not a moral failure alone that had been registered during the insurrectionary movements abroad. Two years of anarchy in Rome had been, despite Lord Minto's mission, productive of bloodshed, as also had the struggles between the people and their rulers both in Tuscany and Naples, victory remaining in both these cases with the soldiery who had triumphed over the populations. In Germany autocratic officialism was rampant both at Berlin and Vienna, while at the former capital the King calmly withdrew his former promises, and declared himself no longer bound to concede a Parliament. In Northern Italy, though the country was literally strewn with corpses, from the heights of St. Marino to the plain of Novara, yet the political condition of the people remained the same. It was, therefore, easy to see why a policy of peace and order should, in 1852, obtain a general support from those desiring the general welfare; and that such was the general tenour of the Conservative policy an attentive reader of the next few pages will allow.

Lord Malmesbury found the refugee question, concerning which Lord Granville had acted with such spirit, still in an acute stage when he entered office. The quarrel between Lord Granville and Count Buol, the Austrian Ambassador, was not appeased, the latter never having withdrawn the rejected notes request-

ing expulsion of the Italian refugees from Rome and Modena. Prince Schwarzenbergh, the Austrian Prime Minister, however, reversed the policy he had unfortunately been led to adopt, and declared for cordial relations between Great Britain and Austria, a consummation not destined to be realised, in consequence of his untimely death, which left the conduct of affairs to the very Count Buol who, full of anti-English prejudice, proceeded to encourage the putting into force of local law towards thoughtless English travellers, such as Mr. Mather and Mr. Newton,* whose relatives, of course, regardless of international law, raised the *Civis Romanus sum* of Lord Palmerston as a means of obtaining their release, the importance of this phase of the question being enlarged when, at the ensuing general election, an outcry commenced against Lord Derby's Cabinet, which contributed not a little towards securing what history bids us now designate that untoward majority of nineteen which seated Lord Aberdeen in power.

Lord Malmesbury is now known to have taken his stand, as Lord Granville had previously done, firmly upon law ; and if difficulties of the same description are recurrent, and, therefore, the heritage of the Foreign

* Mr. Mather was an Englishman resident in Florence, who adopted the long beard which in an Italian town betokened membership with the Carbonari, or secret societies. Not content with wearing this emblem of partisanship, he elected to march in the midst of a military band, and hence the blow he received and the disturbance which ensued.

Mr. Newton was taken red-handed in the act of sketching the fortifications round Verona, and that at a time when the prevalence of conspiracy against Austrian rule was notorious.

Office officials, it is all the more incumbent upon the recorder of political events faithfully to narrate the earlier phases of the question.

But the main interest of Lord Derby's short premiership, and, therefore, of Lord Malmesbury's Foreign Secretaryship, consists in the recognition of Louis Napoleon as Emperor of the French, for to such did the assumption of the title of Napoleon III. point, not to the sanction by England of an hereditary claim contrary to a provision of the Treaty of Vienna.

Napoleon III. reigned by reason of the suffrages of his countrymen. Had his throne been based upon hereditary right, his title must have been Napoleon IV., because his father, Louis, the whilom King of Holland, was a previous heir according to the rule of Napoleonic succession, and must have reigned as Napoleon III. at the King of Rome's demise.

Lord Malmesbury stood out stoutly for this security, which possesses an importance reflecting far into the future. The Duke de Reichstadt (or, as we have called him above, the King of Rome), the Great Napoleon's son, had signed some documents, when living in Austria with his grandfather the Emperor Francis, the tendency of which had been to strengthen the European denial of the Buonapartist claim to have established a dynasty, and now, thirty-seven years afterwards, the English Government took due security against any revival of such an assumption.*

* Louis Napoleon gave Lord Malmesbury a written assurance that he claimed his title as a matter of fact, and disclaimed hereditary right.

The French ruler should be chosen by the French people.

According to the *Russian Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War* (vol. i., p. 82), Lord Malmesbury, à propos of the new Napoleon's elevation, endeavoured to reconstruct a quadruple alliance in defence of the treaties of 1815; but the Foreign Secretary's action was, in truth, confined to a request that the three Great Powers would state, categorically, how far they were ready to contribute towards the defence of treaty law should a restored empire in France threaten European peace. In response, Russia *alone* promised to contribute 60,000 men, while Austria refused to bind herself, and Prussia took refuge in diplomatic evasion; so that the writer of Prince Gortschakoff's lately-published volume has erred in assuming the reconstruction of the Holy Alliance to have split upon the rock of British refusal, caused, as the Russian volume tells us, by the non-concurrence of Lord John Russell in his predecessor's project.

Our readers will observe the immense importance of the form in which Lord Malmesbury's friendship with Louis Napoleon had enabled him to settle this question of reconstructing the Buonapartist Empire, and how carefully guarantees were taken against the re-imposition of a yoke, to overthrow which competent calculators reckon that England, between the years 1793 and 1815, alone had spent 600 millions. We shall shortly be led to point out how the inclination of the new French Government came to be favourable towards England and Englishmen, while the ensuing war was of

a totally different character to those waged by the First Napoleon.

During Lord Malmesbury's first stay at the Foreign Office his attention was, of necessity, much occupied with Belgium, where, if the new Government of France had taken a hostile attitude towards England, they might have found specious cause of complaint in the intrigues of French refugees. It became, therefore, the duty of England to prepare against a probable *coup de main*, which the Franco-Belgic railway system made possible by means of a sudden irruption of 100,000 men across the French frontier.

Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, was therefore bidden to insist on the neutrality of Belgium ; while the British Cabinet, following the advice of Lord Granville, given before he left office, entered boldly upon the thorough ventilation of the situation in converse with Louis Napoleon's Ministers.

At this juncture it became apparent how valuable was Lord Malmesbury's previous knowledge of the new French Emperor. Delicate contingencies had to be boldly and instantly grappled with at a moment when the Belgian King, Leopold I., was alarmed, having sent his Polish officers back to Russia (so acting from sheer fear of a French invasion), and when, on that very account, he was about to supplicate for Russian help.*

* Such, indeed, was the disturbed state of Europe that, notwithstanding their frank acknowledgment of the Empire as the chosen government of the French people, Lord Derby's Government held it their duty to put our Channel defences in order, and

We venture to predict that history will approve Lord Malmesbury's skilful and successful diplomacy, the wisdom of which has not been arraigned with success by the purely professional critics, and the results of which now stand patent to the world.

On the 6th December 1852 Lord Malmesbury formally announced in the House of Lords the election of the French Emperor. "I believe," he said, "that the Emperor himself, and the great mass of his people, deeply feel the necessity, for the interests of both countries, that we should be on a footing of profound peace ; and, on the other hand, that they see the great folly and crime which it would be on either side to provoke a war. They must know that a war, so far as it would lead to the subjugation of either country by the other, is an absurdity ; that neither country, so great, so powerful, and so independent, could in any manner subjugate the other, and that, therefore, war must be as useless as cruel, and as inglorious as useless." (*Hansard*, cxxiii., p. 975.)

In another respect, at present unrecorded, did Lord Malmesbury leave his mark on English diplomatic relations, *i.e.* by sending Mr. Odo Russell to Rome as a permanent communicator with the Pope, then a temporal sovereign.* Government after Government

add considerably to the seamen and marines, such measures being taken in response to the strengthening of the French navy, which had been one of Louis Napoleon's early resolves.

* Diplomatic relations proper were impossible, owing to Lord Eglintoun's legislation specially forbidding them.

had suffered through the absence of any interchange of ideas with the spiritual head of a vast majority of the Irish people ; and despite inevitable theological objections, the want was not supplied hastily, or the unenviable position unfitly filled, inasmuch as Lord Malmesbury was but carrying out the desire of his great Tory predecessor, Mr. Pitt, and in the person of Mr. Odo Russell (now Lord Ampthill) had chosen a diplomatist whose future conduct justified such selection. It is, on the other hand, impossible not to note the advantages which the then increasing *entente cordiale* between England and France gained for the world at large during the few months of Lord Malmesbury's administration. Mr. Disraeli, in his celebrated speech of February 1858, on our relations with France, told the House of Commons how, "during Lord Malmesbury's *régime*, a misunderstanding between France and Switzerland was appeased through England's good offices ; how the South American rivers were opened to the navigation of the world by joint mediation ; how Prussia was induced by similar means to refrain from violent measures against Neufchatel ; how the United States renounced its designs on Cuba ; a dispute between the Sultan and the Egyptian Pacha receiving prompt settlement ; while the Greeks secured the fulfilment of their constitutional law ; all these beneficent achievements being accomplished in the early dawn of the Anglo-French alliance, as secured for England by Lord Malmesbury." (*Speeches of Lord Beaconsfield*, Kebbel, vol. ii., p. 20.)

It now remains to comment upon *the* most important diplomatic incident of the period, which, arising out of

rival French and Russian claims to supremacy at Jerusalem as regarded custody of the Holy Places, made its appearance during Lord Malmesbury's term of office. A careful analysis of the Eastern papers supplied to the House of Commons (1853, Part I.) must convince a reader that when the Government of Lord Derby resigned, at the end of December 1852, the Emperor of Russia had decided finally* on no violent measures to support assumed rights, wherein were wrapped all that Peter the Great and Catherine had desired for Holy Russia. But that no sooner had the telegraph flashed the tidings of Lord Aberdeen's political supremacy in England, deliberately elected to such position with an embarrassing disability clinging to his person,† than,

* We say *finally*, because after-events proved the idea to have lingered long in Nicholas's mind.

† Lord Aberdeen had signed the afore-mentioned private agreement in 1844, promising support to Russia, as against France, in the matter of the Holy Places. Nor do we deny that the construction placed upon this document by Lord Aberdeen, after the co-signatories Peel and Wellington were dead and gone, might reasonably be one which, to say the very least, questioned the validity of its binding power. But the question is not what Lord Aberdeen thought about his own responsibilities in the matter, but rather, how ought statesmen to have expected Nicholas to act when in possession of a document that, in his ignorance of British politics, would naturally appear to him of far greater importance than it was in reality. It must also be remembered that, although the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen, in 1844, only represented the Conservative party of that day, and not any future coalition, still the name of England's great captain carried a weight of an almost determining character; and this was specially the case with the Russian Emperor, steeped as his mind was in the traditions of 1814-15.

as we shall show in the succeeding chapter, Nicholas proceeded on his downward course by entering the Principalities, sending Menschikoff to intimidate the Turks, and placing imperial power above public law.

It will fall to us to record, in a succeeding memoir, how Lord Aberdeen, struggling to enact the part alike of a man of honour and a patriot, succumbed before a stronger will, and to the then unveiled truth that under the desire for Greek supremacy at Jerusalem lay dormant that for Russian rule on the Bosphorus.

Sebastopol was not armed to secure the custody of the Holy Places for Greek priests, but to support the Protectorate, which, going hand and hand with such claim, gave a commission to Russia to lead her fleets and armies to the confines of Constantinople—*Hinc illæ lacrimæ*.

A careful attention to dates, as recorded in our own pages, combined with recollection of the fact that Lord Aberdeen was known by the Emperor of Russia to be bound to support his contention against France, may well account for the reason that official Russia thought an alliance between France and England impossible, and fully justify Lord Beaconsfield's oft-times confidently expressed opinion that there would have been no Crimean war if Lord Derby's Ministry had not fallen in December 1852.

But, as regarded domestic affairs, Lord Derby's Administration was not in an equally secure position. The bulk of their supporters desired to re-try the issue between Free Trade and Protection, which had been decided in 1846, and on this question the new Ministry

was clearly divided in opinion, nor was it until a general election had taken place that the policy of attempting to relieve the burden of agricultural taxation was substituted for that of Protection. It was not exactly a dignified spectacle to behold statesmen actually waiting to see which way the political cat would jump, and such a condition of affairs undoubtedly detracted somewhat from their otherwise decorous demeanour before the world.

When, however, a deliberate policy had been adopted, the eulogium of Mr. Walpole, M.P. for Cambridge University, may be said to have been essentially true when he described the idea of relieving the prevailing pressure on agricultural interests as alike bold and prudent.

The Government did not, moreover, retire from office without effecting a consolidation of the national defences. By the acquiescence of all parties, and the special aid of Lord Palmerston, Lord Derby's Militia Bill was accepted as embodying the temporary requirements of the nation. But it was the outcome of much thought, and was framed after previous experience had demonstrated where the pitfalls connected with the subject were situated. Moreover, the benevolent neutrality evinced by Lord Palmerston helped to lift the Ministry over their passing difficulties, and made this Bill become law as the measure of an unanimous deliberative assembly rather than of a party. The Militia Bill empowered Her Majesty to raise a force not exceeding 80,000 men, of which number 50,000 were to be raised in 1852, and 30,000 in 1855, the relative numbers

subscribed by each county to be fixed by an Order in Council.

Yet, notwithstanding that the Ministry addressed themselves faithfully to adjusting the business of their country, their compact Parliamentary following was seen to be insufficient, even after the general election of 1852, and its slight Conservative gains, to secure a prolonged tenure of office. They were, like Peel's first Ministry, not in a majority whenever the various sections of adverse political opinion could be cajoled or driven into the so-called Liberal-Conservative net which the talented Peelites prepared for them.

Two months before this change occurred, and on September 18th, 1852, the great Duke of Wellington passed away.

In the course of nature, this event could not have been long deferred, but the period of its occurrence, nevertheless, stands as a mark amidst the ocean of time, showing where and when a link between the England of to-day and of the pre-Reform period was removed from amongst us. Moreover, the Duke represented all that was most noble and disinterested in his own times. His position before his death had become to be entirely outside and independent of politics; as he was consulted no less by Liberal than by Conservative ministers, when the Commonwealth required the counsel of disinterested patriotism.

It is not unworthy of mention here that Her Majesty Queen Victoria herself perceived the fitness of Wellington and Nelson resting side by side under the dome of St. Paul's—the greatest military by the side of the greatest

naval chief who ever reflected lustre on the annals of England.

The national sorrow, and the old Duke's funeral, are amongst the best known and most frequently recorded topics of modern history ; but Lord Derby's recollections of the ceremony, as conveyed to the House of Lords, are too impressive to escape repetition here : —

“ When,” said that striking orator, “ amidst solemn and mournful music, slowly and inch by inch the coffin which held the illustrious dead descended into its last resting-place, I was near enough to hear the successive sobs and see the hardly checked tears, which would not have disgraced the cheeks of England's greatest warriors, as they looked down for the last time upon all that was mortal of our mighty hero.”

Who, reading this panegyric, will not alike adjudge it worthy of the occasion and of the speaker?

Beyond the mere record of prominent events, domestic politics claim no place in this compilation, but it would be impossible to pass without mention the great Budget debate which overthrew Lord Derby's first administration.

It is, indeed, the mere pedantry of politics which can urge, as Mr. Keibel has done, on page 345 of his first volume of Lord Beaconsfield's speeches, that Mr. Disraeli, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was forced to bring in a less popular Budget because he was not allowed by the Opposition to wait until the usual time, which, not occurring until April 1853, would have left the minister free to act without bestowing special relief on the owners and occupiers of land; and, therefore, would not have necessitated unpopular taxation.

We should have thought the measures proposed might have been better defended on their own merits ; for, notwithstanding the contempt of Mr. Gladstone for the whole Budget, he has since appropriated its main features, repealing the malt tax (of which Mr. Disraeli in 1852 only proposed a reduction) in 1881, having in 1853 followed his rival's example, and extended the income tax to incomes of £100 a year. And we say this, desirous of showing the amplest honour to the magnificent talents which enabled Mr. Gladstone to win votes by the world-renowned oration which dealt a death-blow to his rival's financial scheme.

The great modern leader of the popular party ever must command acclamation, if only for his peerless gifts, but more especially should such tribute be freely rendered in a record such as this of those men, with many of whom the most popular of all modern Liberal leaders has been personally familiar, so that the history of Mr. Gladstone's life is a reflex of the political story since Queen Victoria began her reign. If, then, called on by diverse interpretation of questions connected with foreign policy to express dissent from views held by one so pre-eminent, such divergence will be expressed here in terms which imply the fullest respect, while reserving the Briton's privilege to draw his own conclusions upon the matter of high policy. But at the very threshold of Mr. Gladstone's political eminence, it is difficult not to feel the result of his action in overthrowing Lord Derby's Cabinet in December 1852 to have been unfortunate, although, in acting as he did, the brilliant rhetorician was only employing his talents as

other great party leaders have, generally speaking, been in the habit of doing.

We state this with a knowledge that later biographical disclosures * reveal our Great Chancellor of the Exchequer in the light of one by no means unfavourable, during a crucial part of his career, to the Conservative party, with whom he remained in sympathy while differing in opinion.

Whether all the members of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet knew of their chief's written promise to support Russia in the matter of the Holy Places we cannot say, but the three former Foreign Secretaries (Lords Aberdeen, Palmerston, and Granville) must have seen the fatal agreement concerning the Holy Places, as it had been handed down from one Foreign Secretary to another.†

* *Bishop Wilberforce's Life.*

† THE HOLY PLACES AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EASTERN QUESTION AS REGARDS THE CRIMEAN WAR.—In the year 1740, capitulations securing exclusive privileges were secured to the Latin Church by virtue of the Sultan's consent, but these were abrogated by subsequent firmans, which left the Greek Church supported by Russia in a position of pre-eminence at Jerusalem. Anyhow, when Mr. A. W. Kinglake was at Jerusalem, in 1844, he found the Greek priests in almost undisputed supremacy (*Eothen*, p. 222). But Louis Philippe's Government could not afford to allow traditions dating from the Crusades, which had been upheld by Napoleon the Great and Sebastiani on behalf of a rival dynasty, to be totally disregarded; so that on November 1st, 1847, Mr. Lavalette, the French ambassador, persuaded the Porte to grant a Commission of Inquiry. Frenchman and Turk were alike ignorant, maybe, that previously, in 1844, Nicholas of Russia had secured the support of influential English statesmen, who undertook to forward Greek claims as against Latin, and that without reference to France or her claims. On the 14th of February 1852, little more than a

Possibly, absorbed with the financial future of the country, Mr. Gladstone may not have apprehended the importance or gauged the measure of Lord Aberdeen's bondage, but when, as a reference to Mr. Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort* shows, the elevation of the old Tory Foreign Secretary to the Premiership had been resolved on anterior to the introduction of Mr. Disraeli's Budget, there should surely have not been absent some friendly mentor to apprise Mr. Gladstone of the situation before he mercilessly destroyed

fortnight before Lord Granville retired from the Foreign Office in favour of Lord Malmesbury. Turkey once more gave way to the pressure brought to bear, doubtless by Louis Napoleon, and concluded a treaty with France. The Emperor Nicholas looked, doubtless with anxiety, towards England, where an expiring Whig Government, which had expelled its leading spirit in Lord Palmerston, was nevertheless inspired with that statesmen's conviction that "the Greek and Catholic Churches, as regards the East, are merely other names for Russian and French influence" (Evelyn Ashley's *Life of Lord Palmerston*, vol. i. p. 257), while neither Lord John Russell, Lord Granville, or any other leading member of the Administration had signed the secret agreement of 1844. Nor was any member of Lord Derby's incoming Conservative Cabinet compromised in the matter of the Holy Places, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, was enabled to stand aloof from an embittered ecclesiastical controversy, which nevertheless waxed so fast and furious that on October 27th, 1852, a conference at Jerusalem between representatives of the rival religions broke up in confusion. But the dispute never became of direct political importance until the 22nd of December 1852, when Lord Aberdeen having been made British Premier, Nicholas in delight turned to him for the support which he had in 1844 promised to give on this very question of the Holy Places. Well may Mr. Kinglake, in his *History of the Crimean War*, vol. i., p. 82, remark that—"The Emperor Nicholas heard the tidings of Lord Aberdeen's elevation to the Premiership with a delight which he did not suppress."

a financial scheme, the leading provisions of which he was destined in future to appropriate—so employing his powers with the same faith in the truth and rectitude of his cause which has brought, if not always conviction, at least confidence to generations of supporters. But something beyond the mere glamour of eloquence is requisite to account for the glad acquiescence of a whole nation as represented by Sovereign, Lords, and Commons in a political change which, from the nature of the case, was fraught with the gravest evil.

We learn from Mr. Kinglake's graphic pen how these very same statesmen who, in December 1852, stood on the threshold of office, when established in power actually took the gravest decisions when sense was steeped in the forgetfulness which is of slumber born. But we venture to assert that their very existence as a Government was commenced in a land of dreams, which time, by teaching appreciation of hard stern facts, might have dissipated to national advantage, and that therefore their future lethargy was but the natural outcome of an ill-omened birth, which was accomplished, if not in perplexity, at least in doubt. In the words of Shakespeare (*Julius Cæsar*, ii. 1)—

Between the acting of a dreadful thing
And the first motion, all the interim is
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream ;

and that such was the experience of the confederated sections of the House of Commons who overthrew Lord Derby in 1852, subsequent events proved most conclusively:

Fully believing that a majority of those studying modern history will be convinced of the services performed on behalf of the State by the fourteenth Lord Derby when he, so to speak, crowned the newly consolidated Conservative edifice by training the members of his party in official life, we pass on to consider how fortunate England was, amidst a crowd of clever but unpractised men, to be served in foreign matters by one to the manner born, as was Lord Malmesbury.

Problems awaited instant solution, and in the event of delay the country could not but suffer; but the new Secretary proved equal to all emergencies. The plain unvarnished facts narrated above prove beyond the possibility of contradiction how thoroughly the British Foreign Secretary did his work. Some men, it is true, would shrink from acknowledging that any good could be done by politicians of the Tory party.

Those, that is, who believe that our country would have prospered better if left to the unhindered schemes of philosophers and opportunists, realised without receiving an adequate hearing in the country, will mark down the Earl of Derby and his colleagues of 1852 as obstacles to their designs, and therefore as those who deserved not well of the Commonwealth.

But those, on the other hand, who admire consistency, and rejoice that the sluices of Democratic anarchy have not already overwhelmed the rights of property and sapped the nation's strength, making of a great kingdom a third-rate republic, will appreciate to the full what was accomplished between March 5th and December 20th, 1852. No great truth can receive

absolute and final demonstration unless it be first tested in the crucible of thoughtful and instructed contention. To guarantee this indispensable condition in questions connected with public affairs, there must be rival organisation to compete with the party that represents dominant opinion.

While demonstrating the necessity for any great change, it frequently happens that the facts are exaggerated and made to bear an import beyond what the occasion requires. To modify such a tendency, the existence of a compact and well-disciplined Conservative organisation is absolutely necessary to English public life, where the Constitution demands that all classes should equally bear the burthen of Government, and with its responsibilities also reap a share of honours and emoluments.

This was once again rendered possible in 1852, and to that lord of high debate (Lord Derby), under whom all colleagues were proud to serve, do we owe not only a resuscitated Conservative party, but also the choice of a coadjutor in the Commons' House of Parliament (Mr. Disraeli), who, by sheer force of talent and imagination, was destined to fascinate the minds of men.

But we must, in conclusion, conduct our readers to a spot familiar, may be, to many of those who, taking delight in eloquence of the most elevated type, have from time to time crowded into the gallery of the House of Lords on a great occasion. On the evening of December 20, 1852, the political world was gathered together within those glittering galleries. The fairest of the fair looked down upon the scene and were drinking in eagerly

the concluding words of Lord Derby when resigning the Premiership.

And it was thus he spoke of his Foreign Secretary: --
“ My lords, I have no hesitation in saying that, in regard to the foreign relations of the country, we leave it in a more advantageous state—that our foreign relations are in a more friendly and in a more satisfactory position—than when my noble friend the Foreign Secretary received charge of that department; and I rejoice to have this opportunity of bearing my testimony to one than whom no one has been more unsparingly and, I venture to say, more unjustly maligned, than my noble friend. From first to last, I have had no cause for anything but self-gratulation, in having obtained in the Foreign Department the services of one who, without previous political experience, has brought to bear an ability, a diligence, and a good judgment on the affairs of his department, which reflect the highest credit upon him, and which, I venture to say, without fear of contradiction, has extorted the applause and admiration of old and experienced diplomatists, against whose views he has on more than one occasion had to combat, and successfully to combat.” Words these which must be highly valued by the man whose official life they endeavoured to describe, because the most precious testimony to merit is *laudari a laudato viro*.

To this outspoken encomium of Lord Malmesbury we desire to append the no less favourable judgment of a famous contemporary historian. Sir Archibald Alison, in his *History of Europe* (vol. viii., p. 827), writes as follows:—

“Lord Malmesbury conducted the foreign affairs of the country with judgment and temper, and in the most conciliatory spirit.”

We have no hesitation in saying that these judgments are amply endorsed by general opinion, and will never be reversed or even modified in the Supreme Court of Historical Tradition.

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Russell.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL.

DECEMBER 1852 TO FEBRUARY 1853.



SHARING with Charles Fox, Earl Grey, Lord Macaulay, and Lord Lansdowne their claim to be the most celebrated Whigs of the nineteenth century, the political faith possessed by Lord John Russell may be said to have been imbibed with his mother's milk. A Russell might think Toryism, and even be found talking it in private, but when it came to standing for Parliament, Whig he must remain, or else for ever hold his political peace; and the young statesman whose administration of the Foreign Office is under consideration, took kindly to the line mapped out for him.

It necessarily forms part of the task falling to the share of any biographer desiring to record a Russell's career to wander through the glades of Woburn, and enjoy the pictures which adorn the extensive quad-

angular building of the Ionic order, which, for more than a hundred years, has stood upon the site of the ancient Abbey.

The thought not unnaturally arises, How came the Russells to gain such broad lands? They owe their possessions to the wisdom and popularity of Mr. John Russell, of Kingston Russell, Dorsetshire, who in 1506 met the Archduke Philip of Austria, at Weymouth, whither he had been driven *en route* from Flanders to Spain. The Archduke became attached to Mr. Russell, whose pleasant qualities showed to advantage during the journey to London, where, through the introduction of his *companion de voyage*, Mr. Russell was presented to Henry VIII., who henceforth kept him near the Royal person through his French wars, finally raising him to the peerage as Baron Russell, of Chenies (Bucks), and conferring grants of the dispossessed monasteries at Tavistock and Woburn. Portraits both of the Austrian Archduke, and of the astute founder of the Russell fortunes, adorn the Woburn walls, that of the latter indicating the qualities which enabled him to hold his own in the different atmosphere of Queen Mary's Court. By the latter Sovereign the first Earl of Bedford was chosen to conduct her future husband, Philip II., from Spain, in 1554, after which he survived but a year. In Mr. Russell's career we see to a certain extent exemplified the tact and perspicuity which has since allied the profession of popular principles with the favour of their Sovereign—characteristics not alien to the Russells of our own time. Of all the remarkable portraits at Woburn none exceeds that of the Marchioness of

Tavistock, who, herself formerly a Keppel, is said to have died of grief in 1767, after her husband had been killed out hunting. "She would have escaped such a fate had she been a scullery-maid," was Dr. Johnson's rude comment on the touching incident; while a competent modern critic, in the shape of Mr. Gladstone, remarked that he thought he had seen most of the more beautiful female portraits in Europe, but that this surpassed all. It requires no critic to tell the visitor that it is a veritable crown of beauty to an apartment filled with objects of art and interest.

Another critic of renown passed through this same room, in the shape of the late Sir Robert Peel, who, on being shown a fine Velasquez, representing an olive-complexioned, stern, not to say unamiable-looking, Spaniard, remarked, in answer to a request for his opinion, that it seemed to him the gentleman's expression was one of discontent at being so badly hung—an evil which Calcott, the artist, suggested should be cured by the building of a room with sufficient light to show the portrait off.

One room at Woburn is reserved for Canaletti's works, which that artist painted for the noble owner in 1760. So precise and careful is the execution in these magnificent specimens of Canaletti's peculiar domain of art, that the sculptor, Canova, when on a visit to Bedfordshire, recognised his own house in Venice.

A lasting monument of this gifted visitor is the "Temple of the Graces," which forms one end of the noble sculpture gallery, and enshrines Canova's exquisite group of the three goddesses. The "Temple of Liberty" at the other end of the gallery is devoted to

the less lovely, but not less interesting, busts of the great Whig leaders. The father of the subject of our memoir, though not the founder of the celebrated collection of marbles, amassed the bulk of its varied treasures. The connoisseur can here compare masterpieces by Canova, Chantrey, Thorvaldsen, and Westmacott, with rare survivals of classical antiquity, among which may be especially mentioned a torso of a youth (207), a statue of Bacchus (201), a bust of Diadumenianus (150), the Lante vase, the Aldobrandini reliefs, and the Ephesian sarcophagus with the story of Achilles (219).

Woburn Abbey is redolent of the memory of the good sixth Earl of Bedford, father of Lord John Russell, whose qualities fully entitled him to be considered the type of what an English nobleman should be. He died in 1839, not a record of the time failing to recognise his value and lament his loss. The wealth of the Russell family seems to have been progressive. The Bloomsbury property came through marriage with Lady Rachel Wriothesley, and its value may be best realised by a walk through the region around Tottenham Court Road, where the family motto, *Che sara, sara*, may be seen on more than one building. It was said that the second Duke of Bedford might have thrown £200,000 a year into the Thames and yet have kept up Woburn Abbey. Wealth on such a scale must strike even those accustomed to the enormous hoards of modern capitalists.

Not the least interesting fact connected with Woburn consists in the visit which the young Queen Victoria paid to the seventh Duke during the early days of her

married life. As at Burleigh and other baronial residences, the records of the royal visit are faithfully preserved, and the room where Her Majesty slept remains singled out for special honour, such as time cannot extinguish.

Born in Hertford Street, Mayfair, on August the 18th, 1792, the education Lord John Russell received was broken and disturbed. Sojourn at a private school near Sunbury, was followed by a few months spent at Westminster, where ill-health prevented him from entering into the delights of public school life. After a private tutorship with the Reverend Mr. Smith of Woodnesbury in Kent, where Lord John formed a friendship with the Lord Clare of Byron's early poems, a visit to Spain was undertaken in company with Lord and Lady Holland, so that the future Premier and Foreign Secretary had an opportunity of seeing English armies in the field during the arduous and critical period of 1808 to 1810.* But the latter year may be fixed as the

* It was Lord John Russell's fate to see both Wellington and Napoleon when those great leaders of men were in the meditative mood. It was after the battle of Salamanca and the consequent capture of Madrid that he accompanied the British General to Burgos and dined with him in camp. Wellington had been more than usually talkative, concealing thereby the anxiety which the advance of the French had caused him. Before retiring for the night, Sir Frederick Ponsonby called Lord John Russell aside and asked him if the Duke had made any communication to him. On receiving a negative answer, Lord John was advised to pack up his effects, as the English would be in full retreat at dawn.

Lord John Russell's visit to Napoleon occurred in 1814, when the Emperor was confined at Elba. He was evidently brooding over

critical moment of his life, inasmuch as the Duke of Bedford's refusal to send his son to Cambridge, on the ground of disbelief in the inculcation of knowledge through any English university, led to a period of study in Edinburgh with Professor Playfair, the eminent exponent of moral philosophy. That the youthful Russell did not grow up to be a doctrinaire rather than a statesman, was due rather to the political inheritance

his fate, and anxiously watching the turn of events in France. Probably his visit to Spain was the most interesting episode of the Whig statesman's youth, so thoroughly in unison with his Liberal opinions was the attempt made by Canning, Wellesley, and Wellington to fan the flame of liberty which the Spanish patriots had lighted.

Almost a Stoic in his habits, Lord John Russell did not satisfy the jovial instincts of a representative Spanish canon, who, on his lordship refusing to partake of a second glass of wine, reminded him of a Latin proverb in vogue at Salamanca—

“ Qui bene bibit, bene dormit ;
 Qui bene dormit non peccat ;
 Qui non peccat, salvatus erit.”

Lord John Russell paid three visits to Spain during the Peninsula war: one with Lord and Lady Holland to Cadiz and Lisbon, soon after the original Spanish revolt in 1808; another journey was performed for the purpose of seeing Lord William Russell.

On three separate occasions besides the one already mentioned did Lord John Russell see the great Duke: once on the Portuguese frontier after Massena's retreat from Portugal in 1811, when Wellington expressed a confident military opinion as to the strength of the lines of Torres Vedras, which he would undertake to hold twenty times in succession. Lord John Russell was at Cadiz when the Duke came there to arrange with the Junta certain details connected with the final campaign of 1813, and lastly he saw the English general when about to cross the frontier and cope with Soult on French territory.

which fell into his lap, than to any inaptitude for imbibing the teaching which left such an abiding mark upon the future of a great career. Like Lords Lansdowne, Dudley, and Palmerston, who pursued their studies under Dugald Stuart, Lord John Russell was from the very necessities of his position called on to exercise his matured talents in a more practical school than that in which he had to a great degree formed his character. But men were not slow to adopt a hasty contemporary judgment, pronouncing his talents to be great, but his practical usefulness marred by a bookish reserve which led rather to the contemplative retirement of the study, than to distinction in the most stirring of all arenas, a popular assembly. But a kindred courage to that which had formerly sustained Lords Castlereagh and Althorpe, and with inferior forensic power enabled them to control the House of Commons, came to the aid of this cultured youth, and allowed him to exercise remarkable abilities to the greatest possible public advantage.

Born on the 18th of August 1792, Lord John Russell, at the time of which we write, formed a link between the almost forgotten past and a changed present fraught with omens and earnestness of still more complete change. And yet in the advancement of Reform Lord John Russell never gave an inconsiderate vote or allowed his combative spirit to be the means of stirring class against class, or destroying cherished institutions in Church and State. Reform, not destruction—was ever his watchword, and whether loathed by the dominant Tories in 1832, or in 1848 shunned as

an Erastian by a certain class of Churchmen, it was during efforts calculated, as he believed, rather to strengthen than destroy, that he incurred such enmity; whilst from first to last, whether in the House of Commons, or later in life as Earl Russell, he ever stoutly contended for the honour of England.

To those privileged to enjoy the society of this philosophical follower of Fox it must have indeed been delightful to listen to unreserved narration of events out of which such mighty results have sprung. He loved to dwell thereon, and is known to the writer to have done so frequently at the table of a friend, whose guests never failed to depart instructed and delighted thereby. On Edinburgh and his Scotch life he would often affectionately linger, telling how, when a youth, he escaped from his studies in the modern Athens and betook himself, with knapsack and staff, to the Highlands.

He would, moreover, tell how on one occasion he forced his way through the tangled ground which separates Lochs Achray and Katrine, and that when the first sensations consequent on contemplating the beauty of the scene, where Benvenue casts its shadow over Loch Katrine, had passed away, the traveller rested on a silvery beach of fine sand which came down to the water's edge. There he descried an individual clad in rough Scotch woollen cloth, who, with pen and pencil, was committing to paper such beauties of detail as his capacious memory might not retain.

The stranger was Sir Walter Scott, taking his notes for the *Lady of the Lake*, and the scene of this event was laid on the silver strand so well known to each reader of

the poem or sojourner in the fair Trossach region. This same man who thus claimed acquaintance with Sir Walter Scott talked with Wellington in Spain during 1809–10, held converse with the great Napoleon at Elba in 1814, and, indeed, was destined to claim acquaintance with every politician and literary genius who flourished during the remarkable period in which his manhood was passed.

If his predilections led him to eschew the politics of Liverpool and Castlereagh, there was no opponent more ready to acknowledge their merits than Lord John Russell, no statesman who more fully appreciated the noble magnanimity of Mr. Canning's character, or who sooner descried the talents of Stanley, or better appreciated Sir Robert Peel, at whose very feet he was not unwilling to sit when the details of an abstruse matter had to be mastered.* Although in political opposition when this event occurred, the two statesmen were realising Burke's favourite aphorism, to the effect that "Party should be made for politics, not politics for party."

This aristocratic Whig, favoured by the fortune of birth, remained through life a consistent friend of freedom, tempering his zeal, however, by an abiding faith in the principles of political economy as indoctrinated in the school of Scotch philosophy. Following, therefore, the teachings of Adam Smith, he believed that legislation directed towards the advantage of any one class at the expense of the other must be wrong in principle, and accordingly gave his whole life over to effecting

* Greville, *Memoirs*, vol. iii., p. 282.

such a condition of things in England that, to use Mr. Fox's words, quoted previously in this work, "the poor man might have the right to enjoy a shilling such as protected the rich man whilst he spent his a pound." To wild and romantic schemes of emigration Lord Russell was averse, inasmuch as he preferred to do all that in him lay to make Great Britain a happy place to live in before he sent its manhood to protect property in other climes; and, indeed, Lord John Russell did not attempt to conceal his views on this subject from the poorest or most insignificant individual into whose society he might be thrown, and travelling on a coach through the country between Loch Tay and Dunkeld he expressed his sorrow at hearing of the frequent cases of emigration and expatriation which the Scotch poor law of some years back entailed on the inhabitants.

"Do not send the people out of the country, whatever you do," he said; and considering that the depopulation of the Scotch vales and moors means absence of the material which enabled Wellington to pass from the Douro to the Pyrenees, and Sir Colin Campbell to relieve Lucknow, there seems to be good reason for doubting whether our increasing urban population can supply us with men of such stamina as were formerly found in the agricultural districts.

By many leading Churchmen and influential laymen Lord John Russell was, we repeat, for many years looked upon as a doubtful friend to the Established Church, all because he recognised the just claims of the historic Nonconformist party to equality before the law—protected, that is, the descendants of those who first made it

apparent to King Henry the Eighth that the liberties of England were inalienably bound up with the repudiation of the Pope's Supremacy in Great Britain, and who freely shed their blood for what they believed, and did so in no antagonistic spirit to the pure and reformed Church of England.* But when the conduct and opinions of the philosophical Radicals was in question, Lord John Russell stood stoutly by the Church, as affording the only effective bar to the spread of infidelity, which in old age, the subject of this memoir tells us in his *Recollections*, it was his good fortune as Minister to be enabled to check.†

It would be as superfluous in the year 1881 or 1882 to recall to our readers the personality of Lord John

* Lord John Russell's Protestant opinions were the means of partially reconciling to his Government no less a Tory than the late Sir Robert Inglis. When, in 1839, Lord Melbourne's Government was kept in power by a few votes, Sir Robert confided to the leader of the House of Commons how often he prayed that Lord John might be succeeded by an equally good friend to the Church; having doubtless in his mind's eye the figure of Sir Robert Peel, who, according to the worthy baronet's view, had previously gone wrong on Catholic emancipation. When this was told to the Premier, Lord Melbourne, he replied with a hearty laugh that at last he had discovered why his Government remained in office with so scant a majority; as a result, that was, of the good Sir Robert Inglis's prayers.

So sociable was Sir Robert with his political opponents, that the old family butler was wont to denounce the baseness of those who first consumed the good cheer put before them in Bedford Square, and then went down to the House and voted against the cherished Church and State theories of the member for Oxford University.

† Lord Russell's *Recollections*, p. 423.

Russell, as it would be to tell the story of his connection with reform and love of civil and religious liberty.

It is as absolutely true that the noble Lord's career remains a precious possession of the House of Commons as it is that Lord Stanley's apt expression, "Johnny has upset the coach," represents the outcome of more than one political combination—the fact being that Lord John Russell could not willingly brook a Liberal supremacy in the Commons, such as he had temporarily warded off after Lord Althorp's elevation to the Peerage, and was destined to dispute with Palmerston and Gladstone.

But despite all these differences, Lord John Russell remained a staunch Whig, uniformly loyal to the Liberal tenets of statesmanship so far as they did not in his opinion tend towards the injury of British interests. And even when, in after years, he felt himself bound to give expression to his dissatisfaction with the line of foreign policy Mr. Gladstone's Government, perhaps not uninfluenced by the Birmingham school, adopted after 1870, he remained in his old age still a consistent and enthusiastic party man; and during the Conservative supremacy which followed the election of January 1874, he expressed himself to Mr. Gladstone as desirous of seeing that statesman's guidance once more supreme in the State councils.*

There is no more mistaken reliance than that placed upon the changed sympathies of those who all their lives have been attached members of a political party. At the moment of trial they not unnaturally gravitate

* Midlothian speeches of Mr. Gladstone, 1881.

towards the opinions and associations of a life-time, and therefore speculations as to what course illustrious statesmen of a bygone time would have taken in controversies begotten long after their death, and decided under circumstances non-existent during their life-times, are specially and notoriously unreliable, and so to be discarded.

Who, for instance, can make a true forecast of the working of a living man's mind, much less the possible course likely to be taken by one whose energy was devoted towards the solution of problems connected with the past in which he lived; and we state this without desiring to deny that the written and spoken testimony of our great men presents a fund alike of warning and knowledge such as the statesman should have ever at hand, and study to use as occasion affords.

Thus it follows that the administration of the Colonial Office by Lord John Russell in 1839 should be contemplated by those who favour ideas of imperial confederation and would desire not to yield an inch of ground where the flag of England had once been planted.

In pages 199 and 203 of Lord Russell's *Recollections*, we may read how the stout-hearted little Colonial Minister secured the sovereignty of New Zealand, answered the French official who asked him how much of Australia he claimed as the dominion of Great Britain with a decided *all*, and so closed the question, whilst he gave assurances to the North American Provinces that England would never desert them so long as they desired to remain her subjects. "A faint-hearted Government," said the noble lord, "may break these pledges and depart

from this policy ; but from the day when they do so, the decline and fall of the British Empire may be dated " ; and, again, he adds, " In my eyes it would be a sad spectacle, one for gods and men to weep at, to see this brilliant empire, the guiding star of freedom, broken up, to behold Nova Scotia, the Cape of Good Hope, Jamaica, and New Zealand, try each its little spasm of independence, while France, the United States, and Russia, would be looking on, each and all willing to annex one or more of the fragments to the nearest portion of their dominions."

Who, then, could be better fitted to hold the Foreign Office seals in a Cabinet where divers views obtained, and to be invested with the dignity of Foreign Secretary of State at a moment when peace and war trembled in the European balance, than was Lord John Russell ?

But there were reasons, unknown to the ordinary observer, destined to blight this fair prospect, and with all his courage, all his integrity, the first Foreign Secretaryship of Lord John Russell was undertaken apparently in doubt, and when his mind was still set upon a fresh measure of constitutional reform. And, indeed, the flaccid, cumbrous nature of the purposeless coalition which had overthrown Lord Derby soon became apparent. They agreed upon nothing but keeping their places. Lord John and Lord Palmerston were at daggers drawn ; Lord Aberdeen had spent the last thirty years of his life in counteracting what he called the meddlesome policy of one of his Foreign Secretaries of State (Lord Palmerston), whose presence in the Cabinet was, however, on all hands declared to be a necessity.

Then the *bête noir* of Lord John Russell—the philosophical Radical, in the person of Sir W. Molesworth—having been admitted into the Cabinet, had to be conciliated; the parliamentary opposition of the trading classes appeased by promises of a peaceful foreign policy, whilst as Mr. Justin McCarthy tells us in his history, the most eloquent member of the Government, Mr. Gladstone, believed the Russian claim to a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey to be justly founded on a clause of the Treaty of Kainardji, and therefore valid.

All was confusion, all uncertainty; round pegs were tossed pell-mell into square holes; and the deluded nation trusted to the undoubted talent, not to say genius, of their several ministers to save them from disaster, rather than to their combined wisdom.

And all this danger, all this desperate tangle, was encountered and brought about mainly in order that the only compact political party might be hurled from power. The best that can be said for this concatenation of heterogeneous and mutually repellent atoms is that it was expected to prevent what the combined sections believed to be Tory mischief, but was not designed to do any positive good.

Never since the days of the flat-bottomed administration of Mr. Pelham in 1744, had anything approximate been seen in the political arena. The coalition of Fox and North, however reprehensible, limited its evil possibilities by the line at which the community of these two men's interests ended, whilst the administration of Lord Grenville in 1806, if it enlisted all the talents in

its ranks, at least contrived to deal a death-blow to slavery. Not only, however, was the administration of Lord Aberdeen designed for no settled purpose, but it proved totally unequal to the difficulties with which it became called upon to cope. True, the difficulties were considerable.

A Napoleon had ascended the throne of France. So portentous an event does this appear to a modern historian, Mr. Justin McCarthy, that he is led to doubt whether the battle of Waterloo can be classed amongst the decisive combats the world has seen. Its results, as it appeared to him, were obliterated within forty years—years, however, be it noted, of unbroken European peace.

But the Imperial Sovereign of France was in 1852–53 eager to prove that the policy of 1809–14 was to be abrogated so far as his personal desire, begotten from observation and knowledge of Englishmen and English institutions, could influence the course of events; yet he had not unnaturally to contend with cold distrust, and in addition, unfortunately, almost with halting despair, when he essayed to form friendly relations with his uncle's old foe. The autocrat Czar of the North, it is true, frowned on Napoleon the Third's pretensions, and a like attitude would doubtless have been adopted by the other European sovereigns, if Lord Malmesbury's skilful diplomacy had not arranged the intricate matters at issue.

Russia, however, adopted a scarcely benevolent neutrality in the matter, speaking officially of Louis Napoleon, when *de facto* Emperor, as *cher ami*, when

custom favoured adoption of the term *mon bon frere*—a course similar to that chosen when Louis Philippe superseded the Legitimist line in 1830, after which change even such a *bon parti* as the Duke d'Orleans had to put up with the sneers of the Faubourg St. Germain, whose Legitimist analogues in Russia did not afterwards hesitate to declare Louis Napoleon's choice of a wife that he loved, a mistake, inasmuch as he might have waited, save the mark, and married a princess of Sweden.* But surely common sense revolts against such skin-deep servility, while Louis Napoleon is seen at his very best both in his choice of a partner for life and his subsequent fidelity to the object of his affections.

But the re-opening of the Eastern question was destined to disclose chances of international alliances such as more pressing needs offered to the Lord of many battalions, and, despite the passing inclinations of a contrary tendency seen in 1852, the banding together of France and Russia against England was in 1853 by no means impossible. Hence the justification of the impugned Anglo-French alliance.

What, then, did the new Napoleon desire—what did he intend? No man can answer this question in accordance with truth and not reply—An *entente cordiale* with Great Britain, such as Lord Palmerston, Lord Malmesbury, and Mr. Disraeli had welcomed, and which the country desired her Ministry straightway to consolidate.

It is worth while to consider under what circumstances this country might have found herself if the pressure from without had not carried Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet

* *Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War.*

into a hearty acknowledgment of the benefits which an alliance between England and France portended.

In the first place, it saved the British nation from a naval conflict in the Mediterranean, which would have been rendered necessary for the purpose of preventing a junction between the fleets of France and Russia after Sinope, and a consequent anxiety at home as to Channel defences and a then imperfect organisation for the protection of hearth and home. If the Russian war called for sacrifice and threw our opponents back half a century, surely a death-struggle between England and France in 1852 would have been attended by results far more deplorable to humanity and deadly to commerce.

It happened that Lord John Russell, with his well-known love of constitutional maxims, had spoken coldly in public of a *coup d'état*, which he allowed the Prince President might have believed to be necessary, and the tone of this remark betokened the spirit animating Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, not one of whom came forward as Lord Palmerston, Lord Malmesbury, and Mr. Disraeli had done, but showed a disposition to let events drift. To this, as may be supposed, the Emperor of the French refused to accede. There must be a real alliance between the two countries, or none at all. It was for English statesmen to choose whether the great opportunity should be lost, or whether the honest denunciations of more than one member of the British Government should be taken as indicating a renewed and deadly feud between two former foes, not by any means enemies by interest or desire.

It was primarily owing to the Emperor Napoleon III. that so deplorable a catastrophe as a quarrel between England and France did not follow the hesitation apparent in English counsels, during which, as we have shown, both Lord Palmerston, Lord Malmesbury, and Mr. Disraeli and the Derbyites generally, remained staunch to the French alliance. But men spoke encouragingly of the future when, on the formation of Lord Aberdeen's Administration, they saw a practised and experienced statesman of Lord John Russell's type prepared to share with loyalty the arduous responsibilities inseparable from all government.

But there was in Lord John Russell's nature a certain disposition to claim the free right of private judgment, which made it difficult for him to act as a subordinate and not endanger an Administration thus tottering in its very inception. On previous occasions he had been unable conscientiously to sink differences in minor matters such as others were ready to forego for the sake of the party to which they belonged. Hence the long string of dislocated Cabinets which Mr. Disraeli once recited to an amused House of Commons. When, therefore, after Lord Derby's resignation in 1852, the coalition Government of Lord Aberdeen came to be formed, not the least difficulty was the finding a place for Lord John, who, in addition to possessing the above-mentioned peculiarities, which might any moment assert themselves awkwardly, was in active competition for supremacy with Lord Palmerston.

The first event of importance that took place during Lord John Russell's first Foreign Secretaryship was the

conclusion of a Convention between the Persian Government, whereby the Shah undertook not to send troops to Herat unless the city and its territory was invaded by a foreign army; the British, on their part, undertaking to persuade foreign Powers to respect the independence of Herat. This Convention was signed on the 5th of January 1853, and formed the ground of a future quarrel between England and Persia when in 1856 the Shah proceeded to lay siege to the coveted city.

Lord John Russell likewise interfered with success on behalf of a brother and sister, by name Madai, who had suffered imprisonment at the instance of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, solely and entirely because they were propagators of Protestantism. They were nominally arrested for reading the Bible in their own apartments, a crime which, if contrary—as was averred—to the laws of Tuscany, revealed an ignorance of the first glimmerings of religious liberty in the Bourbon Duchy which in its very atrocity alone justified an interference by the stronger power, one, moreover, which proved thoroughly effective, and demonstrated Lord John Russell's fidelity to the dictates of Freedom.

Tuscany, it is true, was weak, and without substantial support, inasmuch as her indirect abettors were the Vatican, Austria, and the Autocrat of all the Russias, who, as certain of their proceedings were then attracting the attention of the world, were in a position to offer nothing but sympathy on behalf of those whose system of government was identical with their own.

But the British Foreign Secretary was, nevertheless, most thoroughly in his element when, as the Protestant

Minister, he alike broke a lance for the rights of humanity, and justified the first principles of religious liberty in the face of Europe and the world.

But in so doing, the risk of war was not amongst the possibilities which Lord John was called on to calculate. It was otherwise with the dispute for pre-eminence between the Latin and Greek Churches at Jerusalem, waged for custody of the Holy Places, when by previous agreement Lord Aberdeen, the British Premier, had, in 1844, pledged himself to adopt the Russian, and therefore the Greek, view. The Turks had endeavoured to make a compromise, which, leaving the Latins in possession, yet guaranteed free worship to the Greeks on an altar which accorded with their custom and doctrine. But this, pleasing neither party, left the controversy doubly embittered ; so that on the Emperor of the French instructing his Ambassador to press for a more complete Latin victory, the Czar of Russia talked of moving troops into the Principalities, and thus, to use Prince Metternich's words, cast before him the presage of a disastrous future.* Declaring the report of Nicholas's advance

* Mr. Kinglake tells us, in p. 64, vol. i., of his *Crimean History*, that after the beginning of 1853 there were strange alterations in the Emperor Nicholas's conduct. On the 20th of December 1852, Lord Derby resigned. On the 22nd the dispute between France and Russia concerning the Holy Places at Jerusalem was allayed, under pressure, in favour of the former, who obtained possession of the coveted keys both of the Church of Bethlehem and of the Sacred Manger ; and on the 27th Lord Aberdeen became Prime Minister. In bondage to Russia, so far as the Holy Places were concerned, Lord Aberdeen's Government issued a despatch, on January 28th, which blamed the French as having been the first

to the frontier with 50,000 men to be premature and unfounded, Lord John Russell questioned the wisdom of the threatening French diplomacy, in a despatch which is one of the last penned during his tenure of the Foreign Office. But this event, occurring on January 28th, 1853, had been earlier in the month preceded (January 9th, 1853) by the remarkable conversation between Sir Hamilton Seymour and the Emperor of Russia in the palace of the Archduchess Helen at St. Petersburg on which occasion the Czar proposed to partition Turkey and give Egypt and Candia to England. The sick man of Europe has since become a bye-word whenever Russia desires to further sap her way towards the fortress of Constantinople.

To a statesman of Lord John Russell's special knowledge and experience these murmurings meant the advent of war, or, if not war, of complications such as diplomacy of the most exquisite character could alone hope to prevent. And he was certainly the man to speak out plainly for England.

Why Lord John surrendered the Foreign Office to Lord Clarendon was not communicated to Parliament when about the middle of February the practised statesman retired to the Lord Presidency of the Council.

to disturb the *status quo* at Jerusalem, while early in February the Secretary of the Board of Control, Sir Charles Wood, spoke in unfriendly terms of the French Government in a similar tone to that which Sir James Graham, Lord Aberdeen's First Lord of the Admiralty, had previously adopted. Could the Russian Emperor, knowing Lord Aberdeen's previously expressed inclination, believe in the existence of the Anglo-French alliance?

“I object,” said Mr. Disraeli, in his most remarkable speech of February 18th, 1853, “to thus shutting up great men in small rooms, and of binding to the triumphal chariot wheels of administrative ability all the fame and genius of the Whig party.” Mr. Disraeli’s speech contained a spirited protest on behalf of the French alliance, and an historical disquisition on the duties of the two countries which one and all should study.

Lord John Russell’s subsequent part in matters connected with the Crimean war is well known. He would have ensured the acceptance by Turkey of the Vienna Note, notwithstanding that the prescience of the British Ambassador, Lord Stratford, descried that the claim to a Protectorate of the Christians was not thereby abrogated; and yet Lord John, on reflection, and in the fulness of his heart, could go down to the hustings and declare that the war was one made on behalf of the liberties of Europe; and his making this statement after his previous objection to diplomatic details, proves very conclusively to the writer that, whatever the errors may have been which created such a situation, we were in 1853 in presence of a war which no human power could then avert. It had been for some time pending. The reports of our diplomatic agents were not such as to hold out hopes of peace. Russia was arming, and at great expense. The same story came from St. Petersburg and Moscow as sped across the plains of Warsaw, carrying the message of the shrewd Sir William Mansfield (afterwards Lord Sandhurst). The spell was at last to be broken, and the nations

once more would elect to trust all to the decision of arms.*

Lord John Russell had no small share in stirring the spirit of the people he had served so well when once the Rubicon was passed. Mr. Cobden, in one of his great anti-war speeches, observed this, knowing full well how

* The subjoined extract, culled from the Russian diplomatic papers, bears evidence of its truth and of the stout-hearted reserve of England's Minister.

In the lately-published *Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War*, for which the Russian Foreign Office is responsible, the following conversation is, at page 326 of Volume I., represented to have occurred between Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador, and Lord John Russell. It dates from the moment when war was on the horizon :—

“ ‘ What think you of the situation ? ’ inquired Lord John. ‘ I think you are making a cheap display of courage by announcing your intention of covering the Turkish ports, in the certainty that winter will prevent us from attacking them,’ replied Baron Brunnow. ‘ But if the winter does not prevent you, can we leave the Turks unprotected ? ’ said Lord John. ‘ I hope,’ replied the Russian Minister, ‘ that winter will bring discretion, and lead to a peaceful solution. If this takes place, so much the better ; if not, we are prepared. If war is inevitable, I hope, at least, that it will not last long. I put little faith in successes that are easily won in a struggle between great Powers where honour is involved. You know that Russia does not make terms in adversity.’ ‘ Nothing must be done precipitately,’ rejoined Lord John, with emotion ; ‘ so long as there remains the least hope we must try to avoid war, but if it breaks out we cannot leave the Turks undefended.’ ‘ At least,’ added Baron Brunnow, ‘ before a war is begun, its duration should be foreseen. England will not be willing to fight a struggle to the death, like that with France. The days of Pitt are gone.’ ‘ I hope,’ said Lord John, ending the interview, ‘ to find you here on my return from Scotland.’ ‘ I am not sure,’ rejoined Baron Brunnow ; ‘ that will depend on what you do.’ ”

weighty was the noble Lord's influence. And when the war began to flag, and peace became a possibility, although Lord John talked of a cessation of bloodshed as desirable, he declared peace without honour to be impossible and war preferable, and yet (to anticipate the course of events for biographical reasons), in March 1855, he proceeded to the Conference of Vienna on behalf of England, and there agreed to recommend certain Austrian proposals for peace which he subsequently repudiated at home.

Lord John has been much blamed for remaining in the Cabinet, and so endorsing the non-acceptance of terms to which he, as a Plenipotentiary, had agreed,* and it would be vain to deny that he remains associated with what contemporary critics, one and all, adjudged to be a diplomatic failure. Be that as it may, he had loyally supported his colleagues throughout the war, and this after incurring the, to him, great disappointment of having to shelve Reform. Lord John Russell believed most thoroughly in the necessity of preserving the independence of Turkey. When sent to Vienna it was to gain a formal recognition of the Turkish Empire in its character of an independent and self-existent State. Even if the treaties of 1856 had

* It is characteristic of Lord John Russell that when at the Conference of Vienna, in March 1855, he claimed of Prince Gortschakoff a Constitution for the Danubian Principalities, when present for the purpose of settling matters at issue which was to decide if these countries were not to be the scene of a sanguinary conflict. Prince Gortschakoff replied with a sarcasm better to be imagined than described.

not given apparent denial to such a conception, how is it that Cabinet Ministers responsible for the results of all the bloodshed between 1853 and 1856 were found to maintain, twenty years afterwards, that a treaty right was reserved for Russia to interfere in Turkey under certain special circumstances, under which the whole effect of the former struggle might be neutralised.

Such, certainly, was not the contemporary idea when the war closed, and Lord John Russell's public utterances point to a totally different conclusion. Lord Russell left behind him a statement to the effect that an implied promise had been made to him when joining the coalition Government that he should succeed Lord Aberdeen in the Premiership whenever opportunity for the Prime Minister's desired retirement might present itself. We know, likewise, from Sir Th. Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, that Lord Aberdeen's proposed resignation would have led to the instant disintegration of a Cabinet the members of which were never in accord.

The various memoirs and biographies of the time have not yet elucidated the truth concerning these negotiations, while the secret agreement concerning the Holy Places has rendered them more than ever difficult to explain; and their unravelment must be consigned to some future discussion of an epoch whereon much light may yet be cast. We shall probably learn that the cordial acceptance of Napoleon III.'s proffered alliance was resorted to as an alternative to practical isolation in Europe. We can scarcely learn more than we know of the British Ambassador's (Lord Stratford's) ready sagacity, and we shall think of Lord John Russell's share in the

transactions as that of a straightforward Englishman—eager for peace, but not shrinking from any sacrifice when the known interests of his country were at stake. Above all, he stands, at this and every other epoch of his career, as a consistent lover of freedom at home and abroad.

A land of settled Government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where Freedom broadens slowly down
From precedent to precedent,

was his Utopia, and in such a spot he dwelt.

LORD CLARENDON.

FEBRUARY 1853 TO FEBRUARY 1858.

ONG the foremost of the distinguished men who came in with the present century, George William, fourth Earl of Clarendon, has rendered his name by no means the least famous. Born in the year 1800, he was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and, entering the College in 1816, the young Villiers was sent at once into the diplomatic service, without the previous advantage of a seat in the House of Commons. But the youth had, on the other hand, every requisite to fit him for success in the duties set before him.

Sprung from the Villiers family, and tracing lineage through the Buckingham branch, Lord Clarendon claimed his descent from the second Earl of Jersey.

His grandfather, Lord Hyde, having married Lady Charlotte Capel, the heiress of two historic families, Hyde and Essex, became an apt recipient of honours contingent on the revival of the ancient Earldom of

Clarendon

Clarendon, the fourth Earl of which revived line is the subject of our present consideration.

We find in the Villiers' family history, gleaming through the vista of the past, memories of the Capel family, one of that race being prominent in the Pilgrimage of Grace, a successor fighting stoutly by the side of Philip Sydney at Zutphen, another the favourite of Queen Elizabeth, while a fourth espoused the cause of King Charles I. with almost romantic affection. But possibly the Hyde alliance suggests even a more interesting theme, when we think of the meditative and interesting historian of the Civil War, who first rendered the name of Clarendon famous.

Amidst traditions such as these was the eminent British Foreign Secretary nurtured. A visit to the Grove, Watford, Lord Clarendon's Hertfordshire seat, literally throws one back into the Stuart era, as we gaze at the three children of the unfortunate Charles I., delineated by the magic of Vandycke's brush, and contemplate other efforts of that matchless portrait painter, such as are met with in the houses of but a few old families. A picture of the Duke of Buckingham who accompanied Charles I. to Spain, when the future monarch was Prince of Wales, hangs on the walls, and a youthful portraiture of the interesting Falkland specially appeals to the imagination of the visitor, who is simply transplanted to the past of Edgehill and Naseby and confronted with actors in those stirring times, who, looking down from their canvas with characteristic persuasiveness, lead one to wish that Vandycke had been able to add to his powers of reproduction that of impart-

ing speech. But the figure of the Great Chancellor which crowns one apartment, may be galvanised into the life which the artist's genius has portrayed by a perusal of the history which, even allowing the faults of its detractors, still opens to us the thoughts and objects of men during the Civil War. And the connection between this stately chronicler and the Foreign Secretary whose career we now essay to narrate, is likewise patent, inasmuch as in the nineteenth-century statesman's person reappears the liberty-loving sentiment which led the councillor to urge moderation and legality on his beloved sovereign, together with the high-souled inspiration prompting the cavalier gentleman to break a lance for the throne—characteristics not wanting in the person of the famous historian. We still feel inclined to say with Sir Walter Scott—

Here 's a health to the gallant who fights for the crown.

An irregular red-brick building standing in a spacious park and surrounded with fine trees, prominent amidst which is a magnificent cedar, is a fit receptacle of those art treasures which tell us so much of our forefathers, their hopes and fears, what they desired and how they strove to gain it ; and there is in the home of this branch of the Villiers family ample evidence of the respect which foreign sovereigns entertained for the Liberal Minister for Foreign Affairs. Fine vases alternate with other brilliant and costly gifts, prominent amongst which is a tapestried representation of the miraculous draught of fishes, given by Napoleon III. to the fourth earl,

whose Foreign Secretaryship occupies these present pages.

It was in the year 1766 that the then Lord Hyde, ancestor of Lord Clarendon, was elevated to the Earldom of Clarendon by George Grenville, as a reward for distinguished public services, and as a consequence of such appointment, Lord John Cavendish is said to have declared that the Ministers had first made a rebellion in America, and then created a Lord Clarendon to write the history of it.

At the early age of 31, Mr. George Villiers, who became the fourth Earl, was negotiating a commercial treaty with France, soon after the return to power of that Whig party whose principles he early adopted and faithfully supported throughout an eventful career.

The year 1833 saw George Villiers placed at Madrid, and entrusted by Lord Palmerston with a task of an arduous nature, as the representative of Great Britain during the commencement of the civil war between Carlists and Christinos in 1834. He was instrumental in advancing the famous Quadruple Treaty of 1834, thus early earning a just title to fame. As the official papers of the time show, moderation and discretion tempered the broad Liberal sympathy for Constitutional Government, in support of which Lord Palmerston and the Whigs were just then inclined to press on with what their political opponents thought to be undue haste. Mr. Charles Greville has told us in his *Journals* (vol. iii. p. 321), how hopeless the task of driving the Carlists out of Spain appeared in November 1835 to be, and that Louis Philippe was half-hearted and disinclined

to fulfil his part of the compact, whilst Spanish parties were corrupt and unreliable. All these varying circumstances were minutely described by Mr. George Villiers in his letters to England.

Of these, in 1836, Mr. Greville, who previously had limited his terms of praise to noting clever, ready and lively writing, declared that George Villiers' correspondence from Madrid would, one day or other, make one of the most valuable and entertaining publications that ever appeared.

During the Duke of Wellington's Foreign Secretaryship, Mr. Villiers' energies were devoted towards furthering the celebrated Eliot Convention, so successful in moderating the horrors of internecine war in Spain; and on the return of the Whigs to office, he became exposed to the fury of partisan rage amongst those leaders of Madrid politics who deprecated any dealings—even in the cause of humanity—with the dreaded Carlist Prince.

We say Prince, for Pretender in the ordinary sense of the word it is impossible to style a man whose right to the throne rested, as we have had previous occasion to state, on a solemn decision of Philip V. ratified in 1713 by the Cortes or legal Parliament of the realm; such claim being, however, as the Liberal party in Europe declared, vitiated by the subsequent action of Ferdinand VII., who in April 1830 declared his desire that the nation should revert to its ancient law, and allow females of preferable line and rank to be admitted to the crown. It will, however, be remembered that this same Ferdinand VII., being in 1832, as he

believed, on the verge of death, sent for his minister, Calomarde, and in his presence, and also before the Queen and all the ministers (except one) who happened to be in Madrid, abrogated and annulled the Pragmatic sanction of March 29th, 1830, thus stultifying his previous action.

But the King's final resolution was yet to be made, and on the 31st of December 1832, after recovering from his illness, Ferdinand made an equally solemn declaration before the Queen, several bishops, all the ministers, and many other functionaries who were assembled at the palace. He then averred the following:—that when his royal mind was “taken by surprise in moments of agony,” to which he had been brought by serious malady —“I signed,” he said, “a decree, repealing the Pragmatic sanction of March 29th, 1830.” He added, “As a King, I could not destroy the fundamental laws of the land,” and straightway proceeded to recant his latest resolution concerning the succession. Thus Ferdinand VII. twice declared for his daughter Isabella, and once for his brother Don Carlos.*

We have re-stated here somewhat at length the intricacies with which Mr. George Villiers had to deal whilst at Madrid as British Ambassador. He had there to sustain the rights of a throne based on questionable legality, and to carry out the provisions of such treaties and international agreements as each successive British

* The above details are taken from papers in the possession of the late Sir Robert Inglis, kindly placed at the author's disposal by the Venerable Archdeacon Harrison.

Government might ratify. The Quadruple Treaty of 1834 may be taken as containing the very diapason of modern Whig principles, as distinguished from old Tory maxims.

By the young George Villiers, it was characterised, in February 1837, during a dinner given to Captain Maitland at Madrid, as presenting a new and important feature in European politics.

"The time is arrived when the necessity of a new element in the balance of power is begun to be felt, and this alliance tending towards the establishment of true liberty, and, therefore, towards the consolidation of order and true liberty, is to become the means of such ends being accomplished." Such in effect were the words of England's representative, who had to further a line of political action, for opposing which specious reasons were found at home, and of which the tardy success did not for years bring the fulfilment of Lord Palmerston's hopes. The Quadruple Treaty was scurvily disregarded by Louis Philippe, who, picking up the threads of Charles X.'s policy, as inherited from Louis XIV., desired to see females allowed to reign in Spain, and so leave the field open for an alliance between the two Bourbon families, followed, as such state intermingling of consanguineous dynasties must necessarily have been, by the practical union of France and Spain as one Power.

Mr. George Villiers was, likewise, the unwilling witness of the ill-treatment to which the unpaid soldiery of Sir De Lacy Evans were subjected, and again had to face the arguments of those who pointed to

failure all round as the visible effect of British interposition with Spanish affairs, insomuch as the immediate outlook seemed to justify the gloomiest prognostications, though there existed the elements of future success, such as Lord Holland claimed for it in Parliament when he said—

“Granted these failures; granted the equivocal position and doubtful success of an English expeditionary force, and of a fleet sent on a mission of benevolent neutrality towards Spanish Liberalism; where would Don Carlos have been but for such support given to his opponents. He, the representative of absolutism in its crudest and most priestly form, would have been ensconced in the Escorial, and there, in virtue of his position, have acted as a bar to progressive legislation, Protestantism and liberty.”

It was the weakness of Don Carlos, that his austere religious character made him the representative of extreme ideas abhorrent to the mind of a modern Englishman, to whatever party he might belong. Mr. Villiers had, therefore, but to act as the advocate of the more Liberal cause, to secure the popular verdict at home, despite the doubts of statesmen such as Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington.

The task seems to have been performed to perfection, and this despite the fact that the elaborately constructed theory of Liberal and constitutional interference met, so far as Spain is concerned, with no immediate result at all equal to the anticipations of its promoters; and, indeed, it can scarcely be averred that, until the days when Canovas de Castillo administered the Government

for the young King Alphonso during the first years of his accession, any approach to real constitutional liberty, such as Lords Palmerston and Clarendon desired to propagate, ever obtained a sound footing in Spain. We cannot at the same time but feel that British sympathy, as a concomitant of the Quadruple Treaty, has, through various vicissitudes, contributed towards the establishment of a better state of things in Spain, and so justified the policy which in 1839, when called up to the House of Peers, Lord Clarendon proceeded to defend, and did so in reply to a speech of the Marquess of Londonderry (better known as Sir Charles Stewart), whose knowledge concerning Spain had enabled him to make a great impression on public opinion.*

The English Ambassador's correspondence concerning the events of August 12th, 13th, and 14th, 1836, had been the means of elucidating much that otherwise might never have become known in England. We read in Mr. Charles Greville's *Memoirs*, vol. iii. p. 365, how the uprising which took place at St. Ildenfonso was encountered courageously and prudently by Queen Christina, notwithstanding that the Carlists chose the moment to threaten the city of Madrid, and progressed towards the capital like water spreading over a plain.

It became, likewise, Lord Clarendon's duty to paint favourably the prospects of Constitutionalism in Spain, and so justify his leader's conduct when impugned in terms the gravity of which was borne out by the facts

* *Speech of Lord Londonderry in the House of Peers, June 19th, 1838. Hansard. It contains much information.*

established. Lord Clarendon, however, although unskilled in debate, showed that there was nothing radically unfit for freedom in the Spanish people, and that changes at that very moment were in course of advance, which would improve the revenues, introduce free discussion, and unshackle the press.

Temporarily dimmed as these glimmering hopes may since have been, there is a manifest interest clinging to the utterances of one who had seen so much of and observed so closely the habits and customs of the Spaniards, and thus learnt to understand them thoroughly.

We pass lightly over the Irish administration of Lord Clarendon, between 1847 and 1852, admitted to have been careful, temperate, and conciliatory, and hasten to the time when, after Lord Russell's retirement from the Foreign Office, he stood chosen to fill the vacant and coveted place.*

* Although Ireland as such does not come within the scope of our subject, Lord Clarendon's able administration of the Lord Lieutenancy does, and cannot be dismissed without notice. It was characterised by a firm hand combined with a conciliatory disposition, by means of which he was enabled to steer through the insurrection of 1848 without blood being spilt to any great extent, inasmuch as when Smith O'Brien was captured, seven of his misguided followers alone fell, and at a moment when one thousand men were in arms on his behalf. A momentary success might have deluged Ireland with blood, and the horrors of 1798 have been repeated within half a century of their occurrence.

Lord Clarendon did not, however, as has been the case with too many of our Irish Viceroys, lack imagination, and, following in the steps of Lord Wellesley, did not hesitate to respond to the desire of the nation for something more than the every-day routine of busi-

As we have previously stated, premonitory symptoms indicative of a re-opening of the Eastern Question welcomed Lord Clarendon to his new duties, which soon became tangled and intricate even beyond the reach of his skilled diplomacy. Although the lack of a previous training in the House of Commons gave the Foreign Minister a disadvantage in debate, yet his natural powers and acquired knowledge allowed him to deliver himself with great weight of authority. Moreover, he spoke with fluency, replying in simple language to the arguments of others with the greatest readiness. Such at least is the verdict of those constantly accustomed to

ness life in Dublin. The visit of Her Majesty to her Irish dominions was an apt sequel to the faithful upholding of law and order on which Lord Clarendon had first insisted, and it is on record that the Queen of England received a magnificent welcome in August 1849 from her Irish people.

Politically this *régime* will ever be memorable for the fact that in July 1848 Sir Robert Peel and his followers walked into the lobby in support of the coercive measures for Ireland, the refusal of which at the hands of all the Whigs and a batch of Protectionists had brought his political life to a close. Also for the Encumbered Estates Act, which enabled pauperised landowners to sell their properties; traditional respect for ancestral intention being laid aside—a precedent this for legislation of later years. But nevertheless it is notorious that Lord Clarendon, with all his knowledge of Ireland and desire to atone for English former efforts to limit the wool trade, the latter having created a forced sympathy between Irishmen and foreigners, who were looked for to assist in evading the army of Custom-House officers and informers which it became necessary to keep up—Lord Clarendon, we say, dreaded a cry of no rent arising in Ireland, and that his consent to the Land Act of 1870 was given in confident belief of its finality.

follow his arguments. His famous description of Lord Aberdeen's Government drifting into war will remain fixedly in men's memories, as an example of neat and truthful phrasing. His unwearied industry did not preclude Lord Clarendon from being the ornament of conversational society, and the merited favourite of each Court and capital where he resided. In youth Mr. George Villiers was immensely popular with the fair sex—an advantage he retained to the end of his life, being known as an agreeable member of society, possessing alike ready wit and constant good humour. An inveterate smoker, Lord Clarendon would frequently smoke all night while he wrote despatches and letters to his diplomatic staff, the latter being numerous. Nevertheless, he kept them all up to date with the greatest care and clearness, thereby fulfilling the duties of a model Foreign Secretary. In the words of a leading political opponent, and, we may add, admirer, *He was an extremely hard worker.* Such was the man who in person was the very embodiment of statesmanship, and whose presence filled the eye with a sense of dignity.* Such, at least, is the impression left on the

* Lord Clarendon could be firm when he deemed that occasion required. In April 1858, the question of what was called the Canadian reserves came up for settlement. Certain waste districts of the colony in question were available for the purposes of Protestant clergy before those of the laity, and a Bill for the purpose of abolishing such title to ecclesiastical pre-eminence passed the Commons, under the advocacy of Mr. Gladstone.

Bishop Wilberforce, supporting the measure in the House of Lords, quoted from Burke when referring to an amendment of Lord Derby, suggesting that the American (and, therefore, we

author's mind after seeing the minister on a public occasion. How it came to pass that all this tact, industry, and talent was powerless to prevent war in 1853, cannot be satisfactorily understood, even now. So many reasons have been given to account for the kindling of war between Russia and the Western Powers in 1854, that the reader is led to believe in the existence of an inherent predisposition to conflict.

suppose, their Canadian brethren) became intractable whenever they saw the least attempt to shuffle freedom from them by chicane. On Lord Derby demurring to such construction being placed on his amendment, the eloquent prelate, who had used the word chicane, explained that he had used the word with a smile and in a playful way. Lord Derby in reply retorted, "My lords, I accept the explanation of the right reverend prelate, but when he tells me it is impossible to say anything offensive with a smiling face, he will forgive me if I quote in his presence from a well-known author, without intending in the least to apply the words to him :—

A man may smile, and smile, and be a villain."

Amidst some cheering, deprecatory remarks being heard, Lord Derby declared that he was unable to conceive who could have been offended by his remarks.

Lord Clarendon, however, who thought that Lord Derby had overstepped the limits of debate, interposed with great energy, and with a voice of thunder, saying that he was the man who objected. "I and my noble friends near me," declared the Foreign Secretary, "*were* offended by such expressions. We are not accustomed, even in the language of poetry, to hear such a word as villain applied to any noble lord in this House." Drinking off a glass of water, Lord Clarendon was answered by Lord Derby, who in the same beverage toasted his opponent with a "Here's to you, Clarendon," so bringing the incident to a close. For a full account of the scene, see *Fifty Years of My Life*, by Lord Albemarle, vol. ii. page 328.

Strife between the Latin and Greek Churches concerning guardianship of the Holy Places, developed a claim made by Russia to a sole protectorship over the Greek Church previously secured, as the Czar believed, by treaty at Kainardji in 1771, but which it was desired to strengthen in 1853 by promulgation of a fresh treaty engagement.

But it was clearly open to Russian statesmen to hold this claim in abeyance until their ends could be compassed without war, inasmuch as the case they were enabled to place before a tribunal of international lawyers could suffer no hurt through lapse of time. Therefore if the legal means existed which might empower Russia to enthrall Turkey, it could not be in accordance with the national policy of sap and mine to risk all in unequal conflict, when the choice of time was in the Czar's own hands. And the above reflections lead us to suppose more than ever that the secret agreement to which Lord Aberdeen was party, and which, binding him to support Russia against France as regarded the Holy Places, had certainly encouraged Nicholas to put his case to the touch at the end of 1852, likewise lured him on to engage in strife with the Western Powers.*

* In 1844, the Emperor Nicholas was in London, and met the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and Lord Aberdeen, who, acting in fear of French aggression in the East, signed a secret memorandum, binding them, so far as they were personally able, to support Russian claims to supremacy as regards the Holy Places at Jerusalem, ignoring those of France.

This document was passed on from Foreign Secretary to Foreign

And this we state without desiring to lay too much stress upon a document signed as far back as 1844 by, and only binding upon, three British statesmen, Wellington, Peel, and Aberdeen, the last of whom alone survived in 1853 to be thrust to the front by consensual choice as chief of the famous coalition ministry. But whatever Lord Aberdeen might consider the measure of his bondage to Russia, Nicholas' interpretation thereof lives in history.

It is possible, also, that in 1853 Russian statesmen did not, for other reasons, believe the consistency and stability of England's alliance with Imperial France to

Secretary, until, in 1853, Wellington and Peel being dead, Lord Aberdeen was elevated to the Premiership.

Nicholas, not understanding English politics, naturally thought his time was come for the consummation of the Russian Office desire for practical fulfilment of the Treaty of Kainardji, which, it was assumed, contained a protectorate of those Greek Christians whose claim to supremacy at Jerusalem betokened Russian influence throughout, if not ultimate possessions, the fairest provinces of European Turkey. Foiled by Sir Stratford Canning at Jerusalem, the baffled ministers of Nicholas advanced the Protectorate pure and simple, and after—in Prince Menschikoff's person, while on his minatory mission at Constantinople—suffering a diplomatic check, and vainly endeavouring to pass their schemes uninjured through a European Conference at Vienna, appealed to the last arbitrament of the sword.

On the other hand the Russian Foreign Office, in their *résumé* of the causes which brought on the war, claim for their then Emperor the rôle of conservator of treaty law, as established at Vienna in 1814 and 1815; forgetful, however, it seems to us, of the fact that the promise then given to provide a constitution for Poland had been flagrantly broken by the Russians themselves, who likewise connived in 1846 at the suppression of the Cracow Republic, which then suffered absorption into Austria.

be assured, or they would neither have ventured on infringing the suzerainty of the Principalities by military occupation in June 1853, nor have resolved on dissipating the last hope of peace, when on November 30th, 1853, they attacked and destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope.

The British press had, as we have stated, given specious cause for believing that no real alliance was possible with a Napoleon who reigned by reason of the *coup d'état*, whilst their diatribes received weight and import through the utterances of more than one responsible statesman.* The historian, on the other hand, who essays to explain how it came to pass that, after thirty-eight years' peace, war raged once again in Europe, is bound to show due reason for a technical infringement of the Treaty of 1841, when the allies allowed their war-ships to enter the Dardanelles.

The Russian occupation of the Principalities which had been previously effected, may of itself appear sufficient palliation to those predisposed to judge European affairs from the point of view whence international law is paramount, but does not seem a satisfactory reason to those who believe that some sacrifice should always be made in the cause of peace.

M. de la Cour, the French Ambassador, believed a massacre of Christians at Constantinople to be imminent; since the conduct of the invading Russians had excited the Mahomedans almost to frenzy, and his

* Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Wood had publicly denounced the conduct of Louis Napoleon.

remedy consisted in ensuring the presence of the French and English fleets. Sinope followed, and peace became impossible.

Mr. Kinglake, whose narrative of these events will not be superseded until many years have passed over our heads, has been forced to adduce divers reasons for the war, and to arraign at the tribunal of historical truth the leading political personages in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Turkey, whilst he does not permit the ambassadors to escape without censure, or the people of England to pass totally unscathed through the fiery ordeal of his criticism.

We, on the other hand, are led then to believe that it was not the Emperor Nicholas, Lord Aberdeen, Louis Napoleon, King Frederick William, or the young Austrian Emperor, who were responsible for the war, but that their lot was cast in a period when the difficult questions connected with Turkey and the East were destined to force themselves to the front? Were the nations content to accept the supremacy of Russia in Europe, such as asserted itself even in German transactions, including those in Schleswig-Holstein between 1848 and 1852? or could Nicholas' claim to control fourteen millions of the Sultan's subjects long remain in the most politic abeyance and not receive that solemn denial which the Muscovites did not intend to submit to without war? * We believe not, but nevertheless opine

* Mr. Kinglake's error seems, one would imagine, rather to be that he has imputed to contemporary rulers and governments a course of events which took final guidance from popular impulse.

that the torch was prematurely lighted by reason of the encouragement which Nicholas received when he saw Lord Aberdeen elevated to power.

Nicholas desired to gain straightway the power over Turkey which Lord Aberdeen believed would be dangerous to Europe,* and which great Britain in alliance with France determined to hinder, repudiate, and, if necessary, destroy. As the critic of thirty years of foreign policy observes, it did not need the mistakes of an English Ministry to make this complication inevitable.

Nicholas of Russia was but interpreting the desires of his people when he claimed pre-eminence for their religion at Jerusalem. Sir Stratford Canning was but consulting British interests, and therefore national sentiment, when he lay bare the Protectorate shrouded under the demands of Menschikoff, and held England back from practically sanctioning the oft-disputed clause in the Treaty of Kainardji. In like manner the French Emperor, straightforward throughout, as the Prince Consort of England described him,—acting in perfect good faith, as admitted by M. Thiers (see Blanchard Jerrold's *Napoleon III.*, vol. iv. p. 18), was but consulting the dignity and interests of France when, as Baron Stockmar phrased it, Lord Palmerston perceived that Russian madness made the Franco-British alliance a political necessity, one the possibility of which paralysed the English Ministry, and fatally blinded that of Prussia. Moreover, it is a fact that Louis Napoleon recalled M. Lavallette in 1852, for displaying too great zeal in regard to the Holy Places question.

So far as England is concerned, we very much doubt if the historian will not pause to censure the formation of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet with that nobleman pledged to a certain course in the East regarding an already aroused controversy, of which it was a statesman's province to forecast the import.

But we are confident no abiding judgment can stand if based on a desire to make a solitary scape-goat of the British Premier, whose honourable position in history is assured.

* Speech in explanation of his previous averment that he did not fear Russian aggression.

Again and again did the despatches of Lord Clarendon go to show that every sacrifice consistent with the denial of supreme Russian influence in Turkey would be made by England and France, but it will ever remain an unfortunate fact that the diplomatists of Europe did not discover the existence of this claim in the famous note accepted by the assembled diplomatists at Vienna, and that it was left to the British Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to hinder an acceptance which might have preserved peace. But Count Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, subsequently confessed that the claim to an exclusive protectorate of the Christians was not believed by Russia to be surrendered according to the provisions of that same repudiated note.

The individual in whose hands the choice of peace and war rested, was undoubtedly the Emperor Nicholas, who himself chose the time for persisting in assumption of authority which, if acquiesced in by united Europe, must, sooner or later, have thrown him into antagonism with those really interested in the Turkish occupancy of Constantinople and the navigation of the Mediterranean.

As Lord Palmerston phrased it, a Russian protectorate over the Principalities would lead the magic of Muscovite diplomacy up to the very shores of the Bosphorus. The contentions evoked by a consideration of this subject are endless, besides being dry and unprofitable. Moreover, Lord Clarendon's part in the negotiations alone concern us here.*

* We know from the pen of Russian officials that the disturbances in Montenegro, which took place in December 1852, were fostered by the Emperor Nicholas' agents, who desired to

On February the 21st, 1853, Lord Clarendon succeeded Lord John Russell as Foreign Secretary, and his first act, four days after entering office, was to send back Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Constantinople.

On March the 2nd, 1853, Prince Menschikoff came to Constantinople as Russian Ambassador, and violently pressed his master's claims as to the Holy Places, indicating also that he had ulterior views.

On the 5th of April 1853, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Lord Clarendon contrived to convince the Porte of the desirability of keeping the Russian claims as regards the Holy Places separate from a Protectorate of the Christians, which was assumed to appertain to the former ; and this may be considered as a master stroke of policy, inasmuch as it subsequently allowed the Turks to give way where they might technically be proved wrong, and yet stand firm on the crucial point.

On June the 13th, 1853, the *Morning Herald* declared Lord Clarendon and the Premier to have been acquainted with the Russian designs for some time, alluding doubtless to a rumoured existence of the Secret Agreement signed by Lord Aberdeen in 1844. The *Times* of

create a diversion which should divert men's minds from Palestine and the Holy Places.

The future historian, therefore, who describes Omar Pacha's success in quieting this outlying Turkish province early in 1858, will narrate how he is describing incidents outside of the main question which decided European issues of peace and war. And we state this with a due appreciation of the bull-dog courage which has enabled a handful of mountaineers to retain their independence through more than one threatening crisis, conduct to be emulated with advantage by those conducting Western diplomacy.

June 16th, 1853, however, with what we now see to be plausible veracity, declared that the British *Cabinet* was previously apprised of details concerning Russian claims to supremacy at Jerusalem.

After much diplomatic parley, Nicholas ordered his troops into the Danubian Principalities on June 26th, 1853.

On the 31st of July 1853, the famous Vienna note was agreed on; but as it could not stand the searching criticism of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who detected a Russian Protectorate of the Ottoman Christians lurking in its provisions, England never finally accepted it, and war ensued between Russia and Turkey in November 1853.

One of Lord Clarendon's parliamentary utterances about the time represented England as standing on a mine, before the Western Powers became embroiled, while he said to Baron Brunnow—"I am not superstitious, but when I see so many vain efforts, so many results certain to-day and vanished to-morrow, I am forced to admit that Fate is guiding the Eastern crisis towards an unknown issue."*

And, indeed, after the battle of Sinope, peace became next to impossible; but we demur to the term massacre sometimes given to the Ottoman defeat, inasmuch as the Turkish fleet at Sinope was preparing to carry provisions to Batoum for the tribes which were engaged on incursions directed against the Russian territory;

* *Russian Diplomatic Study*, vol. i. p. 322.

while both Sinope and Batoum being Turkish ports, unimpeded passage between the two could not be claimed for belligerents.

At the moment when the Government of Lord Aberdeen was at the height of its unpopularity, the character of Lord Clarendon's despatch-writing was concealed from men's eyes, because the necessities of diplomacy necessitated the diplomatic details being withheld. But when the crisis had passed by, and time together with opportunity was given to analyse the different phases of negotiations through which the Eastern Question had passed, there was but one verdict upon the character of the Foreign Minister's despatches. They have been unanimously adjudged to be worthy of England's minister ; such in depth of patriotic tone as might have done credit to a Pitt, a Canning, or a Palmerston.

Lord Clarendon had brushed aside the Czar's claim to a Protectorate of fourteen millions of Christians dwelling within the Sultan's dominions, as of a nature such as would preclude its acceptance by an independent sovereign ; and, further, he subsequently avowed boldly the British determination to defend that independence. But the Foreign Minister was not forgetful of the Christians of Turkey, precluded as they were from adducing evidence whereon a verdict could be given, and otherwise proved to be deprived of just citizenship ; and it is due to Lord Clarendon more than any other individual that the lot of these suffering people received attention at the Conference of Paris in 1856. A careful study of the British despatches before the Crimean War

will convince any careful reader of the truth which has been lately declared by Mr. Gladstone to be at the root of the Eastern Question, viz. the European character of the matters at issue, and the illegality of any one power coming forward to settle difficulties as they appear.

On the other hand, the same contemplation will lead to a doubt whether the European concert can be relied on when great results are expected from its decisions, such as should receive potent and immediate effect if peace is to result therefrom. For instance, when Count Buol (speaking for Austria on February 22nd, 1854, a little more than a month before the declaration of war) intimated that if France and England would fix a day for the evacuation of the Principalities, the expiration of which should be the signal of hostilities, the Cabinet of Vienna would support the summons,* Lord Clarendon and M. de Thouvenel, the British and French Foreign Ministers, naturally asked if this meant material help on the part of Austria, and receiving a doubtful reply, declined to wait until Count Buol on the part of Austria had consulted his secret ally Prussia. It was obvious on the occasion in question that the concert of Europe was made subservient to a private understanding, such as, it is notorious, exists from time to time between Continental Powers.

Great Britain and France could not, therefore, in justice to their own position or that of their threatened ally, afford to wait for Prussia's co-operation, when not

* Kinglake's *Crimea*, vol. i. p. 457.

only was King Frederick William known to be Russian at heart, but the Turk needed all the aid which the instant moral support of the two Western Powers could give.

It is idle for Mr. Kinglake to attempt to throw responsibility upon the Emperor of the French for forcing the hands of his English ally, and breaking the concert of Europe, when he counselled active measures of precaution, because weeks after England and France were committed to war Austria and Prussia took measures to protect their own interests. It by no means followed that they ever intended to become active allies on whom the Western Powers could have depended. It was the half-heartedness of Austria* and the temporary sub-

* "Put spokes in all their wheels," said the veteran Metternich, "and let Austria alone be strong at the close of a general war."

The Russian account of the diplomatic events which led to war in 1858, has been given at length to the world, written, as is generally supposed, by General Jomini. The two volumes are very diffuse and ably put together, looking as they do at the various phases of the question from all points of view. Generally speaking, Russia is presented to us as the great Conservative power, guardian of the treaties of 1815. The writer couches his thoughts as if he lived in the days before England found it necessary to separate herself from the other Powers, and to break connection with what men had learnt to know as the Holy Alliance.

In 1858-54, Nicholas found to his cost that no such alliance really did exist, inasmuch as with all the preconceived partisanship of Prussia the King was unable to finally determine his Government's course of action, and when the war ceased in 1856 the Muscovite statesmen were by no means convinced that another campaign might not have seen German soldiers in the field against them. As for Austria, Metternich's pithy remark, *we must get the Russians out of the Principalities*, better represents the national

servience to Muscovite dictation, which kept those astute Germanic powers out of the fray. And after all,

feeling than could any assumed sentiment of gratitude which might be supposed to have existed for the army which had saved Hungary in 1849 for Francis Joseph.

As we have above recorded, "Put spokes in all their wheels," said the wary ex-Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, "so that, however long the war lasts, the combatants may emerge from the contest enfeebled," leaving Austria, as Metternich hoped, high and dry amidst general confusion.

As for France, the Russian writer cannot find words to describe his manifold complaints against Louis Napoleon, who appears simply as a filibustering disturber of the peace, careless where his sword was drawn so long as the Allies who bore him company were powerful.

We hear a great deal of the Holy Places and of the Russian claim to pre-eminence, which, consolidated, as the Russian Emperor had long assumed, by treaties, had in the case of that signed at Kainardji in 1774 conferred on Russia a sole protectorate over the Christian Church, and therefore over the Christian inhabitants in Turkey. As the writer whose summary we are considering says, *there*, in 1858, was the *knot* which rendered the Eastern Question intricate, and which the diplomacy of Europe failed to disentangle.

This and much more written in these pages may be found in the history of Mr. Justin McCarthy or that of Mr. Kinglake, and we read the old accusations against Lord Palmerston accentuated by a rumour (to which we have elsewhere alluded) to the effect that the British statesman had years before planned the war in London with the exile Louis Napoleon.

Of Lord Aberdeen, the writer speaks respectfully, alluding to no special personal obligation to support Nicholas as to the Holy Places, but rather assuming a general understanding amongst the Powers to that effect, mildly suggesting that the Prime Minister's well-known love of peace and belief in the sturdy trustfulness of an old ally, which had survived 1829 and the Treaty of Adrianople, helped to lead the Emperor Nicholas into the false position in which he found himself when war broke out.

notwithstanding what may have been written to the contrary, has not the Prussian King's policy been justified

We read of Lord Clarendon as a minister who saw matters from an English-interest point of view; and those curious in such matters may find food for reflection in the unblushing acknowledgment of Muscovite intrigue in Montenegro and Servia during 1852-58, thus fully confirming the view held by those best acquainted with the Eastern Question, that puppet principalities on the confines of the Turkish dominions are only refuges for those appointed on behalf of Russia (in Lord Derby's words) to sap and mine, bit by bit, towards the fortress of Constantinople.

The student of this remarkable diplomatic survey will learn that, answering to the advice of Prince Paskiewitch, the Russians were some time hesitating whether they should go to Constantinople *by* Vienna, inasmuch as not only the afore-mentioned soldier, but General Jomini also, believed that *with* Vienna or *through* Vienna could the venture alone be made with safety. So near was the Emperor Nicholas to a desperate throw of the dice, raising, as he hoped, the Slavonic populations on his behalf, when they beheld Austria stricken down before their eyes.

All this and much more worthy of note is told us by Prince Gortschakoff's amanuensis, whoever he may be, and some things new, few of which it is possible to declare untrue, are unfolded for the first time. We unhesitatingly recommend a study of these volumes to our readers, but cannot say with truth that they elucidate the problem how war came about. As we have argued elsewhere, it could not at one and the same time have been the fault of Lord Aberdeen, Sir Stratford Canning, Louis Napoleon, and the Emperor Nicholas. The French Sovereign who allowed Latin claims at Jerusalem connected with the Holy Places to be pushed aside, would have fared as ill as the Ministry did in England who were found unequal to conducting the war into which they drifted.

If statesmanship be foresight, then did the collective wisdom of the Liberal and Peelite section err in 1852, when they elected Lord Aberdeen Premier in spite of his personal obligation to support the Emperor Nicholas' claim to supremacy as regards the Holy Places, a claim which was soon to be found sheltering

by the late saying of Germany's great statesman, Prince Bismarck, who in 1870 declared the Eastern

the assumption of the more important legal right to exercise a Protectorate over the Sultan's Christian subjects.

Wisdom, experience, and knowledge were all present in the Aberdeen Cabinet; but collective forethought paled before the desire of the nation for a strong Government, and Nicholas' purposes were not apprehended.

And now, writing twenty-nine years after the events recorded, and desirous of judging the whole case dispassionately, it is impossible not to perceive Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to have been right in branding as impossible any settlement which confirmed the exclusive Russian Protectorate over the Greek Church, sanctioned as the statesmen of Nicholas desired it to have been, again and again, by treaty. (First, as they with doubtful legality averred, at Kainardji in 1774, and, secondly, as later Muscovite diplomacy would have desired, at Vienna in 1858). Lord Aberdeen was not the only English statesman who failed to perceive this.

That Sir Stratford Canning pointed out the Russian resolve to stand by the Protectorate of the Christians, clouded as such claim might be by diplomatic verbiage in the Vienna note, was surely but the duty of an ambassador whose conspicuous talents were dedicated to his country's service. However it may be popular to condemn the Crimean War, there is little doubt expressed by diplomatists familiar with the subject, that, given an unchecked and acknowledged Protectorate of the nature of that claimed under the Treaty of Kainardji, the force of events must years ago have placed Russian influence dominant if not absolutely *regnant* in the land now known as Eastern Roumelia.

To the unfortunate change of Government which took place in England in 1852 must every thoughtful student still trace the necessity which made this assertion of Western interests imminent. That the wisest heads in the kingdom went astray brooks no denial, inasmuch as when Lord Aberdeen was elevated to the post of First Minister of the Crown four other men who had held the office of Foreign Secretary knew of his preconceived disposition, not to say acknowledged bondage, inclining him towards supporting the claims of Russia to custody of the Holy Places.

Question not to involve interests for which one Pomernian soldier should be called on to shed his blood.

It is obvious that the European concert must ever be in danger of separation, through the existence of special interests such as swayed Prussia and Austria, England and France in 1854, or of private understandings, upon which it is notorious that the policy of continental nations are, from time to time, founded.

Nothing, we believe, will be more indelibly stamped on the minds of attentive students than the unreliability of Prussia as a possible ally against Russia in 1854, and yet a blind adherence at all hazards to the theory of international coercion would have pre-supposed such union, and placed trust in its fruits.

We shall not dwell long upon the public feeling in England, which became vehement when at last the calm stately diplomacy of Lord Clarendon had landed us face to face with the inevitable, and yet effected all that diplomacy could do to secure a peaceful result.

Neither are we of the number of those desirous to

Responsibility of a wholesale character was thus taken from the shoulders of Lord Aberdeen personally on to that of a great party, each official member thereof sharing his due proportion.*

It will be somewhat astounding to most of us to learn that the Muscovite operations in Central Asia have been undertaken on their present scale because Lord Palmerston in 1856 forced Persia to loose her hold on Herat.

It is a pity that the writer on Russian diplomacy did not go further, and tell us the object of the war waged in 1826 by Pas-kiewitch against Persia, and why such great sacrifices were undergone in 1889-40, in a then fruitless attempt to capture Khiva.

* *The Russian Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War.* W. H. Allen & Co., 18 Waterloo Place.

do penance in sackcloth and ashes for the Crimean War, that great State necessity forced upon Lord Aberdeen in the teeth of his notorious desire to preserve peace, and which was caused by the attempt of Russia to extort a treaty giving her arbitrary power over the Christian inhabitants of Turkey, to secure which she did not hesitate to invade the Danubian Principalities, and so commit an act of war; and we state this, aware that her ruler believed he could fairly claim something akin to a concurrence from Lord Aberdeen.

Lord Lyndhurst set forth the case from England's point of view, when, on the 19th of June 1854, he enthralled the House of Lords by a powerful summary of previous Muscovite dealings, declaring that never except in extreme necessity was England justified in closing the conflict without destroying the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and laying prostrate the fortifications behind which it lurked. At the advanced age of 82, the fervour and eloquence of the aged man's utterances came with redoubled force, and may be taken on the whole as an expression of national feeling, even if not representative of the considerable section of opinion which, even in 1854, had imbibed the doctrine and theories of the peace-at-any-price party. Again the hope of Sir E. B. Lytton expressed to the students of Edinburgh University, to the effect that Europe should not render up the haven that commands Asia on the one side and threatens Europe on the other, to the barbaric ambition of some new Alaric of the North, points more correctly to the real state of

Englishmen's minds during 1854 than do the more impassioned diatribes of some patriot orators, or the closely-reasoned sophisms contained in the able speeches of Bright and Cobden. The fatal flaw in the argument of the latter school consisted mainly in a persistent blindness alike to the character of the Muscovite diplomacy in the past and to its effect on the constitution of Europe generally, as seen in the politics of the times they themselves lived in, when part of the continent was in an almost subservient condition, and, as Baron Stockmar proved to the Prince Consort, the shadow of Russian influence was spreading over Germany.

The events that followed are matter of every-day narration amongst us.* The defence of Sebastopol was cer-

* Opinions differed considerably as to the policy of merely defending Turkish territory as opposed to that of absolute aggression which was ultimately adopted in the Crimean expedition, and to an attempt at destroying Russian power in the Black Sea. It has become the fashion to decry the Crimean War because, after thirty-eight years' peace, commissariat arrangements failed to work, and the British military system is thought to have lagged behind the times; and it is a fact that no military or naval reputation was created on the side of the Western Allies, even if Lord Raglan sustained the chivalrous traditions of the past he truly belonged to, and if a British subject serving the Sultan distinguished himself as a soldier at Kars.

But neither the British Commander-in-Chief or Sir Fenwick Williams were enabled to throw determining weight into the balance of events.

French military leaders must be placed in a similar category. St. Arnaud, Canrobert, Bosquet, and Pelissier, are one and all remembered as brave and agile generals of division who sustained

tainly a grand one, whilst the attack has been generally underrated by those writing on the subject. Mr. King-

the reputation of France without devising any master-stroke in the field.

Sardinia, moreover, passed through the ordeal without originating a military genius, fighting bravely at the Tchernaya. Not so Russia, who in the person of their engineer defender at Sebastopol, General Todleben, can boast of possessing a soldier whose reputation is European.

As to the military events themselves, so admirably described in detail by Mr. A. W. Kinglake, few will refuse to the victory of the Allies, when, on September the 20th, 1854, they stormed Prince Menschikoff's well-studied position (on apparently inaccessible heights, confronted by a river), all the praise due to brave men resolved to do and die. But truthful students will, nevertheless, aver that the ardent and overpowering French attack, on the Allied right, was carried out under fire of the fleets, while much British blood might have been shed to little purpose had not Lord Raglan during the *mélée* succeeded in placing artillery on a vantage ground which commanded and to a degree enforced the enemies' retreat.

The subsequent battles of Balaklava (October 25th) and Inkerman (November 5th) are as household words amongst us, as, indeed, thanks to Mr. Kinglake, is the one happy stroke of strategy recorded in the campaign, when the Allies, making a flank march, threw all their force against the south of Sebastopol, rather than against the previously threatened northern side.

Altogether, the British soldier sustained his Peninsula and Waterloo reputation, and the French engaged in the Crimea might have been with the Great Napoleon at Arcola, or traversed the snows of Muscovy in 1812, while the Sardinians at the Bridge of Tchernaya developed qualities the exercise of which in after years made Italian unity possible.

It is, as we believe, but a shallow philosophy which leads men now to condemn the Crimean expedition as rendered futile by later events.

True it is that Russians, speaking through their Foreign Office in 1882 gladly demonstrate the inoperative character of shackles

lake has not fallen into this error, and his narration, partly the result of personal observation, will probably never be superseded, but will rank as the first thing of the kind ever attempted.

The Russians were somewhat exhausted, but still full of fight and pluck, when on the morning of September the 5th, 1855, they commenced their retreat to the north side of Sebastopol, amidst a dread confusion of fire and explosion.

Lord Lyndhurst's counsel had been followed to the letter, and when the Russian line-of-battle ships were seen to be sunk in the harbour, speedy and decisive action against Constantinople became impossible for Russia.

forged in 1856, and urge that the Czar is free to recreate a fleet in the Black Sea.

But if Sebastopol had not been destroyed by the Allies, the subsequent war of 1876-77 would have been fought with Russia in command of the Black Sea, a contingency calculated materially to shorten the struggle, and render Osman Pasha's subsequent defence at Plevna of less vital importance, even if such a change of conditions would not have entailed the early fall of Constantinople. Moreover, the fact should never be forgotten that the desperate attempt to keep armies in the Crimea, and subdue Kars, holding their own in Asia Minor, precluded the Russians from advancing appreciably towards Afghanistan and the north-west frontier of India, such abstention occurring but a short time before the Indian Mutiny.

Mr. Blanchard Jerrold in his fourth volume of Napoleon III.'s life, tells how, at the outset, were the desires of the French Emperor alone consulted, an attack on Poland would have superseded operations in the Black Sea. But Prussia threw the *agis* of her neutrality over any such scheme, while England in the person of Lord Palmerston looked with disfavour on a war not waged, so to speak, for the British object at stake.

And we pass lightly over the abortive attempts to gain peace which characterised the close of a war during which, as Mr. Disraeli deprecatingly observed, we were fighting and diplomatising at one and the same time.

The final Conference at Paris was presided over in 1856 by Lords Clarendon and Cowley.* Russia was

* In Sir Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, will be found ample material for a monograph on Lord Clarendon's official life, so perfect, clear, and compact, that, did not the nature of our task enjoin a completeness not to be found in any one book of reference, we should hesitate to add anything to the high testimony of worth rendered by sovereigns and diplomatists. But it has been for us to show why Lord Clarendon was also honoured by the people of England. It is, however, none the less interesting to learn how many additional orders, British and Continental, might have adorned the Foreign Secretary's breast, if official custom and his own modesty had not stood in the way. We there read how thoroughly resolved Lord Clarendon was to gain solid results for expenditure of British blood and treasure after the Crimean War, and are told that the Foreign Secretary selected Paris as the place for the famous Peace Congress because there he would be enabled to call on his friend the Emperor Napoleon III. for support whenever any specially subtle proposition was mooted on behalf of Russian interests.

Such was Lord Clarendon's influence over the French Emperor, that he had been previously the means of preventing him from going in person to the Crimea, when such an arrangement, involving the assumption of chief command, would have been unpopular with the British army. It was natural, then, that despite the fact that he knew and avowed Paris to be a hot-bed of Russian agents, yet his friendship with the Emperor might not unreasonably be expected to neutralise this apparent disadvantage. To foil the Muscovite schemes, which involved the embroilment of England and France, became Lord Clarendon's special object, and to effect such an end he himself proposed that, following the precedent of Lord Castlereagh in 1813, he should, as Secretary of State, leave the country for the better accomplishment of England's purposes.

heavily stricken, but by no means morally crushed, inasmuch as her troops were prepared to continue the contest, and defend the Czar's territory, while disaster had killed Nicholas, but had nevertheless failed to cow his successor into submission, such as the position might have warranted.

But the plenipotentiaries steered successfully through the difficulties that surrounded them, and it followed, strange to say, that the treaty which secured the independence of Turkey also laid the seeds of a regenerated Italy, which under the *ægis* of Sardinia, the brave little ally of the Western Powers, was shortly to spring into life.

By the treaty of 1856 the European Powers took every precaution to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman dominions in Europe. It was sealed by the equally famous Tripartite Treaty between France, Austria, and Great Britain, which guaranteed the whole of the Turkish territory. Means were taken to ensure, as it was hoped, the fair treatment of Christian inhabitants in Turkey, and the signatory powers had a *joint* right of interference on their behalf. The Russian pretensions to an exclusive protectorate were thus destroyed, and the next time a Czar gratuitously invaded Turkey no man could in truth say that law bore him out in so doing, or that he was acting in accordance with treaty right; at least, it was so believed at the time.

These highly valuable results reflected high honour on Lord Clarendon.

In Sir Th. Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. ii., p. 470-7, will be found summed up the Foreign Secre-

tary's announcement of peace, as made to Queen Victoria :—" Lord Clarendon presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and humbly begs to congratulate your Majesty upon the signature of peace this afternoon (March 30th, 1856). It is not to be doubted that another campaign must have brought glory to your Majesty's arms, and would have enabled England to impose different terms upon Russia ; but setting aside the cost and the horror of war, in themselves evils of the greatest magnitude, we cannot feel sure that victory might not have been purchased too dearly."

After congratulating Her Majesty on the position England held at the close of the war, Lord Clarendon ventured to hope that the language at home would not be apologetic or dissatisfied concerning the peace.

It was a proud reward for all his labours and anxieties to be told in reply, by his Sovereign, that the result was, so far as the Conference was concerned, alone due to himself. The royal verdict had been previously anticipated by that of Lord Clarendon's countrymen, as well as by the collective judgment of contemporary statesmanship.

When Lord Derby attempted to form a government in February 1855, after the dissolution of Lord Aberdeen's heterogeneous cabinet, he applied to Lord Clarendon begging him to retain his seat at the Foreign Office ; Mr. Disraeli on the same occasion admitting the value of Lord Clarendon's patience and ability. He was indeed the Foreign Minister of England's choice.

One matter was decided in Conference at Paris, the motives prompting which have never been fully eluci-

dated. It is, anyhow, necessary to read between the lines, if we desire to discover due cause for what Lord Derby—as it seems to us, with immature judgment, during the debate in the Lords—called the Clarendon surrender of Paris. Certainly the platitudes put forward on this sole occasion, when the subject was publicly mooted, could not be held sufficient to justify a change deprecated by Pitt and Grenville, and not previously advocated by statesmen of note or experience.

But when the treaty-making power of the Crown is utilised to make such a change by a trio such as Lords Palmerston, Cowley, and Clarendon, it is allowable to suppose that England received substantial *quid pro quo* when she exercised such total self-abnegation. It is possible to conceive that in a war with an individual State, little, if any, loss through abandonment of the right of search could accrue to a nation owning the strongest navy, and determined to own the most powerful and effective ships. But given a naval coalition against England—such as in the present state of Europe fortunately seems improbable if not impossible—how would a nation owning the carrying trade of the world find herself situated with her harbours in blockade ; her fleet forced to fight for doubtful supremacy, or to retire into Portsmouth and Plymouth ; whilst by this very declaration of Paris she would find herself precluded from employing her wealth in fitting out privateers to protect her trade, and retaliate on those bent on ruining her commerce ?

It is worth while to endeavour to discover for what

reason the right of search was surrendered by Lord Clarendon in 1856, and why, at the same time, privateering was declared illegal by every nation but the United States, who declined to bind themselves to such a manifestly hurtful surrender.

We should, however, note the fact that at the very time during which the Treaty of Paris was in process of negotiation, war between Great Britain and America was imminent, in consequence of a difference arising out of our Foreign Enlistment Act, whereby, during the Crimean War, American citizens had been drafted into the so-called German Legion. Added to this we should recollect that in Lord Palmerston's opinion, the right of search had been—so far as America was concerned—surrendered by the Ashburton Treaty of 1844. If given up to America, it followed logically that we could not deny a like privilege to France, our chosen ally, or to the other European nations who, by the treaty of 1856, were engaging to protect English interests in Turkey and the East.

Now Lord Palmerston's Government of 1856 was neither in a position to defy America, or to act independently of Europe. A remission of taxation was adjudged to be advisable, if not necessary, in England; and to ask the House of Commons to provide for renewed war expenditure was scarcely within the power of a Liberal Government who, proud of having concluded a great war, could not plead danger to the State as a reason for renewed conflict.

Lord Clarendon, in conjunction with Lord Palmerston, proved themselves, in 1857, to be in possession of

such resource when danger threatened European peace, that we have plausible reason for believing that they took due security when they agreed, on behalf of England, to the Declaration of Paris. An overture of alliance had been made to Louis Napoleon, as ruler of France, by the Russians, and he seemed for a time to waver before such temptation, whilst, without believing that in heart the French Emperor was ever hostile to England, there is evidence that during a visit to England in 1857, devised by Lord Palmerston, the latter minister in conjunction with Lord Clarendon prevailed on the Sovereign of France to compromise a matter which threatened to re-open the Eastern question. France, Russia, and Prussia, desired that the Principalities should consist of one large State, instead of being subdivided into Servia and Roumania, as Austria, Turkey, and England believed to be most antagonistic to Russian intrigue.

The Turks had made a demand which Lord Clarendon undertook to induce them, through Lord Stratford's influence, to withdraw, and on the other hand Louis Napoleon engaged not to press the consolidation of the Principalities to a conclusion.

It is difficult to believe, even after allowing for the great personal influence of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, and the Prince Consort, that a reserve power was not possessed by the British ministers, such as they exercised to manifest advantage on this occasion, and which could only be theirs by reason of some compromise, the outward evidence of which was seen in the Declaration of Paris in 1856.

Parts of these remarks are, we admit, the result of pure

conjecture ; but except on the supposition that some recompense was given to England, is it possible to account for patriotic statesmen yielding up *in toto* what had been formerly found to be the main strength of their country?

The fact, moreover, should not be lost sight of, that the far-seeing Prince Consort endorsed the Declaration of Paris. Mr. H. M. Hyndman, in his able work, *England for All*, p. 180, has suggested a repudiation of this engagement as necessary for England under a democracy of the future, which is to reign amidst peace, plenty, and contentment. Such conduct would, in our opinion, be totally unjustifiable, unless the provisions to which we have solemnly agreed were previously infringed by others opposed to us. It should not, however, be forgotten that when war threatened between England and Russia in 1878, elaborate preparations for privateering in American waters were made by the latter nation. At the same time that we would jealously uphold the prerogative of the Crown to enact treaties, it does seem most extraordinary that members of a Cabinet who endorsed the Treaty of Paris, should in subsequent years have unsparingly denounced the *constitutional* character of a conditional arrangement such as the Anglo-Turkish Convention, which, whatever may be said of it, gave up no rights, and embodied no national sacrifice. There is this much also to be urged in favour of surrendering the right of search, formerly claimed by England, that foreign countries resented it so far as to predispose them towards hostile proceedings. Therefore under the present engagement war is rendered less

probable; but, so far as Great Britain is concerned, threatens graver risks even than those formerly incurred.*

Much of the late diplomatic success achieved by Lord Clarendon, gained in power and endurance through the fact that a mistake of the opposition leaders had forced a dissolution on Lord Palmerston in February 1857. Commissioner Yeh was the cause of this temporary Government defeat in the House of Commons,

* The recollections of Lord Kingsdown (Mr. Leigh Pemberton) the well-known Conservative lawyer, were privately printed in 1869, and the *Edinburgh Review* of January in that year contains a most interesting article thereon. It will be there found that in 1854 Lord Aberdeen had consulted Lord Kingsdown upon the questions of international law likely to arise between belligerents and neutrals on the high sea, after thirty years of peace had elapsed, and when the shadow of war once more rested over Europe. "A careful study of Lord Stowell's former decision had convinced Mr. Leigh Pemberton that however he might admire the learning and diction of that great judge, the Court of Admiralty had in the last war carried its restrictive measures further than either justice to foreign nations, or the interests of our own commerce could warrant at the present time." So strictly did Lord Kingsdown construe the law of blockade, that there can be little doubt how much his ruling served to make the adoption of the Declaration of Paris probable; and together with the other facts which we have enumerated, the dictum of Lord Kingsdown must have contributed much towards the line of conduct chosen by England when through the concurrence of her plenipotentiaries, Lords Clarendon and Cowley, she subscribed in 1856 to the Declaration of Paris. We desire to emphasise our reference to the *Edinburgh Review* of January 1869, because Lord Kingsdown's *Recollections* were published for private circulation only, and an inquirer can alone satisfy his research upon various points of historic interest connected with this celebrated lawyer's career by consulting the above-mentioned periodical.

and it is difficult to believe that either Lord Derby or Mr. Disraeli were informed as to the true character of the Chinese official's high-handed barbarian proceedings, when the Conservatives joined with Cobden and Bright to assert the unnecessary character of the war that had ensued. At any rate the country endorsed Lord Palmerston's determination to protect British trade, and revenge insults directed against her flag; while the nation further applauded the determined resolution to protect Herat, the key of Afghanistan, from the insidious attacks of Persia, as inspired by Russian agents.

Lord Clarendon's later administration of the Foreign Office thus fell on quieter times, so far as Europe was concerned, when he retained his portfolio during Lord Palmerston's first premiership, although in 1857 the Indian Mutiny attracted all men's attention. The previous spectacle of Lord Dalhousie returning from India in the prime of life and stricken with deadly bodily weakness, but fearful as to the future of the country over which he had ruled, is only surpassed in its dramatic intensity by the horrors that succeeded. It is likewise necessary to record that the historian's judgment has been hostile to the confiscatory measures adopted by that same conscientious, over-worked public servant.*

It was in accordance with the policy of sympathy with subject nationalities, which Lords Palmerston and Clarendon had initiated, that English Liberal diplomacy

* See concluding volume of Malleon's *Indian Mutiny*.

should favour the expulsion of Austria from Italy. The train was laid for such action even during the Conference at Paris in 1856, when informal conversations are known to have taken place between the British Foreign Secretary and Count Cavour. And we recount the fact without pretending to endorse with approval a policy which, if successful, gained its ends through bloodshed incalculable.

But one of the last official acts of Lord Clarendon was alike illustrative of his official wisdom, and at the same time an evidence of how deeply political animus may lead passing opinion astray.*

One Orsini had made a diabolical attack upon the French Emperor, blowing his carriage to pieces by means of explosive bombs; and when it became known that the conspiracy was concocted in London, public excitement in France became general, and a dangerous feeling permeated through the army. History has shown that the Emperor stood firm to the British alliance, but Count Walewsky wrote a strong letter, reflecting on the state of our laws, and "on the conduct of refugees in this country." Lord Palmerston's Government considered the subject, and came to the conclusion that there was a matter in our law which required amendment, and a bill was prepared, by which the crime of murder or inciting to murder, either in this country or any other country, should be a felony, and not a misdemeanour, as it then was. The matter came

* Account given by Lord Granville in the House of Lords during Session of 1881.

to be very carefully considered by the Cabinet, who took some hours to discuss the bill. Lord Clarendon said, "How am I to act with reference to the despatch? I think I had better not answer it at all." Lord Palmerston agreed, and the whole Cabinet acquiesced without saying a word. The first reading of the Bill was approved, but on the second reading a political combination assailed Lord Palmerston's Government and destroyed it. A year or two after, that same improvement in the law was agreed to without a single dissident.

The subject has a present interest, as marking the spot where the land of freedom may become an international refuge for the assassin, and Englishmen have very properly determined that the right of asylum given in their liberty-loving country to purely political refugees should not be extended to men like Herr Most, who threaten the fundamental laws of society. The Conservative Opposition did not gauge this necessity in 1858, but made common cause with extreme Reformers in utilising the public feeling which a supposed subservience to France was calculated to arouse. They were clearly and undeniably wrong, and their mistake went far towards consolidating Lord Palmerston's ultimate position. And, indeed, with the din of furious party discord still ringing in our ears, it may easily be forgotten how strong were such sentiments even when Palmerston and Disraeli ruled over rival camps. We may likewise learn the lesson of how frequently contemporary judgment may err.

The party opposition of the Conservatives, both

during the Crimean War and afterwards, while Lord Palmerston was Premier, is allowed by all to have been temperate, and not guided by factious motives ; and yet not only were mistakes made, but the hostility between Liberals and Conservatives occasionally rose to a considerable height. Such, indeed, are the penalties we in England pay for a system of Government which demands more or less immediate expression of opinion from those who are frequently but half-informed as to the subject in question. In the third volume of Sir Th. Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort*, there is an account of an interview between Lord Derby and the Prince after the Conservative leader's abortive attempt to form a Government to succeed that of Lord Aberdeen. Prince Albert represented to Lord Derby how the country had suffered by means of statements made in Parliament which gave a false impression abroad, and at the same time confided to Lord Derby certain facts which, as Sir Th. Martin remarks, he *could* not know.

Now, here appears to exist a flaw in our national proceedings, which should not again be superadded to any recurrent Continental difficulties. Why should the trusted leader of a compact party numbering 280 members in the Commons, and possessing a powerful majority in the House of Lords, be left in ignorance of matters which, in the hour of supreme danger, it was not thought unconstitutional to disclose.

It is presumable that, with the curtain of officialism drawn aside, the conduct of such men as Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli would have been shaped towards furthering their country's undoubted interests, and that

reticence would have been loyally observed and seemed to point out a contrary course.

It may, anyhow, be useful for our readers to know how far it is constitutional and how far desirable in times of anxiety mutual confidences should be encouraged between the rival leaders of the two parties. The effect surely would be both to increase national strength and to assuage the bitter strife of faction.

Lord Clarendon laid down his office in 1858, when Europe was in an agitated condition. The principles for which the great Liberal party had contended since 1832, were warring with those of an extreme anarchical character, such as obtained in Russia, were condoned in Prussia and Austria, and were embraced of necessity by the French Emperor.

Russia was by no means ready to accept her defeat in the Crimea as destructive of the principles of government which she had chosen, and encouraged her *protégés* to sustain. Within a few months of the Paris Conference Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular protesting against English interference at Naples, as contravening the agreement entered into by treaty, which precluded interference with the internal affairs of other nations. The cruel conduct of Ferdinand II. to Foerio and other political opponents, had continually grated against English susceptibilities, and were put forward by the Liberal leaders, Palmerston and Mr. Gladstone, the latter of whom in his famous pamphlet laid bare transactions the atrocity of which seemed to condone exceptional action, such as British public opinion would undoubtedly approve.

But the weakness of such action consisted in the fact that the British representations were addressed to the weak, and that when in the case of Poland or Hungary similar atrocities called for equally strong condemnation, the danger of kindling European disturbance shaped diplomatic conduct into a different and less minatory course.

Herein logically consists the weakness of the Liberal programme in Foreign Affairs, which, if successful, on the whole, in improving the face of European society, has yet from time to time been forced to adopt means repugnant to feelings of justice, and reached its half-attained desires after much conflict. Thus it has come to pass that moderate and statesmanlike measures, such as those furthered by Lord Clarendon during his official life, have become discredited through the vagaries of extreme men, and the violence of secret agents sent forth by the societies with which Europe is honey-combed.

Posterity will, however, whatever its verdict on party policy may be, undoubtedly see in Lord Clarendon personally the highest type of a Foreign Minister during the middle of the nineteenth century. He was a Liberal in the best sense of the word, and his fidelity to party ties was as assured as his devotion to England was notorious. When the period of his second Foreign Secretaryship is under consideration in these pages, the time for biographical summary will have been succeeded by that of historic narration, inasmuch as personal reference to the motives and conduct of those who lived after 1865 will be religiously eschewed. The facts can

then alone afford food for general comment and consideration.

But we are here obliged to shift the scene to a period in advance of the times at which we have chronologically arrived, and to forestal as it were the inevitable end towards which each reader of a biography intuitively glances, conscious at the same time that we are saddening the page.

In a case such as Lord Clarendon's, the lesson of his life teaches that of honours and fame gained most worthily the enjoyment may be but brief.*

The three-score age of man but just attained in a period of remarkable longevity, points to more than ordinary wear and tear working on a constitution such as George Villiers, Lord Clarendon, possessed ; and it is undoubtedly true that unflagging perseverance at the desk when the appetite for hard work increases rather than diminishes as stress of business presses, will in ordinary cases wear out the frame sooner than when lettered ease, giving recreation to the mind, is the lot of intellectual men.

In the nineteenth century, such is the stress of duty, such the work to be performed, that public officials are well-nigh overdone, and deserve, more than English

* Lord Clarendon's literary fame will be connected with his Foreign Office work, but Mr. Charles Greville was probably correct in forming a high opinion of the letters written from Madrid during the first Carlist war.

In later years, although much occupied with public affairs, Lord Clarendon filled the offices of President and Treasurer to the London Library in St. James' Square, honours conferred by those best able to judge where literature was concerned.

people generally know, that title which the late Lord Derby once claimed for them, viz. *working men*. Such in the best sense of the word was Lord Clarendon.*

In April 1870, when in the full swing of official work and conscious of the night-mare which, in the shape of vast hosts armed if not actually gathering, hung over Europe, there occurred a tragedy in Greece, which may have, as the *Annual Register* of 1870 expresses a fear, tended to hasten Lord Clarendon's end.

Lord and Lady Muncaster, Mr. Vyner, and Mr. and Mrs. Lloyd, Mr. Herbert, and the Italian Secretary of Legation at Athens, went out of the latter capital one April day in 1870, for the purpose of visiting historic Marathon. There they were seized by brigands, and

* Lord Clarendon made a most characteristic speech in support of the Irish Church Bill on June 14th, 1869, and while deprecating mere clamour as a means of influencing votes, drew a comparison between Mr. Gladstone assailed by Tories and Churchmen in 1870 and Sir Robert Peel when writhing under the Protectionist attacks during 1846. Lord Clarendon recounted how, in that same year 1846, he had occasion to go to Salisbury, and mingled in the train with the farmers bent on their weekly pilgrimage to the county corn exchange. To their bitter taunts regarding Sir Robert's conduct in deserting Protectionist principles, Lord Clarendon retorted with his own sound knowledge which led him to embrace free trade, interlarding the same with a warm defence of the impugned statesman's noble character. "All you say may be true," answered one of the farmers; "but this I know—if Sir Robert Peel were to come to Salisbury market, there would not be a square inch of him left in two minutes' time." An answer denoting the existence of strong passions outside as well as inside Parliament, such as should bid us hesitate to accept Professor Goldwin Smith's (*Nineteenth Century* for April 1882) picture of Mr. Disraeli's conduct, and lead to a more charitable construction thereof being adopted.

detained until Lord Muncaster could arrange for the transmittal of £25,000 from England as ransom.

The British Foreign Secretary, apprised of this, did all that he could to induce the Greek Government to desist from attempting a capture of the gang before the hostages were rescued, and, indeed, he urged on them an immediate and complete amnesty, urging that, when constitutional rules had been so constantly broken, the least a British *protégé* such as Greece could do would be at all hazards to save innocent lives.

But party feeling in Greece was too much for the Government, who either lost command of their troops or moved them to avert Parliamentary opposition.

Be this as it may, a girdle of soldiers gradually encircled the bandits, who despatched their prisoners, as they had threatened to do if themselves molested.

Not a flaw could be found with Lord Clarendon's conduct of the matter ; but on the last occasion he spoke in Parliament, and on this very subject, signs of weary disgust at the dreadful issue were apparent alike in his manner and diction.

The outcome was indeed too horrible, and we gladly draw a veil over events the mention of which may awaken sad memories in living men's minds.

But it is certain that the noble-hearted Foreign Secretary survived the victims he had struggled so hard to save but a short time. Lord Clarendon never lived to see the great strife between Gaul and Teuton re-awakened, and he sank to his rest in blissful ignorance of the fate which was awaiting his handiwork elaborated after the Russian War at Paris in 1856.

The abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris by Russia must have been a bitter blow for England's patriot minister ; and amidst the terror and rapine of war, it is pleasant to think of him sinking to his rest, honoured, as while he lived, by those best acquainted with European affairs. But a short time before he died, Lord Clarendon gave evidence before a Committee of the House of Commons on the, to our readers, most interesting subject of the Foreign Office and diplomatic service. Hearers were then delighted with his simple clearness, employed as this characteristic was to justify the traditions of the older diplomatic school, and to limit in regard to external politics, so far as constitutional conduct would allow, the almost total abandonment of reserve which the British people welcome, nay, almost demand, in domestic affairs.

Hence, Lord Clarendon's death marks a distinct epoch in diplomatic history, change being scarcely retarded by his successors.

It was but a week before Lord Clarendon's death that he was at Mr. Chichester Fortescue's, at Strawberry Hill, where, amidst the *élite* of London (royalty itself being present), he delighted all by his courtly vivacity and noble presence.

There can be little doubt but that the untoward tragedy at Marathon, where English travellers suffered death, caused grave trouble to Lord Clarendon towards the close of a life passed in genuine hard work, even if the disaster did not absolutely hasten his death, which occurred in his town house in Grosvenor Square on June 27th 1870.

A plain but striking marble cross in Watford cemetery marks the spot where the former friend of liberty at home and abroad rests, to which many a pilgrimage will be hereafter made by those conversant with nineteenth-century history, both from Spain and France, and, indeed, from all Europe.

The England that would have come nearest to Lord Clarendon's ideal is thus described in Mr. Baily's fine poem *Festus* (1877), p. 137 :—

Let faith her rites, her creeds to Israel trace ;
 Earth's lore, earth's art let flow from Græcia's race ;
 Owe Christendom to Rome its states, its laws ;
 The freedom of mankind is England's cause.
 To science, learning, law, religion, she
 Adds nature's grace supreme of liberty.
 Mother of empire, native to command ;
 Whose stern self-rule to fickle realms makes known
 A love which serves, but serving, awes the throne ;
 Hope, yet, and aid of thrall in every land ;
 She first refused with slavery to defile
 Her shores ; and God looked down and blessed the Isle,
 Saying :—" In this cause, England, fare thou forth ;
 Elect of powers, be first in wealth and worth ;
 To lands less blessed, teach thou fair freedom's charms ;
 Fear not the snares of peace, nor war's alarms ;
 And leave with Heaven the issue of our arms."

LORD MALMESBURY. (II.)

FEBRUARY 27TH, 1858, TO JUNE 20TH, 1859.



It is certainly no more than bare justice that Mr. Disraeli claimed for Lord Malmesbury, when he stated that the late Foreign Secretary's untiring industry never received adequate public acknowledgment. But the second administration of Lord Derby came into power labouring under a misconception of Lord Clarendon's conduct about the political refugees, and this very same Government was destined to retire from office without a just estimate being generally arrived at as to their own diplomatic efforts to prevent war between France and Austria in Italy.

To this very day an impression prevails in some quarters, culled doubtless from the party prints of the time, to the effect that British influence was cast by Lord Malmesbury into the balance against France, and given to Austria, the traditional supporter, as was generally

believed, of internal repression and the prop of autocracy in Central Europe. It is, moreover, true that Lord Palmerston shared in the error in question, and approved it at Tiverton previous to the general election of May 1859, doubtless thereby influencing the votes of many thoughtful and influential people on an occasion when parties remained equally balanced. But Lord Palmerston had not, when he spoke, the materials wherewith to arrive at the sober judicial decision he of all men would have desired, and for the simple reason that the Blue Books were not at hand when he set himself to express a hustings opinion such as a dissolution forced each political leader to be prepared to make. There was, indeed, but scant colour for such an assertion, afforded but by the known desire of Lord Malmesbury to stand by public treaties and so to protect public law, and the writer states this after a careful perusal of the Blue Book of that day, which contains overwhelming evidence of the skilful and temperate counsels which prevailed in London.

Never, probably, had the decision to be arrived at greater need of direction by statesmanlike minds. Never was the union of wisdom and experience more fully exemplified than when Lord Malmesbury could seek the counsel of that enlightened statesman the Prince Consort, whose knowledge of the German Courts was so exceptional, and fortified his views by the adherence of colleagues such as Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli. The matters at issue involved not only war between Austria and France, but a probable, and in certain contingencies assured, European conflagration.

And it is the reality of this danger that we now propose to prove in the fewest words that evidence will allow.

Those familiar with the modern history of Italy and Austria will know that the latter nation never succeeded in establishing anything but a military occupation in Lombardy and Venetia ; while, as Mr. Freeman reminds us in his geographical history, the Emperor Charles V. reigned there only as conqueror of the country, and not because he gained the hearts of the people. In the present century, after a glimpse of something akin to liberty had been allowed to permeate the political gloom amidst which the people lived, 1814 and the Treaties of Vienna supervened, and Italian hopes were sacrificed to an imperious necessity.

The peace of the world depended, after the Great Napoleon's fall, on the propitiation of the Emperor Francis of Austria, whose armies had enabled the Allies to give effect to European opinion, and yet who, as Napoleon's father-in-law, was believed to be somewhat half-hearted in the cause. Peace was the main object of all the plenipotentiaries, and the map of what was geographically styled Italy remained to give colour to the repugnance which Liberals of all schools felt for a transaction it is still impossible to justify except on the ground of necessity.

But as time passed on, men began to aver that for Austria herself timely and voluntary retirement from Italy was the only safe policy. Insurrection and conspiracy, often recurring and savage in its nature, could be the only future for a country honeycombed with secret societies, and where the most reliable and respectable

citizens were thoroughly ill-disposed towards a foreign rule they detested and would ever study to destroy.

Lord Palmerston in 1848, knowing this, sent Lord Minto on a mission to Italy, and actually did convince the Austrian authorities of the desirability of abandoning Milan and Lombardy, if a European undertaking was given them that they should remain undisturbed in Venetia. This solution Lord Palmerston declined to admit of, and therefore failed to press on diplomatically a line of conduct which the Prince Consort and Louis Napoleon agreed in condemning as a mistake. Moreover, with the story of Novara and 1848 before us, together with knowledge of the streams of blood which deluged Lombardy in 1859, it is scarcely possible not to concur in this opinion, even if the immediate results of the proposed amicable agreement had not promised to be less than those afterwards gained at Magenta and Solferino.

But Louis Napoleon had in some informal manner pledged himself when in exile to the secret societies of Italy, to the effect that he would take any feasible opportunity which might tend towards the deliverance of Italy from Austrian rule. When, therefore, he wielded the sceptre of France, it is scarcely to be wondered that the conspirators should demand their pound of flesh. Hence, followed the promise given to Cavour at Plombieres, in July 1858, which the wily Italian schemed that Napoleon III. should commit to paper, limiting his part of the compact to merely undefined promises resting on most improbable eventualities. These embarrassing engagements were, moreover, concealed from England, where Lord Clarendon declared himself occupied with

building bridges for the Emperor to retreat over, the country remaining faithful to the French alliance through good and evil report.

Such, then, was the heritage that fell to Lord Malmesbury at a moment when Europe was convulsed with reports of new alliances and warlike preparations, and when the French Emperor was bent on the revision of the treaties of 1815, to be effected in a Congress which was to assemble at the instance of Russia. On the 1st day of 1859, Louis Napoleon spoke a few solemn words to the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, which set all Europe aflame with excitement. Baron Hübner was desired to tell his master, the Austrian Emperor, that although the political relations between the two countries were not satisfactory, the Emperor's personal feelings towards Francis Joseph were unaltered. This was fully in accordance with the Napoleonic traditions, inasmuch as some time after the Emperor adopted a similar tone with the veteran British diplomatist, Lord Cowley, but was met by a grave and dignified rejoinder, such as alone could make a maintenance of the alliance possible, and save it from becoming hollow and unstable. Yet Lord Malmesbury was unwilling to doubt the good faith of his old friend, whose society he had enjoyed in former days, and whom he believed to be incapable of underhand conduct towards England. In this belief Lord Malmesbury may be said to have been borne out by Lord Palmerston, even if Her Majesty and Prince Albert adopted a diplomatic reserve which spoke volumes. Austria had the European treaties on her side, and was in Italy by virtue of a public mandate,

such as the French Emperor sought to discount by diplomatic means, and in the last resort to destroy by the sword. But he continued to declare his fidelity to England.

For some time the Austrians remained content with seeing Napoleon III. on the horns of a dilemma, and satisfied at the general opinion that prevailed as to the illegality of Sardinia's conduct in arming for an attack on their neighbours' territory. But the populations of the Duchies of Lombardy and Sardinia, were alike unanimous, and agreed to welcome the French as allies, and once more hail a Napoleon as the liberator of their soil.

Travellers through Lombardy and dwellers in beautiful Venice will remember how to the very women and children the hatred against the Tedeschi extended, a feeling which in 1848 had led to a general sacrifice of the national habit of smoking throughout Lombardy in order that the Austrian revenue might not profit by the sale of tobacco. Considerations of this description were on the point of forcing the French Emperor's hand when Lord Malmesbury sent Lord Cowley on a mission to Vienna for the purpose of preserving peace.

Lord Cowley, himself a nephew of the great Duke of Wellington, would as such receive a welcome in Vienna commensurate with his position as kinsman of the immortal hero whom every Austrian honoured, and whose death was sorely mourned amongst our old allies, notwithstanding passing differences which had in 1852 created a sore feeling between the two nations. Lord Cowley, then, clearly was the man to effect an agreement between Austria and France, even if he had not

possessed every attribute which could give personal fitness for the task in question. But at the critical moment, and when Lord Cowley believed the success of his mission to be assured, Count Buol sent an ultimatum to Sardinia, requiring her to disarm on pain of an instant Austrian invasion.

The passes of Savoy were crowded with French troops, and it had become known to the Viennese authorities that the various departments in France had been instructed through their prefects to advocate any war measure the Emperor might decree.

Francis Joseph and his advisers, acting as sovereigns and statesmen usually do on such occasions, determined to be first in the field, and after an expiration of some days, during which Cavour made no sign but continued his preparations, crossed the Rubicon, and encamped on Sardinian territory. From that moment, from an English point of view, the Austrians were in the wrong. They were the oppressors of nationalities. They were the breakers of treaties, and branded as such by the Emperor of the French, and, more marvellous than all, were destined to show an inability to wield with skill the sword which a somewhat ill-timed and desperate courage had prompted them to unsheath. It was on the 26th of April 1859, that the Austrian armies crossed the Ticino. On the 5th of May, before a shot had been fired, and when the rival armies were in battle array, died Prince Metternich, the most influential Continental minister of his times, who never lived to see the disasters his own matchless diplomacy might have temporarily averted, even if the causes of their occur-

rence lay too deep for the permanent assurance of future security. But it is nevertheless true that he never would have been guilty of such a palpable mistake as that made by the ministers of Francis Joseph, when, after long months of patient waiting, they rushed into the very indefensible position into which their foes were scheming to entice them. From the moment that Austria invaded Sardinia, Cavour had gained all that he desired in the sympathy of Liberal Europe, and, above all, of England.

As Lord Malmesbury explained in the House of Lords, and as has since been supported by undeniable testimony in the *Life of the Prince Consort*, Russia, acting with France, proposed a conference at the very moment when Lord Cowley's mission was in progress, and declared that she did so when the failure of the English Ambassador's object was patent, though dates tell us that negotiations between Lord Cowley and the Austrian ministers had not actually commenced.

Well might the upright and high-minded Prince Consort lament the perfidy which could lead a nominal ally to act in such a manner, and sorrowfully admit the impossibility of dealing trustfully with such diplomacy as was thereby disclosed. Conduct of this description was, however, but in unison with that which wrested a commercial treaty from the Turks at Ackerman in 1824, by false pretences, and has since, from time to time, deceived the well-meaning class of British statesmen who, after permitting Cabul to become a nest of Russian intrigue, between 1873 and 1876, still cry peace when there is no peace, and look for an ideal future which

they themselves believe to be assured, and would therefore honestly hope to perpetuate—the wish, we fear, being father to the thought.

But it was not alone Muscovite perfidy that in 1859 complicated the European outlook. Germany was alarmed, and Prussia resolved to mobilise, inasmuch as if the warlike promptings of her people had received attention, the hosts of citizen soldiers, not then believed to have attained thorough organisation, would have marched to the assistance of their German brethren. But the Government of Berlin was in the hands of far-seeing men, and presided over by a Prince Regent, in the person of the present German Emperor, who took wise counsel and adopted a policy of reserve. Patriotic sympathy for the Teutonic race, as opposed to the Latin hosts fast gathering on each side of the Savoyard mountains, no individual, however eminent, could dispel, and it was this very sentiment which, from first to last, Napoleon III. most feared, carried back, as his thoughts doubtless were, to the events of 1813 in Germany, where the popular feeling compelled the ruling powers in Prussia to withdraw from the compact with the great Napoleon, and take advantage of his disasters in Russia to join the league of the fallen conqueror's foes. Students of Seeley's *Life of Stein*, and of Sir Archibald Alison's history, may read the impressions of more than one eye-witness, who recounted the intensity of the national inspiration which, leading peasants and herdsmen to die for their country's cause, likewise gave a life and dignity to the alliance of the Emperor and Monarch who conquered at Leipsic, such as enabled them to enter

France in triumph. Napoleon III., hastening to the Sardinian frontier in 1859, hoped to forestal a repetition of historical enthusiasm that, if fairly kindled, boded ill for the furtherance of his designs, and might threaten his very existence as a European monarch.

A strange lethargy seemed to possess the Austrians encamped in Sardinia, and they failed to put their threat to march on Turin into execution, thus giving time for the allies to equalise the strength of rival hosts, whose diplomatic guidance, as received from Paris and Vienna, varied daily to the very last; and, indeed, if Austria made more than one damaging error, she was situated in a position of the greatest difficulty. Russian troops were assembling on her north-west frontier, thereby fulfilling a promise made to the French Emperor, who had designed this concentration to neutralise a portion of her military strength, whilst at the same moment domestic dissensions were rife at Vienna, such as might be temporarily appeased, but, like a renewed bill, could only be said to have deferred the evil day. Well might the young Emperor elect to rely on the courage of his soldiery; but, alas, not successfully on the skill of his generals. When he was thus forced into the trap prepared by Cavour, and face to face with French armies pledged to free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic, the warnings addressed by the Austrian Chancellerie to Europe were not followed by powerful or, indeed, skilful military action, such as could justify the wisdom of such utterance. "The second French Empire," said Francis Joseph, "is about to realise its long-cherished ideas, and replace those treaties which have so long formed

the basis of European law. The traditions of the first Napoleon have been resuscitated." Language such as this showed that the Kaiser feared that war was imminent, but if not swiftly succeeded by long-matured and skilful military operations, which might alike confirm wavering adherents and strengthen the resolution of doubting allies, it could but fail to carry due weight. When, therefore, first blood was claimed on behalf of France and Italy at Montebello, on May 20th, 1859, there were many who saw an ill-omen in defeat suffered in an advantageous military position, and rendered famous by a former French victory; and the tide of battle from that moment rolled in one direction. On May 31st, the King Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia repulsed the Austrians at Palæstro, so that the troops of General Giulay, abandoning the Austrian scheme of invading Sardinia, concentrated at Magenta for the defence of Milan and Lombardy, such resolution being doubtless adopted with the knowledge that for the nonce the Empire of the Hapsburghs and Maria Theresa stood isolated in Europe, and must struggle alone.

But the great Cavour had been far-seeing, not only as regards diplomacy, but had not forgotten fully to develop the strategic advantages of his country, and railways running parallel to the line of the Ticino had been devised for the purpose of concentrating troops on the occasion of an invasion of Lombardy. These, amidst the hasty change of purpose which paralysed the Austrian commanders, had not been destroyed, and by such means it happened that the concentration of Louis

Napoleon's army for the purpose of forcing the Ticino was more perfect than the hasty massing together of troops which General Giulay effected at Magenta. General McMahon had been despatched to cross the river Ticino by the bridge of Turbigo, several miles higher up than Magenta, and succeeded in reaching that devoted town before sunset, and at a moment when the French Emperor, at the head of his Imperial Guard, and near the bridge of Buffalora, was in a position of great peril. Slowly and sullenly did the baffled Austrians draw off from their rallying ground amidst the fertile vineyards which surrounded Magenta. General Giulay had viewed the struggle from the top of the church tower, and was the last to leave a spot rendered famous for ever in history, conscious that he had fought and lost a decisive engagement at a moment when a body of his compatriots, varying in numbers between 20,000 and 30,000, were within a few hours of the spot, and had taken no part in the encounter. McMahon had arrived first, and the marks of his cannon-shot on the walls of the picturesque Italian houses remain to this day a witness of the service which won for the fortunate and true-hearted general the *bâton* of a Marshal of France, delivered to him on the field by his victorious Sovereign. Well might Europe hesitate to fully endorse the sentiments of sympathy with half-accomplished national independence such as greeted the warm-blooded Italians while in company with their French allies they took possession of Milan and its incomparable Duomo, and at the same time awakened memories of the first Napoleon at Marengo and Lodi. From the elevated roof of that

above-mentioned marble cathedral, we learn how the good citizens of Milan had watched the white puffs of smoke darting through the distant vines, and had glanced towards an advancing line of fire which told of coming deliverance such as each mother had taught her child to live for, pray for, and hail, when accomplished, with delight.

Greater minds than those of the third Napoleon might have lost their balance, when he reflected what a past was recalled by this, the outcome of his most dangerous, and at one time apparently an indissoluble, dilemma. Amidst the mingled terror and enthusiasm which the creation of such a situation engendered, the administration of Lord Derby, which Lord Malmesbury had served so efficiently as Foreign Secretary, met with a Parliamentary defeat in their own lately-elected House of Commons. A somewhat artificially created political question had been astir, whilst the old Reform banners of 1832 were reproduced, and the maxims inscribed thereon re-adapted for the occasion. Men had ceased to consider the political vote as a trust, but looked on it as a right not to be withheld from those possessing a modicum of knowledge and property, whilst in the background there were ominous signs that such ill-defined fitness for exercising a right might suffer indefinite and undue extension whenever the minister of the day elected to give effect to popular desire.

The Conservative bid was not high enough, in 1859, to secure its adoption, and an appeal to the country decided that, although the most compact of all parties, that led by Mr. Disraeli in the Commons was destined

to be outnumbered by a coalition of the Liberal sections; and here is to be found the key to the solution of British politics ever since the first Reform Bill of 1832.

From time to time the very nature of the case will prevent the great Liberal party from preserving its unity, and the influence of Church, landed property, and the older institutions will become apparent; but on the whole, and especially in the absence of any towering form such as that of Peel or Beaconsfield, the political machine will be worked by those unable to give effect to their more extreme desires, but still destined to rule the State as members of that great Liberal party which, in the name of Professor Seeley's well-defined enthusiasm for humanity, succeeds in captivating the human mind in times of excitement or desire for change. But if the Government of Lord Derby failed to settle the Reform question in 1859, by the help of the Moderate Liberals they had succeeded in putting our Indian Empire on a fresh footing after the suppression of the Indian Mutiny. In so doing, it is true, they had been compelled to sacrifice Lord Ellenborough in consequence of his own rash conduct when giving crude expression to certain views as to the undesirability of further annexations, such as those carried out in Oude by Lord Dalhousie, and now adjudged by no less an authority than Colonel Malleson to have presumedly kindled a fatal torch in Hindustan; for as in the last volume of his *History of the Mutiny* that historian declares such aggression to have been the main cause of what men but lately called a mere military revolt, caused, as was then believed, by the

mingling of grease with the soldiers' cartridges, whereby those using them lost caste.

The era of Lord Malmesbury's second Foreign Secretaryship is remarkable for a temperate tone in the utterances of public men, which entailed beneficent after-effect in their actions. The Conservative sympathies which mingle so largely in Mr. Gladstone's composition were never more patent than at this epoch. His acceptance of the High Commissionership of the Ionian Islands occurred at or about the time when, as the *Life of Bishop Wilberforce* has revealed, the member for Oxford inclined towards the Constitutional belief of Lord Derby, whilst to consolidate the gathering Conservatism of the realm Mr. Disraeli (to his eternal credit be it stated) was prepared to forego the position of leader and sacrifice ambition to the public weal. Mr. Gladstone, moreover, in March 1859, during the Reform debate, made a memorable declaration, advocating retention of the smaller boroughs on the ground of the illustrious names adorning the past whose owners had thus sought and gained admittance on to the arena where fame is the prize; and it is further worthy of note that when the vote on Lord Hartington's resolution was taken and its success destroyed the Conservative Government, on June the 10th, 1859, Mr. Gladstone held aloof from the combat. In the special department of Foreign Affairs, the Prince Consort's biographer, Sir Theodore Martin, has produced evidence of how skilfully and with what remarkable success the nation's share in the various transactions was conducted; and to withhold from Lord Malmesbury the due recognition which Mr. Disraeli

claimed for his untiring diligence and experience, would be to commit the very error against which his great leader protested.

That he acted in warm accord with Lord Derby and the great political chieftain who never allowed anything to distract his thoughts from the interests of England, gave Lord Malmesbury exceptional advantage. The war which threatened to become general was limited to Italy, and, by an extraordinary stroke of perspicuous foresight, Prince Albert persuaded the Prince Regent of Prussia to adopt a policy of reserve, such as after events proved not only saved the German Fatherland from mingling in a strife for which it was unprepared, but preserved the balance of power in Europe when it threatened to become dangerously dislocated. Lord Derby had, however, previously warned Prussia to desist from strife.

But for the fact that a false impression prevailed as to the Government conduct of Foreign Affairs, there is reason to believe that the gain of Lord Derby's party would not have remained in 1859 limited to the twenty-five seats which proved insufficient to enable them to conduct public business.

Such misunderstandings must arise when the ministry is the sole custodian of State secrets, from the disclosure of which their own actions may gain a passing justification, but which would involve peril to the State whilst it is engaged in still-pending diplomacy.

Before the shadow of war first rested over Europe in 1859, a difficulty had occurred between France and England's old ally Portugal, to defend the integrity of

whose dominions our country was bound, if called on, by a treaty signed as far back as 1703, and it was in accordance therewith that Canning sent troops to Lisbon in 1826.

But in November 1857, a French ship, the *Charles et Georges*, engaged in the exportation of negroes from the Portuguese African possessions, was seized and condemned by the Portuguese Government, on the two-fold charge of having violated municipal law, and, secondly, that the vessel was, under the specious name of free immigration, engaged in the slave trade.

The French Government urged that the fact of their agent being on board should have freed the ship from such imputation ; but Portugal continued to stand on her dignity, and for a long time refused to deliver the ship up, until in 1859 the English Government, as represented by its Foreign Secretary, mediated successfully between the parties, inducing the Portuguese to give way in the matter of detention, and the French Emperor to suppress the free immigration so likely to revive the justly reprobated slave trade ; and having attained this result, the Parliamentary shafts even of Mr. A. W. Kinglake fell harmlessly around Lord Malmesbury.

So far as the Italian war is concerned, the English Foreign Secretary who served Lord Derby, both in 1852 and 1859, can claim the triple credit first of preserving a neutrality which, in Lord Malmesbury's own words, could only have been broken as far as England is concerned by naval operations in the Adriatic, the bombardment of Venice, and the consequent destruction of

its marble palaces, while for every Austrian killed by British shot a dozen Italians would have been slain.

Secondly, acting in concert with the Prince Consort and the Prime Minister Lord Derby, Lord Malmesbury succeeded in limiting the area of warfare, and so eluding European conflagration, an outcome rendered more than possible by the action of certain members of the Liberal party, who agreed with Kossuth to hold England neutral while Napoleon III.'s armies freed Hungary, such compact being based on a promise of the French Emperor that he would extend the war as Kossuth desired, provided that the Tory Government was turned out as a result of the general election, during which Kossuth was to agitate on behalf of popular government generally. Hence the prevailing idea that Lord Malmesbury favoured Austria unduly was fanned, and votes gained from those who knew no better.*

* See Blanchard Jerrold's *Life of Napoleon III.*, vol. iv. pp. 201 and 558.

In 1859, the main object of the Conservative Government was to preserve the Peace of Europe, and by Lord Malmesbury's precautions Prussia was induced to hold apart from the fray so long as the war remained localised, and in this endeavour he received effective support from the Prince Consort, whose knowledge of the smaller German Courts aided the cause of peace.

As is known from Kossuth's diary as well as from the lately published last volume of Mr. Blanchard Jerrold's *Napoleon III.*, the Hungarian patriot undertook to agitate in England, and help to secure the overthrow of Lord Derby's Government, provided that Napoleon III. on his part promised to thrust forward the tide of war towards Hungary, for the purpose of freeing the populations who were themselves prepared for revolt.

When the Liberal coalition did get a majority, Kossuth claimed

It is, moreover, but fair to record that when the correspondence of Lord Malmesbury was made public,

his part of the compact, and showed the signatures of leading British politicians, who promised neutrality for their newly-formed Government during the extended operations of the war.

Well might Louis Napoleon, when he saw Kossuth at Milan, look with wonder on the signatures, and ask Kossuth to let him examine them thoroughly.

Sir James Hudson took a leading part in encouraging the Sardinians to embrace a French alliance against Austria in 1859, and so incurred the displeasure of Lord Derby's Government, who were solely animated with a desire to preserve peace. Lord Malmesbury was successful in inducing Sardinia to agree to disarm, and then Count Buol, the Austrian Minister, broke the windows, so to speak, and sent Francis Joseph's troops to invade Sardinian territory, so destroying all hopes of peace.

But the influence of Lord Malmesbury extended beyond the war, because Louis Napoleon, when he halted before the Quadrilateral after Solferino, was only acting on advice previously given by his old friend the British Foreign Secretary.

We have seen the disastrous effect of a private agreement between three heads of the Tory party and the Emperor Nicholas of Russia made in 1844, and are forcibly called to observe how British statesmen, with a full knowledge of the possibilities involved, yet elected the one remaining man inculcated by this aforesaid document to head a coalition of all the available talent outside the Conservative party in 1852.

We are now called on to contemplate the great Liberal leaders in league with a foreign agitator, and binding themselves to hold England neutral, provided that France should carry war into Austrian territory and free Hungary.

A statement to this effect appeared in Kossuth's memoirs, but has received recent confirmation through the research of Mr. Blanchard Jerrold, who in his fourth volume of Napoleon III.'s life (pp. 548-55), recounts the whole negotiation, telling how the mission of Kossuth had been fulfilled according to agreement

not only did it gain general approval in official circles, but the party led by Mr. Cobden declared that all which diplomacy could effect had been cast into the scale of peace and justice.

Why Mr. Disraeli, who took his part with Lords Derby and Malmesbury in matters connected with Foreign Affairs during 1859, did not present to the Commons the same papers Lord Malmesbury placed before the Lords never was known, but any such omission may be forgiven in consideration of the skill and dignity with which he led the Commons.

with the Government of Napoleon III. after the Whigs had taken office. We read as follows :—

“ ‘The most astounding circumstance, Sire,’ interposed M. Pietri, ‘is that M. Kossuth has in his pocket letters by which the English ministers pledge themselves to preserve England’s neutrality even if we should march to Hungary.’

“ ‘Is that so?’ said the Emperor. ‘May I see the letters?’

“ When handed to him, they seemed to interest him deeply ; he read one after the other, smiling from time to time and shaking his head, as though he found much that surprised him in the letters.”

Now there were present at Willis’ Rooms at the meeting which reconstituted the Liberal party on June 6th, 1859, amongst others Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Mr. Bright, Mr. Horsman and Mr. Sidney Herbert, while Lord Hartington proposed the vote which overthrew the Government of Lord Derby. Some future biographer will possibly enlighten us as to who the signatories of this strange agreement really were. Surely none of those statesmen who, in later years, have inveighed so vigorously against diplomacy generally and secret treaties in particular. Mr. Gladstone certainly stood aloof on this occasion.

But the fact remains, that M. Kossuth did come on to English platforms and influence public opinion against the Ministry of the day, and in so doing carried out his part of a previously arranged compact.

The writer can never forget a visit to the House of Commons during 1859, when old Admiral Walcott, a Trafalgar veteran, with snow-white hair and noble mien, asked in trembling accents when the monument to his beloved Nelson was to be finished and rescued from apparent neglect.

In a few well-chosen and sympathetic words did the Minister at once testify sympathy with the feeling of the veteran, and evince a determination to do all in his power to quicken the completion of a work since rendered by Sir Edwin Landseer worthy the immortal hero whose fame it is built to commemorate.

Listeners felt, whilst Mr. Disraeli was speaking, that the old English spirit burnt in the breast of the Conservative leader, and that the country gentlemen of England were represented by one like in resolution and courage to those ancestors who had endured any and every sacrifice for the common cause; and we record this as demonstrating the power which, when developed, led to future successes, not to say political pre-eminence.

Fidelity to their colleagues being a distinctive feature of both Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli, our readers will not be surprised to learn that the traditional position earned so justly by Lord Malmesbury has been constantly acknowledged by the Conservative party.

In July 1866, the Lord of Christ Church became Privy Seal, an office which he again held in 1876, when Mr. Disraeli ruled supreme. Lord Malmesbury is believed to have secured the rejection of Lord Russell's Life Peerage Bill on the third reading in July 1869, a course objected to by many as contrary to Parliamentary

custom, inasmuch as opposition is ordinarily directed against a measure before that stage. The year 1856 had seen this matter of life peerages debated with great vigour by the late Lord Lyndhurst, who denied the legality of such creations, and carried his point after prolonged discussion. Lord Russell's proposition empowered the Crown to confer life peerages for distinguished public services, and was an avowed attempt to popularise the Upper Chamber, by bringing it, as the seventy supporters of Earl Russell believed, nearer in sympathy with the Commons House of Parliament.

It was, however, urged on the part of those who desired to retain the hereditary system intact, that although distinguished public services were not sufficiently frequent to swamp the House of Lords suddenly by a large creation of such peers, yet, as the Minister of the day was left judge of what distinguished public services really were, such responsibility might under changed circumstances devolve upon powerful popular leaders bereft of the social sympathies and Constitutional leanings which Grey, Russell, Palmerston, and Gladstone have from time to time displayed. That Lord Malmesbury had no idea of placing the will of the country, duly and constitutionally expressed, in subjection to the ruling or dictation of a more aristocratic chamber, his own assertion will prove.

Replying to Mr. Bright's statement that if a Reform Bill were passed in 1866 by the Commons it would be rejected by the Lords, Lord Malmesbury on October 23rd, 1866, used these words :—

“ There is nothing in the past history of the House

of Peers to justify such an assertion, and he believed that the members of that assembly would always be ready to accept the clear and deliberate judgment of the country whenever it should be manifested through the votes of their representatives in the other House of Parliament."

Lord Malmesbury will, as we have previously declared, ever hold a position in the literature of his time as editor of his grandfather's diary and letters, interspersed as these historic documents are by the notes of one who had himself made a deep study of foreign policy long before such knowledge was practically utilised in the nation's service.

We do not, however, pretend in these few pages to have given anything like an adequate idea of the value of Lord Malmesbury's services, either to his country or to the party which he adhered to with fidelity. But the pages of Hansard attest to the almost universal extent of his information, as also to his ability to conduct measures of the gravest importance. Whether the subject was salmon and trout fishing, as regarded the regulation of locks and weirs, the succession duties,* or his own

* Lord Malmesbury was censured by Lord Granville in July 1853, because, in speaking of the new succession duty, he said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would in future be a vulture soaring over society and watching for a harvest of dead meat. The scheme, he said, was cruel in principle. It took a man at a time and fleeced him, and when he had disappeared it took another and fleeced him, so that it would be impossible to collect a numerically strong opinion on the subject, if adverse to the minister of the day.

To our mind, Lord Malmesbury's objection is thoroughly justi-

special province of foreign affairs, Lord Derby's chosen Foreign Secretary was equally at home.

When in 1866, during the absence of his chief, he introduced the Conservative Reform Bill into the House of Lords, the difficult task of persuading a section of the peers, including the erudite Lord Carnarvon, who had seceded from the Government, was performed, according to the testimony of those present, alike with dignity and effect.

That the traditions of the past may live long amongst us in the person of Lord Malmesbury, is the hearty desire of politicians of every shade acquainted with the noble Earl, as of many devoted personal friends, to say nothing of the British public generally, who never forget those who have served them faithfully and with diligence.

Lord Malmesbury has been twice married; first, in April 1830, to a daughter of the fifth Earl of Tankerville who died in May 1876; while the present Lady Malmesbury, to whom his Lordship was married in November

fied by the fact that so humane an individual as Mr. Gladstone should be forced to speak, as he did in April 1882, when introducing his Budget. On that occasion, the falling off in revenue was accounted for by extraordinary mild weather, and a corresponding immunity from death which, from a Chancellor of Exchequer's point of view, had afflicted the community. If our population do not die fast enough, and will not drink, where is the revenue to come from?

Here is a problem to be solved by some future Pitt, Peel, or Gladstone. Surely the prolongation of life resulting from the greatest attainable comfort and happiness as enjoyed by the many, should be a main object of all good government.

We agree with Lord Malmesbury that the Succession duties are founded on a questionable principle.

1880, was a Hamilton of Fyne Court House, Somersetshire.

Lord Malmesbury possesses a seat called Old Dunford, in Wiltshire, but it would be difficult to conceive a fitter retreat for a retired statesman than that afforded by the old Priory House, yclept Heron Court, near Christchurch, Hants, situated as it is amidst rich foliage, and pleasantly near both to river scenery of much beauty and to a noble sea fringed with broken cliff and leafy dell.

The poet's (Cowper's, *The Timepiece*, lines 3-5) desire might, at Heron Court, almost appear to be accomplished :

Some boundless contiguity of shade,
Where rumour of oppression and deceit,
Of unsuccessful or successful war,
Might never reach me more.

Nevertheless, we venture to hope that while he is combining health with enjoyment, Lord Malmesbury's counsels—the result of proved ability and practised experience—may still permeate to Downing Street. Thus trusting to her nobler traditions as interpreted by her soundest statesmen, shall England fear no ill.

Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them. Naught shall make us rue,
If England to itself do rest but true.

Shakespeare, *King John*, Act v., Scene 7.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL. (II.)

JUNE 1859 TO OCTOBER 1865.

AT the moment when, after a long day's carnage at and about the position of Solferino, General Hess, the newly appointed veteran commander of the Austrian armies, withdrew his troops behind the Mincio, the Liberals and Whigs were once more installed in Downing Street, and Lord John Russell again filled the office of Foreign Secretary. The military struggle—severe as it had been—left the hated Austrians in a position amidst the quadrilateral and its chain of fortresses, judged by competent military opinion to be well nigh impregnable; and although in view of the success achieved at Solferino, French troops might hope for victory, there were divers circumstances which led Napoleon III. to conclude peace.

In the first place, Prussia and the German States were arming and clamouring to be led against the

French in Italy, rather than fight them on the Rhine after Austria had been defeated. In the second place, dissensions appeared amongst the French generals.*

* We know of no more instructive comment on the sometimes vaunted nineteenth century perfection, than is afforded by a visit to Solferino. Starting from the little hamlet of Desenzano, situated in a picturesque position on the margin of the Lake di Garda, the traveller is conveyed by excellent convergent military roads which, gradually ascending, lead by the village of San Marino to the famous eminence of Solferino, crowned by the building of an old convent, and now by a military observatory, whence the country may, on a clear day, be scanned from Alps to Appenines. But all around still tells of death and destruction. In ghastly array may be seen the bones of those Frenchmen who fell, where, collected in a mortuary chapel to the amount of some thousands, they remain to tell the story to future ages how unappeased were the savage instincts of mankind in times when the wonders of modern civilisation so lately assembled seemed to augur improved feeling between man and man. A similar spectacle is to be seen at San Marino, on the Austrian right, where General Benedek sustained a successful conflict with the Italians. Amidst the funereal-looking Lombardy pines which abound, there is another mortuary chapel, dedicated to the gallant soldiers of Victor Emmanuel, and again do we see an enormous gallery of bones and skulls. But these two relics of the strife by no means give an idea of its magnitude, as the vanquished Austrians removed their own dead. There remains a sad interest still existing in more than one other quiet Lombardy town and village, such as Magenta, where the blackened walls and indented houses still tell us of McMahon's victorious advance.

Walking up the hill of Montebello, where it is recorded that the struggle commenced, our party was eagerly accosted by a farmer in possession of some neighbouring buildings, who fondly hoped that the strangers were emissaries of the Italian Government, sent to give compensation for losses suffered in 1859, and this more than twenty years after the conflict. Such, then, is war, in the nineteenth century.

Louis Napoleon admitted to an intimate friend, after he returned

Thence occurred the celebrated armistice and treaty signed at Villafranca, on July 11th 1859, which resulted in the proposal for an Italian Confederation under Papal presidency, whereby—although Austria yielded Lombardy to Sardinia, through the French Emperor's agency, who was to see the cession completed—she yet remained in Venetia by virtue of the same new treaty engagement wrested from Francis Joseph after the expenditure of much Italian blood and treasure. Moreover the Grand Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were to return to their dominions, granting a general amnesty. Great was the indignation of the Italian National party when the terms of peace were disclosed, while Cavour resigned his position as Victor Emmanuel's Prime Minister. But, as Mr. Disraeli told the British House of Commons, the questions at issue between Austria and Italy had then passed out of the regions of diplomacy, and, the ball once set rolling, nothing could hinder the accomplishment of Cavour's designs but the impenetrable chain of fortresses which, armed to the teeth, and crowded with soldiers, temporarily saved the province of Venetia to Austria. The people of the Italian Duchies rose and declared for annexation to Sardinia; kindling, as they thus acted, the hopes of the ultra-Liberals all

from his Italian campaign, that he was unable to proceed further. Not only had military losses been immense, and the quarrels of his generals become embarrassing, but, as he approached the quadrilateral, the very people themselves were more Austrian than Italian, utterly upsetting all his calculations, based as they were on the enthusiasm evinced at Milan and on the Sardinian frontier, and which was known to exist in Venice itself.

over Europe, and rendering Louis Napoleon's position almost untenable; for whilst on the one hand he was bound to stand loyally by the compact entered into at Villafranca, so far as Austria was concerned, or be prepared—according to current belief—to confront United Germany in arms,* on the other hand, the prestige gained on the battle-field as liberator of Italy was fast ebbing away, and became for the time well nigh obliterated, when, as a consequence of popular feeling, Tuscany, Modena, and the Romagna, were practically added to the Sardinian Kingdom. Thus it happened that within a few weeks of the agreement at Villafranca being succeeded by the permanent treaty of Zurich, more than one important proviso of the latter arrangement suffered direct stultification.

Well might Austria—torn with internal dissensions between Hungarians and other nationalities—tremble for Venetia, the retention of which could never co-exist

* It is curious to reflect that there was a reported divergence between the views of the Prussian Government and the Prussian people at this moment. Mr. Blanchard Jerrold has recounted in the fourth volume of his *Napoleon III.*, how a messenger was sent from Berlin to the Count Pepoli, after Solferino, offering to France an offensive and defensive alliance on behalf of the Berlin Government, but the messenger arrived too late. It is fair to state, however, that those best acquainted with the politics of the time doubt the credibility of a story which—to do Mr. Blanchard Jerrold justice—he only mentions incidentally, and as based on something akin to rumour. For the original Prussian desire to meet the French on the Rhine was notorious, and the Duke of Cobourg was desirous of leading on the smaller German armies to the assistance of a common Fatherland. Hence the special value of Prince Albert's attempts to restrain Prussia.

with friendship for the new kingdom across the Mincio. In England, although both Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston were heart and soul with the Italians, and disposed, as a biographer of the Foreign Secretary remarks, to apply the balm of the British Constitution in turn to each Continental nation's woes, they were restrained by a gathering distrust of the French Emperor's design, which reached its height when it became known that the Liberal doctrine of nationalities was to be somewhat questionably applied on the slopes of the Savoyard mountains, and take effect in the incorporation of Savoy and Nice into the French Empire.

Indignation could no longer be suppressed, and Lord John Russell represented the feelings of many Englishmen when, at the close of a speech in Parliament, and in answer to Mr. Horsman, on March 26th, 1860, he spoke as follows:—

“Such an act as the annexation of Savoy is one that will lead a nation so warlike as the French to call upon its Government from time to time to commit other acts of aggression; and, therefore, I do feel that however we may wish to live on the most friendly terms with the French Government, we ought not to keep ourselves apart from the other nations of Europe. . . . The settlement of Europe, the peace of Europe, is a matter dear to this country; and that settlement and that peace cannot be assured if it is liable to perpetual interruption, to constant fears, doubts, rumours, with respect to the annexation of one country, or the union and connexion of the other.”

Language this, in truth, condemnatory as words

could make it, of a policy of constant interference abroad—such as, but for the wisdom of the Sovereign, and the statesmanlike attitude of Mr. Disraeli, might have landed England in foreign entanglements—well intentioned so far as British statesmen were concerned, but originally devised to extricate Louis Napoleon from some of the more pressing difficulties which surrounded him.

As it turned out, both Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston were drawn somewhat further into expressions of open sympathy with the popular movements in Italy than their subsequent denunciations of the Savoy pact seemed to warrant, and it was wholly owing to warning voices in high places that Lord John Russell had been enabled to assure the House of Commons, on the 12th of March 1860, that it was for European objects England had employed her influence, and had not directly encouraged the special designs of Sardinia or France, such a result being a notable instance of the late Prince Consort's wisdom and foresight in council.

But if the British Liberal party suffered a diplomatic defeat from Cavour, the Emperor of the French, by keeping secret the terms of his implied compact concerning Savoy and Nice, had sapped public confidence in England, and dealt a dangerous blow at the Anglo-French alliance. No matter that the sympathy of Mr. Cobden and his school had been secured by the Commercial Treaty of 1860, which, giving French light wines and other articles in exchange for the indispensable British coal and iron, had surrendered more than one point of the French protectionist code; still the distrust became rooted if not general, and received

public expression in the demand for measures of defence as urged by the aged Lord Lyndhurst, to which in a former chapter we have alluded.

Volunteers were raised by Act of Parliament, fortifications were designed, and the doubting Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone, was prevailed on by Lord Palmerston to consent thereto. The whole nation became alarmed, and to the eyes of superficial observers such suspicions appeared to justify the laments of those who, like Mr. Kinglake, had ever upraised their voice against the *entente cordiale*.*

But it should be remembered that by the original acceptance in 1852 of Napoleon III.'s proffered friendship, the former international rivalry between France and England was straightway robbed of its sting, and if not entirely extinguished, languished but to revive fitfully while a new generation arose who knew not the first French Empire and the dangers it had engendered for England.

At the moment we write of, the alliance had grown cold, and the old flame of international rivalry flickered. But the French Emperor, nevertheless, remained in heart true to England, whilst suffering all the disadvantages which his unsound position entailed on a throne gained by the *coup d'état* of 1851, and, therefore, from

* Mr. Cobden alludes to the crisis in his famous pamphlet on the three panics, and forgetful that he had previously made a great point against the necessity for guarding the balance of power, as evidenced by America, who looked contemptuously on the dogma, nevertheless blames England and France in 1859 because in arming they led America to enlarge its naval armaments, an unconscious tribute to the much abused balance of power.

the very nature of the case, liable to be overthrown whenever the opportunity afforded itself to those who chafed under measures of repression, scarcely defended by their authors on principle, but adopted on grounds of sheer expediency. But the inevitable result of a vague desire to reorganise Europe and reconstruct its kingdoms created a distrust in England such as subjected Napoleon III. to the onslaught of his numerous enemies. The Emperor of the French might not as a man have merited such hard measure, but as the head of an unsound system he was suffering from the weakness inseparable from his Imperial dignity. Men fancied they saw the Chauvinism of Thiers brought forward to prop up a parvenu's rule, just as in 1840, under Louis Philippe, the same national passion had been allowed to bring Europe to the verge of general war.

Nor had Louis Napoleon to deal with a united nation at home, inasmuch as dissension showed itself in his very Cabinet, and Count Walewski had resigned the Foreign Office to M. de Thouvenel before the annexation of Savoy and Nice could be carried out. The flame of revolt once kindled did not cease to spread. The agents of Count Cavour had ignited the torch all along the Danube, where Hungarian discontent communicated itself to the distant shores of Roumania and Bulgaria, whilst it is notorious that more than one leading power contemplated an early partition of the Turkish Empire.*

Knowing all this, it is not difficult to appreciate the mingled good fortune and skill of our leading Liberal

* *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. v. p. 128.

politicians who guided their country safe through the crisis, and satisfied the dictates of public opinion without sacrificing a material advantage—and this when, as was wittily observed by Lady William Russell, the Premier and Foreign Secretary had adopted “the rôle of two old Italian masters.” Masterful in truth was their conduct towards the Pope, the King of Naples, and Grand Dukes. Nor can strict legality, in the sense understood by Grotius and Puffendorf, be said to have been respected when British Rulers were found openly condoning the attacks made by Garibaldi on Sicily and Naples, and watching amidst sympathetic silence whilst the troops of Victor Emmanuel attacked the marauders and dispersed the Foreign levies of Pius IX., giving as excuse for such conduct the imminence of a Garibaldian assault on Venetia, as a result of which, be it noted, Austria would straightway have entered the field, confronted only by a disorganised Italy.

The British justification is to be found in Lord John Russell’s circular of October 1860, which, if it laid down doctrines incompatible with the maintenance of former treaties, yet limited such pleadings solely to the exceptional circumstances which had arisen in Italy. When during the summer and autumn of 1860 the Eastern question threatened to revive and French intervention became a necessity in the Lebanon, the terrible massacre which had there occurred never dulled Lord John Russell’s care for the interests of England, while, as we have shown later in this chapter, the measures adopted succeeded only because England’s resolution was known to be unflinching. Again, when

the illegal imprisonment of Mr. Macdonald at Coblenz, in consequence of a railway squabble, in September 1860, stirred public opinion at home to the uttermost, the Government was not slow to give effect thereto, and they prevailed on the Prussians to withdraw from an untenable position.

Although it cannot be truthfully avowed that at this period our country possessed any settled foreign policy, there was a thread yet unbroken, and faithfully preserved through the traditions of Whig and Tory alike, which provided, in Mr. Canning's words, for the interests of England, and gave her subjects cause to boast in the phrase rendered famous by Lord Palmerston—*Civis Romanus sum*. Of Lord John Russell's share in these transactions, it may with truth be said that he was engaged in pursuing ends and aims dear to his heart. We hear of him joining the royal tour to Coburg in September 1860, and there illustrating the truth of that well-known saying, that he never hesitated to undertake the most novel task,* inasmuch as by killing a wild boar he inaugurated a reputation as sportsman in a department specially understood by our German neighbours.

It had been Lord John Russell's misfortune to have been constrained to adopt no settled principle in his conduct of foreign affairs; and although he could claim the honoured name of Earl Grey as his example, in considering each individual case upon what he held to be

* Sidney Smith once said that Lord John Russell would perform a difficult surgical operation at the shortest notice, or undertake to command the channel fleet whenever called on so to do.

its absolute merits, the general issue of his rule at the Foreign Office was not conducive to stability of principle in dealings with other nations. It followed that while endeavouring to adhere as closely to the letter of the law as circumstances admitted, the same measure of justice was, nevertheless, more than once withheld from one foreign community which had previously been granted to another. As an instance in point, we may cite the famous circular on the Italian question of October 1860, where it was announced that Her Majesty's Government did not concur with Prussia, Austria, Russia, France, and Spain, in declaring that the people of Southern Italy lacked good reason for throwing off their allegiance to their rulers, nor could the Foreign Secretary see cause to blame the King of Sardinia for assisting them. Rather would the British Government turn their eyes to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties.

Language such as this held during avowed neutrality and deliberate non-intervention, so far as England was concerned, may be not disingenuously compared with the stern and unsympathetic adherence to the formula of international law, which proceeded from the British Foreign Office when in May 1860 the United States were confronted with civil war waged mainly to free their nation from the curse of Slavery. Misapprehensions on this subject were very general amongst the untravelled classes in England, including in their ranks, as they unfortunately did, statesmen like Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Roebuck, and Lord Salisbury, together with the *élite* of London society, literary and social. Frigid and unsym-

pathetic neutrality on the part of Government, combined with the not unnatural indignation of those whose occupations and means of livelihood were limited and in some cases destroyed through a failure of the cotton supply, thus combined to give impulse to this uninstructed phase of public opinion, which temporarily obscured the views of those who really had studied the history and politics of the new world.

Admitting that recognition of belligerent rights to the Southerners was inevitable, the strong antagonism to the mother country which arose in America is not to be marvelled at. Neither was the national excitement in America soothed when, concurrently with the events alluded to, Napoleon III. invaded Mexico, and, speculating on a division of the United States into two separate nations, ventured to disregard the most cherished political idea of trans-Atlantic statesmen, which had led them to deprecate further European advances upon territory pointed out by nature as a future heritage of the great Western Republic.* It is, as we conceive, specially unfortunate that England, by sending representatives of her navy, should have been to a degree responsible for such mistaken policy.

Foreign travellers, such as Prince Napoleon and the Orleans Princes, gauged the truth more accurately, but the practical statesmanship of Europe was notably and signally at fault. Conceive the England of to-day standing forth as the furtherer of the very principle which the life of Wilberforce had been spent in destroying, and

* Munro doctrine.

gloating over the establishment of a slave-holding state high placed in the comity of nations.*

* Southerners dreamt of a Confederated Empire around the mouths of the Mississippi river, which, dominating the Gulf of Mexico, should for the most part recruit its population southward, retaining slavery as an institution, and holding permanently, both by means of quality of produce combined with ready and inexpensive labour, the title of first cotton mart in the world. This brilliant vision, we say, was never realisable, provided that the northern states were in earnest to prevent it. A study of United States history should have shown this to European statesmen, even if leisure to travel or opportunities of consulting friends who had done so intelligently, were not to hand. And we say this with no partisanship in our minds, beyond that which it is impossible not to feel for brave men hopelessly engaged in a struggle for what they deemed freedom, and with a deep-rooted hatred of slavery as an institution, combined with deep regret for the misery and loss of life which afflicted North and South alike. But not numbers only were against the Confederacy, for their opponents had command of the sea, and a practically inexhaustible fund from which to feed, arm, and recruit their armies. No skill or bravery (both of which virtues were after all pretty equally divided) could in the long run prevail or alter the fate of a predetermined end. A glance at the map shows Virginia to have been held as if in a vice, and subjected to a gigantic siege from the moment that a shot was fired, and the fact of the Confederate impotency for aggressive purposes was never more apparent than after the famous battle of Bull's Run, when the victorious Southerners failed to press on and capture Washington.

For on some such *coup* alone could the South have reckoned, hoping to lead foreign powers to recognise them as a nation, if not to utilise them as allies. For a time such an event as the latter was, we are aware, deemed possible, but it has been never shown that such an idea lingered in the brain of a politician of note, except the French Emperor, whose fiasco in Mexico followed closely upon the Confederate collapse. Still it appears to us that great responsibility rests on English and French statesmen, who looked on and gave the weaker side fair words, when the

Knowing all this to be possible if not probable, what wonder that American feeling ran high and nearly led to war.

slightest reflection and inquiry would have told them that such encouragement was worthless. There was, of course, the original chance that the North would not proceed to extremities and but for the complete break-up of the Democratic party which secession brought about, it is doubtful whether the Republican party, led by Mr. Lincoln, would have been able to act in the uncompromising manner they did, and carry a united nation to a task of coercing brethren to re-enter the Union, who, so far as legality was concerned, had, as many believed, a State right to secede. But to argue matters where empire and morality are concerned from the mere *nisi prius* point of view, as it seems to us Mr. Jefferson Davis has done in his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, is to adopt a mode of argument ill-adapted for the purpose on hand. All human devices, constitutional, legal, or otherwise, have their weak points, and there can be little doubt that if the letter of the law was with Virginia and the two Carolinas, North and South, when they seceded, so must the sympathy of the great United States creator, Washington, have been given to those who strove to keep his handiwork intact, had it been vouchsafed to the New World once more to be swayed by his sapient counsels. Mr. Jefferson Davis seems utterly unable to perceive the evil of slavery. Otherwise, his new book is a remarkable production, both as regards careful detail and wealth of description. But we recommend its perusal in company with Draper's *History of the American Civil War*, where we are taught to look at matters from a Northern point of view, while facts are faithfully given and partisanship does not blind the writer to his opponent's virtues.

There are pictured in these afore-mentioned works, several supreme moments during which the Star of Empire hesitated, so to speak, in its course. One of these undoubtedly occurred towards the close of the battle of Shiloh, when General Albert Sydney Johnston, the Confederate leader, fell in the moment of victory, and when engaged in prosecuting the plans which died with him. Mr. Davis has likened the loss to that incurred by France when she lost the great Turenne, near Saltzbach, in July

Lord John Russell's conduct in the matter of the Confederate Commissioners taken by force from the *Trent*

1675, and with him perished alike the design of the campaign and therewith all hopes of speedy success. Probably Sydney Johnston's fame will rise equal to that of Grant, Lee, Sherman, and Stonewall Jackson, when the still smouldering embers of passion have grown cold, and the dreadful personal losses men suffered have so far passed into oblivion as to make them prize the deeds of America's bravest children, without regard to state or party.

As Mr. Jefferson Davis says at the close of his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*,—*Esto perpetua*. A study of the war and its incidents cannot fail to fill the reader's mind with hopes of the future of the negro race, and to imbue him with an idea of the extraordinary power which Christianity exercised over the four million slaves, whose deportment during their masters' difficulties evidenced the possession of all the virtues which make men great. Bravery and fidelity may, it is true, exist in any home, but seldom take the wide scope they did in 1862, when the power to injure their masters was so enormous, and yet was almost unanimously spurned by slaves who placed personal affliction and traditional duty before the blandishments of those who offered freedom as a price of defection.

And when condemning, as on the whole we think any just historian must do, the long cherished project of the South to gain predominance, and failing therein to secede and break up the Union, we desire to render a just tribute to those high-cultured women, who had never been brought up to see the wrong of slavery, and yet used their influence over the dark children of Africa by teaching them the ennobling truths of Christianity.

We have elsewhere passed an opinion upon Lord Russell's conduct, when recondite and difficult questions of international law were forced upon him for official decision, but it is worthy of record that he satisfied neither party in America, and Mr. Jefferson Davis speaks with a condemnation which in our humble opinion the British Foreign Secretary's acts by no means deserved. The lesson to be learnt by statesmen from these events would seem to be—Refrain from promoting federations of states owing homage to a supreme Government, because in times of excitement contention must be far more dangerous when a possibility of secession

was dignified and very properly determined, while a golden bridge was built for our former colonists to walk over, alike avoiding war, guarding American honour, and saving humanity from an increase of the bloodshed which deluged the world during Lord John Russell's second Foreign Secretaryship.

Indeed, after taking his seat in the House of Lords as Earl Russell in August 1861,* the great Whig's

exists. Who believes, for instance, that Austria-Hungary, or even Norway and Sweden, would not find themselves in difficulty during a general European war, or that a European war would have threatened over the Schleswig question in 1863, had not it been complicated by the federal claims of the German Diet, which had been allowed when Europe patched the same quarrel up in 1852? England's position with an Irish Parliament sitting on College Green, Dublin, may be easier imagined than described. America certainly did live down the difficulties inherent in her very being; but at what a cost?

* The delight with which the late Lord Derby met his old opponent when he stepped on to the floor of the House of Lords as Earl Russell, has been described to the author. It was as though two school-boys recognised one another after years of separation. "Why, Johnny, what sport we shall have," said the Conservative chief, who very soon began poking fun at the sedate Liberal leader, ending, moreover, by one of his apt quotations from the poets. "The wit," replied Lord Russell, "was good, it was Shakespeare's; not so the application, it was the noble lord's": reminding one thereby of a former *bon mot* of the same speaker, who retorted upon an opponent that his *facts were in his imagination and his wit in his memory*.

It is a mistake to suppose that it was not Lord Russell's fate to generate much opposition during his career, and he had a dry sarcastic humour, which repaid all that more powerful oratory could send. Indeed, the passion aroused by more than one controversy to which he was party, reached a pitch of bitterness which may have had a counterpart in the past, and be represented in the present, but could scarcely be surpassed.

career at the Foreign Office was passed amidst wars and rumours of wars. Internecine conflict commenced between the two republics of Buenos Ayres, and the Argentine Confederation, thus completing the denial of

As an instance of what we mean, take the debate upon the West Indian Question in 1848, when the amenities of social life were temporarily forgotten, in the combat between Lord John Russell and Lord George Bentinck on the arena of the House of Commons.

Again, party, which with him was almost a religion, carried Lord John away when, in January 1854, he attacked Mr. J. W. Croker, the well-known anti-reformer, as it now appears somewhat gratuitously. Mr. Croker, although himself a vehement Tory partisan, was not capable of nurturing malignity towards a dead man, such as Lord John Russell in a moment of literary aberration charged him with being likely to direct against the poet Moore's memory. It was possible to listen to Lord John Russell throughout an evening, and to come away convinced, may be, of the command which he possessed of his subject, but not impressed with him as an orator.

On the other hand, as occasion arose, the latent fire would sometimes peep out, and leaving Whig theories and statistics behind, he would soar into the heights of dignified, not to say impassioned speech.

Lord Lytton has described this well in the *New Timon*, when he essays to tell us of glorious John, meaning thereby Lord John Russell in his happiest mood.

“ When Hampden's thought, by Falkland's muses dressed,
Lights the pale cheek and swells the generous breast,
When the pent heat expands the quickening soul,
And foremost in the race the wheels of genius roll.”

Probably for knowledge of history and precedent, combined with generally well-stored minds, no two men ever surpassed Lord John Russell or Sir Robert Peel; and we speak mindful of Shelbourne, Pitt, Fox, Burke, and Beaconsfield in the past, and with an appreciation of Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll in the present. Lord Macaulay's memory and capacity of mind men generally agree to have been unique.

peace to a whole continent seething with agitation from the plains of Rosario to the forests of Canada.

Nor did the year 1862 pass by without renewed bloodshed in Italy, where Garibaldi was wounded at Aspromonte by his own countrymen, when the patriot, relying on what he held to be Italian national enthusiasm, placed himself between the opposing troops, a misfortune lamented by none more than those anxious for the independence of Italy under Victor Emmanuel.

It is true, as we have previously stated, that peace was preserved in England, where, however, the nation had suffered a blow in December 1861, from which she has never recovered. That wise counsellor and philosophic statesman, the true-hearted Prince Consort, prematurely passed away. Of him it might indeed be said that, so far as foreign affairs are concerned, he limited the scope of more than one conflict, saving England's dignity while preserving to her the blessings of peace.

Rest and be thankful, might well be Lord Russell's advice, given in September 1863, on the subject of Reform, when but three months previously, and amidst national sorrowing and confusion at home, Poland had risen against her oppressors, and had added, in Northern Europe, yet another sanguinary conflict to those which were already desolating the new world. To a British Foreign Minister, whatever the character of his more immediate sympathies might be, the general unsettlement of the nations prevalent in 1863 could not admit of any distraction. In Poland, history had repeated itself after a lapse of thirty-two years. By the treaty of Vienna, full and sufficient self-government had been guaranteed to the Polish provinces of Russia, together with a

national army and the use of their ancient language. But the Muscovites so early repudiated these sacred obligations, that within fifteen years of the promulgation of the aforesaid Polish constitution, an attempt was made to draft the youth of Warsaw and the adjoining provinces into other parts of the Russian Empire. Europe, however, looked on in 1831 at the suppression of a consequent revolt amongst the Poles, in the same way she had formerly done in 1793, when various pretexts were put forward to justify the partition of John Sobieski's once powerful dominions; Europe being at the later date totally powerless to prevent the Emperor Nicholas from absorbing Poland altogether, and declaring the country to be an integral part of his Empire.

Lord Russell, therefore, in 1863, had but a traditional treaty-right of interference when he protested against the sudden deportation of 2,500 youths into distant parts of the Muscovite Empire, and succeeded in uniting the European Powers in a formal attempt at intervention which Prince Gortschakoff treated with scorn, knowing, as he did, that a shot would not be fired in the cause at issue, and that neither the flagrant barbarities, or unscrupulous measures of repression which accompanied this contempt of former treaty engagements would enlist material aid, so as to modify the hopeless situation of Poland. This state of things led her sons no longer to hope for help from Europe, but to look towards a future incorporation with Austrian-Hungary as the sole political hope remaining for the most unfortunate of all nationalities. And it was at a moment such as this, when Russia laughed at the ties of treaty and

waited but for an opportunity of casting off the obligations incurred after the Crimean war, when Prussia hungered after Schleswig-Holstein, and Italy after Venetia, that the Emperor Napoleon III. recurred to his project of inviting the European nations into Congress for the purpose of settling various international difficulties.

Having regard to the aforesaid yearnings of the Great Powers, Lord Russell refused, dreading—to use his own words—the demands and pretensions put forward by some and resisted by others, so that the Congress would probably separate, leaving many of its members on worse terms with each other than when they met. This rebuff, however, coming within a few months of a previous refusal to join with France in recognition of the Confederate Government, was scarcely calculated to draw England and her chosen French ally into closer communion; and, indeed, such loosening of the *rapprochement* so lately existing between the two nations was, of itself, a temptation to other nations who desired to urge forward their own schemes of conquest or aggrandisement.

Lord Russell's refusal to participate in this Congress was, moreover, determined upon ten days after Frederick VII. of Denmark died on November 15th, 1863, and must, therefore, have been issued with full knowledge that the Schleswig-Holstein question was liable to revival, and thoroughly aware that France was bound, together with other Powers, by the Treaty of 1852 to respect the integrity of Denmark, and repudiate the Duke of Augustenburg's claims.

But Prince Bismarck had arisen in Prussia, and resolved that if such action were taken, it should be in

opposition to Germany in arms. It is almost impossible for an Englishman to conceive the burning enthusiasm felt on this subject by the Teutonic races.* They looked upon their brethren under Danish rule as Italians obeying Austrian laws in Lombardy or parts of Venetia regarded the Power to whom they were subject, while a similar longing to succour those of his own race and religion fired the imagination and excited the pity of each Slavonian inhabitant of Russia on behalf of those who, up to 1878, dwelt beyond the Danube and the Balkans under Turkish dominion. But in England no such sentiment was appreciated or understood, and a most dangerous feeling of antagonism to Germany took possession of men's minds. No more flagrant breakers of treaty-law had in late times appeared than the Prussian Government in 1863, when, led by Prince Bismarck, they cast to the winds engagements with Europe which no later than 1852 had received solemn endorsement by three of the Great Powers.†

True it was that this settlement had been made in opposition to Germanic feeling, and took position on the statute-book of Europe as the result of a

* In the earlier part of Seeley's *Life of Stein* we learn how that patriot German desired to surrender his own hereditary position as a knight or princeling in order that such institutions might be abolished and lead to the unity of Germany, towards effecting which all Stein's efforts tended. Radowitz and Schleinitz were afterwards forced to hold schemes in abeyance which Bismarck carried with so high a hand.

† It is fair to Prince Bismarck and the Prussian King to acknowledge that the Treaty of 1852 allowed a federal right of interference upon certain points, which complicated the question, and gave both Austria and Prussia a technical case.

Russian intrigue, but its validity was as undoubted as the Treaty of Vienna in 1815, or the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The breakers of the former pact, who annexed Cracow, and, regardless of treaties, regenerated Italy, or the would-be heralds of Muscovite influence in the Balkan Peninsula, could one and all point to this abnegation of public law as in some sort a condonation of their own efforts to attain great ends by illegal means. In fact evil was encouraged in confident belief that the results thereof might be good. The result, so far as the present is concerned, is well known to us all. Prussia induced Austria to join her in enforcing the mandate of Germany in defiance of Europe. The Danes made a brave, but necessarily ineffective, struggle to avert the inevitable, and the question of Schleswig-Holstein and the then Duchies was settled in 1865 by might, not right.

Lord Russell's part in these transactions has been judged unfavourably by contemporaries, and no writer who approaches the question with unbiassed mind will ever be able to say that, after promising the support of British ships to the Danes when they had carried out their engagement to Germany, it was either honourable or dignified to be content with outspoken protest when the iron arm of Germany was stretched out to seize her prey.

But the gist of Mr. Disraeli's great speech of July the 4th, 1864, when these matters came before Parliament, consisted in an arraignment of the Government for appearing before the world at a great crisis without an ally. War with Germany in the absence of support he

deprecatd for England, and would never consent to engage in conflict for the purpose of extricating British Ministers from the consequences of their own indiscretion; and inasmuch, then, as both Whig and Tory rejected the idea of accepting the logical results of deliberate treaty-breaking, as practised by a prominent nation, it is worth while to pause and consider into what condition England had drifted in 1865, in consequence of the loose ideas prevalent on such subjects.

It has been pretty generally avowed, by those conversant with our foreign affairs, that the year 1865 and its attendant Danish *embroglio* form the starting-point for the reign of diplomatic uncertainty which has since affected our foreign politics, and paralysed the efforts of skilful and practised statesmen. Mr. H. M. Hyndman, for instance, in the chapter on Foreign Affairs of his interesting work, *England for All*, takes the era in question as forming the point where for the reign of law was substituted that of many battalions. Sorrowfully admitting that England was much at fault in 1865, we yet cannot but point further back to Poland in 1831 and 1863, to Cracow in 1846, and (allowing all its good results) to the action of Victor Emmanuel in Italy between 1859 and 1862, to show that treaties were treated as so much waste-paper long before Prince Bismarck came on to the scene; so that in the case of four disruptions of European treaties, in one instance only did the result in any way justify the means employed, and even in the case of Italy gained the desired end through bloodshed of the most horrible description.

But the bad precedent had obtained tolerance, if not

favour, in the world, and henceforth the position of those who desired to act according to the dictates of law and right was appreciably less secure.

A distorted view of Mr. Canning's foreign policy had after 1827 led to the adoption of certain assumed maxims justifying interference with Foreign States, which a powerful class of politicians traced to that great statesman's teaching. Hence the Quadruple Treaty of 1834, which guaranteed parliamentary government to Spain and Portugal. Hence the wars and insurrections in Italy and Hungary, the intrigues in European Turkey, to say nothing of uprisings in Schleswig and Poland, where the inhabitants believed they had law on their side as well as justice.

Now Lord Russell's diplomacy was of necessity burdened with the weight of such party tradition, and it is but fair to him to recount that, wherever the expediency of forwarding Whig principles did not stand in the way, he was ready to break a lance on behalf of public law.

But the mandate which in one instance was allowed to remain inactive and unused could scarcely be produced on a parallel occasion, when in the opinions of her ministers the cause at issue was not worth the expenditure of British blood and treasure.

Neither the wrongs of Poland nor the rights of Schleswig-Holstein directly concerned England, so on each occasion matters were allowed to drift, and the noxious idea suffered to circulate that the balance of power was a thing of the past so far as such matters could concern a little island surrounded by the sea.

And it is because such doctrines date their ill-fated appearance in England from 1864, that we to some degree concur in Mr. Hyndman's averment in *England for All*, stating that the period of our possible declension from highest repute amongst the nations was then entered on, and must ever continue, unless the eternal principles of Mr. Pitt are once more embraced by this nation. They consist in strict fidelity to treaties, the carrying out of which, as Prince Metternich said, was in England regarded as a sacred duty, together with due observance by statesmen engaged in forming such engagements of the natural laws which incline communities towards one another either by reason of geographical position or similarity of race, religion, and language; such conduct being combined with a watchful care over national interests. Under these circumstances a dignity and probable permanence belongs to the alliance between two or more great nations when their union is for purposes of self-defence, not defiance. Such is the balance of power so called by Sir Robert Walpole, without the sustenance of which a new Rome or another great Napoleon might any day arise and meet no community willing or able to save the world from serfdom. But for the fact that nations were ready to sacrifice much to ensure their existence, and in the first instance to resist schemes of partition, we should never have seen the spectacle of Europe in arms at Leipsic, so that when an attempt at reorganisation came to be one day made, it must from the very nature of the case have been far more faulty and imperfect than that which at Vienna in 1815 secured the peace of forty

years. Then, indeed, would the world have burdened itself with many Polands and many Venetias, each in its turn destined to become a burning question, to solve which men must die and people suffer

The Liberals of England, when devising the Quadruple Treaty in 1834, perceived the imperfect manner in which the treaties of Vienna had provided in several instances for the rights of nationalities, and studied to neutralise the evils of consequent discontent by the promulgation of what, in the words of Mr. Villiers, our ambassador (afterwards Lord Clarendon), as spoken at Madrid in 1837, was described as a *new and important feature in European politics, put before the nations when the necessity of the new element in the balance of power is begun to be felt*. Such, then, was the Liberal watch-word whereby order had been consolidated in Spain, Belgium rescued from insurrection and foreign invasion, Italy freed from Austrian rule, and the vain hopes of Poles, Hungarians, and Schleswig-Holsteiners encouraged, and which yet, from the manifest imperfection of its scope, left the chances of war undiminished, and Great Britain absolutely without an ally.

France had shown by manifold signs that she failed to reciprocate the Emperor's solid fidelity to England; Prussian feeling had been outraged by the hostility engendered by the unfortunate dispute about the Duchies; Austria was sullen and unfriendly to those whose neutrality during the Franco-Italian war had, as they believed, been but nominal; whilst Russia scrupled not to scheme for the obliteration of all traces of the Crimean struggle, and intrigued freely both in Turkey

and Greece ; whilst, worse than all, America considered she had cause for quarrel against the old country, which she intended to put forward at a convenient season. At such a moment as this, when after a general election his party had received accession of strength, Lord Russell succeeded to the Premiership on Lord Palmerston's death in October 1865. The last few months of his rule had seen the Confederate armies dispersed, and the triumphant Federals free to indulge their indignation against England.

As Prime Minister, Lord Russell saw the war-clouds gathering yet once again in Europe, and the two German powers who had settled the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1864, by absorption of the Duchies, struggling over the spoil in 1866 ; and on the defeat of his Reform Bill in June of that year, he concluded his great career.

In the words of Mr. Justin McCarthy, " Lord Russell was born in the very purple of politics. He had been intimate with all the men and women worth knowing in Europe during his times. Had been the pupil of Dugald Stewart at Edinburgh, and sat at the feet of Fox. Had spoken to Talleyrand and Metternich, met the widow of Charles Stuart the young Chevalier, conversed with Cavour and Bismarck, as he had formerly done with Moore and Byron, and lived to be the colleague of Bright and Gladstone, while his official life was passed in active opposition to Stanley and Disraeli, and as the contemporary of Macaulay."

We have studied to present to our readers the chief events incidental to Lord Russell's career at the Foreign

Office. In Italy he will never be forgotten, in that he threw the weight of British influence into the scale when her complete independence was at stake in 1860, and brought the authority of Vattel to confirm his own opinion that when a people for good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defence of their liberties. But without waiting to suggest that the judge called on to decide what are good reasons for overthrowing a government will be entrusted with a task beyond the powers of average minds, and that precisely similar language as the above might be used by the agents of a foreign power desiring to gain a footing in Ireland, we yet willingly record as a fact that the gift received by Earl Russell at the hands of noblemen and gentlemen of Milan, in the shape of a marble statue representing young Italy, was conferred on one who had powerfully aided Italian unity, and so far conferred a blessing on the world.

Otherwise, stirring as the times during which Lord Russell was at the Foreign Office undoubtedly were, it is not in relation to external politics that Englishmen will best remember their stout-hearted little leader.

Rather will future ages learn to speak of struggles in the Senate such as in later years he loved to dwell on, neither minimising or concealing his own disappointments or defeats, each of which it was his habit to take with philosophic composure as the certain fortune of each competitor.

In some sort, so far as indomitable courage is concerned, Lord Russell's career presents a counterpart to

that of Disraeli, and as such finds a similar monument in the English people's memory.*

* Sir Archibald Alison has left on record his conviction, based on personal observation, of Lord John Russell's *intrepidity*. The original introduction of the first Reform Bill stands as an abiding evidence of this characteristic. One of the most powerful and by no means the least noble-spirited party organisations ever known had resolutely resolved to perpetuate a system of class privilege which their greatest leader, the younger Pitt, had desired to remove. Their compact ranks had been cemented by the knowledge that under the auspices of Castlereagh and Canning, men had seen England foremost in the defence of European freedom, nor had the ruling class shrunk from enduring sacrifice, however burdensome. Lord John Russell knew all this, and was the last man not to acknowledge its truth, and felt doubtless, with Lord Byron, that he had learnt—

“ to venerate the nation's glories,
But wished they were not owing to the Tories.”

Lord John, we say, saw all this clearly, but became conscious of existing discontent amongst the urban populations of Great Britain, such as, if suppressed, must become dangerous, even if the principles of political economy, which his lordship was well versed in, did not teach that the greatest happiness and contentment of the many should be the object aimed at by those essaying to govern a nation, and that this end was incompatible with the rule of a class, however unexceptional the manner in which such rule was originally obtained. But to persuade the ruling class to resign the power they held as a privilege to those humbler brethren who claimed it as a right, was a task calculated to appal a less intrepid soul than that belonging to Lord John Russell. Lord Broughton, in his *Recollections*, dwells upon the astonishment of opponents, and even on the incredulity of friends, when the Ministerial propositions were first submitted to the House of Commons in 1831 by Lord John Russell.

And, indeed, it was not until the country spoke out that the bold action of ministers received hearty parliamentary support from that Whig party, which has since reaped the reward of their

It is well known, by those who have followed closely the politics of our time, that after his final resignation

leader's courage and forethought, and we state this without expressing any opinion as to the wisdom of the absolute course adopted, either as to extent or detail.

Bearing in mind what Lord John had undergone for Reform, it is easy to understand his watchful care over its future progress, which the fourteenth Lord Derby likened rather to the zeal of a lover than the watchful care of a parent.

But if he helped to create the power which made the Radical party powerful, Lord John Russell never adopted the views of the Manchester school so-called, praising them as he did, on the 4th of June 1849, during a debate on Mr. Hume's motion on the subject of Parliamentary reform, for their knowledge of economical questions, but charging against them narrowness of understanding concerning the great principles on which our ancestors founded the English Constitution.

But the Whig leader's political creed was almost a religion, and he lived to be Premier in a Ministry which contained the eloquent Mr. Bright, who, fully appreciating the private excellencies of his chief, greeted him one day when he met him in the breezy highlands of Scotland with a hearty welcome, capped by the desire that the keen air might brace his lordship's constitution, "Aye, and," as the orator added, "his politics too."

The subjoined letters tell their own tale concerning the views on national defence held in 1860 by Lord Russell and Mr. Cobden.

Lord Russell writes on July 31, 1860:—

"I am anxious for the completion of the Commercial Treaty. But I cannot consent to place my country at the mercy of France."

Cobden replies on August 2, 1860:—

"I would if necessary spend one hundred millions sterling to maintain an irresistible superiority over France at sea."

Morley's *Life of Cobden*, vol. ii., p. 318.

A statement this which we find difficult to reconcile with the generally received idea that Cobden remained a peace-at-any-price man to the last. His earlier writings, however, clearly condemn any such competitive expenditure between nations.

Lord Russell's dissatisfaction with the conduct of foreign affairs by his late colleagues was marked, and by no means concealed from the world.

Both Lords Russell and Palmerston had limited their sympathies for foreign nationalities wherever English interests were at stake, and this rule of conduct being, as he believed, transgressed more than once between 1869 and 1873, he was not slow to trace the Liberal overthrow at the polls, which occurred at the latter date, to the fact that their leaders acted as if they were unaware that the United Kingdom is a great country, and that its reputation ought to be dear to every heart,* while he stated in the House of Lords that by the Treaty of Washington the honour of the British nation was tarnished, her character lowered, and her interests endangered.

But in extreme old age, Lord Russell did not scruple to inform Mr. Gladstone that, notwithstanding these recorded differences on matters of foreign policy, he still desired to see his own party once more to the fore, and Mr. Gladstone as leader entrusted with the guidance of its destiny. As a Whig he had lived, and as such, believing that the spirit of progress alone could nurture liberty, he died. Like Burke, he had been led by patriotic motives to place country above party; but in common with that eloquent Parliamentary genius and philosopher, will be best remembered as a great Whig ever faithful to the Constitution of 1688, and content to

* Lord Russell's *Recollections*, p. 407.

see it develop its constitutional rights to the benefit of poorer and less favoured men.

Lord Russell's last Foreign Secretaryship is remarkable for the gaps left in British political life through deaths of those who had helped to shape the destiny of their own times.

On December the 28th, 1859, passed away Macaulay the peerless historian, whose life, had it been prolonged to three-score years and ten, might have led to the next generation possessing something beyond a compilation of the contemporary events which brought on the Crimean War and led up to German Unity, together with the great European dislocation of 1870. It is, likewise, presumed possible that his extraordinary mind might have been endowed with corresponding vitality, and an accepted account of the European turmoils which a revival of the Eastern Question brought about in 1875-78, have been left behind him by the man alone pre-eminently marked out for the task. But such was not to be.

Following the great Whig historian to the grave in quick succession, came men such as Lord Aberdeen on December 15th, 1860, to the beauty of whose character Guizot and Bishop Wilberforce have left loving testimony; Cavour, the greatest of modern diplomatists; Sir James Graham, the friend of Peel; Lord Lansdowne, Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1806, when, as Lord Henry Petty, he figured in the Government of all the Talents; Sir G. Cornwall Lewis, statesmen and philosopher; Charles Greville, the author of an historical diary; Mr. Cobden and Lord Palmerston; each famous

name awakening memories enshrined in the history of the days in which they lived.

One and all were destined to be outlived by the venerable statesman who, pursuing his favourite pursuit of literature to the last, enriched the shelves of our libraries with accounts of his own share in public events, and left behind him a life of Charles Fox which contains a fund of information it would be well-nigh impossible to supplement.

Lord Russell made his memorable final appearance in Parliament in 1871, when he besought Englishmen to defend Belgium at all hazards, and not to enter on the path of national decline which follows a neglect of treaty engagements and an abnegation of plain and self-imposed duty. His appeal to his countrymen was not on this occasion made in vain, and we may therefore hope that the precious possession of a patriot career may likewise leave lasting impression on posterity.

A visit to the family mausoleum at Chenies will leave deep impression on the mind of any reflective visitor. There, by the side of the old manor-house stands the church, on the north side of which is a chapel which may justly be termed the Walhalla of the Russell family. There for three hundred years have the scions of this noble house been placed side by side, after having shuffled off the mortal coil common to all. As the old domestic retainer who shows the building told us, each coffin stands as it had been originally deposited, in a spacious vault which stretches far under the green churchyard. There are the barons, whose helmets of the Tudor period swing over their marble effigies which

adorn the ancient tombs. There is the honest patriot William Russell and the excellent sixth Duke of Bedford, who, as our informant told us, caused trenches to be dug at Woburn that the poor might earn bread while so employed. Nor did the good woman forget to praise the Earl Russell of this book, speaking of him as just and good; "not demonstrative," as she said, "but ever ready to help others"; stating, moreover, how he gave an old servant the character of being an "uniform man," meaning doubtless trustworthy; a species of praise that the recipient appears to have adjudged scarcely laudatory enough; and possibly for his purposes, as having to deal with those who knew not the stout little earl, the discontented individual was right. But the remark is characteristic of the man whose terse mode of expression coincided with the courageous nature which enabled Lord Russell to carry his point more often than some of his Foreign Office critics will allow.*

* The firm resolution shown by Lord Russell as Foreign Secretary in 1860, during the terrible massacres in Syria, should not be forgotten. Ancient tradition, combined with possession of considerable property by her private citizens, had given France an interest in the Lebanon—as, indeed, throughout the whole of that part of Asia Minor—which led the Christians to look up to her for help when, as the result of a Druse and Maronite quarrel, Damascus was given up to the savagery of fanatic Mussulmans. Consequently Napoleon III. sent his troops to the aid of the Christians, having previously proposed a joint occupation of Syria by England and France.

Great Britain was difficultly situated. A joint occupation contained the elements of eventual quarrel, and was wisely rejected in favour of Franco-Turkish intervention; but how to get the French out of Syria without forfeiting a somewhat strained alliance (the

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member of the ducal house of Bedford, or a lineal branch thereof, has been committed to the dust from whence they in common with the rest of mankind came; and spectators tell us it is a solemn sight to behold, one moreover not the less interesting from the fact that the public are admitted to view the vault, and even wander through its cavernous recesses.

Amongst the visitors to Chenies of late years was Lord Beaconsfield. His well-known admiration for his political opponent Lord Russell, may have prompted this journey to a remote corner of Buckinghamshire, where, if situate only twenty-six miles from London, railways have not yet penetrated, and agricultural habits reign supreme.

The praise of political opponents is proverbially unreliable, and may mean a desire for temporary alliance in Parliament; but Lord Beaconsfield's respect for Lord Russell went beyond this, inasmuch as away from the busy hum of London he equally honoured the man who, he once said, had not only a thoughtful mind but a noble spirit.

As we wended our way from Chenies, and left behind us the sculptured forms of the barons, and almost seemed to hear the clank of the armour as it swung over those knightly graves, it needed no Wizard of the North to vivify the imagination or fill the mind with visions of

what these men have been and what deeds they have wrought. History, and not fiction, remains to enlighten posterity as to the services of a race, second neither in quality nor extent to those performed by any other noble family in the realm.

The late Lord Lytton's stirring lines might not inaptly have reference to the burying-place of the Russells :—

What gives the Past the haunting charms that please
Sage, scholar, bard ? The shades of men like these
Seen in our walks ; with vulgar blame or praise,
Reviled or worshipped as our faction sways.
Some centuries hence, and from that praise or blame,
As light from vapour breaks the steady flame,
And the trite present—which, while acted, seems
Time dullest prose—fades in the land of dreams,
Gods spring from dust, and hero-worship wakes ;
Out of that Past the humble Present makes.

Lord Lytton's *New Timon*, p. 32.

On May 28th, 1878, at a moment when war was threatened with Russia, Lord Russell died at Pembroke Lodge, Richmond Park,* a residence granted to his family for life by Queen Victoria as a reward for great services, much in the same way that the White Lodge

* Pembroke Lodge was built on the site of a hunting-lodge in the famous Richmond Park, which the First Charles devoted to the chase and enclosed for the purpose. The modern house has been inhabited by the Pembroke and Errol families before the late Earl Russell came to reside there. In the gardens is a mound called King Henry's Mount, and said to command a view of six counties and to be the spot whence Henry VIII. watched for the signal of Anne Boleyn's execution having taken place. At present, growth of trees impedes the view.

had formerly been allotted by George III. to his faithful Addington (Lord Sidmouth).

Like Peel and Beaconsfield, Lord Russell was marked out by his Sovereign for public interment in Westminster Abbey, but in common with the statesmen just mentioned the terms of his will precluded the acceptance of such honours ; but amidst the Russell ancestors at Chenies the ashes of one of Britain's noblest nineteenth-century statesmen received fit sepulture.

Inalienably bound up with the history of his country, no word written here can enhance his fame ; but an honest record thereof, however imperfect, will always please those who take delight in honest and liberty-loving guidance of our public counsels.

FOREIGN POLICY

FROM LORD PALMERSTON'S DEATH IN NOVEMBER 1865,
TO THE FALL OF MR. GLADSTONE'S ADMINISTRA-
TION IN 1873.

LORD CLARENDON resumed the duties of Foreign Secretary when Lord Russell became Premier, and applied all his diplomatic ingenuity and experience in a series of endeavours to prevent the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. He found, however—to use his own words, spoken in the House of Lords in February, 1866—that England could do nothing against a determination that war was the most effective means of carrying out ambitious projects. The Liberals' own doctrine of nationalities was flaunted in the face of those who desired peace, which was destined to be sacrificed to the unity of Germany and Italy.

Lord Clarendon's avowed helplessness to avert this

terrible and sanguinary outcome, undoubtedly strengthened the number of those who, with the late Mr. Cobden, believed in absolute and unconditional non-intervention in the affairs of other nations, whilst the reaction from the policy of which the Quadruple Treaty was an embodiment, received further encouragement at the hands of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who told the House of Lords in February, 1866, "*that the doctrine of nationalities can be easily extended in any direction, and from its influence no country could claim to be secured, so that, if it were allowed to prevail, universal uncertainty must exist.*"

The Session of 1866 also saw the subject of the Declaration of Paris debated, and a claim made to extend its scope, and prohibit the capture or destruction of private property at sea, so making a distinction between military and naval warfare.

Lord Clarendon was probably contented to hear the Government, of which he was a member, decline to depart from the policy which led him, in conjunction with Lord Cowley, to disagree to such an extension in 1856 ; a policy adjudged by the British plenipotentiaries to be so injurious to England as the leading naval power, that not even the promised adhesion of Mr. Marcy, the American representative, to the abolition of privateering, could induce them to concur in the proposal.

America, as is well known, had alone declined to abandon the practice of privateering, and, as was assumed in 1866, would at any moment lend her countenance to measures restricting the scope of possible war, provided

the exemption of private property from capture at sea were added to the famous Declaration of 1856, which received a justification during the debate of March, 1866, not hitherto urged on its behalf, and which must have been satisfactory to the Foreign Secretary who, as one of the plenipotentiaries who signed the said Declaration, remained tongue-tied as to the causes leading him to accede thereto.

“The days had gone by,” said Mr. Gregory in his statesman-like speech, “when the old exclusive privileges of England could have been enforced with their former effect or certainty. Railways, and the difficulty of preparing effective blockade, would have conspired to minimise advantages which any moment might have been thrust upon us at the price of war, or resisted at the price of war.”

The above considerations have been dwelt on as forming an interesting episode in the brilliant career of Lord Clarendon, so soon—unfortunately for England—destined to close, and furnish a justification for conduct which has certainly never been elsewhere so directly defended in Parliament.

When, on the 3rd of June 1866, from the fortress of Koniggratz the infantry of General Benedek, the Austrian commander, were seen reeling in helpless masses beneath the fire of the Crown Prince of Prussia's artillery, and falling fast before the superiority of breech-loading needle-guns, a Conservative Government was settling in Downing Street, and, as after Solferino, and 1859, the threads of diplomacy came to be entrusted to others than those who had struggled to

prevent the war. Austria, however, in 1866, was hopelessly driven out of Germany, and Venetia freed, notwithstanding the decisive military overthrow suffered by Italian armies on the Mincio at and around Custoza on June 23rd, 1866, and the signal defeat undergone by the fleet of that nation off Lissa on the 20th July 1866, within a few days of the close of hostilities.

We have said that diplomacy was at fault before the war, and that elements existed irreconcilable with peace. These were high-handed proceedings of Prince Bismarck's which compassed such mighty results, and reminded older men of what they had read of Frederick the Great, even if those who best knew Prussia and its universal desire for unity in the Fatherland could decipher no approximation in Bismarck's policy of blood and iron to that Napoleonic resolve to enslave Europe under one standard, which had led to the great alliances that had their outcome at Leipsic in 1813 and at Waterloo in 1815. This being specially notorious to close observers of modern German history, became generally accepted by European statesmen, who, nevertheless, were confronted with a military power established on the principle of might makes right, whose pre-eminence Imperial France, crowned with the glories gained in Lombardy during 1859, could never brook and retain internal concord; so that the presage of a disastrous conflict dimmed the prospect of the future. This additional anxiety was then added to the already disturbed and lawless state of feeling which we have shown to have existed in Europe towards the close of

Lord Russell's sojourn at the Foreign Office. In England the Minister responsible for the national relations with other countries was, most opportunely, the philosophical and statesmanlike Lord Stanley, who in this department served his father's Government right well. Where soporifics were required, his was the hand to bestow their benefits on the several agitated communities who looked towards England for sympathy and moral support. Thanks to his steady resolution the prevalent laxity of revolutionary morality was not allowed to make local disturbances in Crete an excuse for opening the Eastern Question; and the compromise by which he ensured the neutrality of Luxembourg, and so gave France and Prussia an excuse to refrain from war, would be better remembered in the annals of diplomatic history if the results then attained had not been obliterated in the turmoils of 1870 and 1871, when Napoleon III. let slip the dogs of war.

Lord Stanley also deserves the credit of establishing the principle of arbitration as a means of settling the *Alabama* Claims, and in words at once temperate and dignified, the effect of which will never be forgotten by those who heard him; can claim to have placed fairly before the British Parliament the conduct of Lord Palmerston's Administration when, acknowledging the belligerency of the South, they but gave effect to words of Mr. Seward's own choosing; and this we state, fully aware that much might be said on the other side of the question by an equally competent advocate. But there was respect for his adversary, combined with a conscious possession of strength, in every word Lord Stanley

uttered, such as led those present to desire the more fervently that the interests of their country might be left in the hands of one who seemed specially competent to deal with the matter on hand.

Finally, as regards Lord Stanley's first Foreign Secretaryship, we may note that it fell to his lot in a few earnest, almost pathetic, words to announce to the House of Commons the failing health and consequent resignation of his distinguished father; an episode rendered more interesting by the few graceful words of unstrained panegyric, replete with feeling, with which, amidst the profoundest silence, Mr. Gladstone, equal to the occasion, fulfilled the expectations of the whole House of Commons.

Mr. Disraeli, although occupied in the accomplishment of a great Constitutional change, had not failed to mark the importance of a new departure in the region of Foreign Affairs, and, generally speaking, represented his party as being unwilling to meddle where their own interests, or the rights conferred by treaty, were not at stake. In its previous character of candid friend the British Government had gathered but few golden opinions from those interested in the thorny questions at issue on the Continent, nor can it be urged with confidence that the success of any great cause had been thereby rendered wholly secure; whilst the manner of attainment portended a shedding of human blood perfectly horrible to contemplate.

The programme of Lord Derby's Government in 1866 was therefore friendly sympathy all round, but provided that, under the special circumstances of Europe,

no single alliance must overshadow the general good understandings, to carry out which policy no individual could be better fitted than Lord Stanley, and we state this, conscious that the necessity of adopting a different course appalled him in later years when, in the judgment of a majority of his colleagues, the time for such change of procedure had arrived.

Mr. Disraeli then applied himself solely to his great Reform task, upon which the future of his country was thought to hinge.

It has been commonly assumed by those of a Conservative mind that whatever evils, either in Church or State, have threatened the community since 1867, were due to the extension of the franchise granted by the Conservative Government at that date. But this appears to us only to express the shallowest view possible of a great subject. Rather would we turn for exemplification of our belief to the utterance of Mr. Gladstone, spoken before the House of Commons in April 1866, when impressed with the possibility of defeat arresting the progress of his own Reform Bill.

“You cannot fight the future,” said Mr. Gladstone. “Time is on our side. The great social forces which move on in their might and majesty—those great social forces are against you; they are marshalled on our side, and the banner which we now carry, though, perhaps, at this moment it may droop over our sinking heads, yet it soon again will float in the eye of heaven, and be borne to a certain and not distant victory.”

The truth being, that from the moment when, in

in 1832, the franchise was granted to the large towns, and became in the eyes of men rather a right clinging to intelligent citizenship than a trust resting only on property and position, the question of further if not indefinite extension of the privilege was only held in abeyance until time became ripe for the change.*

* It has fallen to the author's good fortune to have read through a private correspondence of the late Lord Beaconsfield's, who, in April 1866, as Mr. Disraeli, was bent on arresting the fast rising desire for democratic change. The movement took the form of a disposition amongst moderate men of different politics to coalesce in favour of moderate change, but ended in the well known Cave of Adullam, which presented a phase of modern history it is impossible to contemplate with approval. But the original *rapprochement* between the two great parties for the public good was entirely a different affair.

Their intended efforts were rendered futile when Mr. Gladstone's above-mentioned great social forces had been brought into life by the eloquent enthusiasm of that statesman and Mr. Bright, a direct result of which was the public registration of a resolve to ascend an appreciable step in the ladder of popular dominion.

Thus the Conservatives gained little by the Adullamite secession, time fighting on the side of change when the Reform ball had once again been set rolling. Under these circumstances the Derby Government took its leap in the dark so reprobated by Earl Russell in his *Recollections*.

The mistrust of poorer people, which found expression in Mr. Lowe's oratory, found no abiding echo in the national counsels, reprobated as it was destined to be by all responsible politicians. The shouts which hailed a party victory not expressing popular feeling on the deliberate judgment of statesmanship were as transient as the results of a mere parliamentary manœuvre.

When Mr. Gladstone and Lord Russell entered upon a fresh course of Reform, and repudiated the rest-and-be-thankful of

Seeing, then, that the question of Reform was again and again used by the more popular party as a whip to drive their rivals out of office, Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli preferred to close the question by endowing each borough householder, who had paid his own rates, with a vote, preferring this qualified test of solidity to the more indefinite right which a certain rental might afford. Here, then, whatever may be said to the contrary, was embodied a principle, the carrying out of which by Mr. Disraeli in 1866, even with the lodger franchise appended, cannot be permanently injurious to the State, since present dangers will vanish as soon as those entrusted with votes have received the education, now at last open to all. Meanwhile the teaching of any particular minister whose influence is paramount on the hustings may, it is true, prove temporally supreme, and issue in results calamitous, or the contrary, according to the differing views of those in power.

former years, they must have calculated the perils which environed their scheme, allayed as those dangers were by the unmaking of a Government and the conversion of an educated Tory party to what looks, even now, something akin to democracy; but *l'homme propose et le Dieu dispose*.

In Mr. Disraeli's letters we find a continuous flow of sensible counsel combined with an absence of party bitterness, such as, had the matter contained therein borne more directly on our subject, would, if made public, have softened many a prejudice and allayed some still existing doubts; but the leave freely accorded to publish matters concerning foreign policy did not justify more than this general reference to information which will doubtless ere long be given in full to the world.

But the ultimate reliability of the tribunal in question is as secure as its further expansion is assured whenever the popular desire for enfranchisement can find a leader able to convince Parliament and the country that civilisation and education have rendered such confidence desirable ; and we write this in full belief that many years, aye, something like a whole century, must pass before the original objections of the Leaders of Conservative opinion in 1832 can finally be declared entirely baseless. Either, as Lord Shaftesbury said in effect when writing to the *Times* in June 1882, the England of future years will be immeasurably greater or immeasurably smaller by reason of this great and inevitable change, the same holding good as regards each successive development which may be logically promulgated.

In spite of some prejudice on account of race, much political acerbity, displayed alike by Sir Robert Peel's old friends, and by the old Whig Party generally, Benjamin Disraeli became Premier on February 29th, 1868.

It is noteworthy that personally he met with toleration, if not absolute support, from some of those most wedded to Radical opinions, and that long experience of the House of Commons allowed him to utilise an individual popularity for the purpose of guiding its deliberation, even if the colour of the legislation adopted received impulse from Leaders of the Liberal Party. Nor was this additional experience undergone by Mr. Disraeli in a period of national repose. The Fenian Conspiracy hung a dark and threatening cloud over Ireland, men's minds were being subjected to the alternate influence of

conscientious doubts as to the entire wisdom and justice of the course adopted in governing the sister kingdom, and to the influence of an undefined fear, none the less present because the real cause of apprehension was concealed from the public gaze.

In India, the Bengal famine had left anxiety behind it, while disturbances and petty wars on the north-west frontier were coincident with a steady advance of Russia in Central Asia. To cope boldly with the latter evil, and, at all hazards, retain an independent and friendly Afghanistan, Lord Mayo's appointment as Governor-General was judiciously designed; and there is reason to believe that but for the Governor-General's assassination, Shere Ali would have been once and for all the confirmed ally of England, and that he would have visited London as the guest of Her Majesty.

So far Mr. Disraeli's judgment and policy was successful. But in the case of Ireland, remedial legislation was proposed by opponents, and measures modelled on such lines were urged with eloquence born of conviction, which fired the imagination of the generous British nation.

Before a whirlwind of popular feeling on this subject, then, did Mr. Disraeli succumb—the recondite, if truthful, objections set forward by the Conservatives being ignored by a people determined to render justice to every section of the Queen's subjects. In Europe, Napoleon III. had allowed that he looked askance on German unity, a fact of itself fraught with earnest of future war and unsettlement; while across the vast Atlantic came not only the reverberations of a late

schism amidst our brethren of the United States, but of misunderstanding in Mr. Canning's new world which bore fruit in a war between Brazil and Paraguay.

But no great European crisis can justly be declared to have threatened explosion after Lord Stanley allayed the Luxembourg question.*

The new constituencies in December 1868 straightway repudiated their authors and recalled Mr. Gladstone to power. One of those periodical reunions of the Liberal parties had taken place, caused immediately by the proposed disestablishment of the Irish Church, and destined to be more than usually durable under the beneficent influence of a trade progressing, to use the Premier's words, "by leaps and bounds," and of a revenue which responded, towards the latter part of this memorable administration, and after Mr. Lowe's

* Although Liberal principles were in the ascendant at home, and an apparent calm reigned in Europe, the same could not for the moment be said of Spain, where the design of the Quadruple Treaty of 1834 was defeated, while Queen Isabella, for whom England under Lord Palmerston had risked so much, had to fly to the frontier.

The Count de Novaliches made a stand at the head of what few troops he could retain around the royal standard, but suffering defeat, left the Peninsula nominally to Government by a Republic, but absolutely to something akin to anarchy. At the close of the same month General Prim fell the victim of an assassin, being shot in the shoulder while driving through the Cala Alceida. After much confusion, not unmingled with danger of continued Socialistic disorder, the practical dictatorship of General Prim in Spain gave way to the rule of the Italian Duke d'Aosta, better known as King Amadeus, who was presented with the crown on the 8rd of December 1870.

resignation, to the brilliant calculations of the greatest financier England had seen since Pitt or Peel. Probably no Government ever entered on office more thoroughly popular than that of Mr. Gladstone when, after the general election of 1868, they found themselves with a majority of 120 in the House of Commons. It is true they were a heterogeneous mass holding various opinions, but the presence of Mr. Bright and Mr. Gladstone in the Cabinet had generated an enthusiasm, fanned into a flame by the eloquence of these great orators.

Since the time of Canning, no such accomplished scholar and genius had filled the foremost position in the State as Mr. Gladstone. Brilliant and various as were his talents, it was in the region of finance that friend and foe allowed his superiority, and if there was a cloud in the bright future it was the original trusting of the exchequer to other hands. But on the other hand, however meritorious might have been the tenor of Lord Stanley's conduct of foreign affairs, he had not been installed sufficiently long in authority to calm—had it been possible—the various jealousies, and avert the dangers which in a former chapter we have shown to have impended over European Society.

The Conservative Government had striven to pour oil upon the troubled waters, and had left the name of England respected, and suffered her authority to be appealed to for advice and mediation. They had sent Sir Robert Napier to rescue the Abyssinian captives from Magdala, and conquer, in so doing, geographical difficulties almost unparalleled. They left office also on

good terms generally with the world, but had neither calmed the passions which daily caused an increase in French and German armaments, nor seen their way to making any special alliance on behalf of England. The Alabama claims remained unsettled, and a heritage of doubt left to their successors, who, on coming into office in 1868, reaped the fruit of circumstances not under human control.*

* Scarcely eight months after his resignation of the Premiership, and on the 23rd of October 1869, died Geoffrey Smith Stanley, Fourteenth Earl of Derby, one of the ministry which passed the first Reform Act, and First Lord of the Treasury when the second became law; he nevertheless passed away out of accord with the then dominant political spirit. In touching and dignified language had the Earl protested against Disestablishment of the Irish Church, and his words have been generally accepted as embodying the fears of the minority: nevertheless, as an abstract act of justice—however prompted—the measure in question can scarcely be condemned by history.

A study at once all-absorbing to the historian and instructive to the reader will be opened up whenever the life of Lord Derby comes to be thoughtfully and intelligently written. The result can scarcely represent alone the image presented to the minds of those of us who remember the later controversies of that nobleman's life, when the form of an unbending aristocrat, striving to appease the democracy whose power he dreaded, dwells in our imaginations. This attractive career must, in the interest alike of truth and completeness, be analyzed from more than one other point of view. We shall see the young Lancashire politician, schooled at the feet of Canning, calmly and resolutely supporting Grey and Brougham in what he believed to be the furtherance of measured liberty, as secured by the Reform Bill of 1832. We shall trace his career in the Commons' House of Parliament, where the star of his success in debate never paled before O'Connell, or lost reputation while he broke a lance with Macaulay. We shall witness the conscientious hesitation resulting in a separation from

It is well known to all that before the events of 1870 electrified Europe, Mr. Gladstone's great Foreign Secre-

Peel, when staggered by a change he believed deadly to the agricultural interest, and, therefore, injurious to England. With manifest interest shall we watch the process of re-consolidating those broken ranks of the country party at the head of which the Rupert of Debate was henceforth elected to stand. We shall admire the mingled force and grace of periods which, despite Mr. Justin McCarthy's contrary opinion, have left admiration graven on the memories of those accustomed to oratory such as has not since charmed the Peers of England.

We must, moreover, read of the successful translator of Homer, and study a series of passionate lyrics betraying a poetic inspiration in unison with other qualities, which elevated the Lord of Knowsley above his fellow men.

Above all, the truthful narrator must tell us of an open hand in sympathy with an open heart, so that the poorer neighbours of this remarkable Englishman, were allowed to benefit freely by the wealth and influence the owner held—as he believed—but in trust for the Great Giver of all.

Lord Lytton speaks of Lord Derby, in the *New Timon*, as follows:—

The brilliant chief, irregularly great,
Frank, haughty, rash, the Rupert of Debate,
Nor gout, nor toil, his freshness can destroy,
And time still leaves all Eton in the boy.

* * * * *

Yet who not listens, with delighted smile
To the pure Saxon of that silvery style;
In the clear style, a heart as clear is seen,
Prompt to the rash—revolting from the mean.

In the eighth volume of the continuation of Sir Archibald Alison's *History of Europe* (Blackwood), page 826, occurs the following valuable contemporary estimate of Lord Derby's oratory, made by a man who had enjoyed more than ordinary converse with the actors in former great events which he had essayed to

tary, Lord Clarendon, was removed by death, and it is no injury to his politic and experienced successor,

describe, and who had occupied much of his time in observing the rulers of men amongst whom he lived.

Beginning by an admission that judgment on Lord Derby's statesmanship should be relegated to the future, he proceeds to describe the Lord of Knowsley's forensic powers :—

“ He is beyond all doubt, and by the admission of all parties, the most perfect orator of his day. His style of speaking differs essentially from that of the great statesmen of his own or the preceding age. His leading feature is neither the vehement declamation of Fox, nor the lucid narrative of Pitt, nor the classical fancy of Canning, nor the varied energy of Brougham. Capable, when he chose, of rivalling any of these, illustrious in the line in which they excelled, the native bent of his mind leads him rather to a combination of opposite and seemingly inconsistent excellencies, but which combine in a surprising manner to form a graceful and attractive whole. At once playful and serious, eloquent and instructive, amusing and pathetic, his thoughts seem to flow from his lips in an unpremeditated stream, which at once delights and fascinates his hearers. None was ever tired while his speech lasted ; no one ever saw him come to a conclusion without regret. He is capable at times of rising to the highest flights of eloquence, is always master of the subject on which he speaks, and never fails to place his subject in the clearest and most favourable light ; but the natural bent of his mind is to win the assent of his hearers by the charm of his fancy or the delicacy of his satire, rather than to sweep away their judgment by the torrent of his oratory.”

We have quoted this extract in full, because Mr. Justin McCarthy, justly celebrated for his own bright sketches of contemporary statesmen, expresses a doubt whether Lord Derby's fame has not already paled before more recent lights of oratorical excellence.

We would, moreover, remind our readers once more of Lord Aberdeen's well-known remark to the effect that he had heard both Pitt and Fox, neither of whom came up, in his opinion, to the Fourteenth Lord Derby, who, be it remembered, for the last

Lord Granville, to describe that event as a national calamity.

It is likewise the common property of those interested in political history to be aware how persistent had latterly been Lord Clarendon's efforts to bring about a disarmament in Europe, weighted and impoverished as it was in 1869, and has since remained, with the expense and drain of enormous armies, the existence of which bids a thinking man long for the halcyon days of earlier civilisation, when the soldier was paid to fight as the lawyer to plead, while men agreed to abide by the result. It was the very nature of these armed hosts of citizens which precluded Lord Clarendon from attaining success in his endeavours.

That universal service which the First Napoleon forced Schardhorst to engraft on Prussia did not contain the elements of disarmament, even to the extent of the 10,000 men which Lord Clarendon desired to subtract, inasmuch as such partial interference with the system was equivalent to its destruction. In France a

sixteen years of his life, never addressed a popular Chamber. When history finally gives its dictum, the position of the Conservative chieftain will be, we take it, in the forefront so far as public speaking is concerned, while he will be thought of as one of the last of the older barons.

His flashes of wit, moreover, will probably not be lost to coming generations, while many amongst ourselves must have heard of the dry sherry which the Earl declared was worse than the gout, or of the ideal Right Reverend prelate who so far emulated the famous Vicar of Bray as to cling consistently to the powers that be, earning thereby at Lord Derby's hands the title of Spiritual Lord-in-Waiting, a type of Churchman one would suppose the witty nobleman had himself encountered.

standing army did, technically speaking, exist, but not in Prussia.

France and Germany, as the world is aware, gave themselves up to conflict in 1870, after strange misapprehensions; but before so doing, entered into *pourparlers* for a division of Belgium, such as must have necessarily entailed war with England.*

* Blanchard Jerrold's *Napoleon III.*, vol. iii. This book should be read by the student of the European situation before and after the Franco-Prussian war. Mr. Jerrold possesses the power of concentrating his work, and, therefore, of giving us much information in a short space. This is specially evident when he undertakes description of the two wars waged, one in 1859 with success, and the other in 1870 so disastrously. By the aid of a good map, the veriest tyro may follow the accounts of these campaigns, and understand them thoroughly. The oft-reported rumour concerning dissensions amongst the French generals after the battle of Solferino is shown to be true, and the then invisible necessities which led the French Emperor to brave Cavour's wrath and disappointment are, therefore, proved greater than the world previously believed, even if our own information had not led us to believe them to be decisive. Mr. Jerrold gives prominence—in connection with the same stirring period—to a rumour which represents the Prussian Government as separating itself from the German people who were clamouring to advance beyond the Rhine, and as despatching a messenger to Count Pepoli bearing a proffered alliance which should weld together the antagonistic elements of Gaul and Teuton in the hour when the arms of the former nation were triumphant.

Without disputing Mr. Jerrold's information, we must nevertheless humbly state that those engaged in the affairs do not remember anything of the kind occurring, nor did the French Emperor mention the matter to his most intimate friends.

We do not find it difficult, after perusing these pages to understand why the Third Empire had not strength to combat the war party in 1870, or why the military movements resulted in

Mr. Gladstone's reply was worthy of the occasion, immediate provision being made for raising 20,000

disaster. In the first instance a restless conscientiousness impelled Louis Napoleon to grant measures of Constitutional Liberty out of all unison with the *raison d'être* of his Government, and the consequence was that he surrounded himself with men who desired anything in their hearts but a sustained period of Napoleonic rule. They honoured and loved Napoleon III., as everyone who came in contact with him was sooner or later bound to do, but they were not adherents of the type who still cling to Henry V. and his ancient traditions, or were prepared to risk all on the altar of dynastic existence, as were the followers of England's royal but erring Stuarts.

Even the very props of the family were allowed their own predilections totally inconsistent with the enthusiasm which alone can support a threatened throne. "Why, how can you expect my Government to get on," said Napoleon III., half in jest, "the Empress is a Legitimist, Morny is an Orleanist, Prince Napoleon a Republican, while I am a Socialist?" And there was a modicum of fact in the latter statement, just as there was a general truism involved when he uttered the sentence just quoted. There is a certain degree of socialism, for instance, in any scheme whereby the workmen of a country earn their bread solely through the rearing of great public works, for which the nation pays. The daily bread of the artizan is prepared for him by the State.

As for the Franco-German war of 1870, Mr. Blanchard Jerrold, following history, is bound to show how the Imperial *régime* contrived to get into a great war without a single ally, and were then strategically outnumbered as well as politically deceived, and the former truth is made clear in the Emperor's own plan of campaign, as published by Mr. Jerrold. Such is the gist of a story which we unreservedly advise our readers to peruse. He will be a hard-hearted Republican who traces the sad tale to its close without a pang arising in his heart when reading of the sorrows and shattered hopes of those guiding a *régime*, now but a thing of the past, but which for seventeen years contributed much to the happiness and advancement of France. It is, however, to the credit of M. Thiers' perspicuity and consistency, that as early as 1869 he was heard to

men for defence of the low countries, whilst a friendly and watchful neutrality was observed in readiness

declare for a Republic as the future Government most suited for Frenchmen, though he was not of that persuasion himself.

Purely dynastic the French errors, before war was declared in July 1870, clearly were not. The acceptance of constitutional guidance by a legislative majority to some degree threw responsibility upon the Chambers, who refused flatly to accept the withdrawal of the Prussian prince's candidature as deciding the question at issue between King William's subjects and those of the Third French Empire. History will ask whether the sacrifice of a ministry at Paris might not have kept the peace, making a Jonah of Olivier, as Louis Philippe did of M. Thiers in 1840, when war threatened with England over the Syrian question, and so at least saved the French nation from the blame ever accruing to the party who precipitates conflict. This blame, Mr. Blanchard Jerrold in his fourth volume of Napoleon III.'s life has striven to erase, but it was impossible that he should succeed in doing more than to palliate obvious and fatal diplomatic errors. But the wild paper-talk about the Emperor and Empress propping up their rule by a recourse to war has absolutely no foundation ; and did Napoleon III.'s widow care to snatch a premature verdict in her late husband's favour, she has it in her power to put many an anonymous detractor to shame. So admirable was the noble lady's conduct towards France, when entrusted with the Regency, and also after the fall of Napoleon III.'s dynasty, that the Government of National Defence sent M. Tissot—Ambassador to England in March, 1882—to Chiselhurst for the purpose of thanking the ex-Empress for her patriotism.

An eye-witness described to the writer M. Tissot's natural hesitation when he, a Republican official, arrived in the stronghold of Imperialism charged with so delicate a mission.

Mr. Jerrold has not undertaken to free the Third Empire from the stigma of tolerating a loose morality in its midst. Nor has he analysed the surrender of Sedan, with reference to the question of its necessity. A crucial question this, because, rightly or wrongly, the chivalry of France will hesitate to turn for government towards a family whose traditions the ablest pens of literary

to intervene with peaceful offices whenever the opportunity might afford. The situation was yet destined

Frenchmen have been instructed to defile as authors of unnecessary dishonour, alike as regards the capitulation of Bazaine at Metz and that of Napoleon III. at Sedan. One who has made the military art a study thus writes to the author concerning Sedan, in which town he was immured with the ill-fated French army :—

“I have no doubt that 80,000 men, divided into two armies, would have got out of Sedan with great loss. But the French army was demoralised by successive disasters, and was partly officered by inexperienced youths.

“The wooded country towards Belgium was specially adapted to protect fugitives, but not an army in retreat, the forest being an impediment to regular marching. But a desire to save his tired and half-starved men from certain carnage alone deterred Napoleon III. from making a final attempt to cut his way out of the fatal basin of the Meuse.”

The above seems so well considered an opinion that we give it in substance. The writer can never forget a visit to Sedan during the German occupation, or the spectacle of small children playing marbles with bullets, while Prussian soldiers dragged the moat for French arms supposed to be there secreted. From the Hill of Floing may be seen the arena on which an Empire was lost—one, indeed, magnificent in extent, and rendered attractive by pleasantly wooded undulations. With the tale of more than one despairing but valorous French attempt to avert disaster graven on his mind, the author left Sedan fully impressed by the horrors of actual war—a sentiment rendered none the less acute by the spectacle of the burning of the dead by a chemical process invented in Belgium, and carried out for sanitary reasons.

Opinions continue to differ concerning the treachery of Bazaine, but few believe that his escape from the Isle of St. Marguerite was not both connived at and desired by the authorities, who were glad to be quit of a troublesome political prisoner. An examination of the castle itself will confirm this impression, the fact being that, until the late Prince Imperial met his death in Zululand, the Buonapartists were powerful in France.

Finally, on the ground that silence gives consent, Mr. Blanchard Jerrold must be held to allow the truth of the reputed Napoleonic

to present a still more lowering aspect when, in 1871, Prince Gortschakoff executed a long-cherished design, and announced the retrocession of Russia from the Black Sea Clauses of the Treaty of 1856. Here, again, was a situation of the utmost difficulty fraught with malignant alternatives from which any English Government must have shrunk, but which stood before Lord Granville with all their naked hideousness.* War with Russia without an ally came to be dismissed as impossible when more than one prominent member of the Cabinet was avowedly opposed to the traditional policy of England in the East; and, indeed, the shortcomings of Mr. Gladstone's first Government arose almost entirely from its patchwork composition, which necessarily enforced frequent compromise when action was demanded. Silent concurrence in such flagrant breaking of treaties would have sounded the death-knell of Government. The result was a compromise, during the negotiation of which the language used by the British Government scarcely partook of the spirit and resolution of Palmerston. It is not desired here to urge that wisdom or true policy would have prompted England to enter friendless into what would have proved a general war, nor could the isolation of England be with justice charged solely to the account of those who were

scheme to destroy Belgian independence before the Franco-German war.

* Lord Odo Russell was despatched to Versailles, and told Prince Bismarck, in language which Mr. Gladstone shrank from endorsing, that the situation was such that England was forced to go to war with Russia with or without allies.

in office in 1871. They were the partakers of a woeful heritage begotten of long defection from the sound policy of Chatham, Shelborne, Pitt, and Castlereagh, which rested its basis on a wise adherence to treaties having their origin in recognition of a healthy balance of power. This had unfortunately given way to a constant and irritating verbal intervention, to support which no English ship was called on to sail, unless for the purpose of blockading some puny despot, and indirectly aiding his rebellious subjects. The nation thus acting abroad, suddenly retired beyond the white cliffs which fringes its boasted silver streak of sea, declaring for peace at any price, while denouncing force as obsolete, and could, therefore, expect short shrift from statecraft of the Russian pattern when fate placed power to strike within their reach. Nor would it, on the other hand, be just to Russia to expect her voluntarily to concur in war penalties such as Europe declined to perpetuate, and which since 1859 she had avowed her intention to be quit of.*

It is, anyhow, not desired here to urge that wisdom or true policy would have prompted England to enter into war with Russia in 1871, and that without a single ally. If faults and mistakes were made by the British ministry of that day, they will be more safely gauged when Time has spread a wider mantle between the present and past than now exists.

* It is notorious that Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, constantly warned the Home Government of the Russian intention to repudiate the Black Sea Treaty Clauses.

It would, moreover, ill become an outside critic to speak slightingly of the heavy responsibilities which then rested on Lord Granville's shoulders. Few living Englishmen know the internal habits and natural requirements of Continental nations as well as the personally popular Foreign Secretary, who in 1871 found himself in a position where the flood-gates of the dreaded Eastern Question were apparently to be unloosed around him.

Probably nobody had enjoyed such opportunities of learning Lord Palmerston's way out of a difficulty, and the Minister must, on the whole, be held to have acted skilfully when, calling the signatory powers of the Treaty of 1856 together, he induced Russia to declare that she held herself bound to respect the concert of Europe so far as the mangled treaty was concerned.

Therefore the condemnation of posterity must alike press heavily on the Russian statesmen who within six years' time dishonoured this affirmation, and on any Englishman who lightly condoned the conduct of Russia in attempting to tear the same treaty up again. We ought not to dismiss this point without stating the plausible contention that English Ministers were then bound to leave their hands free for the probable necessity for action nearer home in case the national existence of France or the independence of Belgium should be menaced.*

* Shortly before his death Lord Clarendon settled a thorny question which arose concerning a Franco-Belgic railway, supposed to be designed for other purposes than those of mere ordinary transit.

With regard to the *Alabama* Claims and their settlement in 1872, although the events occurred too near our own times for any final estimate to be made, gauging absolutely the merit of the policy pursued, it is yet desirable that a definite understanding of the questions at issue should be generally made. No individual accustomed to dwell with pride on the glorious past of their island home can look otherwise than regretfully upon transactions wherein the high tone of Canning and Palmerston was at any rate abandoned, even if, as many aver, the position taken up did not border on humiliation.

But he should, if indeed a patriot, be equally unwilling to press unduly upon a Government confronted, as Mr. Gladstone's was, with great difficulties, and judge charitably the actions of men fully impressed with the weighty import of their decisions.

But none the less the narrative is an unsavoury one for Englishmen.

In the first place, the principle of arbitration had been agreed on by Mr. Disraeli's Cabinet in 1868, while Mr. Reverdy Johnson, acting on the part of the United States, and Lord Stanley, speaking for England, had at that time, as they believed, settled all the questions at issue between the two nations. This compact was, however, shattered through the influence of Mr. Charles Sumner, acting as Secretary of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, who possessed a constitutional power of veto. So it happened that Great Britain had to pay for her uninstructed sympathy with the South, creditable to the hearts of our countrymen as such appreciation of bravery and genius may have

been when they hailed the noble Stonewall Jackson as a patriot. But not equally excusable was the ignorant national opinion of America, her history, and her institutions, which had permeated into England when the cause of slavery was embraced and that of the Union condemned.

It is, however, clear that each Parliamentary party in England had resolved to adopt the system of international arbitration, and for this purpose commissioners were chosen by Mr. Gladstone's Government to agree by treaty upon the case to be submitted.

Amongst these commissioners the eminent Conservative, Sir Stafford Northcote, was selected, not only as an exceedingly fit person for the position, but to demonstrate the fact that party interests were absent from the Ministerial mind, while bent on restoring amity between the two English-speaking nations of the world.

Had, then, the treaty agreed upon by these chosen commissioners been exclusively adjudicated upon by the Court of Geneva, national dignity might have rested satisfied; and if not exactly proud of their part in the transaction, Englishmen would at any rate not be bound up in history in connection with what diplomatists and statesmen have generally adjudged to be an act of deferential surrender to the United States. For, although a special clause of the treaty distinctly excluded any claims not defined in the treaty from arbitration, the Americans did straightway prefer indirect claims to a great amount, which the British Government allowed to appear at Geneva, notwithstanding that they had, in consideration of an abstention thus unfulfilled, consented

to withdraw their own counter claims for compensation to widows and orphans of those British subjects slain during a Fenian raid into Canada. Thus it happened that for the only blood absolutely spilt during these disputes no sort of reparation was either made or, indeed, demanded.

When, then, the struggle at home between parties for power commenced, Mr. Gladstone's Government had to fight against a strong, if limited, distrust of their foreign policy, which, added to the efforts of discontented and dismissed dockyard employés, publicans and their customers horrified at the newly-enforced short hours, and military men dissatisfied with the scant sympathy shown to our former Crimean allies during the hour of disaster by a British Ministry which, as Sir Robert Peel showed from the Blue Books, had never done more than *venture* respectfully to approach Prince Bismarck, combined to render the Dissenting revolt against the Education Act fatal, and thus close the Liberal rule.* Taken individually, on its own merits, each great question of foreign

* To this record we must add the almost universal *dissatisfaction* of military men, alike with the abolition of purchase and the new order of things which succeeded that reform. We have, as has been explained in the introduction to this volume, been enabled to give but an outline of the later events recorded, and have studied as far as possible to keep within limits of our special subject, avoiding unnecessary controversy. But the power of England both for defence of her soil and protection of her Colonies depends so much upon the efficiency of the soldiers of the Queen, that it is impossible to conceal the fact that at least 70 per cent. of military men believe Lord Cardwell's short-service system to be a fatal mistake. On the other hand, the scheme has never undergone official attack from those responsible. For instance, Lord Cranbrook, when Mr. Gathorne Hardy, resolved to give fair play to changes which, if

policy that came before Lord Granville after Lord Clarendon's death was settled as a minority of intelligent diplomatists thought most prudent, and in accordance with the more immediate needs of each special occasion.

This necessity was, as Mr. Justin McCarthy tells us, in more than one instance unfortunate, yet came to be accepted as a matter of course by the apparent public opinion of the time. Nothing that men spoke or wrote in antagonism seemed to have more than a passing effect, so that it became clear that unless a resolute effort were made by someone ready and able to strike, the line taken generally by the party in power as to foreign affairs would become traditional, and refuge be constantly taken in a plausible and colourless neutrality based on the belief that the sea surrounds England, and that she is independent of her neighbours.

the bulk of the Conservatives are to be believed, has ruined our military strength once and for all.

The question, moreover, has never been satisfactorily answered : how, short of enforced military service, could numbers have been raised to the amount requisite for present purposes, unless Mr. Cardwell's scheme, or a modification thereof, had been adopted ?

The creation of a perfect military force, such as Wellington commanded in the Peninsula, might have been possible under the old system, but with quicker transit and increased numbers on all sides, the conditions of the game were indeed changed. Still the expressed doubt of General Roberts as to the British soldier's present efficiency should nerve our rulers to face any obloquy if they see their way to strengthen and consolidate that army of whose deeds the nation is so justly proud, and on whose efficacy we may any day be obliged to stake so much.

If Mr. Gladstone's success in army reform is questionable, that in the region of education shared another fate, inasmuch as the very strongest opponents allow the good effects of the Education Act.

And it is not the least remarkable fact that the Prime Minister, Mr. Gladstone, acting against all his own outspoken opinions, or the lessons that he must have learnt under the great Sir Robert Peel, accepted generally the theories in vogue as to the undesirability of extending colonial influence, which it was the fashion to assume we had not the means of defending ; whilst experienced officials, believed to possess almost a monopoly of knowledge concerning the offices they administered, calmly submitted to the guidance of a few resolute members of the peace-at-any-price school, whose eloquence and influence never grasped the supreme guidance of foreign affairs until after Lord Clarendon was dead. Then the gospel of a fixed neutrality became as palatable to those in office as it had always been declared expedient by the extreme section of Liberal supporters who in 1872 and 1873 held power. For a short time the so-called Manchester party swayed the counsels of England.

During the prevalence of these opinions it is, however, but justice to recount that, at whatever sacrifice, one by one apparently obstinate difficulties had been removed from the nation's path.

Mr. Gladstone had truth on his side when he averred that his successors had reason to rejoice in the settlement of the *Alabama* Claims when complications afterwards arose in the East. Not a cloud then obscured the relations of England and America, such improvement being duly acknowledged by President Grant, while we were outwardly on good terms both with France and Germany. Lord Granville, as British Foreign Minister,

could claim to have elicited from Russia an acknowledgment of her adherence to the Treaty of 1856, from the provisions of which no one of the signatory Powers could, according to a precise declaration, claim to withdraw unless with the concurrence of all.

In Spain, the once-vaunted policy of proclaiming a new balance of constitutional power had been abandoned in favour of absolute non-intervention between the quarrels of Republicans and Carlists; for there the grandson of Don Carlos, whose attempt to gain the Spanish throne during 1834 and following years is narrated earlier in this work, had unfolded his standard and proclaimed civil war. Queen Isabella, in whose behalf the famous Quadruple Treaty had been invented by England, was likewise a fugitive with that son fated so soon to return and realise not only the hopes of Palmerston in re-establishing his dynasty, but destined by marriage with an Orleans Princess to carry to a peaceful if fruitless accomplishment the scheme for which Guizot sacrificed so much both on his master's—Louis Philippe's—account and his own.*

Such, then, was the face of Europe when the constituencies declared against Mr. Gladstone's Government. In Asia the outlook was scarcely encouraging, inasmuch as the trade of Central Asia was passing into Muscovite hands, whilst their legions were spreading over the

* It was not until December 30th, 1874, that Prince Alfonso was elevated to the throne of Spain by a military *pronunciamento*. Educated at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, he carried with him into Spain a knowledge of England which may prove a source of future profit to the two nations.

country as water steals its way over a plain in times of flood and overflow. A subtle subterfuge had thrown the English off the scent as regarded Khiva; and Afghanistan, the glacis of Hindostan, was ruled over by a potentate who regarded us with increasing hostility. He had offered to side with us against Russia, but had been straightway informed by telegram that the fear of Russian encroachments was not shared by the British Ministry. "Nothing but an old wife's fable" was the opinion of the Prime Minister as to the danger of Russian encroachment in Asia; so that the tendency of policy in the continent of Asia was on the same lines as that in vogue nearer home—a policy, that is, of temporising to secure passing ease, while our merchants and manufacturers gathered in the harvest of wealth which an unusual number of prosperous seasons bestowed. And the desire to keep peace at any price proceeded from one of the noblest sentiments that can inspire humanity, viz. the desire to limit suffering, confer happiness, and to check the ravages of death, which had been multiplied fearfully on the battle-fields of Italy, Bohemia, and France.

The Dissenters of England, who wielded a substantial share of power, desired to hasten the time promised to the world by the prophet Isaiah, when, in his second chapter, he speaks of a season when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. But a great and world-famed artist, Sir Edwin Landseer, has described aright the present situation as regards war, when in his noble picture representing the Arcadia of Peace, he has separated the sheep from the goats, thereby symbolising in the most

refined and suggestive manner how such delights as he has striven to depict, and which we have been one day promised, cannot be permanently retained until the evil passions of mankind are subdued, and the reign of law and power be superseded by that of natural justice and simple truth.

The future will, we believe, criticise, as more creditable to the heart than the head, a policy of withdrawal from European influence and of inactivity in Asia, which, prompted by dread of inability to protect England's divers interests, combined with a commendable horror of war has already caused millions to be spent in counteracting the evil then accomplished, and which sought to rule a great nation whose colonies branched out into every corner of the habitable globe, and whose ships were on every sea, as if it were an economical emporium for cheap goods, not even conducted on principles adapted to secure a continuance of sordid and selfish prosperity.

So with a glimmer of military success fell the first British Government which contained so-called Radical*

* By Radical we understand a man who takes pains to go to the root of an evil before he applies his remedy.

Now the quarrel that men of the Russell type held with the skin-deep innovators who lay claim to the name in question, was that they ignored the past and looked for the origin of an evil too near the surface of society. It is only by taking history as one vast picture, and recognising the connection between its relative parts, that the lessons may be learnt so indispensable to statesmen. Indispensable, that is, because they are certain to find a counterpart when the national narrative repeats itself, as experience shows that it one day surely will. It was the secret of Mr.

elements within its Cabinet, Sir Garnet Wolseley conducting his small force to victory against the King of Ashantee, whose proceedings had threatened our colony on the Gold Coast. The war—an obvious Imperial necessity—was undertaken and brought to a close without that instant resort to Parliament which became a watchword of skilled officialism when relegated to the comparative inactivity of Opposition.

We do not pretend to have indicated more than one of the various causes believed to have led to the somewhat premature unpopularity and destruction of Mr. Gladstone's first administration.* They did but inherit the inevitable in common with all other bodies of prescient and upright men whose actions are recorded

Cobden's influence that, whatever we may think of his views, he did most thoroughly, and to the best of his ability, probe each political problem.

From what page of the past the modern attempt to disparage patriotism and sneer at poor people because they are proud of their country, is culled, we know not. The Poet Laureate has expressed a great truth when, celebrating Her Majesty's birthday, he speaks as follows:—

“ To all our statesmen, so they be
 True leaders of the land's desire !
 To both our Houses, may they see
 Beyond the borough and the shire !
 We sailed wherever ship could sail,
 We founded many a mighty State,
Pray God our Greatness may not fail
Through craven fears of being great.”

* The almost complete alienation of the publicans, in consequence of the early hours enforced by Lord Aberdare's bill, should not be forgotten.

in these volumes. But a leading feature in their system had given partial effect to doctrines of Foreign Policy (containing, as we believe, the germs of national dissolution) resulting in the inevitable loss of Empire, which, as the world is constituted, must accompany even the most sterling patriotism when, lacking the lustre of enthusiasm, it is not supported equally by steady head, strong arm, and bold heart.

We have seen how, from differing circumstances, neither Government ruling in Downing Street between 1865 and 1873 was enabled to obtain faithful and powerful alliances for their country, or to do more than preserve outward cordiality with other nations. It will be the subject of the next chapter to discern how far—judging his action by the light of history, and in accordance with simple truth—Mr. Disraeli discharged his stewardship when power, as distinguished from mere tenancy of office, fell to his share.

ADMINISTRATION
OF
LORD BEACONSFIELD.

1873 TO 1880.

years 1874 and 1875 passed by in comparative calm, but heedless of clouds hovering above the horizon.

As is ordinarily the case after times of hustings excitement, things settled down to the apparent level which existed when Mr. Gladstone was in Downing Street; relieved, however, by the excitement caused by that extraordinary and mistaken circular framed to allow the rendition of fugitive slaves, thus transgressing the fixed principles of the countrymen of Wilberforce, and, in the writer's opinion, discreditable to all concerned, and the one black spot in a period when such reactionary conduct is simply inexcusable. We believe, moreover, that the Foreign Office must bear its share of blame. But the new Premier, ignorant—as we believe—of the above mistake, was in truth pondering on what might be the needs of the country committed to his charge.

No complicity in bastard Imperialism is needed to explain thoughtfulness on the part of England's Premier in 1874. Mr. Justin McCarthy has pictured to us the vision of the author of *Coningsby* resolving to break through the trammels of dull officialism, and take refuge in a blazing policy of striking change which might entrance the more imaginative minds amongst his countrymen, and at the same time assert the truth of principles which the minister assumed he had ever professed. The first part of this charge, when fairly examined, absolutely fades into nothingness under the test of truth; while if the latter finds some countenance in the pages of *Sybil* and other political romances, the foresight of the writer claims our attention rather than can fulfilment of his warnings merit reproof. The facts, then, allow the case to be stated briefly as follows.

Skilled and experienced predecessors in office had dreaded undue strain on national resources when fulfilling the territorial and colonial responsibilities of the kingdom, and unable to compete numerically with the hosts of continental sovereigns, while Mr. Disraeli essayed to solve the problem by pointing out that each extremity of Her Majesty's dominions must contribute in times of danger towards sustaining the common weal, and so form the nucleus of a force for defensive purposes not inferior to any possible demand which might arise. In return for which service, to use Lord Macaulay's words (China Debate, Hansard, April 1840-7), "the Englishman should be aware that, wherever he may wander, he is followed by the eye and guarded by the power of England." Without, then

reviving controversy, or with more than bare allusion to the salient facts connected with events that so lately convulsed the world, it becomes necessary to consider what the position of Great Britain was in 1874. In Europe an engagement, undefined may be, but still a reality, for defensive purposes existed between the three Empires of Germany, Russia, and Austria. We are not of the number who believe that the objects of that alliance were ever completely disclosed to the world, or that diplomatists opened their innermost thoughts to one another, much less to the newspaper correspondents in the various capitals. But the fact remains, as Mr. Justin McCarthy reminds us, that the astute and deliberate Lord Derby believed such an alliance to have existed since 1873.

The wisdom of Austria in accepting the inevitable after 1866 had, as we all know, caused a *rapprochement* between the two great German Powers, into which charmed circle the Czar Alexander was admitted. The security of Germany was thus increased, while the consideration believed to have been given in return for such advantage by Prince Bismarck was *carte blanche* to Austria in the direction of Bosnia and the East, while a further partial partition of Turkey, made in favour of Muscovite interest, was part and parcel of the agreement.

France, bent on recuperation of her strength, held aloof, but England—and here is the fact which no amount of special pleading can surmount—was not consulted concerning matters where her good faith was involved and her interests were believed to be at stake. At the same time Central Asia was falling

under Russian sway, and the independence of Afghanistan rendered more important at the moment when its Ameer was becoming unfriendly to the British. What then must have been the feelings of a British Premier who, conversant with the history of nations, and after long study of imperial needs, beheld the outlook we have endeavoured to describe? Could he be expected to concur in conspicuous want of Imperial consolidation, or endorse a novel creed, the result of teaching which to the masses would, as he believed, lead to disintegration of the empire? It is impossible not to contemplate in the possible fate of England—if threatened by a European combination before the lessons of 1877–78 were taught her—the reflection of that which befel Prussia in 1806, when faint counsels delivered her into Napoleon's hands. Readers of Professor Seeley's *Life of Stein*, are not likely to pass the fearful story by without casting a homeward glance at the possible spectacle of a great insular and maritime nation unable to feed her own population, and shorn, by the Declaration of Paris, of her unexceptional naval strength.

It would be small consolation at such a moment to reflect that our finances and resources had been husbanded by a Gladstone, and the path of safety pointed out by a Beaconsfield, if opportunity after opportunity were neglected by some future Haugwitz,* whose courtly and complacent treatment of Foreign Powers passed current as statesmanship.

The possible scene of popular distress, when starvation

* Haugwitz was the minister of Frederick William III. of Prussia, who uniformly counselled a policy of total surrender to Napoleon I.

or surrender should await the once proud conquerors of the First Napoleon, is such that its very horror forbids its contemplation, and causes its possibility to appear in the light which Mr. Gladstone holds the Russian advance in Asia, viz. as an old wife's fable.

But as the faithful patriot must now plainly and resolutely declare that it is no specific for the annihilation of these dangers to reflect on our insular position, so the whole heart and soul of a British Prime Minister should be, from time to time, given to placing the realm in such a position that ruin from externally hostile combination becomes, humanly speaking, impossible. And this without denying that to gain outward security we must first be sound at home.

This condition Lord Beaconsfield strove to create, and effected such a task without exercising unworthy suspicion as to the objects of other nations, who are the more certain to respect those who respect themselves, and will not take into their safe keeping the neglected interests of others. If the events of 1870 did not prove this, when both Belgium and Holland were threatened with effacement, a Prime Minister of England should not remain unmindful of what was formerly the action of the Prussian Minister most friendly to England, when, amidst the confusion and terror which succeeded Jena in 1807, Hardenbergh was willing to favour a league against England by France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, the outcome of which was to be the partition of Turkey and French command of the Mediterranean.*

* Seeley's *Life of Stein*, vol. i., p. 819.

The Treaty of Tilsit, guaranteeing nominal existence to Prussia, peace to Russia, and aggrandizement to France at the expense of England, such agreement being arrived at in secret conclave, made this project a work of supererogation; but who can aver that similar aspirations may not any day fill the breast of a harassed Continental statesman, when tempted, as the foreign diplomatists were in 1874, by the self-proclaimed isolation of England.

This explanation of Mr. Disraeli's action as Premier seems, then, to be more worthy and better suited to the occasion than that of a desire to indulge Imperial fancies as they came to an imaginative mind during his walks to Downing Street, such as is suggested by Mr. Justin McCarthy, while it possesses a logical foundation not evident in the glib assurance which satisfies the polemical tendencies of writers in the *Annual Register* of 1878-79.

Without pretending to foretell the absolute verdict of the future upon actions the remote causes of which are hidden from our view, it is yet certain that such one-sided estimates can never stand the unerring test of time.

But a British Prime Minister's difficulties were in 1874 further increased by the fact, that a return to a policy from which the Liberal party had but lately strayed was not in accordance with his own often-expressed opinions. The Constitutional balance of power of Palmerston and Russell had eclipsed a still older policy propounded by Pitt (to which allusion has from time to time been made in these pages), and the former had been tried and found to

be effective for passing purposes, such as the liberation of Italy, the unity of Germany, the humanising of Spain—one and all good purposes and ends in themselves, but involving during their accomplishment horrible sacrifice of human life such as followed each great war, and which between the years 1859 and 1878 succeeded in effecting a destruction of human life perfectly horrible to contemplate.

In times, that is, of assumed perfection as regards civilisation, the low countries of Schleswig shared the fate of fertile Lombardy and the mountainous Tyrol, while horrors reached a climax the degree of which it is difficult to apportion, whether the scene be in Hanover, in Bohemia beneath the guns of Koniggratz, or amidst the valleys of Moselle and Meuse, the Vosges mountains, and champagne country which made up the fair French kingdom.

Those who best knew Mr. Disraeli, either as the statesman out of office or under his abiding sense of responsibility when as Lord Beaconsfield he wielded the power of Pitt, know that his whole life was embittered by the shadows thrown by these dreadful scenes, and that next to a desire to elevate England out of the sphere of such miseries, ranked in this statesman's mind a steady resolve to take such measures as might gain for Europe all the safety which a wholesome balance of power could bring. But he found himself opposed by the two discordant sections of the Liberal party, one favouring the principles of so-called nationalities, another peace at any price.

We must perforce, however, pass on to the sparse narration of matters of fact involving, from their very propinquity to our own controversies, matters of opinion

which we would gladly avoid did they but lie outside the scope of high policy. It cannot be claimed for the Conservative Ministry of 1874 that they were free from errors of commission and omission, nor can any mere partisan voice raised upon their behalf alter the judgment of posterity on their actions.

But they have the right to be judged by pure fact, and to claim that the same favourable construction be placed upon their actions which the Speaker of the House of Commons asks on assuming office.

To state carefully, if succinctly, the course of events that then ensued will therefore be the object pursued in the next few pages.

The first indications of a so-called Imperial policy as regards India and the East may be dated from the arrival of the Prince of Wales at Bombay in November 1875. Followed, as his magnificent progress was, by the immediate resignation of the Viceroyalty by Lord Northbrook and the immediate appointment of Lord Lytton, men seemed intuitively to look for a state of things where imagination, playing a larger share in the task of government, might at the same time satisfy the minds of our many million Eastern subjects, thus concurring with the often expressed views of those responsible for Government in the peninsula of Hindostan, which obtain credence through study of the maxims inculcated by Clive, Hastings, and Wellesley, and which may briefly be described as demonstrating the insufficiency of mere Downing Street ideas when dealing with oriental matters of State.

This sentiment, however, pressed to an extreme by

enthusiastic partisans at home, operated disadvantageously to the Government when, in February 1876, the Queen of Great Britain received an additional title of Empress of India—a change defensible only on the ground of an assumed sentiment favourable to the change of style being generally diffused over India. So much, indeed, was this proved to have been the case that previous action had been practically taken, the Duke of Argyll having formerly given currency to the prevailing desire by so describing the Sovereign in an official document connected with India.

How such a matter of comparative unimportance could exercise influence over the minds of different races and religions was not understood in England, where the people had a traditional affection for the Sovereign's homely title of Queen. The measure was not popular; and had a Macaulay pressed forward, as the great historian did in 1839, to describe the strange thrill of indescribable disquiet and lack of confidence which animates an Eastern people governed by sentiment and fired by prestige during times of impending peril, he would, we believe, have met the ill-success he encountered at the moment we speak of, when striving to explain the causes which impelled Lord Auckland to his invasion of Afghanistan in 1838.

The justification in either case was Eastern in idea, Eastern in origin, and unlikely to commend itself straight off to the English citizen's mind.

The degree of danger to be encountered would of necessity govern the future decision of the historian on a measure such as the creation of an Indian Empress; but

reading between the lines in the year 1882, one cannot but see indications likely to gain ultimate approval for those who proposed a then somewhat distrusted innovation.

The purchase of shares in the Suez Canal was almost contemporaneous with the propounding of the change in Queen Victoria's title. It was hailed with extravagant exclamations, on the one hand, as pointing to an increase of influence where such moral leverage was a State necessity, and, on the other hand, decried as likely to prove an unfruitful commercial venture. Neither prognostication has been realised, inasmuch as it is not yet known how much we gained in absolute power over the canal by a measure which, on the other hand, brought an accession of wealth into the British Exchequer.* It is needless to say that, designed for no such thing, it temporarily, nevertheless, popularised Conservative rule, and enabled Mr. Disraeli to press onward in his task of strengthening the

* These lines are written when any crude opinion as to the position of England as regards the Suez Canal would be more than usually unprofitable, and liable to be speedily proved incorrect by the march of events. But we are within the mark when averring that the national property in the canal has come to be worth three millions more than when the purchase was made by Lord Beaconsfield and the present Lord Derby, who, as Foreign Secretary at the time, can claim to have been accessory in the accomplishment of a prescient piece of financial enterprise, even if the ultimate political advantage be ungauged.

We have since learnt the inherent possibility of a block in the canal, which, no matter how such impediment be caused, is allowed to be a conceivable eventuality. Powerful vessels to navigate wider seas, and go round the Cape, should surely be held in reserve, while Parliament should make up its mind to forward a railway through the valley of the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf, as recommended by a House of Commons Committee.

Empire. It was sufficient answer for the Premier to make, when challenged by Mr. Gladstone as the promoter of an extravagant and useless measure, that it was quite clear that, had his rival been in office, the Suez Canal shares never would have been purchased. For ourselves we are disposed to consider the English conduct on this occasion as a timely protest on behalf of legality as opposed to a course of violence, which unauthorised interference with the affairs of the Suez Canal Company might portend—such, however, as would have been previously forced upon this country if a foreign power ever essayed to close our route to India and the East, or if a like danger threatened our interests through anarchy and revolution in Egypt.* The Ministers of Great Britain could speak with an accession of authority when commercially interested in a venture the free and fair working of which was essential to her own welfare. More than this, we take it, nobody in authority ever soberly desired to urge; and those who assumed a protectorate, such as Nicholas offered before the Crimean War, and which ignored public law and the claims of others, were injuring rather than advancing the cause they essayed to serve.

We all know how, in the spring of 1876, the interminable and fathomless Eastern Question arose in the Herzegovina; how Slavonic partisans were enabled to avow the earlier symptoms of revolt against Ottoman

* These lines were written before the British bombardment of Alexandria in July 1882. Before the fall of Mr. Gladstone's first administration, Sir D. Lange,⁹ our British representative, had endeavoured to persuade the then Government to acquire a preponderance of interest in the Suez Canal (*Times*, July 15th, 1882).

authority to have been spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction emanating from an oppressed peasantry, and that the original complicity of Russian agents in that movement was never proved. We know, moreover, that when encouragement did come from without and fan the flame, Austrian rather than Russian agents acted in the matter. It is likewise familiar to each reader of a daily paper, how generally men assumed that all had been previously settled in Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, and that a partial dismemberment of Turkey was designed which should accrue to the advantage of all parties concerned but England and France, the latter of whom had accepted the assurances given her when the Triple Alliance was formed, and sacrificed all for the sake of leisure wherein she might recuperate. But on a sudden, towards the end of May 1876, Europe was electrified by the announcement that England was restive, and by the action of her Government had cast off masterly inactivity, and intended to take her part in any fresh settlement of affairs in Eastern Europe. Having been preceded by acceptance of the Andrassy Note, the refusal of Mr. Disraeli's Government to concur in the Berlin Memorandum fell like a thunderbolt upon the Emperors, who could be hardly expected to know where English statesmen held the compromise of 1856 to have been drawn between the integrity of Turkey and the rights of her Christian inhabitants. The subject has been threshed out *ad infinitum*, and become simply nauseous to the educated British reader, so we shall here endeavour to dispose thereof in very few words.

The Treaty of 1856 was undoubtedly a compromise

between differing opinions, much in the same sense that the English Prayer Book reflects two differing views on ecclesiastical matters. The Duke of Argyll and Mr. Gladstone are probably correct, technically speaking, in their opinion that, solely from the point of view of the Treaty of 1856, Russia could find plausible reason to justify her sole interference on behalf of the Christians when, as was the case in 1876, other signatories held back and the Turks remained obdurate.

By this we mean that Christian inhabitants of the Porte suffering under well-defined oppression had an undoubted right of appeal to the powers for absolute protection in such circumstances, under the provisions of that treaty. Such is shown to have been the case by the Duke of Argyll in his exhaustive book on the Eastern Question, which scarcely received the attention it deserved, in that it appeared, as Lord Beaconsfield playfully remarked, at the wrong time. But its conclusions are hard to set aside, alike on account of their author's experience as a Minister when the treaty was made, and also owing to the close reasoning with which the argument is sustained. According, then, to the Duke of Argyll, Turkey *first* broke the Treaty of 1856, so that neither Russia by crossing the Pruth, or England by *subsequently* passing the Dardanelles, disregarded a valid treaty engagement. One thing remains clear, either Turkey or Russia was the culprit, not England, as dates will show.

But, on the other hand, it is clearer still, as testified by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, that the solid result of the Crimean War was by the English people believed to

be an European guarantee to the Sultan of the integrity of his dominions.* Such, moreover, is notably the gist of that engagement, from the possible responsibilities of which, then incurred, no English statesman since recoiled, or dreamed of repudiating. And even if such special pleading as the Duke of Argyll's could morally prevail, and so lead alike to the condemnation of England for not cringing to the behests of the Triple Alliance, and at the same time justify the Russian invasion of Turkey, there still remains the Tripartite Treaty which, in the joint names of France, Austria, and England, sternly forbade the commencement of one of the most cruel, wanton, and inhuman wars, the record of which stains the history of the world, supplemented as that solemn triple engagement is by an undertaking made in London during 1871, which bound the parties to the Treaty of 1856 not to free themselves by force from any single provision without the consent of all parties concerned.

Idle indeed were it to recount the story of the puppet principalities of Montenegro and Servia, who had danced previously to the wires pulled for them across the Pruth and Danube.

Idle to urge the devilry of an excited Musselman population as excuse for a Russian invasion, when, as Captain Hosier, in his *History of the Turko-Russian War*,

* Lord Stratford also differed as to the separate right of Russian interference. (*Eastern Question*, p. 56.) Once disregarded in its main provision, the Treaty of 1856, as Lord Stratford knew well, practically became a dead letter. England, when in 1878 she passed the Dardanelles, came but to save Gallipoli and Constantinople, and therefore to protect her interests.

vol. ii. p. 53, shows beyond a shadow of a doubt, there was a general conspiracy in Roumelia, with committees and head-centres, strictly and simply organised for the purpose of first creating revolt, and then profiting by the disorder and shame which the conduct of the enraged Turks would be sure to create. The scheme succeeded but too well, and the Turkish dupes walked into the net spread for them, and for ever rendered themselves a byword by the employment of wild Bashi Bazouks and Kurds in needless acts of bloodshed and devastation.*

It was in Turkey, during 1876, the case that the ruling race, endowed with those faculties which will ever place men above others of inferior courage and thrift, were possessed with a belief that religion called on them to retain their superiority, and, as a Turkish diplomatist said in 1877, hold that by the sword which they had won at its point.

But the Czar could but for a short time longer hold his hand ; for the agitation, which his agents vigorously encouraged, swelled into a great chorus of genuine sympathy for Slavonic brethren across the Danube and the Balkans.

* Lord Beaconsfield (then Mr. Disraeli) is blamed by some of his opponents for having adopted a cold tone of cynicism when he first doubted that 10,000 persons were imprisoned contrary to the Oriental practice of destroying victims, and afterwards averred that Sir W. Vernon Harcourt's Rhodian eloquence was exerted for unworthy objects. Hearers whom we have consulted differ as to the tone of this speech, while it should be remembered that the sad truth was not known for certain by anyone when the Premier spoke.

In England several parties strove for mastery, and well nigh paralysed the counsels of their country. Many, fired with memories of the alliance with Turkey during the Crimean War, gave their sympathies to a cause which those best acquainted with the subject held to be fatally lost, in face of the hopeless character of the ruling Mohammedans who, scattered over their pashaliks in Europe and Armenia, were themselves a bar to the good government their Christian subjects could claim by treaty to enjoy.

And then the Liberal Opposition in England, forgetting all that was implied in the phrase "integrity of Turkey," and that when themselves in power they had ignored the responsibilities on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte, called in novelists and philosophers to denounce as irreclaimable outcasts those whose disappearance from the Balkan Peninsula might mean the advent of Russia, and thus invite the kindling of war on ground where statesmanship, however astute, could scarcely hope to mitigate its horrors or limit its extent.

But the class destined to hold their own, and mark the period most permanently with the impress of their opinions, were the more matter of fact and business class of Englishmen, whose idea, speaking generally, may be said to have been that their country was in risk of becoming victimised by a patent trick, and who, although they declared themselves unwilling to see Englishmen fighting for Turkey itself, would proceed to extremities sooner than see British interests sacrificed and Constantinople placed under Russian tutelage.

But the Prime Minister at first took the higher ground

of treaty law, endeavouring to hold by which he was, at the time of the Russian invasion, supported, as it is believed, by but four colleagues.

It is an open secret that Lord Beaconsfield tendered his resignation,* which, after some hesitation, was withdrawn when it appeared how absolute was the chaos which the alternative of dissolution afforded when the helm must have fallen into the hands of those temporarily beside themselves with horror at the atrocities of the Turks. The Eastern Question, as the people were told, had been raised up from a virgin soil by the Ministers themselves. It was the duty of England to throw over all her traditions and join the other powers in an attack on Turkey.

Never in English history had such wholesale and sudden change of front been witnessed on the part of a political party as that executed in 1876 by the Liberals in England. The tergiversation involved when Charles Fox and Lord North coalesced were nothing to it, and old-fashioned politicians looked on with wonderment when they heard the entirely novel theories of public conduct which were afoot.

It was on the 24th of April 1877 that Russia declared war on Turkey, and that at the moment when England was resounding with indignant comments on the Govern-

* Several notable Whigs, followers of the late Lord Palmerston, have told the author that they voted against Lord Beaconsfield at the General Election of 1880 because he withdrew his resignation on this occasion, failing, as they declared, to sustain his *declared* policy—Integrity of the Turkish Empire.

ment's desertion of the European Concert, and when Count Moltke, speaking to the German Parliament, uttered the weighty words reported as follows: "He, as well as others, desired a long period of peace, but the times did not admit of such hope. On the contrary, the time was not far distant when all Governments would be compelled to strain every nerve to secure their own existence. The root of this was to be found in the *regrettable distrust of the Governments towards each other.*" And this was the moment chosen for a forced union between England and those pledged to break treaties to which she was a party, and scarcely bound to protect interests that her would-be rulers gloried in ignoring.

It was after the proclamation of neutrality that the advantage of a strong hand on the helm became most apparent.

Never had the Prime Minister faltered from the line indicated when, on addressing the House of Commons for the last time, he proclaimed that the questions at stake in European Turkey involved an empire, the future of which England could not observe with indifference, but that Turkey would not be upheld from blind superstition or from want of sympathy with the highest aspirations of humanity.

These ideas were amplified and reproduced again and again by the gifted speaker who, as Earl Beaconsfield, was soon destined to bring to a close an extraordinary career.

More than once, it appears, the desire to see England strong and united led to the adoption of a strain calculated somewhat to give colour to the laments of

those who affected to believe that Cæsar and his legions were to gain a footing amongst us. *Imperium et Libertas* as a motto, for instance, we may be sure, gained few adherents amongst the less imaginative of Lord Beaconsfield's countrymen, who, looking askance on what they deemed the despotism of the Roman Empire and magnifying their own small power in the State, were loth to reflect that their influence was also, according to the same high authority, to be obliterated in the dazzling presence of sovereigns and statesmen.

Considerations such as these did not, on the other hand, seriously affect the higher sections of society, but, enforced by exaggerations on the hustings, and highly-coloured Press embellishments, they told, we fear, in the end, and so for a time retarded the great object in view.

But it was given to Lord Beaconsfield to achieve his purpose when in February 1878, after the two campaigns in Bulgaria, he armed England for the purpose of inducing Russia to place the Treaty of St. Stefano before the European Powers, and so save Eastern Roumelia from falling directly under the magic of her diplomacy. But, like good negotiators, the British Ministers asked for more than they could reasonably hope to gain at the close of a campaign which left Turkey at her enemy's mercy, and thus left a margin for a compromise such as ultimately ensued. But they were very determined in their language, and equally vigorous in their preparations, so that the astonished Count Schouvaloff found it necessary to inform his Court how matters really stood. Fortunately thrown, as had been his wont, into

English society alike in the *salon*, the hunting-field, and other popular places of resort, the Russian Ambassador had tact enough to discern that the English ruling powers really did mean to show fight sooner than allow a puppet Government to be set up at Constantinople, or a Muscovite occupation of the Turkish capital to take place.

But as the Czar's promise not to enter the longed-for haven of Russian hopes did not prevent his generals from pressing on, war between the two countries seemed vastly probable, and the seething excitement in England became shortly quite uncontrollable. So far as the position taken up at the Congress is concerned, Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet remained united; but when measures to support our national claims on behalf of public law were insisted on by the Premier, Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon resigned.

The retiring Foreign Secretary thought the crisis did not justify a calling out of the reserves when diplomacy, as he believed, was not exhausted; whilst both he and Lord Carnarvon, although desirous of destroying the Treaty of Stefano, were out of accord with their colleagues as to the means it might be wise to employ. Lord Derby had done such good service in securing sterling support for the Government at home, and had resolutely rebuked the first open Russian aggression in a despatch breathing the true British spirit of fearless equity, that his adoption of a course calculated to unsettle Count Schouvaloff's mind again was looked upon as most unfortunate.

But Lord Beaconsfield's strong will and statesman-like determination were equal to the occasion.

Calling Lord Salisbury to his side, as Foreign Secretary, and assenting to the despatch of the famous circular of April 2nd, 1878, which mercilessly dissected the St. Stefano treaty,* he proceeded to carry to its logical

* Lord Salisbury's Circular demonstrated the injustice towards other races of a large Bulgaria, establishing Slav supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, where the power would rest, of necessity, in Russian hands. Moreover, possession of the harbours of Bourgas and Batoum, and adjacent territories both in Europe and Asia being alienated from the Turks, would give the Russians practical domination over either shore of the Black Sea, and command of its trade, while the possession of Kars would dominate the Asiatic possessions of Turkey. But the Ottoman Empire, the circular averred, has also other interests of England in its keeping, viz. at the head of the Persian Gulf, on the shores of the Levant, and in the immediate neighbourhood of the Suez Canal. "It cannot be otherwise than a matter of extreme solicitude to this country that the Government to which this jurisdiction belongs should be so closely pressed by the political outposts of a greatly superior power, that its independent action, or even its existence, is almost impossible." "The Government," Lord Salisbury said, "would enter a Congress in which the stipulations were examined as a whole, but not one restricted by Prince Gortschakoff's reservations." Lord Salisbury likewise pointed out the dangerous power over the Ottoman Empire which an unsatisfied pecuniary fine, by way of indemnity, would give to Russia.

All this is so undeniably true, and was expressed with such clearness, combined with vigour of style, that the document made an impression on the public mind of a character which called closer attention to the shortcomings of the Government policy when they became apparent. In the first place, five points had been contended for, and of these Kars and Batoum, declared to be of vital importance, were surrendered.

Again, the integrity of Turkish territory, verbal insistence on its maintenance having been originally proclaimed, received decent burial. This, at least, became apparent when men knew that Varna had really been wrested from the Turks.

To those who refused to tolerate either the Anglo-Turkish Con-

sequence an inspiration of the great Marquess Wellesley (who sent Indian troops to Egypt in support of Abercromby in 1801), and by calling a few thousand dusky warriors to Malta indicated the source whence in grave emergency the strength of Empire might be drawn, and never be exhausted.

At home in England we were a divided nation, and herein lay the chief danger. Mr. Justin McCarthy has striven to show that the Government supporters appealed to popular passion on behalf of sentiments generated in the music-hall, and embraced eagerly by the thousands who in a large city delight in a revel of disorder; but he forgets to mention that if the "Patriotic Society," joining its efforts to those of private citizens, bestirred the enthusiasm of poorer people, so, on the other hand, were

vention or to believe in the possibility of any future use in Cyprus, these aforesaid shortcomings appeared the more heinous, and, combined with the slur of treaty-breaking (which was most unnecessarily and unjustly cast upon the Government by political and ex-official opponents, at the time when the British fleet went up to Gallipoli, passing the Dardanelles without a firman), went far to raise up grave doubts in the minds even of Lord Beaconsfield's own supporters, who, manfully as they stood to their guns, were, more or less, mystified by incidents in a policy which the Premier himself allowed could not be fairly judged until three or four years had passed. The clouds are dispersing gradually, but there can be little doubt that the prevalence of the above-mentioned considerations (combined with the hostility of would-be fire-eaters, who never forgave our Ministry for not going to war when Russia crossed the Pruth, not to say the Balkans, and who held that the British fleet had retreated to Prince's Island on the approach of the Russian army) caused disappointment, and spread an idea that Lord Salisbury's great circular had been in the main abandoned.

the self-same organisations in full activity which two years before lashed England into fury over the massacres in Roumelia, and that their efforts resulted only in invoking the protest (strong, we admit) of a minority whose principles would have led them to agree to any cheat foisted on to us by a foreign nation.

The meeting at the Cannon Street Hotel, where the enthusiasm of the citizens of London took the matter out of the hands of rival organisations, and the excitement at Lloyd's and the Stock Exchange, where the then recalcitrant *Times* newspaper (so soon to adopt other tactics) was publicly burnt amidst general approval, go to show that the pendulum of metropolitan opinion at least had veered over to the Premier's side. Moreover, territorial Whigs of influence hesitated not to renounce the leadership of those who appeared to think a huge Bulgaria reaching to Constantinople, while Russia took Kars and dominated alike over Armenia and the Black Sea trade, was better for English interests than the ends on behalf of which Lord Beaconsfield made this sturdy stand.

Such were the elements of opinion in the air when Lord Salisbury, with commendable and business-like precaution, reverted to the ordinary practice of those about to make a bargain, and essayed to learn from Count Schouvaloff what points the Czar would yield; and it is but bare justice to a high-spirited nation to record that any idea of yielding to dictation was scouted by the Government of Alexander II., precisely as it would naturally have been in the days of Peter the Great, the Empress Catherine, Alexander I., or Nicholas.

It became, therefore, Lord Salisbury's duty to impress upon the Russians the fact that any such overbearing policy had never been contemplated in England or adopted by her Ministers.

Count Schouvaloff, armed with the power knowledge alone confers, left for St. Petersburg on May the 2nd, 1878, and the result of his conference with the Russian Emperor was his return to London on the 20th of the same month with power to yield the main contention at issue, and create a new State with the Balkan mountains as frontier.

The mutual agreement was, in accordance with Foreign Office custom in England and elsewhere, committed to paper, and adopted as a guide at the Congress where otherwise discussion might have proceeded indefinitely. A copy of this agreement fell into the hands of a would-be patriotically inclined London evening paper, who allowed it to become the text of bitter attacks on the Government when it most needed support. Just as if, forsooth, anything morally wrong had been effected by following out an ordinary course of procedure, such as was, for instance, adopted when, in 1840, Lord Palmerston approached M. Guizot (Louis Philippe's ambassador in London) with the project of a treaty in skeleton form, as a means whereby arrangement could be arrived at over the Syrian question, and war averted. Had mankind, when working in the elevated spheres of diplomacy been generally endowed with participation in the memory of a Macaulay, still such expedients could not be altogether avoided.

The story of how Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury

went to the Congress, after having signed the Anglo-Turkish Convention* and agreed to occupy Cyprus, and

* The Anglo-Turkish Convention, unpopular after the excitement connected with its announcement had passed by, because it was not understood, became a veritable byword on the hustings during the election of March 1880. It was "an insane Convention." As, notwithstanding the disfavour in which it has been held, politicians do not seem to see their way to its abrogation, it may be worth while to consider what view the man best fitted to form an opinion held of its scope and usefulness.

The veteran Lord Stratford de Redcliffe dissected it mercilessly in the retirement of his old age. He approached it doubtfully but unprejudiced. He allowed the probable wisdom of some such announcement being made, looked with suspicion on the possible extent of its binding power, and carefully asked himself whether the dictates of morality had been infringed or the treaty-making power of the Crown abused.

Favourable on the whole himself to this mode of asserting our interests, he declared that Parliament alone could make the treaty constitutionally binding, and confidently left the matter in their hands. But he did not conceal his private opinion that, if ratified, to quote the exact words taken from the last published book entitled *The Eastern Question*, p. 46, "There can no more be any doubt of English resolution to maintain at any risk her long-established place amongst the highest of the world." The undertaking to defend the Turkish frontier from Russia, so long as that power held Kars, has been much animadverted on, but, in truth, England's obligations have not been increased, inasmuch as the Tripartite Treaty guaranteed absolute integrity of the Turkish dominions. That England stands face to face with Russia in Asiatic Turkey, it needs no new treaty engagement to make evident.

When Parliament had endorsed the well-abused treaty, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe may fairly be adduced as friendly to the policy contained therein, and the fact will be weighed when a final judgment is hereafter passed. As for that wretched Cyprus, as Mr. Grant Duff calls it, sooner or later the money must be spent

how subsequently they carried their point and conferred with Prince Bismarck is well known. It is also true that on their return, bringing "peace with honour," the tone of their supporters kindled hopes the certain nonfulfilment of which was calculated to hasten inevitable reaction. It is probably true that, had an appeal been then made to the constituencies, the state

upon it which everyone is aware to be needed both for the sake of health and harbourage, the latter accommodation being needed in case of a possible war carried on with the Turkish ports closed against us, because it is absolutely necessary to refit within moderate distance of the admiral's flag-ship. Ironclads, as Sir Samuel Baker reminds us, have not the wherewithal to plug up an injury that every wooden ship formerly possessed, and access to harbourage such as Admiral Hornby tells us can be made at Famagousta, is absolutely essential.

The amount of this needful expenditure, as estimated in the Blue Book 1880, No. 3, c. 2,544, is, according to the highest estimate, £354,801, and for this moderate sum the harbour is to be dredged and made efficient, and a breakwater 2,900 yards long erected.

With Egyptian transit in possible dispute, the future of a railway through the Euphrates Valley to the Persian Gulf, as declared feasible by a Committee of the House of Commons, must come within a measurable distance of time, and then the value of Cyprus may be better understood, even if British would-be fugitives from Egypt had not already evidenced the advantage of a haven within easy reach of that country, by piteously beseeching, as Mr. Slagg, the Member for Manchester, informed the House of Commons in June 1882, that they might be conveyed to that much-abused island, which has since proved its adaptability as a local place of arms.

If what Mr. Grant Duff says about Cyprus be true, the place should be straightway abandoned, but no Government worthy of the name should shirk reasonable expenditure for Imperial needs, such as, we believe, exist in this quarter of the Mediterranean. ¶

of parties would not have been changed so sweepingly as in 1880, even if, as many men believe, Lord Beaconsfield's majority might have been then retained. But victory resulting from a snap decision taken without regard to the national interests, must have discredited the party who elected to think first of itself and last of the nation. A dissolution when the Berlin Treaty had been negotiated but a few days would have involved a risk of possible hindrance to the settlement of Europe when an Opposition already committed to extreme courses might have elected to tilt at its provisions. Lord Beaconsfield avoided this danger, but yet another branch of the great Eastern Question was destined to dash all hopes once prevalent of a bloodless settlement of all matters at issue, and of consequent prestige accruing to those who had conducted the negotiations.

By means which it is impossible to detail here, Russia had, in 1873, contrived to reduce the Ameer Shere Ali of Afghanistan into that very position of a puppet chieftain which the treaty of St. Stefano must have reduced the Sultan, that is, his strings could have been pulled from St. Petersburg. General Kauffman, from safe ground near the Oxus, was, as we know by reference to the Kabul papers, discoursing sweet music of diplomatic promise to the Ameer within two months of the Berlin settlement,* and when our Government had been

* Lord Northbrook, in one of his able speeches, told the House of Lords, during the spring of 1881, that General Kauffman's

persuaded from private and other sources that his alienation from England was complete.

This state of things—according to Sir Bartle Frere, and by far the major part of Indian officials, military and civil—had been caused by a policy of unsympathetic neglect current ever since 1868, when Lord Canning was disposed to waver, and make friendly advances as an antidote to the approaching Russian power, but received a summary check from the Home Government. We insert this fact prominently, in justice to Mr. Gladstone's Government, who have the right to claim the honoured name of Palmerston as endorsing the policy of 1873, which culminated in the Duke of Argyll's

pleadings in favour of Russia were of the same harmless nature as Mr. Pickwick's famous addresses to the widow Bardell.

Lord Cranbrook replied that if that were true, the verdict in the above-mentioned trial never could have remained in doubt, and that the special pleading of Mr. Sergeant Buzfuz would not have been required to mulct Mr. Pickwick in crushing damages. Those who persist in blindly condemning all action as regards Afghanistan in 1878, when Russians were supreme in counsel at Kabul, would, by the same token, have risked the scientific fortifying of the passes by Europeans (see Introduction to Malleon's *Herat*, W. H. Allen) which would have, in the opinion of those best able to judge, made Roberts' task even more hazardous than it proved to be at the Peiwar Kotal pass.

How to account for the bitter feeling which accompanied all discussion in or out of Parliament, as regards each branch of the great Eastern Question, we know not. Presumably it had its origin in a somewhat frequently expressed idea, that when Mr. Disraeli was Premier the Conservative leader had at first heard of the cruel bloodshed in Bulgaria with cynical indifference. Such, we believe, was not fairly borne out by the statesman's utterances, and we state this after perusal of the speech in question.

famous telegram to Lord Northbrook, telling the Ameer that Her Majesty's Government did not reciprocate his fear of the Russian advance.

But the forward school of Indian frontier politicians base their case upon the difference of the conditions existing between the years 1868 to 1873 and those obtaining in 1878, when the Russians really had the ear of those ruling over Kabul. They urge that if Lord Lawrence's policy of absolute inactivity had been adapted to the needs of the times, no advance on Quetta in Beloochistan would ever have taken place, nor would the kindly sympathy of Lord Mayo have shed a ray of light and hope on the path of a Prince accustomed to revere the English name, and yet be constantly repelled with cold and unscrupulous neglect. "You exist as a power for the general advantage, but we desire no friendly intercourse with you." With such a gospel of selfishness (to use a recent phrase) proclaimed, what wonder that Shere Ali, branded by England as the leper of Central Asia, should turn in his despair towards the advancing Russian !

We do not pretend here to speak with confidence upon the mooted question as to whether the Government of Lord Beaconsfield chose the right time, in the autumn of 1878, for a hostile advance into Afghanistan, or whether the affront suffered when a Russian mission was received at Kabul, and our advances repelled in the Khyber Pass, constituted a valid and sufficient cause of instant war. The wisdom of that action awaits the judgment of posterity, together with a general verdict which must be one day delivered on all the later events

we have endeavoured to describe. But there is, at least, certainty that the whole of the facts were not before the nation when, in 1880, disappointments in Afghanistan weighed heavily in the scale against the late Conservative Government. It could hardly be otherwise, inasmuch as, although the point of view from which Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Lytton took action was communicated to the House of Lords, when Parliament met, by Lord Cranbrook, in the finest and most exhaustive speech made during the session in that branch of the legislature, yet the vision of that aged and blind warden of the marshes (to use Sir Bartle Frere's words), halting maybe in speech, but present to protest, and, indeed, absolutely foretell, what was so soon to happen, haunted the British nation when they knew that Lord Lawrence had gone to his rest before our envoy was murdered at Kabul, and the Afghan nation had, on September 6th, 1879, for a second time arisen against the British.

It would, indeed, be difficult for any witness of that memorable evening's proceedings to forget the scene when the usually unimaginative Lord Northbrook pointed to the old Indian statesman by his side as one who had saved the Queen's Eastern dominions, and who foretold disaster unless the people of Great Britain declared against the invasion of Afghanistan.

The power from that moment given to the never-ending denunciation of Lord Beaconsfield's policy was incalculable, and through that very same protest, and the universal publicity which it attained, has it since been possible that, despite the Kabul papers, despite the

advice of nearly all the responsible authorities, Great Britain has for once made a step backwards, and failed to perform her most sacred promises.

The danger of making a Pope of any given individual and exalting his infallibility on any given subject, was never more clearly demonstrated. Nor did the Liberal leaders spare their opponents when popularity was waning. They were able to say not only "We told you so," but history was there to warn where the pitfall lay, and into that very trap you have deliberately walked.

Lord Beaconsfield met all this powerful, and by no means unjustified opposition, with the determination which had turned aside the machinations of a foreign foe in Eastern Europe. He declared, in effect, that he was determined to safeguard the gates of India by means of a scientific frontier, and to create, if possible, a friendly and independent Afghanistan, which, as the acknowledged glacis of the fortress of Hindostan, deserved all the care that statesmanship could bestow. In this course he continued to receive the support of a united party in Parliament, but of one whose strength in the country came to be variously estimated.

Mr. Justin McCarthy, in the last volume of his popular history, has assumed that the British troops went to Kabul on the occasion of their first irruption into Afghan territory in the autumn of 1878. This error has such an important bearing on the future verdict of any competent tribunal called on to decide on the facts, that it is desirable to give publicity to the truth. Her Majesty's Government did nothing of the kind, but carefully avoided such occupation when they negotiated the treaty

of Gandamak, and took what proved to be the disastrous course of appointing an English Resident to the Ameer, when, as the modern historian whose clerical error we have mentioned narrates, there was a terrible family likeness in the massacres of 1879 and 1839—the same, he says, only the actors were different. To this we recur in no spirit of unfriendly criticism upon the well-meant and patriotically-impelled course of the late Government, but to demonstrate the source of much popular discontent. But there is likewise a consideration which no man acquainted with the facts about Central Asia can deride, which is, that even a divided and weak Afghanistan, situated as it is on the British frontier, must be better, so far as the English are concerned, than a Principality bound hand and foot (from whatever cause) to Russia, such as Shere Ali ruled over between 1873 and 1879, while, for better or worse, Russians are not in bodily presence at Kabul. Mr. McCarthy is not, then, correct in his notion when he utterly scouts the idea of any possible advantage accruing out of the Afghan campaigns, which, after various vicissitudes, produced, as Lord Beaconsfield said, a general in Roberts, and culminated in the great march from Kabul to Kandahar. It were surely better that Lord Lytton's resolve to let Abdurrahman have a fair field should be in process of trial, however precarious the issue, than that an enforced toleration of an avowed enemy such as Shere Ali had somehow become should remain the groundwork of our policy.

Believing the events in Afghanistan to have appreciably affected the ultimate decision of the British constituen-

cies, we must in truth admit that other circumstances conspired to increase the natural desire for change which succeeded six complete years of power, a duration of office attained but by one other Minister (Lord Palmerston) since the Reform Bill.

The annexation of that immense tract of country known to us all as the Transvaal, which occurred in 1877, supplied a fruitful theme for those ready to charge the Government with a desire to remove their neighbours' landmark ; but, in spite of these objections, the so-called aggression was received with acquiescent approval by Lord Kimberley, the Whig Colonial Minister, and accepted as a State necessity by the great Liberal party. That Lord Carnarvon, Sir Thomas Shepstone, and Lord Kimberley were one and all mistaken in crediting the Boer community with a unanimity in favour of accepting British rule, later events have undeniably proved, inasmuch as men do not elect to die for a cause they have not dearly at heart ; but the means taken to blacken the conduct of Lord Beaconsfield's Government in connection with this question can never stand the test of inquiry. It was mainly the general ignorance prevalent as to South African matters that brought these troubles upon the State, and not the action of any one man or of any single party.*

Trade, already at the lowest ebb, failed to respond to indications of sympathetic recovery in America, whilst the Cape Colony, disturbed by fears of a Zulu invasion, found in Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner, a

* See Appendix E.

participator of their apprehensions. In the view of that remarkable administrator, as set forth in his letter to Mr. Gladstone, safety to Natal depended on forward action, in face of the military preparations of the Zulus.

In fact, Lord Chelmsford, with his small army protecting the frontier in question, was in the same position as regards the hosts of Cetawayo as General Scarlett at the head of the Heavy Brigade when he encountered the vast Russian column in the Balaklava Valley. Charge he must, for very safety, seeing that if his foe elected to bear down on his inferior force the very momentum of collision must bring destruction. An error of strategy, for which responsibility has not been brought home to any one man, caused alike heavy temporary disaster and lasting unpopularity to the war, while at Balaklava a benign fortune watched over the fate of the gallant Scots Greys and their comrades, whose achievement ranks deservedly high in military story.

And thus, notwithstanding that the British fought their way with credit to ultimate victory, both at the Cape and in Afghanistan, the most faithful supporter could but lament when he beheld a Government labouring in their finance with an inelastic revenue, and saddled with two wars, when their supporters had boasted for them that they had allayed peacefully at Berlin the aroused passions of the nations. At length the time came when the electoral decision had to be made. The prominent Whigs, who had declared themselves Englishmen first and party-men afterwards, fell silently into the Liberal ranks when a dissolution was proclaimed. They preferred not to risk a loss of political power, and

believed that in any great crisis they could again separate themselves from the ruck and pose as patriots. Moreover, the Dissenters, having healed their schism on the education question, were united, and eagerly responded to denunciations of so-called purposeless and wicked wars, while, not the least important provision of all, the Irish vote had been secured by the Liberals. Finally, useless expenditure and generally reckless conduct were charged against the Ministry. Of the line taken by the Opposition it is sufficient to say that it remained to the last violent, and finds a nineteenth-century parallel only in the conduct of the Whig Lords Grey and Grenville between 1808 and 1813, when they attacked the policy of Mr. Canning and the Marquess Wellesley in Spain.

The campaigns of Mr. Gladstone in Midlothian were but incidents in a long assault conducted steadily and determinately, with oratorical power beyond that within reach of the Conservative Government. When, then, in a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, the Prime Minister told his tale, and indicated but too truly the state of public affairs, the last shaft had winged its way on behalf of the falling administrators whose orators were forbidden, as peers of the realm, to mingle in the fray. The result is said to have surprised acute judges, but not the Minister himself, who, in a letter written to a friend within a few hours of the Conservative rout, asked for a deferred judgment on his policy for three years, and towards the close of his life admitted in the House of Lords that before the dissolution he possessed grave doubts as to the result. For Lord Beaconsfield knew the great Liberal party to be confident and united. To

ourselves it seems almost an earnest of the future adoption of his principles that, under all these disadvantages, something under 10 per cent. more voters, out of three million enfranchised Englishmen, declared for the coalition of Liberals who succeeded Lord Beaconsfield, than gave their suffrages to a Government which, notwithstanding divers errors, had striven gallantly in times of great difficulty to ensure the safety and enhance the glory of this mighty empire.*

* Mr. F. A. Hyndman, in his valuable sketch of Lord Beaconsfield's career, has, on p. 29, summarised the Home Legislation of the Beaconsfield Government between 1874 and 1880. The list is too long to give here, a fact which of itself is a reply to the oft-repeated cry adopted on popular platforms, and which charged legislative sterility to the Tory rule. Much educated criticism has been directed against Lord Beaconsfield for charging expenses connected with an avowed imperial war in Afghanistan on the Indian revenue. It is possible, we admit, that the objectors were not competent to speak as to the legal aspect, but the Government rested under an assumed imputation of avoiding home taxation at the expense of those who had no share in the makings or unmakings of ministries. Mr. F. A. Hyndman's work is the best and fairest of all the shorter appreciative biographies we have seen concerning the late Conservative Premier's career, and, published in pamphlet form, its price (4d.) places it, by means of dissemination through working men's clubs, within reach of the many. (*Public Life of the Earl of Beaconsfield*, by F. A. Hyndman, Esq. W. H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place.)

CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

FLASHES of passion passed over the political scene after the Conservative rout, but, as is frequently the case on such occasions, it is difficult to gauge correctly how far the new administration were desirous of keeping a continuity in the external policy of the Empire, or whether, answering to the appeals of their triumphant Radical supporters, they would embrace the anti-diplomatic theories, sympathy with which had helped to place them once more in office. Never in English history did it look more probable that the principles of foreign policy favoured by Mr. Cobden were about to be put in practice than in the autumn of 1880.* And yet, although, as the

* It is but fair to state that at no single part of his career, either by public utterance, or, so far as we know, by influence in Council, has Mr. Gladstone favoured the peace-at-any-price party. His personal predilection has been rather for the foreign policy of Mr.

Annual Register phrases it, opposition to Lord Granville was fitful, sporadic, and unauthoritative, it is now certain that the Government, with all their strength, were unable to put the clock back an hour in Europe, even if, by the retreat from Kandahar, they subsequently released themselves, so far as Asia was concerned, from

Canning. It has been rather consequent on the deference due to men sitting in the same Cabinet, and to some degree responsible for conduct of affairs, that events often seemed to drift. The result, according to the view taken by opponents, has been hesitation and delay when decision and action would have averted danger. Divided counsels led Nicholas to interpret England's hesitation in 1853 to represent Ministerial belief alike in the justice of the Russian claims and the reality of Lord Aberdeen's bondage. Decisions arrived at by a Cabinet of clever men lacking agreement on questions of the highest national importance, can scarcely be arrived at speedily, or allow a would-be Canning to strike in time. If the aforesaid disastrous outcome does not open men's eyes to the danger of flagrant differences in a Ministry, Lord Palmerston's prescient warnings against undue extension of the modern system may at least claim attention. The following will be found in *Lord Palmerston's Life*, by E. Ashley, vol. ii. p. 257 :—

Lord Palmerston to Lord Russell.—"You say with less timidity around us we might probably have kept Austria quiet in the Danish affair. Perhaps we might, but then we had no equal pull upon Prussia, and she would have rallied all the smaller German Powers round her, and we should equally have failed in saving Denmark. As to Cabinets, if we had colleagues like those who sat in Pitt's Cabinet, or such men as those who were with Peel, you and I might have our own way in most things ; but when, as is now the case, able men fill every department, such men will have opinions, and hold to them ; but, unfortunately, they are often too busy with their own departments to follow up foreign questions so as to be fully master of them, and their conclusions are generally on the timid side of what might be the best."

the immediate difficulties which hustings pledges had imposed.*

As regards Europe, it is now a patent fact that, notwithstanding measures conceived, as we must all admit, in a spirit of unaccustomed harshness towards Turkey, such as the Berlin Conference, the naval demonstration off Dulcigno, and the proposal to blockade Smyrna, still the ultimate result appeared in the form of a more perfect fulfilment of the aims and objects of the famous Berlin Congress. How this came about we shall not attempt to discover, beyond stating that to Mr. Goschen's diplomacy England is much indebted.

It was not, however, until the spring of 1881 that the long-pending question of an increase of territory for Greece received solution, and in a manner which, considering the rumours of war which had prevailed, it is impossible not to hail with satisfaction, and during that same session which saw the Greek question settled the arena of the House of Lords became once more alive with the contests of the backward and forward schools of opinion as to the north-west frontier of India. Not

* With regard to the public policy involved in this abandonment of Kandahar, it is necessary to record that, as a matter of fact, all the fears of the forward school have not, so far as we know, yet received justification. For instance, the late Lord Beaconsfield, who has been proved to be almost prophetic in some of his later utterances, and whose reputation will not, therefore, suffer for the expression of an exaggerated apprehension, stated in the Kandahar debate (Kebbel, *Speeches of Lord Beaconsfield*, p. 267), that anarchy would follow the British withdrawal. Whatever may be the strength of our north-west frontier, the general condition of Afghanistan seems improved since the withdrawal from Kandahar.

the least interesting fact of all, Lord Lytton appeared in his seat to defend his policy against all comers, and that with an advantage which merits mention. The secret correspondence found at Kabul by General Roberts, and which inculpated Russia as having intrigued in Afghanistan against England, had been moved for and published.*

* The papers found at Kabul contain, amongst many others, the following expressions, patent as to their intentions to the veriest child.

General Stolyetoff writes to the Afghan Foreign Minister, on September 21st, 1878 (three months after the Berlin Congress), as follows :—

“ I hope that those who want to enter the gate of Kabul from the East will see that the door is closed ; then, please God, they will tremble.” And again : “ I tell you the truth, that our Government is as wise as a serpent, and as harmless as a dove. There are many things you cannot understand, but our Government understands them all. It often happens that a thing which is unpleasant at first is regarded as a blessing afterwards.” (Professor Vambéry somewhat waggishly hints that this must allude to the possible, and, indeed, subsequent, British invasion of Afghanistan.) General Stolyetoff goes on to say : “ Now, my friend, I inform you that the enemy of your famous religion wants to make peace with you through the Kaisar (meaning Sultan, but more accurately expressed, according to Professor Vambéry, by the name of Khalifei-Aum) of Turkey. Therefore you should look to your brothers who live on the other side of the river ” (believed to be Indus by Vambéry, Oxus according to Sir Henry Rawlinson and the Duke of Argyll, a fact, if true, which should alarm the latter statesman, who, in his speech on the Kandahar debate in 1881, avowed that he would view with grave distrust the establishment of Russia beyond that river). Stolyetoff then concludes : “ If God stirs them up (these people on the other side of the river), and gives the sword of fight into their hands, then go on in the name of God, otherwise you should be as a serpent, make peace openly and in secret prepare for war.”

Professor Vambéry interprets the papers from which these

The late Indian Viceroy was calm and emphatic. He deplored his inexperience in debate, but vigorously

extracts are taken as expressing the fraudulent desire of Russia to annihilate England's power in Asia by creeping like a serpent in the thick grass of diplomatic assurances to that point where her enemy is deemed to be most vulnerable, and to inflict there a deadly blow. (Paper on Kabul Correspondence, by Professor Vambéry, *Army and Navy Magazine*, pp. 465-478.)

But we have a later confirmation of the fears engendered by the publication of the papers found at Kabul. "Patriotic hearts must experience a sensation of great delight when the course of events leads into error a sagacious and talented enemy of the Fatherland." So commented the late General Skobelev on his return to St. Petersburg from Askabad, in February 1882, upon an alleged failure of Sir Henry Rawlinson's prediction as to Russian difficulties in Central Asia. After speaking thus of England and Englishmen as enemies to his Fatherland, General Skobelev added these words:—

"Never since the time of Mahomed Shah's march to Herat, coupled with the memorable services of Count Simonitch [whose intrigues are notorious in Central Asian story], has the influence of the Russian Minister at Teheran been more predominant. In one word, the spell of the Russian standard is powerful far away to the East, even to the conquered region." General Skobelev goes on to assign to the late Czar Alexander the chief merit for having "firmly taken the Akhal Tekke business in hand, and realised the immense importance of a *place d'armes* at the gate of Herat and Afghanistan at a given period of history." (*Times*, February 6th, 1882.)

And this is the man whom the above-mentioned Emperor was supposed to have recalled at the time of the debate in the British capital on Kandahar and its abandonment, the British House of Commons allowing its fears to be assuaged by an assurance to the effect that the Central Asian schemes of Russia were realised, and the expeditions against the Turkomans brought to a close. We know, however, that not only have the Russian head-quarters been since advanced to Askabad from Geok Tepe (that "green hill," as Vambéry translates it), but that, on General Skobelev's own assurance, Muscovite engineers have been engaged in surveying

disclaimed complicity in underhand and offensive proceedings as regards bridging the Indus and collecting

what he calls the conquered region up to Sarakhs, the possession of which not only won Herat for the Emperor Baber in 1525, but has been held to be a strategic key, the possession of which renders Herat untenable by an enemy, according to the opinion of modern strategists familiar with the subject.

“ If England does not use Sarakhs for defence, Russia will use it for offence.” So writes Colonel McGregor, of the Indian Staff (Malleeson's *Herat*, pp. 64 and 132).

In the face of these hard facts it is reasonable to hope that a better appreciation of the difficulties each English Government must now cope with on the north-west frontier of Hindustan, will alike lead to more moderation in discussion thereof, and, therefore, to the forming a more deliberate and therefore juster judgment as to the policy of Lord Lytton in Afghanistan, than party newspapers and excited ex-officials could possibly be expected to give on the verge of a general election. We hope and believe, for instance, that violent expressions such as that made on the 18th of January 1882, at Retford, by a member of Her Majesty's Government, Mr. Mundella, who is reported by the *Sheffield and Rotherham Independent* to have then said, “ I would hang the first general who ever mentioned an invasion of Afghanistan again,” will be for the future avoided. A high order of statesmanship this, which the turn of events might place it in Mr. Mundella's power, as a trusted Liberal, to give future effect to. Language such as the above is the more deplorable, inasmuch as (in addition to the above-mentioned letters found by General Roberts at Kabul in the autumn of 1879) *pour-parlers* between Shere Ali and his Foreign Minister on the one hand, with Generals Kaufman and Stolyetoff on the other, laid bare a secret treaty hostile to England, and signed after the treaty of Berlin.

Let our readers take up any ordinary-sized map of Central Asia and observe the distance between Orenburgh and Astrabad, and he will realise what advances Russia has made towards India since the Crimean war, when the former place was the base of operations now shifted to the latter, the distance as the crow flies being, at least, 970 miles, according to the Russian map. We may add

troops as a menace to his neighbours at a moment when the tribes around the Khyber were gathering ominously, and the information brought to the Indian Government of the Russianising process going on in Afghanistan warned them to be prepared for any eventuality.

But such reasoning, and the appearance of his arch foe, brought the Duke of Argyll himself into the arena. The life and soul of opposition to the Afghan policy of Lords Beaconsfield and Lytton, this remarkable debater literally revelled in the delight of measuring swords with a foeman worthy of his steel, whom, politically speaking, of all mankind the eloquent Duke would most delight to tear in pieces.

For twenty-five minutes did the Lord of Inverary pour out the burning denunciation of a policy he declared to have been one verging on deceit, while averring at the same time that Lord Lytton's treatment of Shere Ali had forfeited the English name for fair-dealing towards weaker powers ; such conduct having, more than any other circumstances, led the constituencies, when they fully understood the truth, to thrust the late Ministry from power.

In clear nervous language and in thrilling tones was this scathing denunciation delivered, to the admiration of all hearers of whatever persuasion ;* and, indeed, the

that when Buonaparte, as First Consul of France, took counsel with the Emperor Paul of Russia for a joint invasion of India, Astrabad was to be the trysting-place for their armies.

* Two men fully competent to judge, Lord Sherbrooke and Lord Houghton, openly expressed their admiration of the Duke of Argyll's oratory on this occasion.

well-known saying of La Bruyère never received more complete exemplification than by the Duke of Argyll on this memorable occasion, viz. "Eloquence is a gift of the mind which makes us master of the heart and spirit of others."

A parallel between the Conservative host before the electoral battle of 1880 and that of Sennacherib when, in his pride of strength and haughty assurance, the Assyrian monarch threatened Jerusalem, and his legions suffered miraculous extinction, was perfect as an oratorical effect, which would, however, have been less evanescent but for the spectacle of Lord Cranbrook, who, nothing daunted, and miraculously brought to life, confronted the fiery McCullam More, and not only supported Lord Lytton's statements, but also pointed out how, as he believed, the gathering difficulties of Mr. Gladstone's Government had been increased by unguarded language spoken in Midlothian.

Lord Lytton returned to the charge on a subsequent occasion, and established a reputation for resource in debate and power of ready, fervent expression which impressed all present with his ability, and doubtless helped to disperse bitter prejudices which electioneering statements had inflamed. These debates were to be long remembered as the last in which the prescient counsels of Lord Beaconsfield echoed through the land. On the first occasion, although his feebleness was apparent, he concluded with all his old fire, and spoke sadly, and with warning voice, of Ireland, and with contempt of the manner adopted in carrying out the abandonment of Kandahar rather than of the measure itself, which he

regarded as a question of high policy, and therefore to be decided after statesmanlike deliberation. But he deprecated such matters being settled in the streets, or our retreat from Afghanistan being proclaimed as a necessity from every housetop, whence the cry, "Scuttle out of the country," was, as he averred, indecorously taken up and proclaimed to the world. The second and last occasion was rendered historical by the failing statesman's generous opponent (the knight to whom Lord Beaconsfield averred, on a former occasion, we owe every courtesy), Lord Granville, who has told how necessity compelled the great Earl to demand a hearing before his strength—artificially supported as it was—had ebbed away. Hearers learnt on that interesting occasion from the lips of Lord Beaconsfield the never-to-be-forgotten lesson that the keys of India are in London!

It became painfully evident to those who lived most with Lord Beaconsfield that his strength was failing, inasmuch as a defect in sight coincided with a loss of general vigour, apparent even to the bystanders wont to observe his entrance into the House of Lords. During his tenure of office nothing but the highest courage and keenest enthusiasm had kept him chained to official occupations felt to be as far beyond his bodily strength as his freshly developed mental resource exceeded even the estimate of his warmest admirers. At last, during the prevalence of the fierce east winds which swept over Great Britain in March and April 1881, the great Conservative chief passed away, who, to use the words of by no means the least thoughtful of his supporters

(the Earl of Jersey, himself the grandson of Lord Beaconsfield's once discarded leader, Sir Robert Peel), "whatever his faults, never deserted England's interest to serve the passing hour."

The scene in Curzon Street during Lord Beaconsfield's illness was of itself typical of the interest felt in the dying statesman by all classes. He who held a position in the highest grades of London society analogous to that formerly filled by the eloquent fourteenth Earl of Derby, was mourned equally by prince and peasant, nobleman and churl, while loving hands ministered all that constant sympathy can bestow.

But, as a working man watching in the street said, with tears in his eyes, in the writer's hearing, "He has done his work, and we poor people shall benefit some day."*

We are not called upon here to consider at length

* In Lord Beaconsfield's speeches, as collected by Mr. Keibel, vol. ii., p. 180, will be found a parallel between Marius and the British Minister who negotiated the treaty of Berlin, and narrating how it was said of the former that he would have been the greatest and most fortunate man whom either Rome or nature had produced *if his great soul had taken flight*. We venture, however, to express an opinion that the above-mentioned grief of a whole people will amply atone for the momentary desertion of those who, after all, were professedly political opponents, and who, acting according to conviction, dealt out to Lord Beaconsfield, after the Berlin treaty, a party check similar to that which awaited Lords Melbourne and Palmerston when they had just settled the Syrian question so satisfactorily for England in 1840-1. Moreover, Marius, the great Roman Consul, was again elevated to power after his historic exile, a fate not reserved for one whose memory, nevertheless, England delights to honour.

what justification, if any, lingered under the sallies of Mr. Dunkley's facile pen, when, writing as "Vindex," he assailed Queen Victoria's Minister for his conduct of affairs between 1874 and 1880, in the *Manchester Weekly Times*, in language which was adopted by the extreme Liberal party as embodying truth, suggesting as it did unconstitutional influence behind the throne, and throwing at the same time something more than a passing arrow upon the ground men generally agree to hold neutral.

But it is due to those subjected to attacks which materially influenced events, and so helped to mould a future Parliament, that we should record an increasing popular belief that nothing was done between 1874 and 1880 to contravene the principles of 1688, on the constitutional character of which settlement all Englishmen, Whigs and Tories alike, take their stand.

Parliament was acknowledged as an ultimate court of arbitration between rival policies, and decided to resist an external danger which, if the sovereign did descry, and prepare to combat, she acted but as her ancestors, from William III. downwards, had done before.

That the sovereign is estopped from using experience to enable men to read both sides of a question where Empire is at stake, is surely a doctrine which can rest on no solid foundation, especially when the alleged contravention of constitutional rule consists in the publication of a husband's life.

We should not forget that, while liberty is proverbially a tender plant, its most pressing dangers are not always those descried by contemporary observers. For instance, it was not discovered until too late that the almost

complete overthrow of the feudal system during the Wars of the Roses, would leave the kingly prerogative in dangerous ascendancy, and eventually necessitate the great settlement of 1688, when the rights of Magna Charta were, so to speak, reaffirmed. It had not been either previously discovered, when the Commons of England arose to combat the encroachments of Charles I., that they were engaged in establishing a Parliamentary despotism from which the nation shrank when committed to untried and feeble hands. The judgment of contemporary critics, however able, must therefore be accepted with caution.

Desirous of regarding present politics, as connected with the past by the bond of a continuity which has prevailed far back into English history, we close this volume with a few reflections.

It is not possible to contemplate without the deepest interest changes, social and political, alike at home and in Europe, which Englishmen who have not even reached a middle age cannot fail to observe.

We no longer see opinion divided into two distinct camps, but are in the presence of external organisations, without reckoning which the politician will fail to gauge events; * and if the war between France and Prussia,

* It is a fact that a body of working-men, numbering many thousands, are banded together under Mr. Cowen, M.P. for Newcastle, and Mr. H. M. Hyndman, who, under the name of Democratic Federation, desire to make trial of a mild kind of socialism, as conceived and elaborated by Marx and other talented thinkers. They seek, as we believe, to reach the unattainable, but desire most truly and honestly and disinterestedly the happiness of their fellow-men. The influence of their concentration of opinion

concluded in February 1871, led to political and geographical changes in Europe, there occurred during the same period an event destined to exercise a prodigious influence on the future of the human race, to which we made mere passing reference at a time when the full effect was not manifest. On the 20th September 1870, the Italian troops entered Rome, and the temporal sovereignty of the Popes came to a close. This result was hailed with delight by followers of the Eastern Church, and, to some degree, the same sentiment prevailed amongst Protestants, not the least thoughtful, however, of whom were frequently heard to declare a belief that an increase of spiritual power was likely to attend the Pontiff whenever the sympathies of all the faithful, without respect of party, should be enlisted in their behalf.

Later travellers in France and Italy will, however, have seen changes of themselves a sufficient answer to such expectations. The Jesuits have not only failed to hold their own by means of secret influence, but have themselves suffered expulsion, while the whole manners and habits of the people have undergone a change which it would be rash to declare portended unmixed benefits for society.

When, in a country like France, containing a population of thirty-eight millions, those openly dissenting from the Roman Catholic religion are little, if any, more than

will, we doubt not, make itself evident at elections; and as for Europe, as Mr. Disraeli said after the war of 1870, greater change has occurred therein than during the Settlement of 1815.

a million in number, the sense of religion must surely have become cold when such scenes as accompanied the late dispersion of conventual societies, male and female, and consequent destruction of objects formerly held most sacred, could be witnessed with silent acquiescence, if not approval, by the French nation. Identical scenes, involving something akin to sacrilege, have likewise occurred in monarchical Italy, where a civilised rule has not yet adopted the motto of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*.

Turning, likewise, to the contemplation of subsequent events in Germany, and reflecting that, notwithstanding the never-failing return of a solid phalanx of Ultramontane deputies to the Imperial legislature, yet the strength and influence of Rome has paled before that of the unwavering Protestantism and tolerant free-thought of Northern Prussia, it is impossible not to see that when Pius IX. lost the last vestige of his temporal power in 1870, there was there and then accomplished a revolution of opinion destined to leave its mark on the world's history.

The Pope, installed as temporal sovereign, was hedged in with privileges, one and all of which must have been abrogated before Governments such as those of France and Germany dared consistently, and scorning compromise, to fly in the face of Rome ; at the same time, the proclamation of 'Papal infallibility as a dogma has clearly done much to divide the Roman Catholic world.

It is not intended here to substitute for the duties of the narrator of past events those of the journalistic critic of contemporary politics, but it is surely allowable to hope for a tendency in government calculated to

divide the advantages which free commerce, railways, and the consequent possession of the carrying trade of the world have given England, with those colonial communities who contribute so much to the greatness of the mother country. How this is to be effected surely lies within the domain of statesmanship, but to Englishmen any measures will undoubtedly be unpalatable, such as are not framed in sympathetic accordance with imperial unity.

The absence of all jealousy between the great-hearted citizens of the United States and their mother country, is not the least hopeful feature in an outlook dark with the presage of sinister contingencies. We have felt something akin to regret when recording the rejection of a solid alliance with Germany, because we believe such a union of interests, not formed by nature to clash, is calculated to preserve peace in Europe. But as an alternative, we would gladly welcome a hearty continuance of the *entente cordiale* between England and France, knowing full well that if such an alliance be thorough, there can no harm betide either community. England is, as we contend, so situated as to demand the faithful alliance of one great power; and in so far as rival nations perceive the reality of such a compact, will they cease to scheme, and will lend themselves to the cause of peace. It will be a dark day for humanity when the old quiescent—may we not almost hope *dissipated*—hatred which once blighted Britain and Gaul alike shall be again enkindled.*

* We state this in spite of all that may be said or written about Tunis and Egypt by those who talk as if each nation is not at

We have to deal with a condition as regards public affairs, which must more or less subject foreign politics to popular direction. The reaction may be strong which, with the swing of the pendulum, places an Opposition back to the right of the Speaker's chair; but the great movements of the time go on surely, and a nation fired with the desire for popular Government will not cease its demands merely on the threshold of domestic contention.

We may regret this, but cannot alter the inevitable; and a statesman who faces the truth, and in the face of democracy yet protects the constitution and preserves what is sound in the old diplomatic system, will deserve the thanks of all thoughtful men.

We have threats of a perpetual committee of public safety sitting in our midst, in the shape of an anti-aggression society, which, guided by the instincts of undoubted genius, shall make war impossible, and substitute the influence of commerce for the power of fleets and armies.

But the dream is an old one. It was that of Henry

liberty to pursue its own ends and interests, provided that its treaties be observed, and the rights of other nations respected. For the truth as regards France and Egypt, past and present, we can confidently refer our readers to Mr. Frank Ives Scudamore's book, *France in the East* (W. H. Allen, 18, Waterloo Place). Full of history, and replete with facts, the work needs but a good index to render its value complete. It shows most decidedly that the influence of France has been a civilising one and that its stability is not incompatible with an unflinching upholding of English interests such as other nations will not preserve for those unwilling or unable to protect them with resolution.

IV. of France, and its ideas have not passed unsifted here at home. The experience narrated in these pages should, we think, rather lead us to make few treaties but stand stoutly by them ; such a determination possessing vital interest for England both morally and materially.

Let us hold our own, and experience proves that others will ally themselves to the assertors of public liberties, whose motto is, and should be, "Defence, not defiance": integrity of the Queen's dominions, not aggression. But the guidance of our millions, each qualified and ready to vote, must, as has formerly been the case with more contracted constituences, be entrusted to statesmanship. Younger and rising politicians may then be persuaded to search diligently through the experience of the past, and so mould the minds of men that they look not for an impossible future.

But the gravest symptom of all with which those guiding the State machine have to deal, is the undoubted decadence of wealth amongst the landowners and tenant farmers,* who, as Mr. Cobden told us in

* Various opinions as to the probability of British agriculture righting itself have been given by a multitude of authorities. The observations taken during a term exceeding thirty years at Rothampstead, Herts, by Sir John Lawes, the famous chemist and rival of Liebig, rather seem to lead to the conclusion that the soil of England may soon be exhausted. (See *Fertility*, by J. B. Lawes. Bogue, Charing Cross.) Lord Derby, on the other hand, believes that we are suffering from exceptionally bad harvests, and that given a like succession of average yields, and the propinquity of the British farmer to a market for sale of corn, will give security against the foreign competition threatening to overwhelm him,

one of his earlier pamphlets, alone enabled the struggle with Napoleon to be fought to its close. Well, then, may we anxiously desire to learn whether such depression is likely to be permanent, or must a possible appeal be made at a crucial moment of State peril to a class once the backbone of English strength, but now comparatively poor, and less careful of its responsibilities; many of its members, may be, living abroad, or in the large English towns where luxuries are cheap. Living, that is, on the capitalised remnants of their interest in family property, of which prospective poverty will one day force successors to get quit on the best terms Parliament will let them make with the legal dictates of their ancestors. For to such a consummation does the tendency of present legislative effort point.

It will take long to destroy the right arm of England, but he is a bold man who tells us the design is not cherished by those who wield—if not power—at least increasing influence.

There are those on the other hand, bound by no exclusive party shackles, who can, if they are so minded, place the truth before the English people, saying this is no time for internal discord, but counselling them to show a bold front to the world.

The following (translated) lines of Tasso seem to reflect so completely the needs of England in the old age of the Nineteenth Century, that we transcribe them here.

* * * * *

Not underneath sweet shades and fountains shrill,
Among the nymphs, the fairies, leaves and flowers,

Concurrence and support - should any proposal arise of
an Opposition, I shall take the liberty of - troubling
you with a further application.

I am
Sir

your most Obedt. Servt

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

WE are enabled to publish a fac-simile of the younger Pitt's last electoral letter, when recalled to the counsels of George III. in 1804. As the upholder of liberty at home and abroad, he will ever live in his countrymen's memories, even if exceptional talent, exceptional eloquence, and, we may add, exceptional training at Lord Chatham's hands, had not together registered William Pitt's name amongst the greatest of Englishmen.

It is, we venture to suggest, this special training which is needed for the statesman of the future, destined, we trust (as Sir Robert Peel put it) to reconcile the claims of a popular legislature with those of a proud aristocracy, and yet preserve the monarch's prerogative.

APPENDIX B.

ADHERENCE to biography from an almost exclusively English point of view has precluded the author from fully acknowledging the part which North Germany took in accomplishing the deliverance of Europe from Napoleon's tyranny. Generally speaking, as regards the Continent, Hardenbergh, Blucher, and Scharnhorst have been bracketed with Schwartzzenbergh, the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia, and General York, while Metternich's name is very properly foremost whenever the great subject occupies men's minds; but until Professor Seeley's researches laid bare the extraordinary services of the Baron von Stein alike to Prussia, Germany, and Europe, it was never known how pre-eminent were his talents, how powerful his gifts, and successful his patriotic efforts.

On April 26th, 1876, shortly after the famous Cambridge historian had published his unique piece of history, entitled *Life and Times of Stein*, he delivered a lecture, under the Pavilion dome at Brighton, on the subject of Stein. In the local paper, the *Brighton Guardian*, Professor Seeley, to his great surprise, read an article concerning Stein, on the same day he delivered his lecture, which, as the historian declared, betokened an acquaintance with the story little short of his own laboriously-acquired knowledge. It is, we believe, no secret that the writer was Mr. J. E. Mayall, F.C.S., whose sources of information have been most handsomely placed in the writer's hands for the purpose of supplying what all must allow is a deficiency in the earlier pages of this work.

And we state this, conscious that Pitt, by his prescient resource and noble determination, Canning and Wellesley, by encouraging the first sparks of Spanish patriotism, Wellington, by his un-

surpassed generalship and iron resolution, Castlereagh, by his courage and diplomatic address, one and all sustained the resolve of England and utilised her resources in the conduct of a struggle brought to a successful issue. But as Professor Seeley, intent on Stein, scarcely mentions Canning and ignores Wellesley, so has no other chronicler of these mighty events fairly apportioned the just share of honour to the German Baron, whose statesmanship was so woefully misunderstood even by his own countrymen. True it is that Sir Archibald Alison perceived the extent of Stein's services, but was partially informed of their nature. Now Mr. J. E. Mayall is the fortunate owner of some secret memoirs of Napoleon I., which are the outcome of personal observation on the part of one who lived near the Emperor for fifteen years.

The secret memoirs are precious, as the book was repressed and bought up, and it forms a key to some of the great conqueror's characteristics. To a degree it bears out the estimate put forward by Lanfrey, demonstrating a perfidy scarcely conceivable, and the use of unscrupulous means to obtain his ends. Napoleon's ungratefulness to his friends, and worse still, his conduct to Josephine (who made his fortune by timely advice and sustaining womanly sympathy when, as the memoirs show, he was inclined to hesitate when hesitation meant ruin), are fully descanted upon, while his unmitigated hatred to Stein, the rival military genius Moreau, and the Bourbon Prince, Duke Enghien—the latter of whom criticised his military tactics adversely—is made apparent. But, as the silent witness proves, it was the weakness of France and Germany, as States, that consolidated the tyrant's strength.

But the main point of interest, so far as Stein's influence on the liberation of Europe is concerned, consists in a full account of the spy system which, permeating from Napoleon's Cabinet into every capital in Europe, ruined Stein when, two years after Jena, and in 1808, social reforms having been executed calculated to consolidate Prussian society, the great statesman straightway proceeded to arouse Westphalia, and give courage to his doubting Sovereign, Frederick William III.

Fired by the example of Spain, stirred to action by our own Canning, North Germany responded to the patriot's call, and but for the aforesaid spy system Napoleon would have found himself at war with two peoples, as distinguished from other continental combinations assembled at the instance of Sovereigns and their

Ministers. Who can doubt, under such circumstances, that the end which was delayed until 1813 would have arrived sooner, and Europe not have bled from every pore in 1809 and 1812? But a spy seized a compromising communication of Stein's, and Napoleon, warned in time, issued the following edicts from Madrid, on December 16th, 1808:—

(1.) *The person called Stein, seeking to excite troubles in Germany, is declared an enemy of France and of the Confederation of the Rhine.*

(2.) *The property which the aforesaid Stein may possess, whether in France or in the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine, is sequestered. The said Stein shall be arrested whenever he can be reached by our troops, or those of our Allies.*

Evidence, this, of the degradation of Central Europe in 1808. The weak-kneed Sovereign was forced to give his patriot minister up, who fled into hospitable, if conservative, Austria, where Metternich, to his credit, received the fugitive as one who loved Germany, even if constrained to look at politics from a different point of view to that favoured by the Austrian Chancellor.

We, fearing to tread too closely in Professor Seeley's track, cannot undertake to finish the story of Stein's career in anything like detail. But our readers will not fail to class the exiled philosopher-statesman with the stainless William Pitt when they know that he allowed Scharnhorst free play during a short time of office, and so helped to create the army that made European freedom a possibility, and, within the memory of most living men, contributed so powerfully to German Unity. In exile, Stein betook himself to Russia, and stood by the Emperor Alexander's side during the awful hours of 1812. His presence is believed to have encouraged that potentate to advance and follow the retreating French into Silesia, and therefore aided powerfully in welding together the coalition of 1813.

We hear of him as a chosen President for the German Confederation in 1814, such honour being offered by Prince Metternich, and finally know that he sank to his rest conservative in sympathy, liberal in opinion, dreading revolution, loving liberty—but, above all, an enthusiastic German and adorer of the Fatherland.

Always impressed with religious fervour, in his old age the tendency to unobtrusive goodness became more apparent, and a pleasanter picture than that drawn by Professor Seeley of the old

man under his patriarchal foliage, loved and honoured by all, it is difficult to conceive. The French Revolution of 1830 was looked upon by Stein with an apprehension similar to that expressed by Metternich in his lately-published *Memoirs*. The statesmen of Europe knew but too well what a possible renewal of general anarchy might portend. The Baron Stein died in 1881.

Stein laboured under the disadvantage of being in the position of permanent official rather than of a responsible statesman, and this from the nature of that very beaureaucratic system which his legislation helped to destroy. Gifted with all the fire and power of expression which go to make up the orator, he, unlike Pitt, was unable to speak to his countrymen from a place of vantage whence his words might be re-echoed through the land.

Quick in temper, even rough in manner, Stein nevertheless possessed a personal charm of manner which altogether fascinated those over whom he desired to gain an influence. There is little doubt that had his term of office been sufficiently prolonged he would have granted a limited form of Parliamentary representation to Prussia. The perfected unity of Germany was perforce left to a future Radowitz or Bismarck.

The vast measure of indebtedness lovers of history owe to Professor Seeley we do not pretend to estimate, but resort to Mr. Mayall's exceptional source of information has thrown into still clearer light the link between our own early nineteenth-century history and that of half-destroyed Prussia.

It is characteristic of the silent manner in which Stein was destined to perform the greatest of his works, that Napoleon's late Secretary, Bourienne, when in a diplomatic post at Hamburg in 1808, learnt but little of the Baron's doings, notwithstanding that in his *History of Napoleon*, vol. iii. p. 97, he inserts a short paragraph to the following effect:—

“Baron Stein has been too little known. As Minister of the King of Prussia he distinguished himself among the other members of the Cabinet of Berlin. . . . He wished to diffuse in all minds that conservative principle which declares that subjects and governments must be united by bonds of mutual interest. This was enough to make Buonaparte hate Baron Stein.”

Bourienne goes on to explain how the first impulse given to the popular mind in Prussia came from Stein, who straightway

encountered Napoleon's animosity. "And this," concludes Bourienne, "is all I know respecting Baron Stein."

Now, considering that Bourienne remained in Hamburg until all the prospects of Prussia's liberation from foreign occupation had temporally vanished with Stein's fall, the historian's silence becomes the more surprising, and the value of Professor Seeley's researches becomes the more patent. He has rescued from comparative oblivion one of the greatest actors in the turmoil caused by the French Revolution.

Baron Stockmar's *Memoirs* have but one mention of Stein, with whom, in the capacity of hospital doctor, the late Prince Consort's friend had high words at Worms during the war of 1814.

But Sir Theodore Martin's *Life of the Prince Consort* is silent on the great subject.

With regard to the aforesaid Napoleonic system of espionage, Mr. Mayall's secret memoirs go to show that not only were the services of old men tottering on the brink of the grave utilised for this repulsive purpose, but children of tender years were taught to give information which led to the condemnation and imprisonment of their elders.

APPENDIX C.

THE logic of events is hourly proving the wisdom of several provisions connected with Lord Beaconsfield's Foreign Policy in Eastern Europe, even if the complete judgment which one day must be given is yet withheld.

But the use of Cyprus has been practically made evident by its contiguity to Egypt during Arabi Pasha's insurrection, inasmuch as not only has it proved useful as a rendezvous for our shipping, but European fugitives from Alexandria, and other parts of Egypt, found in Cyprus a haven of safety under the ægis of a British Government, which would scarcely have been accorded by a Mohammedan Power.

We shall one day know how far-seeing was the stroke of policy which, through the Anglo-Turkish Convention, will have made it possible for the warlike people of Armenia and Syria to unite under British officers, and in conjunction with British soldiers to defend the shortest route to India *viâ* the Euphrates Valley, as well as to secure the Suez Canal from the dangers which a Russian occupation of Armenia would indirectly threaten. Let this be known once and for all to Russia, and she will hesitate to advance beyond the slopes of Mount Ararat, where her own, the Persian, and Turkish frontiers converge. But if this result is to be obtained, the English ministers must stand by the traditional policy of the country, and not be afraid to spend the three, or it may be four, hundred thousand upon Famagousta harbour, which will render Cyprus an effective place of arms in the vicinity of Egypt and the Levant, being also on the direct route between England and India, *viâ* Alexandretta and the Euphrates Valley. For information on the subject, we are indebted to a pamphlet of Sir William Andrew, C.I.E., an admitted authority on Indian

railways. He shows how the fertile districts between Alexandretta and the Persian Gulf were famous in early scripture story, and were chosen alike for their fertility, and as being on the natural route between Europe and the far East.

The proposed railway could not be used for hostile purposes against England, provided that a command of the sea existed at Alexandretta and in the Persian Gulf.

Again, a Russian force advancing on India through Persia, would be liable to be taken in flank when England could command transit through the Euphrates Valley into the Persian Gulf. This and much more of interest Sir W. Andrew tells us.

Fully allowing the vital importance of the Suez Canal and the Egyptian railway from Alexandria to Suez, an alternative should be provided more reliable even than the fast ships Mr. Norwood tells us of, which are to reach India in twenty-four days, when to do so they must travel 5,000 additional miles by sea, and we state this fully impressed with the necessity of such reserve power of transit being constantly at hand.

For information as to Euphrates Valley route to India, see Sir W. Andrew's pamphlet. W. H. Allen, 18 Waterloo Place.

In another important particular has Lord Beaconsfield's policy received an unexpectedly speedy justification, gained through the inexorable logic of events. Indian troops have been held in readiness for service in Egypt. The direct precedent, it is true, is rather that set by the prescient foresight of the great Marquess Wellesley, who succoured Abercromby by such means in 1801. We are aware that it is sought to draw subtle distinction between Europe and Asia in this matter, opponents of the late Government averring that the India Act of 1858 was broken when Sepoys were despatched to Malta in 1878. Lord Selborne, however, could have relied on no such argument, or he would not have cited the so-called previous infringement of the law by a Conservative Government in Abyssinia in 1867, when Indian soldiers took part in the operations. (See *Annual Register* for 1878, p. 57.) Neither has the contention any validity which is grounded on the technical appeal to Parliament made after the principle had been decided on practically, and when troops were ready to start, as was the case in July 1882.

APPENDIX D.

THE subjoined extract is from the *Times* of April 9th, 1882, and has relation to Prince Gortschakoff's retirement. It is suggestive; and has been rendered more interesting since his subsequent death:—

“ When we look back upon a career like Prince Gortschakoff's, directed by clear and consecutive ideas and devoted to the development of a central purpose, it is impossible not to contrast it with the fragmentary, disconnected, and unfruitful character of our own diplomacy. In spite of diplomatic and military reverses, Russia advances, because she has a policy distinctly conceived and patiently adhered to. Her serious failures occur only when she meets a Power having a policy no less definite and inspired by ideas yet more potent than her own. Against her steady persistence our fitful action, now inspired by a hot fit of feverish excitement, and again paralyzed by a cold fit of apathy, has no chance whatever. . . British diplomacy works at a great disadvantage. Its traditions, to begin with, are lacking in the solidity and coherence which are a primary necessity for Continental Powers. Its agents have to deal, not with one mind imbued with these traditions, but with an ever-varying assemblage of minds swayed by all the gusts that move popular opinion. The effect of this uncertainty as to what is wanted to-day or will be wanted to-morrow is bad enough upon our diplomatists themselves—it is infinitely worse upon foreign Governments. It makes them deaf to the charming of ablest Envoys, and reluctant to commit themselves to any arrangement, however advantageous, or however

apparently agreeable to the country. The opinion of to-morrow, the House of Commons of to-morrow, and the Minister of to-morrow, may represent a reaction of all that is now approved, and may produce the total collapse of all the arrangements made in concert with us. It is only fair to our own diplomatists, who work under enormous difficulties, to remember that the conspicuous successes of a man like Gortschakoff are won by the aid of advantages denied to the representatives of a Parliamentary constitution. Behind him is the momentum of a policy which was in full swing before he was born, and will remain when he is taken away. Men come and go, but the system remains, and we are apt to credit its passing representatives, not only with the fruit of their own ability, but with the accumulated results of the labours of bygone generations. Prince Gortschakoff's career, we may rely upon it, would have been a much less striking one, had he been hampered at every turn with the fear of a change of Government at home, and with the impossibility of persuading people abroad of the continuity and consistency of his country's policy."

APPENDIX E.

WE have made but cursory mention of South African affairs, as being outside the scope of our subject, but there exists a mystery concerning the signature of the peace negotiations at O'Neil Farm, in April 1881, between Great Britain and the Boers of the Transvaal, which it is so desirable to see cleared up that we venture to give publicity to a rumour put confidently forward as containing truth, and that by military men serving in South Africa at the time.

It is said that *Sir Evelyn Wood never signed the final peace*, and declined so to do unless such act were accompanied by a protest, which was to appear appended to the document in question. Surely the real fact ought to gain absolute publicity, and the impression of Sir Evelyn's complicity, if not approval, which has been allowed to go forth, be straightway officially confirmed or denied. If such be done, we shall hasten to expunge Appendix E. from any further issue of this volume.

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